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Can copyright survive in the digital era? Indeed, should copyright survive in the digital
era? The development of information technologies in general, and the Internet in
particular has held out the potential of unrivalled exchange of information, ideas and
creative works. Perfect digital copies of all manner ofworks can, at a keystroke, be sent
around the world to be received, enjoyed and used by millions. But that same potential
has brought a threat, notably for the entertainment industries (intermediaries) whose
livelihood depends on receiving a financial reward for making their works available to
consumers. How then should the promise of such digital dissemination be reconciled
with the threat for these intermediaries fearful of seeing their content distributed beyond
their control?
The answer has been to develop a raft ofmeasures giving these intermediaries the power
to control both access to and use of the underlying work. But what of the law of
copyright? For hundreds of years that law has ensured that those same intermediaries
can control dissemination of these works, but only to a limited extent. The borders on
that power have been found in the limits that have been ascribed to the property right in
a creative work. Thus intermediaries cannot exert control over onward dissemination of
a tangible object containing the work, at least within prescribed territories and regions;
the length of time for which protection can be claimed is limited; ideas contained within
a work are left free; a work must be original before it attracts protection; copyright in a
work is infringed only if a substantial part is copied, and a substantial part can be lawfully
copied within defined circumstances. Together these parts beyond ownership are termed
as being in the public domain.
The precise boundaries of this public domain might be difficult to describe, but the
intent within the overall framework is clear. It is not only the interests of the current
author and the intermediary that are served by the law of copyright. The public interest
is also satisfied in that a variety of new works can be created for consumption,
advancement of knowledge and information. Critically, the public domain is essential in
this process. No works are created without some reference to, and taking from, what
pre-exists. This public domain thus ensures that would-be authors have a variety of
sources on which to draw in creating anew. It is this element of the copyright framework
that appears to have been ignored in the recent legislative process.
This study traces the legislative efforts made affecting copyright in the digital era and
highlight8 the measures taken to satisfy the demands of the intermediaries. It goes on to
consider the public domain, what it is, what it is used for in the non-digitised world, and
how it is and will be affected by recent developments. It will be argued that conditions
for both access to and use of the public domain alter dramatically, critically to the
detriment of the would-be author. Given the 'new' legislative framework seems set to
govern this area in the foreseeable future, the discussion looks at ways in which the
existence of the public domain might be encouraged for the benefit of would-be authors.
Copyright should survive in the digital era, and many would argue that it does. But sadly
it would appear that one facet of the balance that has been nurtured by the law, the
public domain, will be left to be developed by self regulatory mechanisms, rather than
being guarded by the legislature.
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Introduction
Today I see something astounding and delightful. It's as ifsome grimfallout shelter had hurst open and
afull scale Mardi Grasparade had come out".
This statement was made in 1993. It refers to the exponential development of the
Internet then just beginning, and continuing apace to this day. The ''grimfallout shelter'
refers to the historical origins of the Internet in a US military project. The 'Mardi Gras
parade'is the potential the Internet seemed to herald for communication and interaction
on a global scale. This statement has been at least partly borne out. The development of
the Internet since 1993 has prompted one of the most innovative periods witnessed for
many years, and a truly cosmopolitan community has developed. However, this
development has also seen the Internet, and its use for commercial and private purposes,
becoming embroiled in legal, political and social struggles.
This study is about one of those struggles: the interaction between the law of copyright
and the Internet. Specifically it is about how the rights of authors who create works, and
the interests of intermediaries who invest in the dissemination of those works, can be
protected, while at the same time ensuring that there is sufficient material in the public
domain available for the creation of new works.
1. Digital dissemination
With the development of the Internet on a global basis, the dissemination of digitised
works protected by copyright becomes possible on a scale and in a way never hitherto
imagined. Such dissemination does, however, raise acute problems for the owners of
copyright in those works. Whereas on the one hand a global market place is within reach
for the sale of these products, on the other, if a work is released without the consent of
the owner, the chances of obtaining redress for infringement of the rights in the work are
minimal. In response to the actual and perceived threats of global dissemination of
creative works without consent, legislative changes have been made to existing laws to
ensure that the owner has a package of rights to use in the control of the flow of these
works over the Internet.
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But the increase in the power to control dissemination of works for copyright owners, in
turn, raises problems for authors. When devising and creating new works, authors need
both to access and use material which is in the public domain. The public domain
consists of all those parts of creative, and non-creative works over which the copyright
owner has not, historically, been able to exert control. The materials in the public domain
are the expression of the limits on the property rights granted to copyright owners. By
granting increased rights over dissemination of works to owners, so the public domain
may diminish, making the process of creating new works more difficult.
In exploring these developments this study will argue that the public domain is essential
in the creation of new works, examine what is happening to the public domain on the
Internet, and finally suggest some ways in which this public domain might be facilitated
on the Internet within the framework that is being developed for digital dissemination of
works.
2. The copyright balance
One crucial aspect of the development of copyright over the past three hundred years is
expressed in the balance that the law has nurtured between the author (the person who
creates the work), the intermediary (the person or entity who brings the work to the
attention of the user, such as a publisher or record company, often also referred to as the
right holder), and the end user (the person who 'consumes' the final version of the work,
whether for the purposes of pleasure or instruction). Copyright does not give a full
monopoly right to exclude others from either re-using parts of an existing work, or the
market for similar competing works. Rather the right that is granted is constrained in a
number of ways. A limited private incentive has been developed for the author to
encourage creation of new works, and for the intermediary to protect the investment
necessary to make the work available to the public, while at the same time ensuring the
public interest is satisfied in making a variety of works available for consumption.
Limitations of the property right have the important effect of leaving plenty of raw
material available in the public domain on which future authors can draw. However, the
1 Sterling, Speeches to National Academy of Sciences Convention on Technology and Education May 10,
1993. Washington DC Computer Underground Digest 5.54.
http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/William_Gibson/sterling_gibson_nas. speeches
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control that can be exercised over the dissemination and use of creative works in the
electronic era may affect that balance. In particular, it may do so to the detriment of the
public domain. It may become difficult for an author to create new works as a result of
the fences surrounding the raw materials necessary for authorship, or by imposing
contractual restrictions on what use can be made of parts of existing works2.
This study will analyse a number of areas. Both the current law and the developments
that have occurred over recent years will be examined with respect to the following
themes:
A. Is (or was) copyright law at international, EU or domestic level (primarily UK and
US) sufficient to meet the demands of global dissemination of creative works over the
Internet, and if not, which areas require attention?
B. What measures have been adopted on an international, national and regional level, to
assist in the control the flow of works and information over the Internet and how do
these measures operate?
C. What is the effect of these measures on the materials in the public domain? And what
consequent effect might that have on the creation of new works?
It is not the intention of this study to provide a detailed analysis of the application of the
law of copyright to the Internet. Rather, it will look at existing and future measures that
have had, and will have, a profound effect on the development of the application of the
law of copyright to the Internet, and it will identify what these measures mean in the
overall context of the creation of works. The prime focus is on the author engaged in
the act of creation, and the implications of the developments in relation to the ability of
that author to re-use existing works: how an author can gain access to, and make use of,
the raw materials necessary for the creation of new works, whilst at the same time
recognising the legitimate interest of the owner of the work to control dissemination of
that work.
2 Bearing in mind, however, that, at least in theory, contractual restraints are voluntarily assumed.
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3. Common threads
There are common threads that tun through the following chapters which are relevant to
the discussion, and which deserve highlighting at this point. The first is central to the
overall thesis, and that is the shift in the balance accorded to the respective interests of
the author, the intermediary (exploiter or right holder) and the public. It will be argued
that one way in which this balance has been achieved is by limiting the property right
granted to authors and owners. Traditionally this has meant that parts of existing works
are in the public domain, free for all to use. The new modes of dissemination including
stripping the work from the tangible object mean that such parts of the work are no
longer free, but are subject to the owner's control. The heart of the question is whether
parts ofworks should remain free for the creation of new works as has been the case
historically, or whether all users should pay a little.
This leads on to a second central point, and that is that this study concerns the author, or
more properly put, the future author. That is the person who has yet to create a work
which will (or may) in turn be protected by copyright. There are many who favour an
argument which would dictate that all those who wish to use or 'consume' a creative
work should each pay a little towards the cost of that work. If creative works can be
distributed in such a way that unauthorised copying cannot occur, and the Internet as a
medium is used for that distribution reaching in to markets once considered
unobtainable, then one effect is likely to be that consumers will need to pay less for those
products. Because unauthorised copying cannot occur, so the costs associated with
piracy are no longer suffered; so the overall cost can fall. In addition, because the market
is so much larger, and the costs of distribution proportionately small, so the price to the
consumer should drop and thus be of overall benefit to the consumer. In this respect,
therefore, the developments under discussion in the following chapters cannot be
faulted. The increase in control which can be exercised by the right holders supports the
framework necessary for mass distribution of digitised consumer products which are
capable of infinite and perfect reproduction.
But the consumer is not the focus of this study. Rather the emphasis is on the author
who has yet to create a work. In this, the author and the consumer have very different
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interests which, as will be discussed, seem difficult to accommodate side-by-side in the
digital environment.
A further issue arises, and that is to question what has happened to the public domain in
association with the development of copyright and the Internet. As will be explained,
the public domain is a facet of copyright which is easily stated, but hard to define in legal
terms. With the change in the framework as applied to the Internet, it is not at all clear
whether the public domain has disappeared altogether, or whether it remains in some
altered form. As far as this writer is aware, there has been no express statement from any
legislator, regulator or policy maker to suggest that the public domain should disappear
in relation to creative works disseminated over the Internet. However, as will be
suggested, this appears to be the effect of the measures taken.
A final thread that might be discernible from the following chapters is in relation to the
seeming failure of right holders today to recognise that copyright has always balanced
different interests, and that in this compromise is essential. The self interest of right
holders has driven much of the debate as to the future of copyright in the digital
environment, and shaped regulatory developments. The on-looker should perhaps not
be surprised. Those whose commercial interests are affected will always lobby the
longest and hardest for protection in new and somewhat uncertain business
environments. However, the publicity machines that these interest groups have
developed have clouded many of the more important facets of the debate in this area,
and paradoxically, that may be to the long term prejudice of those same right holders.
For instance, the once (relatively) clear boundaries between published works and those
that are confidential have become blurred3. The limitations on copyright as a property
right, while never crystal clear, are even more opaque than before4. And fundamentally,
there seems to be no unifying theory that would explain why the developments have
taken place. The traditional theories that supported and limited copyright seem to have
been long discarded. But nothing appears to have taken their place, at least not in the
consciousness of policy makers. Some academic commentators have been attempting to
fill this void although at present their theories tend to be met with some scepticism5.
3 For discussion, see chapter 4 of this study.
4 For discussion see chapters 5-8 of this study.
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4. Scope
The scope of this study is as follows. Chapter 1 provides background information on
the Internet and seeks to explain how the process of authorship occurs, emphasising
that in order to sustain that process both access to and use of existing material is
essential. In the second chapter, the existing mles of copyright and database law are
considered, together with the justifications for their emergence and development,
showing how they support the production of creative works. The third chapter discusses
the policy arguments that have been used to justify the application of copyright to the
Internet, and what shape copyright on the Internet should take. This chapter introduces
the developments that have taken place to date by particular reference to three
documents that have been instrumental in shaping copyright for the digital era. The
first of these is the US Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights as
part of the National Information Infrastructure Task Force6; the second is the
Copyright Treaty negotiated under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property
Organisation in Geneva in 1996 (WCT); the third is the European Parliament and
Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society (the Copyright Directive)7. The fourth chapter
focuses on digital fences, explains what they are, and analyses the controls that are
developing to ensure legal protection against circumvention of those fences. In
addition, this chapter discusses how the law of contract could be used in conjunction
with these digital fences to give control over access to and use of the underlying work to
the intermediary. The following four chapters focus on areas of the public domain
under the following headings: the exhaustion doctrine, combined with a further analysis
of licensing, fair dealing, the requirement of originality in conjunction with the ideas-
expression dichotomy, and finally the term of protection. The purpose is to comment
on what each part has traditionally contributed to the public domain, and analyse how
both digital fences and contract may affect access to, and use of, those parts of the
public domain such as they remain in the digital era. In chapter nine some suggestions
are made as to how a balance might be attained between the acknowledged need of
5 This theme on the seeming lack of any coherent theory is traced through a number of chapters,
culminating in chapter 9 with an analysis of the 'new' theories being developed.
6 1995 Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure. The Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights. ISBN 0-9648716-0-1.
7 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society.
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intermediaries to have control over the dissemination ofworks, and the need to
maintain a thriving public domain for authorship. Chapter ten provides a summary of
the work, highlighting areas of unresolved tension, and finally poses a challenge for
those readers who remain sceptical about the changes that are being made to copyright
in the digital era as they affect authorship.
5. Relevance
The issues raised in the interaction between copyright and the Internet are relevant
because of the evolving nature of the Internet. The rules and practices being developed
for the distribution of creative works over the Internet have world-wide implications.
Governments and others are investing, or seeking investment in the infrastructure that
makes up the Internet. The desire is for individuals to be able to use the Internet for a
variety of purposes, one of which is to obtain access to an array of creative works. But
the rules being developed at this stage may thwart these long term ideals because they
may impact on re-use of existing works for authorship. At present there are many
outlets for creative works and information that do not depend on the Internet, such as
hard copies of books, television broadcasts, videos, films, and music CDs. It remains to
be seen for how long. Some intermediaries have indicated the intention of abandoning
traditional methods of distribution, and moving to an entirely Internet-based system.
Few, however, doubt that established formats will remain in use. However, it may not
be long before some products are only available in digitised format on the Internet.
Therefore, it is essential to get a balance in the choices that are made in the rules that
apply to the protection, distribution and use of these works, lest the rules that are chosen
to protect the intermediaries and authors today, make it impossible for the author to
produce new works tomorrow.
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Chapter 1
The Internet and authorship: threats and opportunities
No discussion of copyright and the Internet would be complete without a basic
description of the way in which the Internet works. An appreciation of this area is
essential to be able to understand the legal problems that occur in the application of the
law of copyright. The first part of this chapter is intended to provide that background
and to outline those areas in which greatest tension have arisen between copyright and
digital dissemination. The second part of this chapter will seek to explain why the public
domain is essential to the process of authorship. It will do so by looking to that process
and attempting to describe how it takes place.
1. The development of the Internet
The Internet is a modern marvel which has its roots in military defence, in a cold war
project started in the US in the 1960's1. In the 1970's and 1980's this evolved further
through the work of academics seeking to build up a network of computers to facilitate
exchange of information and views. Commercial traffic was finally permitted to use the
infrastructure (the wires that make up the Internet) in the late 1980's when the National
Science Foundation (NSF) in the US, which had provided most of the funding for the
backbone, removed the restriction on commercial traffic. The purpose of this
liberalisation was to encourage commercial investment in the networks. The strategy
succeeded, and commercial and private use of the Internet has increased dramatically,
most notably since the early 1990's. Commercial companies, recognising the possibilities
of the Internet as a shop window, as a means of targeting customers for products, as a
method of distribution of information, and as a way to streamline their businesses and
improve efficiency, rose to the challenge. Estimates vary as to the size of the Internet,
however that is measured. Some put the numbers of individuals who have access to the
1 There are a number of publications which describe the origins and history of the Internet. Some of the
most useful have been written by those who were actually involved in the early development, many of
whom remain involved to this day. Cerf, Leiner, Clark, Kahn, Kleinrock, Lynch, Postel, Roberts,Wolff, A
BriefHistory of the Internet http: / /www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.html. Cerf, A. BriefHistory of the Internet
and Belated Networks, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.html
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Internet at 304.36 million world wide as of March 20002, and that, as ofJanuary 31 2000,
there were more than one billion unique documents on the Internet3.
1.1. How the Internet works
A number of commentators have suggested a variety of definitions of the Internet:
"The Internet is a huge electronic resource "; 'The Internet is a network ofcomputers that allowspeople to
communicate with other people from all over the world"; "It is a hacker's paradise and a computer
security nightmare"; "It's thefuture ofcommerce"; "It's ajargon-ridden techno-jungle'*.
Of these, it is the second that is the most exact description. The Internet comprises
many thousands of networks of computers, linked together to form one network,
through which the computers, and those using computers (surfers), can communicate.
When the technology that underpins the Internet was first tested, the central aim of
those involved was to develop a method whereby digitised material travelling between
computers would not follow any pre-determined path. Rather the packets that contained
the information would follow any route that was available on the networks. This was
because, if part of a network was destroyed, the information would simply be re-routed5
by another path to its destination.
There are three key technologies that lie behind the way in which the Internet works.
The first is packet switching technology, the second is client/server technology, and the
third is the use of a standard set of software protocols.
Packet switching concerns the way in which works travel around the Internet. The effect
of using this technology is to split these into small packets. Each of these packets
includes details about the location of the addressee. Each packet is sent individually, and
reassembled at its destination. The advantage of such technology is that, in the event of a
break in the network, such as one part having been destroyed, only part of the original
information might need to be re-sent. All the other good packets can continue to their
destination. However, the effect of such technology is that the information can travel
2 http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html.
3 ibid.
4 Krol, The Whole Internet: Catalogue & User's Guide. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. 1997.
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almost anywhere in the world before arriving at its destination. Along the way multiple
copies of the packets are reproduced on the interconnected hardware that makes up the
Internet.
The second technologically important facet of the Internet is that of client/server
technology. It is this technology that allows one computer to access and utilise the
services available on another computer. A server is a computer that delivers or 'serves'
information to a client software program on another computer. Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) provide the gateway or point of access to the Internet for many surfers,
by providing them with a software program to make access possible. The ISP may also
have a number of servers on which it places all manner of information, works and data.
Equally, the ISP may provide space on the servers for customers to create an
information repository. Caching is also a significant feature, and often occurs on the
servers belonging to the ISP although it can and does take place at the user level as well.
Caching is a process whereby information retrieved from the Internet will be stored on a
server before passing it on to the surfer. The surfer then receives a copy of that copy
although there is usually some mechanism built in to the system to ensure that the
cached resource is updated if the original changes. The purpose of caching is to reduce
both the cost of using the network, particularly the trans-adantic network, and also to
reduce the load at times of high demand. So information stored on a server in the US
might be cached on a server in the UK, particularly if it is information that is likely to be
accessed a number of times.
The use of standard protocols is the third important feature of Internet technology.
Protocols ensure that communication can occur smoothly over the Internet. A protocol
is a set of instructions to a computer telling it how it should operate. An example is the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol or TCP/IP. The Transmission
Control Protocol converts messages into streams of packets at the source and then re¬
assembles them back at their destination. A key concept of the protocols is that they
were not designed for just one application used on the Internet, but function rather as a
general infrastructure on which many different applications can work.
5 ibid n 3.
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These underlying features have a number of implications for the dissemination of
creative works and the law of copyright. First, use of this technology means that a
number of different services can be delivered over the Internet. These include the World
Wide Web (the Web), e-mail, File Transfer Protocol and Telnet. The most important for
the law of copyright is the Web, which is made up of millions ofWeb sites held on
thousands of servers and which are, in mm, accessible by the users of the millions of
computers linked to the Internet. Web sites consist of information, works and data
placed there by, among others, individuals, companies and governments. Navigation of
Web sites, and the Web pages which make up the Web sites, is accomplished seamlessly
by hypertext links, which enable a surfer to move from one Web page to another, and
from one Web site to another. Search engines developed by businesses and individuals
send out electronic 'robots' to trawl through Web pages, and compile details of the
contents of the Web pages in their databases. These search engines are, in turn, are
available for surfers to consult to find the location of specific Web sites and pages.
Second, the way the Internet has developed, and the underlying technology, means that
no-one owns the Internet as such. Individuals, companies, businesses, governments and
other organisations own the constituent parts, including the computers, the servers, and
the wires that make up the Internet. Equally, individuals, companies and governments
own the intellectual property in the information that is posted on the Internet. But there
is no centralised ownership, and no central control mechanism or gate through which
one must pass in order either to gain access to the information that is there, or post new
information.
Third, the technology makes it simple for copies of creative works to be uploaded on to
the Internet by any person or organisation who has access through a connected
computer. Those copies, which can be perfect digital reproductions of an original work,
are accessible to all, and can be further reproduced by any other person who similarly has
access.
2. The Internet and copyright
One activity the Internet, and in particular the Web, has made possible on an
unprecedented scale, is the distribution of information in digitised form. This
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information may be in the form of text, music, diagrams, maps, photographs, moving
pictures and sound recordings. Much of this information may exist prior to being
digitised and made available over the Internet. Equally some of it may have been created
purely with the Internet in mind. In the UK where the expression of the information is
original, then it may be protected by the law of copyright6. If so, the owner of the
copyright has certain exclusive rights in relation to the reproduction and distribution of
those works7. A party who carries out any of these acts without the consent of the
owner infringes those exclusive rights8 with the result that he or she may be sued for that
infringement. Even where the required threshold of originality to qualify for copyright
has not been met, a person who expends some time and effort in collating information in
a database is likely, in Europe including the UK, to qualify for a suigeneris or database
right in that collection9. This right in turn gives to the maker of the database certain
exclusive rights in relation to extraction and re-utilisation of that information1".
Given the new distribution possibilities on the Internet, one might have been forgiven
for thinking that authors, and owners of copyright and databases, most particularly the
intermediaries and right holders who add value to the work, would have welcomed its
development, because it can make these works accessible to a mass audience at relatively
low cost. But that has not been the case. Far from an opportunity, some authors and, in
particular, many intermediaries, have perceived the Internet as a threat.
2.1. Perfect digital copies
The reason why this is so lies in the ease by which digital copies of original creative
works can be disseminated over the Internet on a one-to-one and one-to-many basis. In
other words, one person might place a work on a Web site. That work is then available
for any number of surfers to visit, view and download. The work may be sent on an
individual basis, from one person to another using e-mail: or it might be sent from one
person to many others using distribution lists. The lack of a central control point for the
Internet means that anyone with a computer, modem and telephone line, or other link to
6 UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) s 1 (1)(a).
7 CDPA s 16.
8 CDPA s 16(2).
9 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases, Article 7.
10 ibidArticle 7. 1.
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the infrastructure, can gain access to the Internet. Thereafter those same users can
upload protected information and distribute it to the same mass audience the authors or
intermediaries might wish to target, and from whom payment may be sought for the
privilege of listening to, reading or viewing the work. Certainly such activities may
infringe copyright or the database right, but the author and intermediary face an uphill
struggle in detecting and suing those who infringe these rights. Copyright has worked
well where the production of unauthorised works has depended on reasonably large
investment, such as printing presses, or sophisticated copying equipment, or where the
copying has been carried out for commercial purposes, such as copying software
programs for a business. The infringing reproduction has generally been distributed in
some tangible medium, such as a videotape, a CD ROM or a book. Infringements of
copyright on a small scale, such as copying a CD for a friend, or taking a photograph of a
painting for a relation, have largely tended to be ignored. But copies disseminated over
the Internet are not produced in tangible media, or at least, not in the same way as those
in the terrestrial world. Rather, the reproductions take place as the information is
uploaded, disseminated around the Internet, held on servers, and downloaded at the
point of the surfer. The work itself is stripped from the physical medium (the book, the
video, the disk) with which it is normally associated and disseminated in the form of
'digital bits', to be re-constituted when they reach their final destination. In addition, the
once small scale copying can, and does, occur on a mass scale on the Internet. Copying
of digital music files, or MP3's, provides a good example11. Anyone who has a pre¬
recorded CD can make a digital copy of the music on that CD in the form of an MP3
file. An MP3 file is a digitally compressed music file which can be uploaded to and
downloaded from the Internet. Music can also be played or 'streamed' over the Internet,
much as with broadcasting radio programmes, and copies can be made by surfers . They
can transmit copies of the music files to other surfers, who can in turn transmit copies to
others. The music can be played on the computer on to which it is downloaded, and can
thereafter be copied on to a portable MP3, player such as the Rio12. Each of these steps
may involve a reproduction in copyright terms. Thus anyone who carries out one of
these steps without permission of the owner of the copyright in the work may infringe
that copyright. But the copying tends to be carried out by individuals on their own
computers in the privacy of their own home. There may be hundreds of thousands of
11 http://www.mp3.com.
12 Recording Industry Ass'n ofAmerica Inc. v DiamondMultimedia Sys Inc. 29 F Supp 2d 624.
6
individuals all over the world all copying the same MP3 file13. An author or intermediary
who wishes to sue for infringement of copyright may be faced with multiple jurisdictions
in which to sue, multiple different laws may apply to the infringement, and there may be
no effective remedy, particularly if the aim is to have the infringing work removed from
the Internet.
2.2. Controlling digital copying
Intermediaries, in particular, have not been slow to respond to the threats posed by
dissemination of digital works over the Internet. Once it became clear that the Internet
was not a passing fad, those whose rights were (and are) most affected poured
tremendous resources into attempting to shape methods by which dissemination of
works could be controlled and monitored, and infringements pursued.
There have been three specific targets. Firstly, the development of technological
protection systems, or digital fences, that can control both access to, and reproduction
of, a work distributed over the Internet. As part of this strategy, legal protection has
been sought for these digital fences, against both the circumvention of the fence, and the
distribution of any device that would enable such circumvention to take place. The
second target has been to develop the practice of licensing both access to works and
subsequent reproductions in all their forms. The third target has been to develop
substantive copyright rules that would cover all aspects of dissemination of creative
works over the Internet. The result, for the intermediary, is a developing framework
which may allow for almost perfect control over access to and use of those works. The
intermediary is thus given the means by which the investment necessary for the
dissemination of these works can be protected.
However, stark tensions have become apparent. Because digital fences and licensing
practices can, or might, allow the intermediary to control both access to, and use of, the
underlying work, so the balances that have traditionally been found in the law of
copyright have changed. Copyright has never been a full property right. Neither has
13 Some estimates suggest that more than 3 million infringing MP3 files are downloaded every day.
http://www.qlinks.net/items/qlitem7787.htm.
7
copyright been about perfect control over copies of creative works14. Rather, there have
always been a number of limitations and exceptions which evolved, not only to give the
author sufficient incentive to produce new works to satisfy the public interest, but also to
ensure that parts of creative works fall into the public domain. Authors, in the process
of authorship, are able to use those parts in the public domain in creating new works.
3. Copyright and sustainable development: the contribution of
copyright to authorship
Authors may be able to use the public domain when creating new works, but that
process is one that is easy to state, but much more difficult to describe. How are works
created, and what is it within the law of copyright that supports the author?
3. 1 Those supported by copyright.
The interests of three groupings have been sustained and balanced to a greater or lesser
degree by the law of copyright: the author, the intermediary (or right holder) and the
user. Each has distinct interests which sometimes converge, and at others diverge, but
each ofwhich has been served in the national and international copyright frameworks
that have developed over the years. The author has traditionally been the central
character, upon whom a number of rights are based. Thus, the term of protection for
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works is determined by reference to the lifetime of
the author. The author is given the incentive to create new works, by being granted a
limited property right in the works once created. The author may license or assign these
economic rights to the intermediary, who may, in turn, exploit the works in the
marketplace, and receive an income in return. The rights granted to control
dissemination of a work can be used by the author or intermediary. Equally, the user is
acknowledged because the limited property right gives the author the incentive to create
more works, thus ensuring that there is always a continuous supply of new works.
Because copyright does not preclude others from the market (but only from copying
existing works) so competitors can enter the market, helping to keep prices reasonable.
14 Lessig, IntellectualProperty and Code 1996, 11 St. John's J. Legal Comment 635, 638. "While weprotect real
property to protect the ownerfrom harm, weprotect intellectualproperty to provide the owner sufficient incentive to produce such
property. 'Sufficient incentive,' however, is something less than perfect control".
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However, a distinction needs to be drawn between the user as a consumer., and the user as
a would-be author. It has been suggested15 that a consumer's interests are met when there is
a variety of works available in the market-place at a reasonable cost. The wider the
choice ofworks, and the lower the price, so the more the consumer will be advantaged.
In general, the consumer may not be particularly interested in, or bothered by, the law of
copyright. She may or may not know that certain activities are not permitted, such as
making a copy of a book or playing a recorded CD Rom in a public place. But beyond
that the finer intricacies ofwho may and who may not carry out a particular act or make
a particular use of an existing work are likely to have little relevance. However, that is
not the case for the would-be author (and those who assist the would-be author such as
the librarian), whose needs, and knowledge may differ quite markedly from that of the
consumer. The would-be author depends not only on having a variety of sources on
which she can draw, but also upon the accessibility and re-usability of those sources.
The survival of each of these groups depends on those sources being available (or as is
most often termed, in the public domain) to the would-be author, for use when new
works are created16. In balancing the interests of the traditional three groups, the law of
copyright has also mediated between the interests of the past author - the one who
created a work and on which copyright may have expired; the present author - the one
who currently has works protected by copyright; and the future or would-be author - the
one who has yet to create a work that will be protected in the future.
3.2 The process of authorial creation
Copyright has historically contributed to authorship by allowing re-use of existing
materials (the public domain) in new creations. But how the author actually creates new
works using those materials has received surprisingly little attention17. On the one hand
15 In the introduction to this study.
16 Some have referred to this process as 'Play'. Mootz, The Onto/ogical Basis ofLegalHermeneutics: A Proposed
Model ofEnquiry Based on the Work ofGadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur 1988, 68 BU L Rev 523. 'Art isplay that
has been transformed into aparticular structure - apainting, sculpture, or symphony - that engages the spectator with each
viewing orpresentation'. Quoted in Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of
Authorship in the post-literate Millennium 1992, Law and Contemporary Problems Vol 55 No 2, 139 at 149 who
argues that copyright should change to allow anyone who wishes to be free 'to play in thefields of the word' at
151.
17 For some discussion see: Lange, At Play in the Fields ofthe Word: Copyright and the Construction ofAuthorship
in the Post-Literate Millennium 1992, Law and Contemporary Problems Vol. 55 No 2, 139. Lange, Recognising
the Public Domain 1987, Law and Contemporary Problems Vol 44 pl47. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement
in IntellectualProperty Law 1997, 75 Texas L Rev 231. 'The current copyright rules regarding improvements on existing
worksgive initial creatorsfar too much control over the work oftransformative improvers'.
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this may be because the process of authorship eludes direct inspection, and consequently
how the public domain contributes to it is far from clear18. On the other hand, the
influence of general impressions, ideas and facts drawn from experience and from
existing works is apparent. Current creative works often represent the sum of
knowledge, understanding, and expression that may be important or popular at a
particular time. Sometimes works are sufficiently original to represent a true
breakthrough; usually, 'new' works are influenced by what has gone before. Few creative
works are developed in a vacuum. Perhaps the statement made by the scientist Sir Isaac
Newton over three hundred years ago concerning a leap forward in understanding in the
scientific world still best sums up the derivative nature of creativity:
What Descartes did was agood step. You have added much in several ways and especially in taking the
colours ofthin plates into philosophical consideration. IfI have seenfurther it is by standing on the
shoulders ofGiantsi :.
A brief glance at how Daniel Defoe's story, 'Robinson Crusoe', came into being, may help
to illustrate the point further. Alexander Selkirk, a sailor, was abandoned by his
shipmates in 1704 on the uninhabited island of juan Fernandez off the Pacific coast of
South America. Four years later (31 January 1709) the crew of another ship discovered
and rescued a man dressed in goatskins and speaking English from that same island.
This was Selkirk. The ship captain described the rescue in his book M Cruising Voyage
A.round the World'. An account also appeared in Sir Richard Steele's 'The Englishman'm
1713. Six years later Defoe drew on the idea of an abandoned sailor who hunted goats
and dressed in their skins as the basis for his novel,211 which has since been made into a
television series, a film, and played on the stage. Thus, the tale of Robinson Crusoe
began in a real-life situation. It developed through embellishment in story telling and has
passed through many stages of adaptation both in the substance of the tale, and by way
of the media through which it has been brought to the attention of the public and is
likely to develop still further in the future.
18 Le Guin, Where doyougetyour Ideas From? In Dancing at the Edge of the World (1989). Writers do say
things like Thatgives me an idea' or 1got the ideafor that story when I hadfoodpoisoning in a motel in Newjersey'. I
think this is a kind ofshorthand use of 'idea' to standfor the complicated obscure un-understoodprocess ofthe conception and
formation ofwhat isgoing to be a story when itgets written down. Theprocess may not involve ideas in the sense ofintelligible
thoughts; it may well not even involve words. It may be a matter ofmoods resonances mentalglimpses voices emotions, visions,
dreams, anything.' Re-quoted from Litman Copyright as a Myth 1990, 39 Emory Law Journal 965 p245.
19 Newton to Hooke 5th February 1676; 1,416 The Correspondence ofIsaac Newton Turnbull and others eds.
Cambridge University Press Vol II 1676-1687. Note that some argue that there is a hint of irony in this
statement. Hooke was physically very small, and one line of thought is that Newton was acknowledging
using work of others who came before him, but not that ofHooke.
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A more modern day example lies with the books by J K Rowling, the author of the
'Harry Potter' books21. These tales are of a small boy whisked off to a school for
magicians, and having many and varied adventures involving wizards, multi-headed
dragons guarding treasures, doors into alternative worlds, dwarves, and over-sized
guardians. The overall expression of the stories may be original22, but since time
immemorial there have been tales of dragons guarding treasure; of small boys (some
with spectacles, and some without) having fantastic adventures; stories of futuristic and
parallel worlds23; of dwarves; wizards; goblins, trolls and other similar creatures24.
Impressions are created through the free flow of creative works and in fashioning new
works ideas they embody are drawn upon, the facts they contain used, and to an extent,
the substance reworked.
Having a mixture of works available in the public domain means that more works can be
produced, drawing upon the sum of current knowledge and existing expressions of
creativity. In developing works, authors do not have to start from scratch every time,
rather they can enlarge, extend, sometimes retract and retrench on what has come before.
More modern day quotations echo these sentiments:
'Copyright and author's rights have as their heartbeat that a culture advances on the shoulders of its
antecedents, andmost ifnot all doctrines ofcopyright and author's rights aim to mediate betweenpast
rights andfuture rights25.
It is also recognised by some that the extent and type of taking from existing works in
the creation of new may vary enormously:
M// authorship isfertilised by the work ofprior authors and the echoes ofold work in new work extend
beyond ideas and concepts to a wealth ofexpressive details20.
20 Quoted in Paxman, The English The Portrait ofa People Penguin Books 1998.
21 J. K. Rowling was apparently being sued by another author Nancy K. Stouffer for copying ideas from
the latter's book 'The Legend ofPah andMuggles' which was published in 1984. The elements said to have
been copied include 'Muggles' and 'Lily Potter' as well as the general theme of the story.
http: / /www.cnn.com/2000/books/news/03/16/harry.potter.lawsuit.ap/ index.html.
22 Although it is said that the story line is closely related to another written by Neil Gaiman, The Scotsman
24 November 1999.
23 CS Lewis, The Narnia Chronicles. Pullman, Northern Lights, The Subtle Knife and The Amber Spyglass Scholastic
Press Ltd.
24 J.R. Tolkien wrote about the Hobbit, Tony Ross about a Beastie (I Want My Dinner). In a question of a
film borrowing from a book see Warwick Eilm Productions Ltd v Eisinger [1969] 1 Ch 508.
25 Goldstein, Copyright and its Substitutes 1997 Wisconsin Law Review 865.
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property/alternative/Goldstein.html.
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This may be by taking directly from an existing work, or merely borrowing the style and
technique:
'Consider any artist, musician orperformer ofany era andponder what his oeuvre would have amounted
to had he beenprecludedfrom using the brush techniques, colour, principles, scales, metres, cadences,
sounds moods and methods - in short the styles - ofthose who hadgone before27.
There can be few who would deny the derivative nature of creativity, although many
might argue over the extent to which direct taking from existing works should be
permitted28. But what is it within the current theories of the law of copyright allows for
this re-use of what exists in order to create anew? As will be discussed in the next
chapter, with the exception of the most extreme form of the theory focussing on the
economic analysis of copyright law, all of the others support a limit on, or exceptions to
the grant of property rights in creative works. These limitations, collectively referred to
as the public domain, represent the balance that has been struck between absolute
property rights in creative works and the commons. The public domain ensures a flow
and re-use of ideas and information which ifmade wholly the subject of individual
property rights, could stifle the creative process29. The existence of the public domain
thus provides a balance not only between the interests of the author, the intermediary
and the public, but also between the past, the present and the future author. The public
domain thus sustains the creative process and is what makes authorship possible30.
Indeed, it has facilitated a thriving cultural output for hundreds of years, and has enabled
authors to enrich the lives of millions who enjoy their works, whether for entertainment,
pleasure or the advancement of knowledge.
This largely unsung public domain and its role in the continued development of creative
works has been a feature of copyright since first placed on statutory footing in the
eighteenth century. Having described the way in which the Internet works, use of the
Internet would seem eminently suited to authorial creation. An author can surf from one
web site to another gleaning ideas, expression, style and technique. Indeed, the Internet
does support that process, at least at present. However, it is the same new measures that
26 Litman, The Public Domain 1990, 39 Emory Law Journal 965 p 968.
27 Liebig, Style and Performance 1969, 17 Bull. Copyright Society 40 p46-47.
28 For a discussion on the contents of the public domain and the limits thereto see chapters 4-8.
29 Leval, Pair Use Harvard Law Review Vol. 103:1105 at 1109.
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are designed to meet the needs of the intermediaries in the digital era that causes
problems for the would-be author. The effect of this programme is to threaten the
existence, accessibility and use of this same public domain.
30 Thepublic domain is the lam'sprimary safeguard of the raw material that makes authorship possible'. Litman, The
Public Domain 1990, 39 Emory Law Journal 965 p967.
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Chapter 2
Copyright and database right: an overview
This chapter will give an overview of the justifications for the law of copyright as it has
developed to date, describe the main features of the international and national (UK, US
and French) systems, and discuss some of prominent cases dealing with the interaction
between copyright, database right and the Internet. The purpose is to highlight some
differences between the streams of copyright protection, as well as to provide a backdrop
against which the changes made to the law of copyright for the digital era may be
discussed.
1. Introduction
Two distinct versions of copyright protection are discernible in the world. The first is
the Common law approach, which finds its roots in the economic necessity of protecting
the investment made by the entrepreneur (as distinct from the author) in bringing a
creative product or information to the market. Countries who follow this approach
include the UK and the US. The second is the droit d'auteur or Civil law approach,
where the economic rationale is important, but perhaps of greater concern is the author,
who has expended the effort in creating the work. Countries adhering to this approach
include France and Germany. The difference finds its major expression in the so-called
moral rights granted to the author. In Civil law systems, moral rights generally give the
right to the author to control the integrity of the work once it is released to the public;
the right to be identified as author; the right to decide when a work will be released; and
occasionally, the right to withdraw a work once it has been released. The rights are
generally inalienable and unwaivable. Moral rights are now found in many Common
Law systems, but their inclusion has largely been as a result of international obligations,
rather than as a manifestation of a desire to protect the author as such. The difference
between the approaches also finds its expression in terminology. The Anglo-American
systems tend to refer to the protection of all forms of creative expression, whether
applying to the basic works by the author, or the media through which they are
exploited, as copyright. Civilian systems, by contrast, refer to the protection of the work
by the author as author's rights, and the protection of the intermediary or entrepreneurial
rights and the media through which they are exploited as neighbouring, or related rights.
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2. Theories justifying the development of the law
Since the introduction of the printing press, various theories have emerged to explain
and justify why an author should be given a property right in a creative work, where the
parameters of that property right should be set, and whose interests are served in
granting that right. Many of the theories have their origins in the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, when writers such as Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke were
considering the meaning and extent of 'property'. These were refined during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by such thinkers as Kant, Bentham, Mill and Hegel.
The theories have been developed, reworked, synthesised, criticised and endorsed over
the years by commentators, academics, legislators, authors, court decisions,
intermediaries and others.
2.1 Justifying the Anglo-American approach
Locke had an influence in justifying the grant of property rights in creative works
through his work in the seventeenth century. Broadly, his thesis was that a creator has a
natural right or entitlement to the fruits of that labour1. Labour and the resulting product
are inseparable, and so ownership of one can be secured only by owning the other. The
raw materials necessary from which to form the products are owned by the community
as a whole; they are to be found in the 'commons'. Individual workers 'mix' their labour
with these materials in the commons and own the resulting product. This argument has
been used in justifying the grant of property rights in intellectual products in both the
Anglo-American and the Civilian systems2. In the Anglo-American systems its
manifestation is the grant of property rights in the resultant product3. For Civilian
systems, it shows itselfmore in the grant of moral rights.
Bentham4, a political philosopher, developed one of the main theories underpinning the
Anglo-American approach: the Utilitarian theory. He argued that laws should reflect the
position where the greatest good of the greatest number was maximised. People should
1 Locke, Second Treatise ofGovernment Chapter 5.
2 Stromholm, Droit Moral - the International and Comparative Scenefrom a Scandanavian Viewpoint 1983,
International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 14 pi.
3 Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property 1989 Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 p31.
4 Bentham, OfTaws in General ed. Hart, and the discussion in Lloyd, The Idea ofTaw Penguin 1985 Ch 5.
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be induced to behave in ways that increase socially valuable goods and services. These in
turn should be distributed in the way that maximises the benefits obtained from them.
This argument has been developed to justify granting property rights in creative works.
If authors are granted property rights in their intellectual works, they will be encouraged
to develop and make available to the public works they would not otherwise produce 5.
In turn the public domain will be enriched, the process of learning encouraged and the
progress of science and the useful arts promoted. If property rights are not granted in
intellectual products, there will be no incentives for the creation of such products.
Nothing new will be developed and thus society as a whole will be disadvantaged6. It is
an economic approach, the central feature of which is the incentive given to authors
through the grant of limited property rights.
However, both Locke's theory, and the Utilitarian theory result in tensions over the grant
of property rights. Copyright in creative works gives exclusive rights to authorise or to
prohibit reproduction of a substantial part of the work. Copyright therefore takes out of
the public domain material that third parties would otherwise be free to copy and exploit
further with no restrictions. The Utilitarian theory supports the grant of property rights
because copyright increases availability and use of works. However, such rights also
restrict reproduction of these same works. To maximise the greatest good for the
greatest number, copyright must balance these tensions. It must not only provide an
incentive to creation, thereby increasing the availability and use of works, but at the same
time it must do so to a greater extent than it restricts the availability and use of protected
works. In Locke's view, a worker must mix labour with the commons, to own the
resulting product. But what part of that product should be owned, if material is to
remain in the commons? Should the worker own the whole product that is made; or
only that part of the product that is original to her; or only that part on which she has
laboured? Whereas it is clear that these theories attempt to balance the interests of the
author, intermediary and the user, neither actually dictates where the parameters of the
property right should be set: what should be owned, and what should not.
Problems that arise from the lack of such boundaries can be appreciated by considering
the length of time for which a work is protected. One of the features of copyright
5 Landes and Posner argue that this is the doctrine that has been used most often to shape copyright law.
Landes and Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofCopyright Eaw 1989, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325.
6 This argument underlies much of the move towards increasing property rights in the Internet era.
16
protection is that the term of protection is often defined by reference to the lifetime of
the author, but there is otherwise little agreement as to what that term should be. In the
EU copyright protection for a dramatic, literary artistic and musical work now expires
seventy years after the death of the author7. For some authors, perpetual copyright
might seem attractive, particularly if the author has created a work which is has enduring
appeal8. For others, however, the term may well be irrelevant: many creative works have
only a finite market life'7. Even for those works which endure, it may not be the author
who receives the benefit of a long royalty stream. Often an author will assign the
economic rights to an intermediary10 who can then recoup the economic rewards
through exploitation of the product11. But the more extensive the period of protection,
the longer it is before these works fall fully into the public domain, free for future
authors to use in the creation ofmore works.
The choices that are made as to where the parameters of the property right should he
tend to be dictated by the strength of the debate at the time at which changes are
effected to legislation, rather than being attributable to absolutes determined by any
theory. Any alterations tend to arouse great passion, illustrated well by debates in
relation to the term of protection. Prior to the passage of the Copyright Act 1842 which
extended the term of copyright protection beyond the life of the author, diametrically
opposed views became evident. The argument against the proposed increase in term was
put by the historian Macaulay: 'it is a tax on readersfor thepurpose ofgiving a bounty to writers.
The tax is an exceedingly bad one on the most innocent andmost salutary ofhumanpleasures; and
never let usforget that a tax on innocentpleasures is apremium on viciouspleasures'12. Putting the
case for extension was Sergeant Talfourd, a barrister with literary interest '...at the moment
when his name is invested with the solemn interest ofthe grave - when the last seal is set upon his earthly
course, and his works assume theirplace among the classics ofthis country -your law declares that his
I Council Directive (EEC) No 93/98 on 29 October 1993 Harmonising the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights. This has now been implemented in the UK, and amendments made
to the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) as a result. In the UK for the duration of
copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works CDPA s 12. For sound recordings CDPA s 13A.
For films CDPA s 13B. For broadcasts and cable programmes CDPA s 14. For the typographical
arrangement of published editions CDPA s 15.
8 The 19th century US author, Mark Twain apparently argued for perpetual copyright before the House of
Lords select committee Quoted in Vaver, Intellectual Property Today :0fMyths and paradoxes 1990 Canadian
Bar Review 98 pi05.
9 Ibid.
10 CDPA s 90.
II Some systems ensure that the interests of the author are taken into account, even in the event of
assignation of rights. See for example French Intellectual Property Code Title 3.
12 Hansard Vol 56 5 February 1841.
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works shall becomeyourproperty, andyou requite him by seising thepatrimony ofhis children'. The
debate was no less vociferous at the time at which the EU decided to harmonise the term
of protection throughout Europe, by increasing protection to lifetime plus seventy years
in some cases13. The debate was just as heated in the US, where the enactment of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 199814 similarly increases the term to the life
of the author plus seventy years15.
2.2 The rise in property rights16
In the Anglo-American traditions economic analysis of law has added further
perspectives on the property theory of copyright protection17. This may have its
foundations in Bentham's theories in part, and in particular in those of his follower John
Smart Mill, who associated property with liberty, and suggested that security of property
is essential for man to maximise his potential for liberty. Intellectual property is
perceived as almost exclusively a system of private rights18. Adherents to this theory
consider that joint or public ownership of property (the commons in Locke's analysis) is
inefficient because those who only use the property, but do not own it, have no incentive
to take care of it. This has been termed 'the tragedy of the commons'. The commons
should therefore be made the subject of private property rights, giving incentives to the
owners to take care of it. The classic analogy is with land: common land owned by
ranchers is overgrazed because the benefit for each individual is to get as much grazing
as possible. By dividing the commons into private property, the problem is solved.
Overgrazing will not occur as each owner has the incentive to manage his or her own
13 Council Directive (EEC) No 93/98 of 29 October 1993 harmonising the Term of Protection of
Copyright and certain Related Rights.
14 Title 1 of Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 amending Chapter 3 Title 17. United States Code.
15 For a debate on this increase in term, see the Berkman Center Law site at Harvard University,
http: / /eon.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno.
16 '[TJhose actors who have most to gain from strong intellectualproperty rights routinely mobilise the language ofprivate
rights to legitimate their claimsfor ever higher levels ofprotection'. In Introduction by Drahos, p xxiv in Intellectual
Property Second Series Drahos ed. Ashgate Publishers 1999.
17 For arguments for and against the rise in property rights on the Internet see: Cohen, Uochner in Cyberspace:
the New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management 1998, Michigan Law Review v97 462. Bell, Pair Use vs Fared
Use: The Impact ofAutomated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine 1998, 76 North Carolina Law
Review 5. Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World in IntellectualProperty Rights and New Technologies.
Proceedings of the Knowright '95 Conference 85, 99 Brunnstein & Sint eds. Hardy, Property and Copyright in
Cyberspace 1996 University of Chicago Legal Forum 217. Merges, Contracting into Usability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organisations 1996, 84 California Law Review 1293. O'Rourke, Copyright
PreemptionAfter the Pro CD case: A Market BasedApproach 1997, 12 Berkeley Technology Lawjournal 53.
O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Pre-emption ofSoftware Uicence Terms
1995, 45 Duke Lawjournal 479.
18 Drahos, Introduction in Intellectual Property 2nd Series Drahos ed. Ashgate Publishers 1999
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part in the most efficient manner. Furthermore, it does not matter who gets the
ownership of any particular parcel of land, as market efficiency will dictate that it will be
sold or rented to the most productive user19, in other words, the one who values it the
most. This approach, based on economic reasoning, has been used to argue for strong
rights and exclusive ownership in what is produced, including intellectual products. In
this way, owners are encouraged to manage their products efficiendy, and to invest in
creating more products, as they can be exploited to the exclusion of all others.
The economic theory focuses on the need to assign strong property rights as a
prerequisite to both local and international trade. As globalisation continues apace, and
international trade expands, so strong rights in intellectual products are seen as a
necessary platform from which expansion can continue. Thus there is a need to ensure
that there is a strong international system protecting intellectual products so that they can
be traded in the global market place. This move to expand the scope of copyright is well
20
illustrated by the copyright harmonisation programme in the EU . Similarly, in the US,
there have been no less than twenty amendments and additions to the copyright
legislation since 1990. Even the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO),
traditionally more sympathetic to the droit d'auteur approach, appears now to be moving
more towards a focus on the exploitation of intellectual property as an economic right.
At a meeting organised to examine the position of least developed countries in the global
market-place, the Director General ofWIPO highlighted: 'the growing importance of
intellectualproperty as a key component ofwealth creation,' and asserted that: 'In a knowledge-based
society, intellectualproperty will be used as a major source, as a critical tool, for economicgrowth and
economic development*1.
However, some economists have reservations about expansion of intellectual property
protection on a global scale: 'There is an unfortunate gap in our understanding ofthe situation
[which] leaves unresolved the important empirical question ofwhethergreaterprotection oflPRs would
p XXIV.
19 Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost 1960, 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1. Lemley, RomanticAuthorship and
the Rhetoric ofProperty (1997) Texas Law Review 75 pp 873-906.
20 See fn's 47-51.
21 WIPO web site http://www.wipo.org.
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callforth substantially more incentive activity. This question lies at the heart ofthe debate over
internationalprotection oflPRs22.
Despite the general trend towards increasing property rights in creative works, there
23
seems to be litde consensus that it is, in fact, economically efficient"". Equally, litde
attention appears to have been paid to the effect that this growth could cause for the
creation of new works, rather than for the exploitation of existing ones.
2.3 The essential limits
Critically for the process of authorship, and with the exception of the most extreme form
of the economic theory, the other theories discussed above each support a limitation on
the property right granted in creative works. Locke not only argued that a worker should
only own the product resulting from the fruits of his labours, but also went so far as to
argue for two specific limitations in relation to takings from the commons. These were
firstly, that a worker could take no more from the commons than was necessary for the
purposes of that creation24; and secondly, after the appropriation of material from the
commons, there must be enough and as good left in common for others25. Equally the
Utilitarian theory only supports the grant of property rights in sofar as the welfare of the
majority is maximised. Neither calls for absolute property rights to be granted in creative
works to the exclusion of all others. It is precisely because limits on the property right are
present that new works can be created without trespassing on existing rights.
22 Maskus, Trade Related IntellectualProperty Rights in Commission of the European Communities European
Economy No 52 at 172 (1993) Quoted in Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and GlobalEconomic
Development 1996, Chicago Kent Law Review Vol. 72:385 p391.
23 See also the following who question the economic analysis behind the grant of increasing property rights
in intellectual property products. Merges & Nelson, On the Complex Economics ofPatent Scope 1990, 90
Columbia Law Review 839. Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study ofCopyright in Books, Photocopies and
Computer Programs 1970, 84 Harvard Law Review 281. Vandevelde, The New Property ofthe Nineteenth Century:
The Development of the Modern Concept ofProperty 1980, 29 Buff Law Review 325. Gordon, Fair Use asMarket
FailureA Structural and EconomicAnalysis ofthe Betamax Case and its Predecessors 1982, 82 Columbia Law Review
1600. Litman, The Public Domain 1990, 39 Emory Law Journal 965. Litman, Copyright as a Myth 1991,
University of Pittsburgh Law Review Vol 53 235. Landes & Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofCopyright Taw
1989,18 Journal of Legal Studies 325. For copyright law to promote economic efficiency itsprincipal legal doctrines
must, at least approximately, maximise the benefitsfrom creating additional works minus both the lossesfrom limiting access
and the costs ofadministering copyrightprotection' at 326. Promo Braga & Fink, The EconomicJustificationfor the
Grant ofIntellectualProperty Rights: Patterns ofConvergence and Conflict 1996, Chicago Kent Law Review Vol.
72:439 discussing IP and world trade concluding that although there is conflicting economic evidence to
support the benefits: 'As countries introduce the minimum standards ofprotection required by TRIPS, a gradual
strengthening ofIPR's on aglobal scale will ensue' at 461.
24 Locke, Second Treatise Chapter 5 Section 31.
20
Ifevery valuable interest constitutedproperty, thenpractically any act would result in either a trespass on,
or a taking of, someone'sproperty... 26.
But what of the arguments of those who adhere to the economic theory and who take
the view that leaving works and parts ofworks beyond ownership is economically
inefficient? This argument has generally been made in relation to land and other tangible
objects. If land is held in common, there will be no incentive for it to be managed
properly: if all are able to use that land for grazing their cattle, so it will become over¬
grazed. That argument holds true in other areas. No-one owns the high seas and the
fish to be found there. So there is the tendency to plunder the stocks, with no-one
taking the responsibility of replenishing them. But do those arguments really apply by
analogy to intellectual products? On the contrary, if everyone is free to take from the
public domain for the purposes of authorship, far from the public domain being
depleted, it will be enriched. That is because parts of those works created by drawing
from the public domain will themselves, in turn, fall into the public domain. Thus the
greater, or perhaps more precisely the morefrequent the taking from the public domain by
successive authors, the richer and more varied it can become. But, of course, this
presupposes that there is a public domain, and that the would-be author can both access
and use the contents. If every part of a creative work is owned or is inaccessible then
there is nothing from which the author can take for authorship. Hence the importance of
the public domain in enabling creative development.
2.5 Justifying the droit d'auteur approach
The countries which follow the droit d'auteur system of protection likewise protect the
economic rights of owners of copyright in the exploitation of creative works. But,
perhaps just as importantly, they also protect the moral right of the author. Moral rights
give the author a right to control certain aspects ofwhat happens to that work, even after
the economic rights have been licensed or assigned to an intermediary. In the droit
d'auteur systems, creative works are seen as a manifestation of the personality of the
author, and it is that expression of personality that is protected. The justifications for
2iIbid Section 27.
26 Merges & Nelson, On the Complex Economics ofPatent Scope 1990, 90 Columbia Law Review 839, warning
about making everything in sight the subject of property. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept ofProperty 1980, 29 Buff Law Review 325. Also Litman, The
Public Domain 1990, 39 Emory Law Journal 965. If property rights in existing works were too strong, there
would be the danger of protecting: 'authors at the expense ofthe enterprise ofauthorship', p 969
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doing this derive in large part from the theories of Kant and Hegel, who argued that
private property is acquired by the joining of individual will to an external object27. Moral
rights represent the inalienable link between the author and the creative work. All
countries of the EU recognise moral rights to a greater or lesser extent, but France has
one of the most developed and deeply entrenched regimes.
In France protection of creative works was put on to a statutory basis when two laws
were passed in 1791 and 1793 just after the French Revolution (1789). The first
concerned the theatre, and established the author's right to control performance of a
work: the second established the author's right to control reproduction of a work. Some
commentators have argued that authors' rights were seen at this time as being 'the most
sacred....and the mostpersonal ofproperties'1*. Others consider that, at this point in
development, the law had the aim of stimulating the dissemination of works useful for
public instruction29 as well as being inspired by economic considerations, most notably
those of the intermediary30. It was in the nineteenth century that alternative theories for
the grant of property rights in creative works started to emerge, and the second element
of French copyright law started to develop through judicial activity when French judges
started to enforce moral rights31. These moral rights, discussed in further detail below
were, and are, seen as the essence of the personal rights of the author and are the
manifestation of the essential difference between the Anglo-American and Civil law
systems.
3. The sources of the law
Rules relating to the legal protection of the expression of creative works can be found in
a number of international treaties, regional and national legislation, and case law.
27 Hegel, Philosophy ofRight ss51-58 TM Knox translation Oxford University Press 1952. Kant, The Philosophy
ofTaw 81-84 W Hastie Translation AM Kelley Publishers 1974. See also Cotter, Pragmatism Economics and the
Droit MoralKs North Carolina Law Review 1.
28 Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights 2nd ed Butterworths n 1 pi 9 mentioning that the
report of Le Chapelier to the Assembly called the right of the author: 'laplus sacree, la pluspersonelle de toutes les
proprietes'. Reported in Le Moniteur Universel, 15 January 1791.
29 Ginsburg,M tale ofTwo Copyrights: literary Property in Revolutionary Trance andAmerica 1990, 64 Tulane Law
Rev. 101. Tracing parallels with first US Law. Trench sources ofcopyright law at its beginnings shows that the
legislators and courts saw literaryproperty 'mainly as a means to advancepublic instruction while at the same time recognising
authors' claims ofpersonal rights arising out of their creations'. Davies, The Convergence ofCopyright andAuthors' Rights
- Reality or Chimera? (1995) 26 IIC 964.
30 Kerever,The Trench Revolution andAuthors Rights 1989, 141 RIDA 9.
31 Further development in the 19th century heralded the advent of the division between authors rights and
copyright, mainly in France. Kaplan, An Unhurried View ofCopyright New York 1967.
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The most important pre-Internet international Treaties for these purposes, and currendy
in force, are the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
1886 (the Berne Convention), the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations 1961 (the Rome Convention)
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994
(TRIPS Agreement)32.
The international Treaties are important in the digital era. Those currently in force, and
those that have recently been negotiated, do and will apply to the cross border protection
and exploitation of creative works on the Internet. As such, the Treaties aim to provide
inter alia certain minimum standards in those countries which have signed up to their
provisions.
3.1 The Berne Convention.
The Berne Convention was signed in 1886, since when it has been revised several
times33. The motivation for agreeing this Treaty came primarily from efforts by authors
and artists, in response to the growth of international piracy of their works. Books could
be smuggled across borders, re-printed and re-imported to the national market, leaving
the authors from other countries with no rights to demand royalties, nor recourse against
unauthorised copying34. Thus international protection was sought. The subject of
protection under the Berne Convention is the author. The objects of protection are
literary and artistic works. Article 5 embodies the fundamental principle behind the
Treaty, and provides that the author is entitled to national treatment in territories of
signatories to the Convention. This means that any right owner who is a national of a
Berne Convention member state or who first publishes in a member state, is entitled in
every other member state to the same protection as the nationals of that state35. The
32 Copies of both the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention can be found on the World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO) website http://www.wipo.int. A current list of signatory states is also
available. A copy of the TRIPS Agreement can be found on the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
website, http://www.wto.org, together with a list of current signatories.
33 Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at
Paris on May 4 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914,
revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris
on July 24, 1971, and amended on September 28, 1979.
34 Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Butterworths 3rd ed. Ch2.
35 Ibid 3.18.
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author is also entitled to the minimum rights guaranteed by the Convention including the
works to be protected which !include everyproduction in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatevermay be the mode orform ofexpression... 56, and the minimum term for which
protection is to last, the life of the author plus fifty years after his death37. As the Berne
Convention is a compromise between the Anglo-American and Civil Law approaches,
moral rights are included. These first appeared in 1928 in the Rome Revision. As
currently drafted the Berne Convention provides that'independently ofthe author's economic
rights and even after the transfer ofthe rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship ofthe
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or othermodification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to ...the work which would beprejudicial to his honour or reputation 58. The rights are to
last until the expiry of the economic rights.
3.2 The Rome Convention
The Rome Convention 196 1 39 protects performing artists, phonogram producers and
broadcasting organisations, via their performances, phonograms and broadcasts40.
National treatment is to be accorded to those benefiting from protection under the
Convention41. Contracting States must grant a minimum term of protection of 20 years
as regards phonograms42. Phonogram producers are to enjoy the right to authorise or
prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms. If a phonogram is
published for a commercial purpose, including any communication to the public, a single
equitable remuneration is to be paid to the performers or producers or both.43
3.3 The TRIPS Agreement
A move to link copyright (and other intellectual property rights) with international trade,
came with negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement in 199444. This agreement was one of
36 Berne Convention Article 2.
37 Berne Convention Article 7(1).
38 Berne Convention Article 6 bis (1).
39 International Convention for the Protection ofPerformers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organisations (Rome Convention) Done at Rome, on 26 October 1961.
40 Rome Convention Article 2.
41 ibid.
42 Rome Convention Article 14.
43 Rome Convention Articles 10 and 12.
44 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (TRIPS). For an interesting
discussion on the politics involved in the negotiation of TRIPS see Drahos, Global Property Rights in
Information: The Story ofTRIPS at the Gatt 1996, Prometheus Vol 13 No 1 p6. In common with others,
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the products of the Uruguay round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).
As with the Berne and Rome Conventions, TRIPS requires member states to accord to
the nationals of other member states, the same treatment as they accord their own
nationals, subject to exceptions to be found in those Conventions45. The Agreement
goes on to require Members to adhere to the majority of the provisions of the Berne
Convention46, give specific copyright protection to computer programs, and provide for
rental rights in respect of both computer programs and cinematographic works47.
All the Treaties introduced above were negotiated and their provisions finalised prior to
the development and expansion of the Internet and information technologies.
3.4 The new Treaties
Two new treaties were agreed in 1996: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). These were the first international
treaties to specifically address the copyright issues raised by the digital era. These Treaties
will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.
The World Intellectual Property Organisation based in Geneva (WIPO) is responsible
for administering the Berne and Rome Conventions, as well as the WCT and WPPT.
TheWorld Trade Organisation, also based in Geneva, has responsibility for the
administration of TRIPS.
Drahos points to the interests of the US in negotiating the Treaty. Large US corporations in particular
were concerned about loss of profits due to piracy; in addition, there was a general fear over the loss of US
international competitiveness. See also Sell, IntellectualProperty Protection andAntitrust in the Developing World:
Crisis, Coercion, and Choice' 1995, International Organisation 49, 2, p315. Ricketson, The Future of the
Traditional IntellectualProperty Conventions in the Brave New World ofTrade-Related IntellectualProperty Bights IIC
Vol 26 No 6/1995 p872 giving a useful introduction to the gestation of TRIPS and the inclusion of
intellectual property. An interesting note in the text attributed to the Australian commentator Drahos:
'TRIPS grew directly out ofUS concern with its declining trade position and its desire to protect its intellectualproperty
abroad' p898.
45 TRIPS Article 3. TRIPS also deals with patents, trade marks, and other intellectual property rights.
46 TRIPS Article 9.
47 TRIPS Articles 10 and 11.
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3.5 The European Union
In Europe, the EU has been working on an harmonisation of laws programme which has
had a profound effect on the domestic legislation of Member States, generally by
extending intellectual property rights, including copyright. Thus, the term of copyright
protection has been increased up to 70 years after the death of the author48; computer
programs have received explicit protection49; databases have a specific regime of
protection, including a suigeneris right in relation to the contents50; rental rights, lending
rights and performer rights have been created and extended51; and the satellite and cable
directive enacted52. Recendy under discussion has been the implementation of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty53 and parts of the WIPO Phonograms and Performances Treaty
through the Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society54.
4. The domestic framework
4.1 The UK
Copyright was first put on a statutory basis in England in 1710, with the enactment of
the Statute of Anne55. The momentum for formal protection arose in large part from
publishers, who lobbied for the ability to control reproduction of books prior to
distribution to the public. After the advent of the printing press, competitors could
relatively easily and cheaply reproduce further copies, with few controls. While
accepting the need for State assistance in controlling copying, Parliament considered the
right should be granted to publishers and authors only in return for satisfaction of the
48 Council Directive (EEC) No 93/98 of 29 October 1993 harmonising the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights.
49 Council Directive (EEC) No 91 /250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs.
50 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases.
51 Council Directive (EEC) No 92/100 of 19 November 1992 on Rental Right and Lending Right and
certain rights related to Copyright.
52 Council Directive (EEC) No 93/83 of 27 September 1993 on the Co-ordination of certain rules
concerning Copyright and Rights related to Copyright applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable
Retransmission.
53 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty 1996 (WCT) agreed in Geneva in 1996.
54 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (the Copyright Directive). This
Directive has seen a number of drafts during its gestation, each of which has been subject to intensive
negotiation and lobbying. The Directive was finally passed by the EU Council of Ministers on 9th April
2001. The documents that have been published in relation to this Directive can be found at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market.
55 8 Anne Ch 19 (1710).
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public interest56. This came in the form of encouraging dissemination of works for: 'The
encouragement oflearning "7. The 1710 Act gave the 'sole right and liberty ofprinting books' to
authors and their assigns. This right depended on a book being registered with the
Stationers' Company, applied only to published works, and existed only for a period of
14 years. If the author was still alive after this period, the right was returned to him for a
further period of 14 years58. Over the next 200 years, there were few changes, and those
that were made extended the term of copyright, broadened the variety of works
protected by copyright, and made provision for the protection of works of foreign
authors as required when the UK first became a signatory to the Berne Convention. In
1911 and 1956 major changes were made to the law of copyright. The law was further
revised and brought up to date in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA)
which, as subsequently amended, forms the basis of the current UK copyright law. This
Act represents a mix of national policies and provisions arising from regional and
international obligations. In recent years still further amendments that have been made,
almost wholly stemming from the EU as the harmonisation programme referred to
above59 moves forwards.
Drawing in large part on the theories discussed above, the law of copyright now protects
a diverse range of expressions of original works, and the media through which they are
exploited. In the UK, original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works are protected
by copyright60. The entrepreneurial or neighbouring copyright cover sound recordings,
films, broadcasts, cable casts and typographical arrangements of published editions, and
now long unpublished editions61. For copyright to protect these works they must be
fixed in some tangible form62. Once fixed, generally the owner of the copyright in a
56 There are a number of texts which consider the historical development of the law of copyright. For
example, Rose, Authors and Owners The Invention ofCopyrightHarvard University Press 1993. Stewart,
International Copyright andNeighbouring Rights 2nd ed Butterworths Part 1 and variously through the individual
chapters.
57 The preamble to the 1710 Act provides: 'A Billfor the Encouragement ofTeaming andfor Securing the Property of
Copies ofBooks to the righful owners thereof.
58 Some argue that although it might appear to favour authors over the intermediary, it was in fact
intermediary who pushed hard for formal protection and whose interests in being able to exploit the
creative works were protected. See for example Vaver, Intellectual Property Today: OfMyths and Paradoxes'
1990, Canadian Bar Review 69 p98 at 104. Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and
Allied Rights, 4th edn Sweet & Maxwell 1999. (hereinafter Cornish Intellectual Property) Chapter 9.
59 See above fn's 17-21.
60 CDPA si.
61 Council Directive 93/98/EC of 29 October 1993 Harmonising the Term of Protection of Copyright
and Certain Related Rights.
62 CDPA s 3(2) which provides: ' Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic ormusical work unless and until it is
recorded in writing or otherwise
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work has the exclusive rights to copy the work63; to issue copies of the work to the
public64; to rent or lend the work to the public65; to perform show or play the work in
public66; to broadcast the work or include it in a cable programme service67, and the right
to make an adaptation of the work68. Any person who carries out any of these acts
without the consent infringes the rights of the copyright owner in work69.
The law also permits certain uses to be made of protected works by third parties without
consent of the owner of the copyright. So, for example, reading a work is permitted, as
is expressing in one's own words the ideas encompassed in a new work, or listening to a
recording of a musical work in private. A third party may make use of insubstantial parts
of a work protected by copyright without permission70. Substantial parts of some
protected works may be taken and re-used if it is for the purposes of research and private
study71, or criticism and review and news reporting72, so long as the use is in accordance
with the principles of fair dealing73. There is also a number of uses ofworks that may be
made without permission for the purposes of education74, or for library or archival
purposes75. On the one hand, the ability to make use of the works in these ways
represent a limitation on the exclusive right of the owner in the creative work. On the
other hand, the limitations also ensure that there is a wide variety of works and material
available in the public domain on which a future author can draw in fashioning new
works.
The author of a work is the first owner of copyright in that work76, except where a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or a film, is made by an employee in the
course of employment, in which case, subject to agreement to the contrary, the employer
is the first owner77. The author is the person who creates the work78. There are special
63 CDPA ssl6 and 17.
64 CDPA ssl6 and 18.
65 CDPA ssl6 18A.
66 CDPA ssl6 and 19.
61 CDPA ssl6 and 20.
68 CDPA ss 16 and 21.
69 CDPA s 16(2).
70 CDPA s 16(3)(a).
71 CDPA s 29.
72 CDPA s 30.
73 CDPA ss 29(1) and 30(1).
74 CDPA ss 32-36A.
75 CDPA ss 37-44 Some of these permissions are only available to the extent that there is no licensing
scheme in place eg CDPA s 36(4).
76 CDPA sll(l).
77 CDPA s 11(2).
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rules for the media through which author-created works are exploited. For example, in
the case of a sound recording, the author is the person who creates the work and who is
to be taken as the producer79, and in the case of the film, the producer and principal
director80. The author of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer
generated is 'theperson by whom the arrangements necessaryfor the creation ofthe work are
undertaken'81.
For literary dramatic musical and artistic works, copyright lasts for a period of seventy
years after the death of the author82; for sound recordings, copyright expires fifty years
from the end of the calendar year in which it is made83 or released84; and for a film, it
expires seventy years after the last to die of the principal director, the author of the
screenplay, the author of the dialogue, or the composer of the music specially created
for, and used in, the film85.
Although at first glance, the framework developed for the protection for economic rights
in creative works might seem straightforward, it does depend on a number of important
factors. A literary, dramatic or musical work must be recorded in writing or otherwise
before it is protected86. Ideas are therefore not protected until such time as they are
written down in some form. The work that is protected is thus generally embodied in
some tangible medium. For a performance of a work to infringe copyright, it has to be
in public87, although the definition of public can be fairly wide. A performance does not
have to be in front of paying guests to be 'in public'88, and in public can be at a
workplace89, or in a hotel90, or at school where members of the family and guests are
present91. However, a CD containing music can be played at home for the enjoyment of
oneself and one's family without infringing this right, as such a performance is not 'in
public'.
78 CDPA s 9(1).
79 CDPA s 9(2)(aa).
80 CDPA s 9(2)(ab).
81 CDPA s 9(3).
82 CDPA s 12(1).
83 CDPA s 13A (2)(a).
84 CDPA s 13A (2)(b).
85 CDPA s 13B (2).
86 CDPA s 3(2).
87 CDPA si9.
88 PRS v Hawthornes Hotel [1933] Ch 855.
89 Ernst Turner v PRS [1943] Ch 167.
90 PRS v Harlequin Record [1979] FSR 233.
91 CDPA s 34(3).
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The right to issue copies of a work to the public92 is limited after the first sale of a
physical object, such as a book or a video93. So the owners of copyright in a work can
control the reproduction of that work, but not reading; first sale of copies of works, but
not the resale of those copies; and can authorise when a performance may take place in
public, but not in private.
4.2 The US
The US approach was based on that of the UK94, but differed to the extent that
copyright was, and still is, limited by the powers granted under the US Constitution of
1789. The relevant Article provides: 'The Congress shall havepower To promote the Progress
ofScience and UsefulArts, bj securingfor limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries95'. The US Copyright Act of 1790 was: 'An Actfor the
Tincouragement ofTeaming, by securing the Copies ofMaps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and
Proprietors ofsuch Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.' Current US legislation is to be
found in Title 17 of the United States Code. This Title is much longer, and more detailed
than the CDPA. It contains thirteen different chapters, ranging from the subject matter
and scope of copyright in chapter 1, to the protection of original designs in chapter 13.
There are, however, some important differences. One arose because, historically, the US
required registration of a claim to copyright at the US Copyright Office for the existence
of the right, and provisions relating to this registration are to be found in chapter 4 of
USC Title 17. However, since becoming a member of the Berne Convention, this
requirement of registration has been redundant for the majority of purposes96. Another
fairly significant difference arises in the 'fair use' provisions found in the US copyright
Act, as compared to those found in the CDPA. Fair use, or fair dealing refers to the
'right' or ability of a user of a work protected by copyright to take part of that work
92 CDPA s 18.
93 CDPA s 18(2).
94 See for example draft amicus brief by US legal historian Edward Walterscheid
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/ .
95 United States Constitution Article 1 Section 8.
96 The award of damages for infringement of copyright depends on whether a work has been registered
with the US Copyright Office. The US Copyright Act provides for the recovery of'actual damages' and
'statutory damages.' Which award is applicable depends on whether the work was registered with the
Copyright Office, and if registered, the date of the registration in relation to the date of first publication of
the work or the commencement of the infringing act(s). US Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. s504.
30
without permission, but only when that part is to be used for specified purposes. The
differences between the two systems in this respect will be explored in chapter 6. Other
differences arise because the US considers that it has already implemented the two most
recent international Treaties negotiated byWIPO in 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and amendments have been made
to the US Copyright Act as a result. Chapter 5 of USC Title 1797 contains various
provisions relating the limitation of liability of Internet Service Providers (ISP's) for
copies of works they may carry on servers they operate, and copies which may be routed
through their equipment during the normal functioning of the Internet. Chapter 1098
contains provisions requiring copyright management protection systems to be inserted
into certain recording media, and for royalties to be paid on digital audio recording
devices. Chapter 12 deals with copyright protection and management systems. Broadly,
it prohibits the circumvention of these systems, and provides protection for copyright
management information99.
4.3 France
Domestic French legislation can be found in the Intellectual Property Code, which
covers both authors rights and neighbouring rights, although in different Titles100. The
major difference between the French approach to the protection of creative works, and
the Anglo-American approach lies in the status accorded to moral rights. This section is
thus concerned with an explanation of these rights
In France, the right of integrity or the droit du respect de l'oeuvre101 is considered the
most important moral right. It enables the author to prevent alteration, distortion or
mutilation of the work in perpetuity. Thus the artist, Bernard Buffet, could prevent the
owner of a refrigerator, on which he, Buffet, had painted various designs, from breaking
97 Added by the US Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 1998 Title 11 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act amending Title 17 USC to add a new s 512.
98 The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 added Chapter 10 to Title 17 USC Digital Audio Recording
Devices and Media.
99 WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998. For
discussion on management protection systems (digital fences) see Chapter 4 of this study.
100 An English translation of the Code can be found on the WIPO website at http://clea.wipo.int. This is
the translation that will be referred to throughout this study.
101 French Intellectual Property Code Title 11 Article 121-1.
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it up, and selling each panel as a separate work102. The heirs of the film director, John
Huston obtained an injunction against the production of a colourised version ofAsphalt
Jungle1"3, and the Societe Metropole Television M6 was forced in 1990 to pay damages to
the director Claude Sautet after cutting his film Les choses de la vie from 80 minutes to
64104. Other rights include the inalienable right to release, or to refuse to release a work,
known as the droit de divulgation105; the right to withdraw or modify the work, known
as the droit de retrait ou de repentir106; the right to be recognised as the author of the
work or to remain anonymous; the right not to have a work attributed to another; and a
person's right not to have her name associated with a work by another (droit a la
paternite)107. The droit de divulgation, the droit a la paternite and the droit du respect de
l'oeuvre108are exclusive and perpetual (so extending to heirs), whereas the droit de retrait
ou de repentir109 is personal to the author. The rights do however allow significant
control by the author over the work when the physical article, and the economic rights in
the article, are sold. Thus the droit de divulgation allowed an artist who had all but
finished 800 paintings and delivered the completed ones to the dealer, to rescind the
contract and recover the paintings from the dealer's heirs on repayment of the fee 110.
The courts will act to curb excesses or abuses in the exercise of moral rights111. French
courts may limit their exercise where an abuse is threatened. For instance, where a
marriage has broken down, moral rights cannot be used to prevent exploitation of a
work where the purpose is to deprive the other spouse of a financial benefit arising as a
result of a division of the pecuniary assets. Such an effect might be achieved as a result
of exercising of the right of divulgation112. Where an author, or the heirs have granted
unconditional adaptation rights in a work, such as the right to adapt a novel to a film,
the courts will not allow moral rights to be asserted to complain about specific deviations
102 Fersing v BuffetJudgement ofMay 30 1962 Cour d'Appel Paris affd Judgement of 6July 1965 Cour de
Cassation.
103 1991 Bull Civ 1 113 No 172 1993 D Jur 197. The Cour d'Appel was presented with evidence of
Huston's opposition to colourisation during his lifetime and awarded his heirs damages for the injury to the
film's integrity 1995 DS Jur (IR) 65.
104 Sautet (1990) Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 14 Mars 1990, Revue de la SACD No. 1 - ler
trimestre 1992, p. 59 quoted in Holdemess, Moral Rights andAuthors' Rights: The Keys to the Information Age,
1998 (1) JILT http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/infosoc/98_lhold/ .
105 French Intellectual Property Code L 121-2.
106 French Intellectual Property Code L 121-4.
107 French Intellectual Property Code L 121-1.
108 French Intellectual Property Code LI 21-1 and L 121-2.
109 French Intellectual Property Code L 121-4.
110 LAjfaire RouaultJudgement of March 19 1947 Cour d'Appel Paris (1949).
111 McColey, Limitations on Moral Rights in French Droit d'auteur ASCAP 1998 p 423.
112 Judgement of the French Supreme Court May 14 1945 D 1945 J 285.
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from that work113. When functional works are in issue, the courts may bar the exercise
of moral rights even in cases where the use of the work violates the spirit of the author's
work, and therefore harms the very personal interests the moral rights are designed to
protect. So where two architects complained about the restoration of a public theatre,
the court permitted the work to the building to go ahead in order to ensure the
continued life of the property, so long as the changes did not substantially denature it114.
In this case the public interest in the continued life of the theatre took precedence over
the moral right of the author. In some cases, even where there is no public interest
involved, but rather a commercial interest at stake, the French courts have indicated that
a court should carry out a balancing test to establish: 'an equilibrium between theprerogatives
ofdroit d'auteur and those ofproperty rights'"'.
5 Moral rights and the Anglo-American approach
5.1 Moral Rights: the UK
Moral rights did not attain any prominence in the UK until the CDPA 1988. Prior to
this, an author who was concerned about her right of integrity being compromised, or a
failure to acknowledge authorship, had to rely on the general laws of defamation116,
passing off117 or injurious falsehood. During the 1970's, the UK was preparing to ratify
the 1967 revision of the Berne Convention, and as a consequence accepted that it would
be required to introduce moral rights into domestic law118. Three moral rights were
introduced in the 1988 Act119. These are the right to be identified as author120, which
requires to be asserted before it can be infringed121 (the right of paternity); the right to
113 Cons. Bernanos v Societe Champs-Elysees Production et R-P BruckbergerJudgement ofNovember 30 1961
Tribunal de Grand Instance de la Seine Gazette du Palais 1962. 1. 898. J. 98. The heirs of Bernanos sued a
film production company to prevent his name being associated with a production based on the Dialogue of
the Carmelites. The plaintiffs had licensed the adaptation, but felt that the resulting work failed to retain its
essential theme and be true to the author. The court said that they could not assert their moral rights to
complain about specific deviations from a work. The court did not forbid the exercise of moral rights
against the adaptation but rather prevented the plaintiff from asserting moral rights to complain about
specific problems in a work for which unconditional adaptation rights had been granted.
114 ConseilNational de I'Ordre desArchitectes v Societe Immobiliere du Theatre du Champs Elysees Tribunal de Grande
Instance of Paris Judgement ofApril 4 1990 145 RIDA 386 July 1990.
1,5 Societe Bull v Bonnier Supreme Court of Paris Judgement ofJanuary 7 1992 152 RIDA 194 (April 1992).
116 Humphrys v Thompson [1905-1910] Mac CC 148.
117 Samuelson v Producers Distributing [1932] 1 Ch 201.
118 Whitford Report 1977 Cmnd 6732.
119 CDPA ss 77-89.
120 CDPA s77.
121 CDPA s 78.
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object to derogatory treatment of a work122 (the right of integrity), and the right to
privacy in private photographs and films123. The right against false attribution of a work
was re-enacted in the 1988 Act124 having originated in the Fine Art Copyright Act 1862.
All the rights are inalienable125 and transmissible on death126. However, they may be
waived by agreement127. The rights to be identified as author of a work (which requires
to be asserted before it can be infringed128), to object to derogatory treatment of a work,
and to privacy in certain photographs and films, subsist so long as copyright subsists in
the work.129. The right against false attribution subsists until twenty years after death130.
These rights are hedged around by many exceptions. For example, the right to be
identified as an author does not apply to a computer program, nor does it apply to
anything done by or with the authority of the copyright owner where the copyright
originally vested m the author's employer131. The right to object to derogatory treatment
does not apply to a raft of exceptions, including computer programs, and publication in a
newspaper or encyclopaedia, nor does it apply to anything done by or with the authority
of the copyright owner where the copyright vests in the employer, and then only applies
when the author has been identified as such132.
There have not been many cases on the UK's version of moral rights. One case that
does not bode well for those who would seek to rely on the right to object to derogatory
treatment is Tidy v The Trustees ofthe Natural History Museum 133. Tidy had produced a
series of cartoons of dinosaurs and given permission to the Natural History Museum to
display these. A book was produced which contained reproductions of the cartoons
reduced to about 1/6 of the original size134. Tidy claimed that the reduction was a
distortion of his work, or alternatively it was prejudicial to his honour or reputation, as
the public would think that he could not be bothered to reproduce the drawings
specifically for the book. The court found that, in the absence of evidence from the










131 see generally CDPA s79.
132 see generally CDPA ss 81 and 82.
133 (1995) 37 IPR 501 High Court 29 March 1995 Rattee J.
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infringement. The court thus favoured an objective test. This is distinct from the
approach taken in at least some of the droit d'auteur countries, where the test is a
subjective one, consistent with the notion that the moral rights are those attaching to
authors, and it is up to the author and her heirs (subject to control of abuses) to
determine when and how they will be exercised135. Moral rights against derogatory
treatment have been considered by the courts in two other cases. George Michael
obtained a pre-trial injunction to prevent snatches of his music from being put together
in a medley136. However, in the second case, a designer could not stop parts of his work
being used in an updated brochure produced by someone else, because the court found
that his honour and reputation were not sullied137.
The moral right to prevent false attribution has fared better. In Alan Clark vAssociated
Newspapers138 the Evening Standard newspaper carried a regular column in the form of
parodies of the diaries of Alan Clark. Although it was clearly stated the author of the
parody was a Mr Bradshaw, this was not noticed by a number of readers, who attributed
the articles to Mr Clark himself. The court found that a case was made out for a claim of
false attribution139.
Given the very few cases that have come before the courts in the UK so far, it is hard to
predict where the decisions on moral rights may go in future. It may be that economic
rather than personality concerns influence the courts. In other words, if the market
considers, or would consider, that the reputation of the author is devalued by a
particular treatment of a work, then the moral right will be infringed140. Such an
134 420mmx297mm to 67mmx42mm.
135 In France the subjective reaction of the author to alteration is generally the governing factor. A court
refused to permit the addition of a complimentary preface to a book which the author did not want. RIDA
1993 No 155 225; JCP 1988 II 21062. But see Stromholm, DroitMoral - The International and Comparative
Scenefrom a Scandanavian Viewpoint Vol. 14 IIC No 1/1983 1 at 31 where he argues that the better approach,
is that the test is objective.
136 Morrison Teahy Music Ttd v Ughtbody Ttd [1993] EMLR 144.
137 Patersfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168.
138 [1998] 1 WLR 1558; [1998] 1 AH ER 959; [1998] RPC 261.
139 Although this could have been a case for passing off. Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
[2000] IJLIT Vol. 7 No 3 at 270.
140 It may also be that the author considers that her reputation may be sullied with potential future subjects,
and thus her market harmed. In the US case Teibovitir v Paramount Pictures February 19, 1998, US 2nd Cir CA
http://laws.fmdlaw.com/2nd/977063.html, Paramount pictures parodied a photograph Ms Leibovitz had
taken of Demi Moore standing naked and pregnant. Paramount pictures argued parody as a defence to the
claim of copyright infringement. The defence was accepted. One factor that appeared to concern Ms
Leibovitz was the effect that the parody could have on her 'special relationships' with the celebrities whom
she makes a living photographing [fn 6], The moral right of integrity might have been successfully pled in
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approach would appear to differ from that taken in the droit d'auteur systems, and would
not seem to accord with the rationale behind the inclusion of moral rights in the Berne
Convention.
5. 2 Moral rights: the US
The US opposition to any introduction of moral rights for authors is deeply rooted. In
the 1850's Harriet Beecher Stowe first published Uncle Tom's Cabin: OrUfeAmong the
Towly. A competing, unauthorised version, appeared in a German language newspaper in
Philadelphia. Stowe sued. The court held that the unauthorised translation did not
infringe on Stowe's statutory rights saying:
Bj thepublication ofMrs Stowe's book, the creations ofthe genius and imagination ofthe author have
become as muchpublicproperty as those ofHomer or Cervantes All her conceptions and inventions
may be used and abused by imitators, play-writes andpoetasters. They are no longer her own — those
who havepurchased her book may clothe them in English doggerel, in German or Chinese prose. Her
absolute dominium andproperty in the creations ofhergenius and imagination have been voluntarily
relinquished. All that now remains is the copyright ofher book; the exclusive right toprint, reprint and
vend it, and those only can be called infringers ofher rights orpirates ofherproperty
Whereas this case was concerned with the translation rights in the book, which if litigated
today would clearly reach a different conclusion, the dictum above does illustrate the
deeply held view that non-economic rights are foreign to US copyright law. However, by
the 1980's, the US was considering becoming a member of the Berne Union. To do so,
some accommodation had to be made for moral rights in domestic law. Indeed, the lack
ofmoral rights was one of the major stumbling block to US accession to Berne142.
The US acceded to the Berne Convention in 1989 by way of the Berne Implementation
Act143 and in so doing, argued that US law already complied with the moral right
requirements under the Treaty144, pointing to legislation in individual states which
droit d'auteur systems, although, even those systems do tend to allow a defence of parody to claims of
infringement. French Intellectual Property Code Article L 122-5.
141 Stowe v Thomas 23 F Cas 201 (CCED Pa 1853) (no 13,514).
142 Dietz, The Artist's Right ofIntegrity Under Copyright Taw -A Comparative Approach 1994, 25 IIC 177, pi 79.
Hansmann and Santilli, Authors' andArtists'Moral Rights: A Comparative legal and EconomicAnalysis 1997, 26
Journal of Legal Studies 95. Another reason was that copyright protection fell below the minimum
standards required by Berne. In addition, that Convention does not permit copyright protection to be
contingent on any formality. The US had required registration since 1909.
143 Pub L No 100-568 102 Stat 2853-54 (1988) codified in scattered sections of 17 USC.
144 Chinni, Droit d'Auteur Versus the Economics ofCopyright ImplicationsforAmerican Eaw ofAccession to the Berne
Convention 1997 ASCAP p241.
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provided for certain moral rights145, and to the provisions of the Lanham Act on trade
marks146, which may provide a cause of action to an artist whose name is appended to a
work without authorisation. Commentators did point out that coverage for moral rights
under these provisions was not as comprehensive as the US Administration was
indicating147. Legislation was not uniform throughout the US, nor did it provide the
coverage required by Berne, as much only applied to visual works, and most rights
thereby granted terminated on death. Further, under the Lanham Act, there were no
provisions relating to derogatory treatment of a work148.
The US Administration has since passed the Visual Artists Rights Act 1990149, which has
arguably come closer to giving moral rights to authors, and thus fulfilling obligations
under Berne. Under this Act authors of works of visual art are given certain rights of
attribution and integrity150, which are personal to the author151, last for the lifetime of the
author only152, and can be waived, but not transferred. However, the Act only applies to
a narrow category of visual works, and generally where such a work is produced in a
limited edition153. In addition, it does not apply where a work is created by an employee
in the course of employment154. This would tend to suggest that the philosophy is to
maintain the integrity of a work for economic reasons and ensuring that the value
remains, rather than the protection of the natural right of the author in the expression of
her work.
145 Eg Californian Civil Code 987-90 (1989).
146 Lanham Act s43(a) 15 USC s 1125 (a).
147 For general comment see Krigsman, Section 43(a) of the EanhamAct as a Defender ofArtists'Moral Rights 73
Trade-Mark Rep 251 May-June 1983.
148 Some writers have argued that over the past 20 years 'courts and legislatures gradually have begun to recognise,
and to expand upon, an American doctrine ofmoral right'. Cotter, Pragmatism Economics and the Droit Moral 1997, 76
North Carolina Law Review 1.
149 17 USC ss 101, 102, 106(a) 107, 601.
150 ibid s 106A.
151 ibid s 106A(d).
152 ibid sl06A(e).
153 ibid s 101. A 'work ofvisual art' is: (1)apainting drawing print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, n a limited
edition of200 copies orfewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case ofa sculpture, in
multiple cast, carved, orfabricated sculptures of200 orfewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2)a stillphotographic image producedfor exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of200 copies orfewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author. A work ofvisual art does not include: (A)(i)anyposter, map, globe, chart, technical
drawing diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data
base, electronic information service, electronicpublication, or similarpublication; (ii)any merchandising item or advertising
promotional, descriptive, covering orpackaging material or container; (iii)anyportion orpart ofany item described in clause
(i)or (ii); (B)any work madefor hire; or (CJany work not subject to copyrightprotection under this title'.
1d4 Carter v Helmsley-spear, Inc 71 F 3d 77 (2D Cir. 1995) cert denied 116 S Ct 1824. Fielkow Clashing rights
Under United States Copyright Eaw: Harmonising an Employer's Economic Rdght with the Artist-Employee's Moral
RJghts in a Work Madefor Hire 1996, 7 DePaul LCA J Art & Ent L 218.
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The Berne Convention Implementation Act155 provides that the Berne Convention is not
self-executing in the US, and that the rights under federal or state law cannot be
expanded on or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne
Convention156.
6. Comment
There are similarities between the approach to protection of creative works between the
UK and US on the one hand, and France on the other, specifically in the way in which
the economic interests of the parties are supported. The major variance between the
systems arises however from the underlying philosophies. In the Anglo-American
system the rights granted are seen as giving to authors an economic incentive. In France,
the rights are considered as natural rights of the author, and an expression of the
personality of the author. That difference is expressed in moral rights.
Despite the obligations in the Berne Convention, and despite having gone some way
towards introducing moral rights, the US and the UK appear wary about introducing a
fully fledged regime. There may be a number of reasons for this, primarily rooted in
economic argument. Firstly, it may result from the potential impact on economic
exploitation of creative works. At their most extreme, moral rights allow an author a
perpetual right to exercise some control over the use of a work, and how the work may
and may not be exploited in the marketplace157. The exercise of moral rights impedes
the finality of contracts, and inhibits the freedom of the holders of the economic rights
to deal with the tangible object embodying the work, to say nothing of the rights of the
owners of the tangible objects themselves. In essence, they detract from the ability of
those who wish to transform the author's work into another medium, to do so without
interference158. They are thus inconsistent with the absolute nature of property, and with
its alienation. In the UK, it has been argued that because every infraction of a moral
15517 USC 102 1988.
15617 USC 104(c) 1988.
157 Hansmann and Santilli, Authors' andArtists'Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and EconomicAnalysis 1997,
26 Journal of Legal Studies 95 plOl.
158 Some argue that establishing a 'moral right imposes a real economic andpolitical cost on society'. Those who want
to use works need to deal with two owners: the moral and economic. Each new use is 'at the mercy ofthe
author'. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement 1997, Texas Law Review Vol. 75:989 pl032. Lemley also
argues that no parodies or satires would be permitted. But cf. French Intellectual Property Code LI22-5.
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right impairs another person's freedom to do business, enforcement should be confined
to cases of real injury159.
Second, the Anglo-American reluctance to extend moral rights is also likely to stem from
the differing historical traditions. Moral rights and their association with theories of
natural rights, have not been a part of the historical development of copyright in the
Anglo-American traditions, as discussed above. Following on from there may be the
perception that moral rights are largely associated with an ideal of'romantic authorship
the view that works protected by copyright are produced by those tucked away in their
lonely garrets, labouring long and hard over a creative work. The reality, from the
earliest times, appears to have been very different. Creativity has always been associated
with wealth and the desire of the wealthy to own creative objects, followed by the
economic advantages that could be gained from exploiting works for the masses160.
Copyright has, however, always needed some link with the author because of the desire
to justify such elements of the right as the term of protection, and the requirement of
some originality, both intimately linked to authorial contribution. It was only after the
French Revolution, feeding the desire to sweep away the privileges linked with such
wealth, that moral rights started to develop in France, focussing on the creative input of
the author.
A third reason may he behind the reluctance of those within the Anglo-American
systems to embrace moral rights, and that may stem from the very low level of originality
required from an author before a work produced by her can qualify for copyright
protection. The requirement of originality will be discussed in chapter 7 of this study,
but for the present it is perhaps notable that when copyright can protect something as
mundane as football pools coupons and telephone directories, many are likely to baulk at
the idea of giving rights to the individual author to object to derogatory treatment, or to
159 Cornish, IntellectualProperty 11-89. For these reasons, in particular the second,'The introduction ofa moral
rights regime has been and continues to befiercely combatedmainly by US industries and US industry orientedpolity which
tend tofavour the interests ofproducers in commercialising the protected work with asfew restrictions aspossiblefrom residual
rights vested in authors'. Dreier, Copyright issues in a Digital Publishing World.
http://associnst.ox.ac.uk/~icsutnfo/dreier.htm
I60In Worldly Goods. A. New History of the Renaissance MacMillan 1996, the author, Professor Jardine, argues
that from the mid fifteenth century important artists were to be found wherever a major trading centre was
located: 'and there are therefore wealthy entrepreneurs to purchase' pi 23. She goes on to say that: 'Theperiod of
transitionfrom manuscript toprint, the relationships between authors, manufacturers, buyers and backers were shaped by
opportunities which characterise any innovation in the commercial sphere. Theprospect ofproducing an individual work
in print....was above all a business opportunity, suggested by a 'gap in the market' or by a recognised local demandforprinted
material ofaparticular kind'. pl42.
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insist on being credited as author of that type of work. The problems may he with the
breadth of coverage of copyright protection, rather than result from an inherent dislike
ofmoral rights.
Suffice it to say that the focus of this study is not on moral rights, but rather the author
and the act of creation. Moral rights will be mentioned again only briefly. A point to
bear in mind during the ensuing discussion, however, is that now that works
disseminated on the Internet are traded globally and there is much focus within the EU
on harmonisation of copyright (and related rights), this may be an opportune time to
consider whether some further harmonisation should be attempted in the area of moral
rights, despite the failure of the Berne Convention rules to achieve just that. Whether
such international harmonisation could ever be achieved must be open to doubt. It has
been said by a US commentator that:
It may be agood idea to try to incorporate some droit d'anteur concepts in US copyright law. However,
this may be a difficult, ifnot impossible exercise. In any case, the US and Europe need a common
standardfor treating commercially exploitable works on the Internet. IfEurope wants to be on the same
level as the US, it willprobably have to be without the author's rightsparadigms. The US most likely
will not accept them
These views are consistent with the belief that the economic functions of copyright are
paramount162. One can imagine that any attempt to water down moral rights in France,
and other countries may face stiff opposition. But these tensions between the two
systems, manifested in the position taken over moral rights, may become more, rather
than less, pronounced as trade in creative works over the Internet increases.
7. Conclusion in relation to copyright
The law of copyright and authors' rights as developed in both the Anglo-American and
Civilian legal systems has supported over the years both the investment necessary to
bring creative works to the attention of the consuming public and the creation of new
works. There has been some discussion and controversy when it has been sought to
extend protection, with regard to the scope and substance of copyright. Nonetheless,
161 Lehman in colloquium discussions in The Future ofCopyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed.
Kluwer 1996 p 239.
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the framework has worked, and appears to have worked well, in ensuring that a
continuous stream of new creative works is made available to the consuming public. An
essential part of that process has been the ability to access and use the public domain.
8. Databases: the EU
In an important, and relatively recent development in Europe databases have been
accorded a specific regime of protection. The topic is vital for this study because the
new law has implications for the dissemination of works and information over the
Internet and the consequent re-utilisation of parts of the content in authorship. Many
databases are made available over the Internet in electronic form. The legal on-line
services provided by the publishers Butterworths (Lexis) and Sweet & Maxwell (Westlaw)
are good examples. Many works are make available on the Internet as databases. In
addition, as will be argued, a web site consisting of an amalgam of creative works
protected by copyright, and information not so protected could itself fall under the
definition of a database.
8.1 Historical development
Signatory states to the Berne Convention163 have been required to accord copyright
protection to "collections" of literary works 'which by reason ofthe selection and arrangement of
their contents constitute intellectual creations'. The TRIPS Agreement164 provides that
''Compilations ofdata or other material, whether in machine readable or otherform, which by reason of
the selection or arrangement oftheir contents constitute intellectual creations, shall beprotected as
such165. Attempts were made at the time of negotiation of the WCT to provide for an
international Treaty dealing with the protection of databases. However, it was not
possible to do more than agree a broad statement for inclusion in the WCT166:
'compilations ofdata or other material in anyform which by reason ofthe selection or arrangement of
162 The US in particular has historically been an importer rather than an exporter of authors' works. Thus
re-use with as little interference as possible has been of great concern. Hansmann and Santilli, Authors' and
Artists'Moral Rights: A Comparative legal and EconomicAnalysis 1997, 26 Journal of Legal Studies 95 pl42.
163 Berne Convention Article 2(5).
164 TRIPS Agreement Article 10(2).
165 The TRIPS Agreement specifies that the copyright protection for compilations 'shall not extend to the data
ormaterial itself Article 10(2), and that 'copyrightprotection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures,
methods ofoperation ormathematical concepts as such' Atisclt 9(2).
166 WIPO Copyright Treaty Agreed Statements of the Diplomatic Conference WIPO Doc 226 (E) (1997)
Geneva.
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their contents are intellectual creations are to beprotected as suchbut this protection does not extend
to the data or the material itselfand is withoutprejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or
material contained in the compilation^1. Negotiations are ongoing atWIPO for a treaty
specifically on the protection of databases168.
8.2 Recent initiatives
In 1994 there was a move in the EU to increase legal protection accorded to databases:
notably, to provide a right against the unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation of the
contents of a database. Protection under both the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement was considered to extend to the selection and arrangement of the material,
but not to the material in the database itself. A number of cases from member states in
the EU yielded inconsistent results as to whether the contents could be protected by
copyright. The UK was considered as having such a low requirement of originality, that
it was possible to protect contents of at least some databases. In other European states,
such protection was not assured because the requirement of originality is higher169.
In 1996, the EU enacted the Database Directive170. The main justifications for its
introduction included a recognition of the increasing importance of a database as a
repository of information, in particular in the electronic era where many are made
available on line171, together with an acknowledgement that investment, whether in time
and effort or financial resources, was needed to compile and maintain a database172. This
investment should therefore be protected to prevent unauthorised parties from
appropriating the contents of the database, and using those contents for their own needs
167 WCT Treaty Article 5
168 http://www.wipo.int.
169 There was a disparity in protection of databases throughout the member states. In many member states
a database was not considered as having sufficient literary merit or originality to warrant protection. For
example, Belgium and Luxembourg limited protection of databases to collections of artistic and literary
works, but did not afford protection to compilations of facts. Germany and Italy required a collection of
facts to be a personal intellectual creation in its own right before protection would be afforded; whereas the
UK afforded full copyright protection to compilation of facts so long as the low requirement of skill labour
and judgement is expended. Porter, The Copyright Protection ofCompilations and Pseudo-literary Works in EC
Member States. 1993, Journal of Business Law 1993, 1.
170 Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March on the Legal Protection of Databases; 1996 OJ L77/20. This followed
on the action plan set out by the Commission in 1991 COM (90) 584 final 17/1/1991 in which the
European Commission proposed to harmonise national laws within the EU on the legal protection of
databases.
171 Database Directive Recitals 9 and 10.
172 Database Directive Recital 11.
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without compensating the original compiler. The influence of the economic approach to
protection is clear from these Recitals.
The implementation of the directive has resulted in a number of changes to UK law and
to the laws of other member states173. Database is defined broadly in the directive: 'a
collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic ormethodical way and
individually accessible by electronic or other means'174. Protection under the Database Directive is
in two parts: copyright protection is granted for the structure of the database so long as
it represents the author's own intellectual creation, a standard drawn from the Berne
Convention175. A new suigeneris (database right) right for the contents of the database is
enacted in addition. The rights arising by way of copyright in the structure of the
database follow the existing rights under the law of copyright. By contrast, the right
given under the database right is to the maker of the database, and is to prevent the
unauthorised extraction and/or utilisation of the contents of the database176. Extraction
means the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of
a database to another medium by any means or any form177. Extraction concentrates on
the copying of the contents of a database, even if only temporarily from one form to
another. An example would be running a CD ROM on a computer and bringing images
on to the screen. By contrast, re-utilisation means making available to the public all or a
substantial part of the contents of the database by the distribution of copies, renting, and
on-line or other forms of transmission. The re-utilisation right thus focuses on the
subsequent transmission and distribution of the information, following on the act of
extraction.
The Database Directive refers only to the extraction and re-utilisation of substantial parts
of the database. The taking of insubstantial parts will not infringe this right. However,
the repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilisation of insubstantial parts, where
in conflict with the normal exploitation of the database, and which unreasonably
173 As the Database Directive was intended to harmonise legal protection throughout member states,
reference will be made to the terms of the Directive itself indicating where applicable, the implementing
legislation in the UK.
174 Database Directive Article 1.2 CDPA s 3A. The focus on the economic interests of the compiler of the
database are reminiscent of the economic theory underpinning copyright law: property rights are required
for economic efficiency.
175 Berne Convention Article 2(5).
176 Database Directive Article 7. 1. The Copyright and Rights in Database Regulations 1997 SI 1997/3032
( hereafter the Database Regulations) 16.
177 Database Directive Article 7. 2. Database Regulations 12(1).
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prejudice the legitimate interest of the maker, are then not permitted178. The directive
allows a number of exceptions to infringement of the database right. A lawful user may
extract insubstantial parts of the contents of a database for any purpose179; or a
substantial part for the purposes of illustration for teaching and scientific research180.
Substantial parts may also be extracted and re-utilised for the purposes of public security
or an administrative or judicial procedure181. The last two of these provisions are
permissive and not mandatory. In the UK, the main exception182 incorporated into
domestic law is that the database right is not infringed by fair dealing with a substantial
part of its contents, if they are extracted (but not re-utilised) for the purpose of
illustration for teaching or research, and not for any commercial purpose. The source
must be indicated183.
Copyright in the structure of the database lasts for seventy years after the death of the
author184. The database right expires at the end of the period of fifteen years from the
end of the year in which the database was completed185, or fifteen years from the point at
which it was made available to the public186. But where there has been a substantial
change to the database, including one which results from the accumulation of successive
additions, deletions or alterations resulting from substantial new investment, then that is
to be considered as a new database and thus to qualify for its own protection. A
database qualifies for the database right where there has been substantial investment in
obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the database187. The owner or maker
of the database and the person who qualifies for the database right is the person who
takes the initiative in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of a database, and
who assumes the risk of investing in the creation of the database188.
As a result of the directive, there is now quite a complicated structure of protection for
databases. A database may consist of information and other works, some of which may
178 Database Directive Article 7 .5. Database Regulations 16(2).
179 Database Directive Article 8. Database Regulations 16(1) and 19(1). But all of these presuppose that a
user can gain access to the contents. Technological protection systems and their effect on access to the
contents of a database will be discussed in chapter 4 of this study.
18() Database Regulations 20(l)(b). Database Directive Article 9 (b).
181 Database Regulations 20(2) and Schedule 1 Database Directive Article 9 (c).
182 Databases Regulations 20(b).
183 There are a number of public interest exceptions in Schedule lof the Database Regulations.
184 CDPA s 3(l)(d) and 12(2).
185 Database Directive Article 10. Database Regulations 17.
186 Database Directive Article 10(2). Database Regulations 17(2).
187 Database Directive Article 7. Database Regulations 13.
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be protected by the law of copyright, and some of which may not. In addidon, database
right subsists in the collection as a whole. If the structure represents the author's
intellectual creation, then copyright protection will also attach to that structure189. As
suggested, the definition of a database is sufficiently broad to encompass web sites,
which can be made up of both creative works, protected by copyright, and works not so
protected. A web site is generally made up of a collection of independent works, such as
articles protected by literary copyright and pictures protected by artistic copyright. In
addition, there is likely to be data such as names and addresses, or lists of products sold.
The material incorporated will be arranged in a systematic way in the form of the
presentation of the web site, as well as through the various levels within the site. The
contents are individually accessible by electronic means, usually through the technique of
hypertext linking. Web sites are thus likely to qualify for the added tier of protection of
the database right190.
8.3 Databases: the US
Two cases to come before the courts in the US have considered what protection, if any,
was to be accorded to the contents of a database, where those contents were not in
themselves sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection. The first was Feist
Publications v Rural Telephone Service 191. In this case the US court found that a list of names
and addresses in a telephone directory was factual information (ie. not original), and
therefore in the public domain192. Thus these listings could be freely appropriated by
others. However, in the second case, Pro CD v Zeidenber^g193 the court found that the
188 Database Directive Article 7(1). Database Regulations 14(1).
189 Since the introduction of the Database Directive there have been several cases throughout the EU,
which have found that the database right has been infringed - both in electronic and in paper databases.
Germany (District Court of Berlin, 8 October 1998). Berlin-Online database comprising compilation of
newspaper advertisements (housing, real estate, cars, jobs etc.). Held: Investment was substantial (including
updating and maintenance). Repeated and systematic insubstantial taking amounts to infringement sui
generis right. AfP 1999, 649. France (case involving telephone directory piracy). Infringement of sui
generis right. Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, judgement of 18.6.1999 MMR 1999, 533. Netherlands
(Amsterdam District Court), KPN v. KapitoI Trading, Informatierecht /AMI 1999, 7 (Pirating of telephone
directory constitutes infringement of sui generis right). With thanks to Joerg Reinbothe DG XV European
Commission October 1999 for the information on the above cases.
190 The first reported case in the UK on the database right, British Horseracing Board L.td v WilliamHill
Organisation Umited, 2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 12; [2001] R.P.C. 31. [2001] EWCA Civ 1268;24059 2001 WL
825162 will be discussed in part 10.4 of this chapter.
191 499 US 340 (1991).
192 The selection and arrangement of this information could qualify for copyright protection if it was in
some way original. However, in this case the court found that the listings were presented in such a way
that 'utterly lacks originality' at p 1297.
193 86 F 3d 1447 (7th cir 1996).
45
compiler of a database could use a licence to limit the use to which the unoriginal
contents of a database could be put. Pro CD had spent millions of dollars in creating a
national directory of residential and business listings, consisting of over 95 million
entries, which included full names, addresses telephone numbers, zip codes and industry
codes. Pro CD sold these on CD Rom's, subject to a licence which allowed home use of
the contents of the database only. Zeidenberg purchased a copy. Using his own retrieval
software, he placed a copy on his web site and allowed users to extract up to 1000 entries
free of charge. When challenged by Pro CD, the Court of Appeals found that
Zeidenberg was bound by the terms of the licence limiting the use of the contents of the
CD to personal purposes. The Court said that while no copyright subsisted in the data
itself, the terms of the licence were enforceable. Thus, Zeidenberg infringed these terms.
Partly as a result of these cases, and partly because the EU had already introduced
protection for the contents of databases, it has been proposed that a regime similar to
that found in the EU should be introduced in the US. There were two competing draft
bills under consideration, one of which was akin to the EU Database Directive, and one
which would have introduced a significantly relaxed regime based on misappropriation of
information from the database rather than on granting a property right in the contents.
At one time it was thought that one or other may have come to fruition in the 106th
Congress194. But this did not, and has not yet, happened.
However, in the absence of a formal regime for the legal protection of the contents of
databases, a new State Act, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 1999
(UCITA) which supports licensing of information that is not protected by copyright, may
serve to provide even stronger protection for the contents of databases.
194 Reichman and Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and
Technology 1999,14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 793.
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/bdj/articles/14_2/Reichman/html/text.html. discussing EU and
US approach and criticising over extensive rights. In Cornish The International Relations ofIntellectual Property
1993, CLJ 52(1) 46 the author discusses the international problems that are wrought over emulation rather
than accretion in the protection of creative works. In particular he argues the choice between the two
generally relates to the issue of whether protection is sought over international boundaries (p 55). The
example is given of computer programs, accretion, and semi-conductor chip protection, emulation. His
conclusion is don't emulate, accrete. However, just this argument is resurfacing over the legal protection of
databases, which the EU has done partly by accretion (the structure) and partly by emulation (the contents).
This has led to some unfavourable comments by US commentators, and a rush by the US to secure
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8.4 UCITA
UCITA195 grew out of a proposal, made in 1997, to amend the US Uniform Commercial
Code196 (UCC), the most prominent US commercial legislation, by introducing a new
article (2B) to facilitate mass-market licensing of information. However, as a result of
objections from the American Law Institute (which works with the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with respect to the UCC), the National
Conference of Commissioners abandoned proposals to amend the UCC. UCITA is
therefore stand-alone legislation. It was adopted by the Commissioners from the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in June 1999; individual
States may now choose to adopt UCITA into State law.197
8.4.1 What UCITA provides
UCITA provides a framework for the operation of licences in the market place198.
Despite the findings of the court in Pro CD v Zeidenberg,m commentators had doubts
whether the contractual terms contained in a shrink wrap licence (those used around a
physical product), or click wrap licence (those used on the web), were enforceable against
the licensee. There had been debate in the US, with some commentators arguing that
courts treated such licences as sales of copies of the intellectual property200, while others
denied that courts ever had a problem in enforcing such contracts201. This practice of
protection although this has not yet happened. Samuelson Challengesfor the World Intellectual Property
Organisation [1999] EIPR 578 at 585.
195 Formerly known as Article 2B. For a general overview of the process of gestation see Samuelson and
Opsahl, The Tensions Between Intellectual Property & Contracts in the Information Age: An American Perspective in F
W Grosheide and K Boele-Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: Europees Privaatrecht 1998.
196 The UCC is a body of law in common to most of the 50 States in the US. For details of the process of
drafting legislation see http://www.2bguide.com/bkgd.html.
197 Virginia has enacted UCITA http://www.ucitaonline.com/whathap.html. There is a hint of a 'regulatory
race'in the endorsement of UCITA. '..if the United States, through the States, does not act, the European Union
(EU) will. As a unified marketfor thefirst time in history, the EU is happily legislating in each ofthe areasArticle 2B
covers, while the Article 2B supporters and critics wrangle. Ifone is comfortable with the EU as a defacto state legislator, or
with legalchaos, then there is no need to continue wrangling'. Towle, The Politics ofEicensing Eaw 1999, Flouston Law
Review 36:121 pl28.
198 For a view that these are justifiable on utilitarian grounds see Gomulkiewicz, The Eicense is the Product:
Comments on the Promise ofArticle 2B for Software and Information Eicensing 1999, 13 Berkeley Technology Law
Journal 891.
199 86 F 3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
200 Hill v Gateway 2000 Inc 105 F 3d 1147 1148 7th Cir 1997.
201 Nimmer, Article 2B Preface Meeting the Information Age.
http: / /www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/1201 /prefll201 .html.
Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Eaw
http://www.2bguide.com/docs/rncontract-new.html.
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licensing now covers a variety of other information products, including CD Roms, on¬
line databases and electronic magazines.202 Some of the contents may be protected by
copyright: others may not203. UCITA now clarifies the position and confirms that this
type of licensing practice is acceptable.
UCITA provides that access contracts204 can be used to license computer
information205, information, and informational rights. Information is defined as
meaning: 'data text images sounds mask works or computerprograms including collections and
compilations ofthem,' while informational rights 'include all rights in information created under laws
governingpatents, copyrights mask works trade secrets trademarkspublicity rights or any other law that
gives aperson independently ofcontract a right to control orpreclude anotherpersons use ofor access to the
information on the basis ofthe right holders interest in the information'. A computer information
transaction is an 'agreement or thepeformance ofit to create, modify tranfer or license computer
information or informational rights in computer information...' Those who license 'information'
can do so on standard terms which are presumed to be valid unless the terms are found
to be unconscionable.
8.4.2 UCITA and databases
There has been much excitement in the US206 over UCITA, and some, but perhaps
surprisingly litde, comment in the UK207. Perhaps this lack of attention has been because
UCITA, when validating the licensing of information, is merely doing by contract what
Europe has already done by way of the Database Directive: in other words, to provide a
legal framework within which makers can compile databases of information in which
there are no underlying intellectual property rights, yet license others to use that
202 For comments see Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses 1995, 68 S California Law Review
1239. 'Software vendors are attempting en masse to opt out ofintellectualproperty law by drafting licensingprovisions that
compel their customers to adhere to more restrictiveprovisions than copyright law would require'.
203 Nimmer, The Metamorphosis ofContract into Expand 1999, 87 California Law Review 17. Samuelson,
IntellectualProperty and Contract Lawfor the Information Age 1999, 87 California Law Review 1. Lemley, Beyond
Pre-emption The Federal Law and Policy ofIntellectualProperty licensing 1999, 87 California Law Review 111
catalogues provisions of copyright act which are put at risk by contracting behaviour.
204 Access contract means a 'contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or informationfrom, an information
processing system ofanotherperson, or the equivalent ofsuch access'.
205 Computer information means 'information in electronicform which is obtainedfrom or through the use ofa computer'.
206 Litman, The Tale thatArticle 2B Tells 1998, 13 Berkeley Technology LawJournal 931 who says the notion
that current law enables publishers to make a transaction into a licence by so designating it is dubious.
Samuelson IntellectualProperty and Contract Lawfor the Information Age, Forward to a Symposium 1998, 87
California Law Review 1.
207 Harvey, Software Licensing - Changes in US Laws may affect UK Practice Computers and Law Vol. 10 Issue 5
December 1999/Jan 2000.
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information. However, a few significant differences deserve comment. In the EU
makers of databases have gained a suigeneris intellectual property right208 in the contents
of the database so long as the prescribed conditions are met209. There is no such right in
the information that can be licensed under UCITA. This means that in the EU makers
of databases will have a right 'good against the world' (or at least others in the EU). By
contrast, in the US, the right is merely contractual, good only against the other
contracting party. In the EU any party, subject to the Database Directive, can be
enjoined from extracting the whole or a substantial part of the contents. In the US only
the party to the contract can be prohibited. It would therefore not be impossible for one
party to license information under UCITA which is not protected by copyright, and pass
this on to a third party who could then make further use of that information (although
the contracting party may well be in breach of a condition in passing that information on
to the third party).
On the other hand, it may well be that, by validating the licensing of even the smallest
particles of information, the US has gone significantly further than the EU. In the EU
the rights of the maker of the database are infringed if a third party extracts or re-utilises
the whole, or a substantial part, of the contents of the database210. But a third party does
not need authorisation to extract and re-use insubstantial amounts of the contents of the
database. By contrast, UCITA validates not only the access contracts, but also would
appear to allow the licensing of the smallest amount of information contained therein,
whether protected by copyright or not.
Finally, US databases, as compilations of uncreative material, may not be protected under
either current UK or other European national laws. This is because the database right is
not accorded to nationals of territories outwith the EU unless those territories give
protection to databases emanating from the EU211. Thus, as the US currently has no
database law protecting EU databases, so the EU does not protect US databases.
UCITA may now mean that US makers of databases will receive significantly greater
international protection than EU nationals. Makers in the US have simply to license the
information under UCITA, and sue for breach of contract in the event that the
208 Database Regulations 1997 Part 111 para 13.
209 A property right (database right) subsists in a database if there has been a substantial investment in obtaining
verifying orpresenting the contents of the database' Database Regulations 13.
210 Database Regulations 16.
211 Database Regulations 18.
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provisions are infringed. If the law of the contract is US State law, makers can protect
the contents of the database internationally, at least as against the licensee.
9. Copyright, databases and the Internet
As the law of copyright, and the law in relation to the protection of databases currently
exist, they can, and do, apply to protect creative works and databases disseminated over
the Internet212. Web sites and web pages consist of all manner of creative and non-
creative works and information. One example, based in Scotland, is SCRAN, the Scottish
Cultural Resources Access Network.213 The aim behind the creation of the web site is to
digitise 'Scotland's heritage'. The site consists of text, photographs, images, pictures,
including moving pictures, artistic works and much more. Many other web sites now
also contain recordings of interviews, moving pictures and stream music214. Some of the
works may have existed before the Internet, and have been put in digitised form for
dissemination. Others may have been created specifically for Internet distribution. Any
one of these individual works might be protected by the existing law of copyright if it
attains the necessary level of originality. In addition, each web page and the whole web
site is likely to qualify for protection as a database. Substantial investment is likely to
have been required to compile the web site, which itself consists of data and information
as well as creative works.
A number of cases from around the world have demonstrated that existing laws do apply
to protect creative works disseminated over the Internet although some also serve to
highlight the difficulties faced by rightholders. The vast majority of this case law has
emanated from the US, where Internet penetration is greatest and competitive activity in
this sector fiercest. The US is home to industries which have huge investment in the
entertainment sector, and own vast portfolios of works protected by copyright, and who
therefore have the most to lose should works be freed on the Internet. It may also be
212 MacQueen, Copyright and the Internet in Regulating Cyberspace: A Framework for Electronic Commerce
Edwards and Waelde eds. Hart Publishing 2000. Cornish, Intellectual Property para 13-78 . Subject to one
qualification 'the reproduction andpublic communication rights in British copyright law seem more than sufficient to meet the
requirements of the /WCT WPPT and the Copyright Directive]'. In the UK, the process of providing new rights
for the digital age has been awaiting the finalisation of the Copyright Directive The House of Commons
Trade and Industry Tenth Report noted that the WIPO Treaties have yet to be ratified, and will not be so
ratified until the Copyright Directive had been agreed and transposed into national law. It has however,




considered as a business strategy that a ruling in the US is likely to influence a ruling
from a court in a different country215, making it worthwhile to pour resources into
fighting cases in the US. In addition, it is in the US that there have already been the most
amendments to existing copyright law to try and bring it into line in the digital era.
Intermediaries (often in the form of a collective organisation representing the interests of
a particular group such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), on
behalf of the music interests, and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) on
behalf of film makers) are testing the limits of these 'new laws' to ascertain the extent of
control that can be exercised over the Internet as a distribution medium.
The patterns of litigation so far show that isolated infringements (except in odd cases
where someone has an axe to grind) are not the target. Rather, it is the ways in which
works are disseminated and copied as they travel around the Internet, together with the
technology that facilitates this dissemination, that have been the subject of the fiercest
battles.
9.1 Copyright washed away: the international nature of the problem
One dispute, which has had a high profile in the media illustrates graphically the
problems faced by intermediaries confronted with multiple reproductions of protected
works carried out on an individual basis. The dispute concerned Napster, an Internet-
based company which distributed software facilitating sharing ofMP3 music files on the
Internet216. Napster made its proprietary MusicShare software available for surfers to
download on to computers linked to the Internet. After downloading the software, a
surfer could access the Napster system directly from the home computer. The software
on the computer interacted with Napster's software held on Napster's servers. When the
surfer, who wanted to locate an MP3 file logged on, there was an automatic connection
to one of the 150 servers operated by Napster. The surfer entered the name of the artist
on the search page. The music files were not located on Napster servers, but held on the
computer belonging to another surfer who had downloaded the Napster software. The
software provided by Napster indexed the location of music files and matched a request
for a particular MP3 file with the location of that same MP3 file on another computer.
215 See the approach taken in John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders [1993] FSR 497 and the comments on
this approach by Jacob J in Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd [1994] FSR 275 at
292.
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Once the MP3 file was found, the surfer could download the file directly from the
computer on which it is held217. Napster said that it did not make any copies of MP3 files
on its own servers.
Napster was sued by record companies218, and by several individual musicians and
bands219. On 26 July 2000, a US court ruled that Napster committed contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement, and ordered the site to be closed pending full hearing
of the case220. The ruling was immediately appealed, and the temporary injunction lifted
on 28 July, again pending full hearing of the case221. On 12th February 2001, the US 9th
Court ofAppeals found that the activities of those who used Napster to share music files
constituted copyright infringement222. As far as Napster was concerned, the court found
that it was liable for contributory copyright infringement because they both knew of the
infringing activity and made a material contribution to it. Secondly, Napster was found
liable for vicarious copyright infringement because Napster had the ability to supervise
the infringing activity, as well as a financial interest in the activity. In Napster's case this
test was satisfied because they would at some point in the future be able to gain revenue
from exploiting the database containing details of those who used the Napster system.
The appeals court remitted the case back to the court of first instance to vary the terms
of the original injunction such that the plaintiffs would be required to notify Napster of
any material protected by copyright on its system before Napster would require to
remove access to those songs. However, Napster was still to monitor the use of the
system within its own limits to ensure that users did not gain access to unauthorised
material223.
After handing down of the amended injunction, there was and continues to be both a
war ofwords, and action between the parties. The RIAA argued that Napster had not
disabled access to songs when notified. In return, Napster alleged that RIAA had
included in the given details, works in which the copyright was not under control of the
216 http://www.napster.com.
217 See generally A&M Records Inc vNapster IncND Calif. 239 F 3d 1004.
218 A&M Records Inc., Arista Records Inc, Mowtown Reocrd Company LP, Capitol Records Inc, Sony
Music Entertainment Inc, Warner Bros. Records Inc, and 10 others. It has been estimated that 317,377
individuals, located all over the world, shared songs by one just one band.
http://www.napster.com/metallica-notice.htm http://www.qhnks.net/items/qhtem7384.htm
219 Metallica and Dr Dre.
220A&M Records Inc v Napster Inc ND Calif. 239 F 3d 1004.
221 http://www.bbc.co.uk.
222A&M Records et al v Napster Inc. Case 239 F 3d 1004.
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224RIAA. Napster filed a request for a rehearing and rehearsing of the case but
meanwhile closed its service because of the inability to comply with the terms of the
injunction. Napster has now been bought by Vivendi. Information on the site states
that it hopes to re-open in the Spring with a new fee-paying service.
The storm whipped up by this case is unlikely to die down in the near future. It has
prompted much wider questions about the development of the law as it applies to the
Internet. In particular it has raised concerns as to whether courts should impede
technological progress by requiring that new technologies should be shut down, a move
that some consider could have a negative effect on the development of the Internet as a
whole. A crucial point arising from the case is that the record companies were able to
sue Napster. Had Napster not been liable, the right holders would have been left to sue
the individuals who uploaded and downloaded copies of digital musical files onto and
from the Internet225.
However, Napster is not the only technology on the Internet that facilitates copying
between individuals. Other systems have been developed which allow peer-to-peer
networking where users connect their computers directly from one to another, and swap
files between them226. Such a network does not depend on a centralised indexing system
akin to that used by Napster. This means that there does not appear to be any central
point which could be attacked by the right holder. Enforcement of rights has thus been
seen as one of the greatest challenges for right holders in relation to digital
dissemination.
223 The amended order was issued on 5 March 2001. C99-05183. MDL No C00-1369MHP.
224 This step in the procedure not only requests the court to reconsider the findings, but also to vary the
terms of the second injunction issued to facilitate Napster's compliance with its terms.
225 For a flavour of the difficulties that would be faced by right holders see generally the papers relating to
the discussions that have been held at WIPO on Private International Law and Intellectual Property Lucas
Private international law aspects of theprotection ofworks and objects ofrelated rights transmitted through digital networks.
Paper GCPIC/1. Lucas, Private international law aspects oftheprotection ofworks and ofthe subject matter of related
rights transmitted over digital networks PaperWIPO/PIL/01/1. Ginsburg, Private international law aspects ofthe
protection ofworks and objects of related rights transmitted through digital networks Paper GCPIC/2. Ginsburg, Private
international law aspects oftheprotection ofworks and objects ofrelated rights transmitted through digital networks (2000




Another target for litigation has been the hardware that makes up the Internet, and those
devices by which works disseminated over networks can be copied.
One of the first worries intermediaries faced was the development of a portable device
called a Rio, which enabled surfers who had downloaded their favourite music from the
Internet to an MP3 file, to copy this file on to the machine from which they could listen
to it wherever they happened to be. They could thus 'place shift' the music. The RIAA
was concerned about this development because, whereas previously MP3 files could only
be listened to on a computer connected to the Internet, now they could be copied and
transported anywhere the user wanted. Thus the RIAA sued Diamond Multimedia227,
the makers of the Rio, arguing that a royalty had to be paid to copyright holders in terms
of the US Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, which requires a levy to be paid on
specified recording devices228. In addition, that Act requires a recording device to
include instructions to prohibit their use to make serial copies229. The RIAA argued that,
because Diamond Multimedia paid no royalties and also failed to install a copy
management system, the portable player was an illegal product that would lead to more
piracy on the Internet. The US Appeals Court230 held, however, that the Rio is not a
'digital audio recording device' in terms of the Act, but is rather a computer peripheral.
In addition, the court found that the hard drive of a personal computer, on which are
made the copies of MP3 files for downloading to the Rio, is also not governed by the
Act. The court opined that The Rio merely makes copies in order to renderportable, or 'space-
shift', thosefiles that already reside on a user's hard drive™. Thus, no royalty is payable in the
US on Rios, and surfers can make copies of lawfully obtained digital files in order to
listen to them in a different place.
226 See for example http: //www.wego.gnutella.com.
227 Recording Industry Ass'n ofAmerica Inc. v DiamondMultimedia Sys Inc. 29 F Supp 2d 624 denying the RIAA's
request for a temporary restraining order to prevent distribution of the Rio.
228 US Copyright Act Title 17 s 1003.
229 US Copynght Act Title 17 S 1002.
230 Recording Industry Ass'n ofAmerica Inc. v DiamondMultimedia Sys Inc 9th Circuit Court ofAppeals June 15
1999. http://laws.findlaw.com/9th/9856727.html.
231 Compare Sony Corp. ofAmerica v Universal City Studios 464 US 417, 455 (1984) holding that 'time shifting'




A further target for litigation has been 'linking': the way in which surfers navigate the
Internet, moving from one web site to another. In some circumstances, web sites may
contain works which infringe copyright. If the owners of the copyright in these works
could prevent others from linking to these sites, then onward dissemination could be
limited. However, to date, these attempts have not been wholly successful.
One early case arose in Scodand: Shetland Times Ttd v Wills232. The Shedand News, an
electronic newspaper based in the Shedand Islands233, copied the headlines from the
Shedand Times, a hard copy newspaper also based in the Shedand Islands, which had an
electronic version234. The Shetland News used the headlines to link direcdy to the story
on the Shedand Times web pages. The inclusion of the headlines was challenged by the
Shedand Times as an infringement of copyright in the headlines, and an infringement
under the CDPA as the inclusion of an item in a cable programme service235. An interim
interdict was granted, but just before the full hearing began, the parties reached
setdement. The Shedand News was to be permitted to use the headline to link to the
story on the Shetiand Times web site, but the words 'A Shedand Times story' should
appear just below the headline, and a Shedand Times logo should be included close-
by236.
Linking has also been challenged in the US in a rather convoluted case, which perhaps
provides an example of someone with 'an axe to grind'. In Bernstem vJC Penney lm^37
Bernstein argued that JC Penney had infringed his copyright in photographs of Eli2abeth
Taylor by maintaining a link on their web site through which (via several other links238)
copies of the photographs could be viewed. The copies were ultimately held on a server
maintained by a Swedish University. It appeared that there was a history of difficult
232 1997 SC 316.
233 http://www.shetland-news.co.uk.
234 http://www.shetland-times.co.uk.
235 CDPA s 20.
236 MacQueen, Copyright and the Internet in Law & the Internet: a Framework for Electronic Commerce.
Edwards and Waelde eds. Hart 2000 pi81 at 185.
237 No 98-2958-R (CD CA dismissal Sept 22 (1998).
http:/ /eon.law.harvard.edu/property/metatags/Linkingl .html
238 Arden pointed to the links that would need to be followed to reach the Swedish web site: from Penney
home page to Taylor Passion part of the Penney site; to biography part of the passion site containing
information about Taylor; to work on screen; to the IMDB site; to FTP a link on the IMBD; site that took
the user to the Swedish site through which she could access the infringing photographs.
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relationships between Bernstein and JC Penney. Bernstein had been commissioned to
take the photographs for the purpose of advertising Passion Perfume (manufactured by
Arden). The agreement had broken down - acrimoniously. Bernstein argued that
Penney had deliberately designed the site so that visitors would be able to see the
disputed images of Taylor, and thus Penney and Arden would benefit from their use
without paying a royalty. The Californian federal judge dismissed copyright infringement
allegations.
In Sweden an attempt was made to impose liability on one individual (Tommy Olsson)
for running a web site which contained links to music files at other web sites239. The
Swedish court ruled that, since Olsson did not copy, distribute, or spread the pirated
music files, he was not guilty ofmusic piracy. The court held that the act of linking, or
directing someone to unauthorised copyright music, does not constitute piracy in relation
to that copyright240.
It appears to be the general view of courts in different jurisdictions, and of
commentators, that linking could not, of itself, constitute an infringement of
copyright241. However, a recent case from the US indicates that linking may, in certain
circumstances, be unlawful under the provisions of the US Digital Millennium Copyright
Act 1998 (DMCA). The case in question is Universal City Studios Inc v Shawn Reimerdes.242
This case had its origins in Norway where a student, Jon Johansen, wrote a program
(DeCSS) which could overcome the encryption (CSS) which limited access to Digital
Video Discs (DVD's). The purpose of overcoming the control (it was alleged) was to
allow DVD's to be run on the Linux operating system, rather than Windows, for which
the DVD's were intended. However, once the control mechanism was overcome, the
DVD's could be copied at will. The DeCSS program was copied on to web pages
belonging to inter alia, Eric Corley (alias Emmanuel Goldstein) at http://www.2600.com.
The major motion picture studios operated with some speed. A case was brought against
239 December 1999 the Swedish Court ofAppeal (Gota Hovratt).
http://www.juridicum.su.se/iri/karc/linking.htm.
240 ibid.
241 Burk, Proprietary Rights in Hypertext Linkages 1998 (2) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology
(JILT), http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/intprop/98_2burk/. Norderhaug/Oberding, Designing a Web of
IntellectualProperty, 1995 Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, 27 (6), 1037, 1042. Lemley, Dealing with
Operlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 1997, 22 University ofDayton Law Review 548-585, 565.
Hardy, Computer RAM 'Copies': Hit orMyth?, 1997, 22 University ofDayton Law Review 449. O'Rourke,
Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders inA Virtual World 1998, 82 Minnesota Law Review 609.
242 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Amended final judgement: 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Eric Corley and others, who the studios accused of violating the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA by making details of the DeCSS code available on the web site,
and by linking to other web sites containing the same code. This encryption technique,
and the legal protection surrounding these controls will be examined in chapter 4 of this
study. However, for this discussion on linking, one of the actions taken by the
defendants was to link to sites which contained information about and copies of the
DeCSS program. One of the questions to come before the court was whether this
technique of linking to sites containing this program was unlawful. The judge in the
District court compared the technique of linking to sites containing the program, which
itself was unlawful, to the spread of a plague. In these cases, it was not possible to
prevent further spread of the disease simply by treating the source. All manifestations
had to be controlled. As a result, there are times when linking could be found to infringe
the terms of the DMCA. The court said that the relevant factors to be taken into
account included whether those responsible for the link knew that the offending material
is on the linked-to site; that they knew that it is circumvention technology that may not
lawfully be offered; and the link is created or maintained for the purpose of
disseminating that technology.
On appeal243, the main focus of the arguments were directed towards the
constitutionality of the DMCA: was the DMCA consistent with freedom of speech as
laid down in the First Amendment to the US Constitution? Specifically it was argued
that outlawing linking amounted to a content-based restriction on speech, one that if to
be upheld 'demand(s) the highest level ofscrutiny^, but the requirements for which were not
present in this case.
On the effect of the DMCA, its application to linking and interaction with the First
Amendment, the Appeals Court were not prepared to accept that the 'rigorous' test
articulated by the lower court was necessary. That Court did however reject the
243 UniversalCity Studios v Erie Corley US Court ofAppeals 2nd Circuit November 28, 2001.
http://www.2600.com/news/112801-files/UniversalBrief_3.pdf.
244 'if [aws must he struck down when they outlaw advocacy of the "duty, necessity, orpropriety ofviolence" (Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969)) or the burning of the Americanflag (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989)), mere reference to a computerprogram alleged to circumvent copyright or access controls clearly may
not be enjoined. The FirstAmendment does not countenance such aprior restraint'.
For full details see Amicus Curiae filed by the Harvard Openlaw forum at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/amicus.html.
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argument that an intention to cause harm was required. Ultimately a choice had to be
made between two alternatives:
'either tolerate some impairment ofcommunication in order topermit Congress toprohibit decryption that
may lawfully beprevented, or tolerate some decryption in order to avoid some impairment of
communication 245.
These public policy issues were not for the court to decide, but for Congress. For the
purposes of the present case, the Appeals Court found that the lower court's injunction
including those parts prohibiting linking to sites containing DeCSS were consistent with
the First Amendment. Thus the injunction including that part relevant to the prohibition
on linking was upheld.
Although this case does not say that linking itself is an infringement of copyright in the
US, it does say that linking to websites which contain information on how decrypt
controls that surround creative works can result in liability under the DMCA. It is
perhaps only a short step from here to argue that linking to sites which contain works
which have been decrypted without permission of the owners is itself unlawful.
Although it remains to be seen if this short step will be taken.
9.4 Works made available over websites
Both copying of music and streaming (performance of music which is listened to by
surfers, but no copy is made) by web site owners have been the subject of court cases.
Once again, examples come from the US. MP3.com, a web site which streams and sells
music to surfers, offered a service whereby owners (or users) of CD's could place these
CD's in their own CD ROM drive on their computer, tune in to the MP3.com service on
the MP3.com website, and transmit data to MP3.com to confirm that they had the CD in
their own disc drive. MP3.com compiled its own database of recordings. Once the user
had 'beamed' the details of their personal CD's to MP3.com, MP3.com would create an
account for the surfer, and allow the surfer to listen to that music on whichever
computer they happened to be using at the time. There was no copy made from the
surfer's CD. When this was challenged by the RIAA, a District Judge in New York
found that MP3.corn's copying of the musical recordings to create its database was not
245 Ibid n238.
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lawful 'fair use' as had been argued246. Thus MP3.com had infringed copyright. As a
result, MP3.com have entered into various licensing deals with the music publishers247.
The digitisation and making available of e-books over the Internet has also caused
problems specifically concerning the interpretation of contract terms drawn up long
before the importance of the Internet as a medium for dissemination was envisaged. In
Random House v Rosetta Books24*, Rosetta Books acquired the electronic-publishing rights
to a number of book tides, including works by William Styron, Kurt Vonnegut and
Robert Parker. On February 27, 2001, Random House, Inc., filed suit against Rosetta
Books249. The suit alleged that Random House owns exclusive electronic rights to the
titles and that Rosetta infringed Random House's rights by publishing them
electronically. Random House argued that the rights it received from the authors during a
period over twenty years previously to 'print, publish and sell in book form' should now
be interpreted to include e-books. So the nub of the issue concerns contract
interpretation. The stakes were said to be high. It was argued that if the court decided in
favour of Random Books, then that company would have the right to exploit a 'new'
market in digitising its existing stock of books. Both the authors and Rosetta Books
would lose the chance to earn extra income from digital exploitation. If, on the other
hand, Rosetta Books won, then the value of the stock that Random House holds could
fall dramatically if and when the consuming public determines that it prefers e-books to
hard copies. It is also unlikely to be just Rosetta Books and Random House who would
be affected by the outcome of the case. Contracts used in the publishing industry tend
to be similar as between publishers. The outcome could therefore affect the electronic
rights to hundreds of thousands of books industry-wide, and thus determine the shape of
the e-publishing business in the future250. In the event, the court decided in favour of
Rosetta Books: the right to print and publish in book form did not include electronic
publishing rights251. The motion for the preliminary injunction was thus denied.
246 UMG Recordings Inc vMP3.com Inc US District Court, SDNY (RakoffJ), 4 May 2000.
http://www.gigalaw.com/library/umg-mp3-2000-05-04-pl.html.
247 MP3.com has apparently reached licensing deals with a number of right holders including Broadcast
Music (BMI), one of the two major U.S. organisations that collect music royalty payments. The deal will
allow MP3.com to play BMI's 4.5 million compositions on its Web site, http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1005-200-1 823327.html.
248 Most of the legal documents have been collated at http://www.rosettabooks.com/pages/legal.html.
249 In the Federal Court in the Southern District ofNew York.
250 http://www.rosettabooks.com/pages/legal.html.
251 12July, 2001. http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/Decision.pdf
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Random House has appealed. Although the appeal has not yet been heard, it is perhaps
noteworthy that at least to this point, Random House's share price has not collapsed.
9.5 On-line databases
The law in relation to databases has also come in for scrutiny252. The first reported case
in the UK on infringement of the database right was heard in the Patents Court on 9th
February 2001 and subsequendy appealed. In, British Horseracing Board Ltd and others v
William Hill Organisation Limited253 the question to be determined related to William Hill's
(WH) extraction and re-use of information about horse racing fixtures from a database
compiled by the British Horseracing Board (BHB). BHB compiles a database
comprising of information supplied by owners, trainers and others connected with the
racing industry, including names of horses, details of registered owners, racing colours
and pre-race information. The information is licensed to a number of different
organisations, including a company called Satellite Information Services who uses the
information for specified purposes, including onward transmission to subscribers, among
whom is WH. WH used this data in developing a bookmaking business over the
Internet, for which there was no authorisation from either BHB or Satellite Information
Services. BHB sued WH for unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation of a substantial
part of the contents of its database. The court found that there had indeed been both
unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation of a substantial part of the contents of BHB's
database, and this was so even ifWH changed the data used on its website.
The Court of Appeal254 lifted the injunction granted in the Patents Court but has referred
a number of questions to the ECJ. The Court of Appeal broadly endorsed the approach
taken by the lower court but was concerned that there had been no definitive ruling to
252 Other countries which have reported cases on the database right include Belgium where a court found
that unauthorised copying of a regional 'self-help list' containing the details of all self-help organisations in
the French-speaking part of Belgium, and re-utilisation in a national list, constituted an infringement of the
database maker's suigeneris rights. The case involved both paper form and electronic databases. Union
rationale des mutualities socialistes v. Belpharma Communication. Civ. Bruxelles, cess., 16.3.1999, JT 1999, 305. In
the US a similar scenario arose in C-99-21200-RMW Ebay v Bidder's Edge Inc. where the US court found that
unauthorised extraction from a website constituted trespass to chattels. This case can be compared with
Kelly vArriba Corp Case No SA CV 99-560 GLT US DC. Arriba created a visual search engine on the
Internet. They did so by sending out 'robots' to reproduce thumb-nail sized copies of images found and
compiled these into a database. Surfers could then search the database. Kelly alleged infringement of
copyright but the court found that the activity was protected under fair use. Had Kelly argued trespass to
chattels, they might have been successful
253[2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 12; [2001] R.P.C. 31.
2W [2001] EWCA Civ 1268; 24059 2001 WL 825162.
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date from the ECJ concerning the interpretation of the directive. This was made all the
more pertinent by rulings from courts in two other Member States, Holland and Sweden.
In ATMMoldingmaatschappij de TelegrafvNederlandse Omroep Stichtinf^, the Court of Appeal
of The Hague refused to hold that broadcasting listings were apt to attract database right
as there was no evidence of substantial investment in their compilation. In Fixtures
Marketing Limited v AB Svenska SpeP56 the Godand City Court found that although there
had been substantial investment in the production of football fixture lists there was no
infringement of the database right. The court considered that the right only encompassed
'reprinting or copying the information in the same or a similar compilationIn other words, the
right did not extend to the underlying information.
The actual questions to be referred to the ECJ by the Court of Appeal have, at the time
ofwriting, yet to be drafted, but it appears that they may be quite wide. One of the most
important is likely to concern the 'database-ness' of the compilation. Both the lower
court and Court of Appeal referred to the argument made by counsel forWH in this
regard. This argument was that what is protected by the database right is the 'database-
ness' of the collection of information; that is, that the materials are arranged in a
systematic or methodical way, and are individually accessible. Any acts which do not
make any use of the arrangement of the contents of the database, nor take advantage of
the way in which the maker has rendered the contents individually accessible, cannot
infringe the database right. In other words, it is not the contents of the database that are
protected, but the way in which the database is put together. This is a crucial question
concerning the protection of databases. Commentators on the database right have
generally been of the view that it is the contents that are protected by the new right, and
not the form. As such, the Directive involves a significant expansion of protection in this
area. All manner ofworks, or parts ofworks which, for whatever reason, do not attract
copyright protection could attract database right if the requirements for investment in
making the compilation are met. Equally, works which do attract copyright protection
can also acquire database protection if incorporated into that type of product. If the
ECJ ultimately decides that it is merely the form that attracts protection, it is hard to see
how that would add to existing protection. Copyright already subsists in the structure -
or viewed another way, the form - of a database so long as it is original. Equally limiting
255 99/165, 30 January 2001.
256 y 99.99 \\ April 2000. This has now been referred to the ECJ. Fixtures Marketing Ltd v OY Veikkaus
Ab C 46/02
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database right to the form would seem to run counter to those Recitals of the Directive
that refer to the investment in collating the information. On the other hand, should the
ECJ decide that it is merely the form that is protected, the implications for the public
domain are positive. The contents of the database would receive no greater protection
that already available by way of copyright. The author would merely be prevented from
extracting or re-utilising a substantial part of the form.
Another point that arises from the case, for the purposes of the discussion to come, is
that BHB appeared to be in a dominant position with regard to the information it
collates from the racing fraternity. It seems that the participants in the racing industry
are required to make the information available to the BHB as part of the regulation of
that industry. In other words, BHB collate facts that have to be given to them as part of
a condition of participation. Although this does not make them a monopoly producer of
the data, it does put them in a position that might be considered analogous to
government departments which collect data from the general population as part of their
functions, and which could be in a dominant position in relation to that data. What was
not at issue in this case was whether BHB had refused to license the data to WH for the
required purposes. WhatWH were challenging was the right of BHB to license the data.
Had the issue been in relation to a refusal to license the data for WH's required purposes,
then competition law might have been called in to play to challenge that refusal257. In
addition, it would appear that BHB are not themselves involved in the bookmaking
business. In other words, WH were not competing directly with the BHB in their use of
the information. It is appreciated that this is not a pre-condition of enforcing the
database right in UK law, but does perhaps help to explain why at least some US
commentators prefer protection of the contents of a database to be based on
misappropriation and unfair competition within the same or a similar marketplace258. If
that was the case in this scenario, re-use byWH of the information in a non-competing
business would not infringe the right. Finally, the court found thatWH had extracted
and re-utilised a substantial part of the information from the database, and therefore the
right was infringed. What was not questioned, but which will be important for future
discussion, is howWH might have gained access to the data should they have wished to
extract only an insubstantial amount.
257 For further comment see the discussion in chapter 9 of this study.
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9.6 Moral rights in the future?
The discussion above on moral rights suggested that, as works disseminated over the
Internet are available globally, it might be advantageous if moral right laws could be
harmonised internationally. It was, however, noted that this might be hard to attain,
given the opposition to moral rights in the Anglo-American traditions. In the absence of
such harmonisation, moral right laws found in those countries which support them might
still affect those who disseminate works over tire Internet emanating from jurisdictions
which do not, or do so to a lesser extent.
Two cases dealing with infringement of moral rights arising from the same facts were
heard in both the US and French courts during the 1990's25y. In the Huston case, the
Cour de Cassation acted on the application of the heirs ofJohn Huston, the director of
the film TheAsphaltJungle'260. Huston had signed a contract with the producer of the
film in the US, in terms of which he forfeited all rights of authorship in the film. The
film, originally made in black and white, was then colourised. Huston's heirs objected.
There was found to be no cause of action in the US because Huston had, by contract,
forfeited all his rights of authorship, whatever they were. However, when his heirs
brought an action in France, the Cour de Cassation upheld the claim, saying that moral
right law in France 'protects the integrity ofa literary or artistic work irrespective ofthejurisdiction in
which it wasfirstpublished, and recognises that the author is invested with the droit moral in that regard
by virtue ofthe solefact ofhis creative effort'261. Thus it would appear that, no matter the origin
of the work, and no matter that, in another jurisdiction, the author might have waived, or
258 Reichman and Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and
Technology 1999, 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 793. See also the discussion in chapter 7 of this
study.
259 Judgement ofApril 29, 1959 Cour d'appel Paris 1959 D Jur 402 which sustained Charlie Chaplins's
objection on droit moral grounds to distribution of his silent film, The Kid, with added musical
accompaniment. The court noted that by the operation of international copyright treaties to which both
France and the United States are signatories American films enjoy the same treatment as French films
under French law.
260 Judgement ofMay 28 1991 Cass civ Ire 1991 Bull Civ 1113 No 172 1993 D Jur on remand Judgement
ofDec 19 1994 Cour d'appel Versailles 1995 D SJur (IR) 65.
261 1991 Bull Civ 1 113 No 172 1993 D Jur 197. The Cour d'Appel was presented with evidence of
Huston's opposition to colourisation during his lifetime and awarded his heirs damages for the injury to the
film's integrity 1995 DS Jur (IR) 65.
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contracted out of any moral rights to which she may be entitled, the French courts apply
French moral right law to infringements that occur in France262.
If this principle is applied to the Internet, then any author, regardless of nationality,
might be able to sue in France for infringement of moral rights that occur in France.
Any work that is made available over the Internet and is accessible in France may satisfy
this test. Thus authors, concerned about the right of integrity in relation to works made
available over the Internet, may be able to use French law to complain of infraction of
these rights. Whether such a suggestion could be borne out in practice remains to be
10. Summary
Copyright has developed over the past three hundred years, to a point where it is now a
key support for thriving cultural and entertainment industries. In this process, a balance
has been found between the author, intermediary and user, while at the same time
sufficient material has been left in the public domain to ensure that the creative process
continues. The trend, over the last twenty years in particular, has been to increase the
property right in, and means of control over the dissemination of works264. This has
been supported largely by developing economic theories, and the perceived importance
262 Fawcett and Torremans, IntellectualProperty and Private International ~Law Clarendon Press 1998 (hereafter
Fawcett and Torremans) p 586 classified this as the French courts applying the mandatory laws of the
forum. Ginsburg, Private InternationalTawAspects ofthe Protection of Works and Objects ofRelated Rights
Transmitted Through DigitalNetworksWIPO paper November 1998 (available as GCPIC/2 on the WIPO
website) on the other hand, classified it as the application of a rule of French public policy. Divergent
approaches can be seen, comparing US cases with those in France. In Shostakovich v Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp 80 NYS 2d 575 (N.Y. Sup Ct 1948) affd affd 87 NYS 2d 430 (NY App Div 1949) Judgement of
Jan 13 1953 Cour D'appel Paris 1 GP 191 (1953) 1953 JCP 11 No 7667 the composers sued 20th Century
Fox in New York when the film company released an anti-Soviet film called The Iron Curtain using music
that was in the public domain. The compositions were in the public domain in the US because the US and
the Soviet Union did not, at that time, have an agreement concerning copyright. As the composers lived in
the Soviet Union they were concerned about having their reputations mixed with an anti-Soviet film. The
court rejected an application for an injunction finding no viable claim under New York law. At the same
time in France, the composers filed a complaint with the police resulting in the seisure of copies of the film
intended for distribution there. On appeal 20th Century Fox argued that the composers had no rights in
their compositions because they had failed to register the copyright. In rejecting the appeal and sustaining
the seizure of the film, the appelate court ruled that under French law copyright vested in the composers
independent of registration and irrespective of the fact that the Soviet Union did not accord reciprocal
protection to French authors and artists. The composers were awarded monetary damages for the
prejudice suffered. For a discussion see Gigante Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway: Foreign liabilityfor
Domestically Created Content 1996, 14 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 523.
263 For an in-depth discussion see De Souza and Waelde Moral Rights and the Internet: Squaring the Circle
forthcoming in 2002, Intellectual Property Quarterly.
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of intellectual products in global trade. In many countries from both the Anglo-
American and Civilian systems, existing laws do extend to the activities that occur on the
Internet, and authors and intermediaries alike have been using those laws to enforce
rights. As suggested, however, these laws have not been considered by many (in
particular intermediaries) to be sufficient to meet the demands of digital dissemination.
The arguments used to justify changes to the law of copyright, together with an analysis
of the direction of those changes is provided in the next chapter.




Setting the Internet scene
1. Introduction
Although the law of copyright applies to protect digital works disseminated over the
Internet, a number of the modes of reproduction and dissemination do not fall neatly
into existing legal categories1. One early question was as to how, in copyright terms, a
transmission on the Internet should be defined2. Works distributed over the Internet
are sometimes said to be pulled from a web site, as when a surfer visits3: at other times
the works are actually sent to the user, as when a work is incorporated into an e-mail.
The different modes of communication are not quite like broadcasting4, or cable
programming, because the works can be accessed individually, rather than being made
available at the behest of the broadcaster or cable programmer. The concept of
reproduction, too, caused some problems. Making a copy of a work on the screen of
one computer, and then transmitting it to another such that the work when it arrives is
the same, look like reproductions of a work. But often these reproductions are only
temporary, and more akin to a performance than to a copy. If so, the work would be
protected, but subject to a different regime. To infringe the performing right, a
performance has to be in public,5 whereas works available on the Internet tend to be
accessed in the privacy of a home or an office. It is also unclear as to how the
distribution right might operate on the Internet. A copyright owner has the right to
issue copies of a work to the public6. This right is exhausted after the first sale of a
physical object embodying the copyright work, such as a book or a video7. How could,
or should, this doctrine apply on the Internet if a surfer never obtained a hard copy of a
1 For a broad discussion on how the Internet breaks down the traditional copyright structure see
Dreier, Copyright Issues in a Digital Publishing World ISCU Press — UNESCO.
http://associnst.ox.ac.uk/~icsuinfo/dreier.htm. See also Dommering, Copyright Being Washed
Away Through the Electronic Sieve. Some Thoughts on the Impending Copyright Crisis, in The Future of
Copyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p4.
2 The Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society COM (95) 382
final 19.07.1995.
3 Shetland Times v Wills 1997 SC 316.
4 CDPA 1988, ss 7 and 9(2)(c). Broadcasting is defined as 'transmission ly wireless telegraphy'. As
transmission over the Internet currently depends on wires transmission on die Internet is not broadcasting.
5 CDPA sl9.
6 CDPA s 18.
7 CDPA s 18(2).
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work? Or is the transmission of a work to be categorised as a service, rather than as
goods, in which case the exhaustion doctrine would not apply.
These are just some of the areas that had to be considered in relation to the protection
of creative works on the Internet: whether the existing rules were sufficient, or if new
ones were needed.
1.2 History repeating itself
Three factors are said to have had an impact on the development of protection of
literary property in the eighteenth century. These were, first, the 'legal struggle about the
nature ofproperty and how the law might adapt itself to the changed circumstances ofan economy based
on tradeI. Second, 'it was a contest about howfar the ideology ofpossessive individualism should be
extended into the realm ofculturalproduction'. Third, it 'was a commercial encounter, played out in
theform ofa national contest between Tingland and Scotland in which a deeply entrenched business
establishment was challenged by outsiders ''/
In the twenty-first century the batdes may not be exacdy the same, but they are fought
along similar lines. Today, the creative property question concerns first how the law
might adapt itself to the changed circumstances of a global economy based on trade.
Second, there is an ongoing struggle to find a way in which those who develop cultural
products can derive a return from works disseminated over the Internet, whilst ensuring
that there is a supply of raw materials available for the creation of new works. And
third, it is in the nature of a contest that sees existing business establishments in the
cultural and entertainment industries being challenged by new modes of distribution and
use9.
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to examine the arguments that have been used to
support enhanced rights to control works disseminated over the Internet. Second, it
introduces three documents that have been of paramount importance in shaping the
8 All quotes are from Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention ofCopyright Harvard University Press
1993 p92.
9 See for example comment by Samuelson, Questioning the Needfor New International Rules in Author's
Rights in Cyberspace 1996 http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4/samuelson/
The biggest threat that Cyberspace poses for authors andpublishers is not how to strengthen copyright law, but
how to reinvent their business models so that they figure out how to provide content that will interest potential
customers on terms that these consumersfind acceptable' p9.
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tone of the legislative programme for the protection of works on the Internet. These
documents represent the position taken by regulators and policy makers at different
stages of the legislative process. The first is the US Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights as part of the National Information Infrastructure Task
Force10 (Nil Report). This document examined the law of copyright in the US as it
existed prior to any amendments being made which were directed towards Internet
activities. It therefore set the scene and made proposals for subsequent legislative
amendments. The second document is the Copyright Treaty negotiated under the
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organisation in Geneva in 1996 (WCT).
This Treaty must be incorporated into the domestic legislation of those States which
become signatories. The third document is the European Parliament and Council
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in
the Information Society (the Copyright Directive)11. This will apply only to Member
States of the EU, which will be required to implement its provisions into domestic law.
The third purpose of this chapter is to consider the policy arguments behind the
developments taking place and to discuss how the traditional copyright framework is
changing as a result.
2. The Voices in the Legislative Debate
Faced with works being 'washed away through the electronic sieve'12, intermediaries13
and lobbyists on their behalf14 have been active in shaping the legislative debate about
10 1995 Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure. The Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. ISBN 0-9648716-0-1.
11 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. The draft which
received the most attention was the one on which the Council of Ministers reached political
agreement on 8 June 2000. This draft was published on 16 June 2000, document number SN
2696/00(PI) and replaced that published by the Commission on 21 May 1999 (COM(1999) 250
final), OJ 1999, CI 80/6). The Directive was finally adopted by the Council of Ministers on 9th
April 2001and contains some, but (despite intensive lobbying) few material changes from the draft
of 16 June 2000.
12 A term coined by Dommering, Copyright Being WashedAmay Through the Electronic Sieve. Some
Thoughts on the Impending Copyright Crisis, in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment
Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996.
13 It appears that the debate was and is being driven by the entertainment industry: the record
publishers, publishing houses and film producers who take an assignment of copyright from the
author, or who employ the author. These bodies thus own huge repertories of works protected by
copyright.
14 One body which appears to have been particularly influential is the Global Business Dialogue
on e-commerce (GBDe). This is a grouping of heads of companies such as Time Warner and
Fujitsu. This group has prepared various 'posm°n papers' on aspects of e-commerce including
copyright. They argue for the views represented in these papers to be reflected in the formal
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how creative works are to be protected on the Internet15. The most vociferous have
been the publishing16 and music businesses17. Literary and musical works are among
those that can currently be most easily distributed and copied on the Internet in a form
useful to the surfer, and seem to be the products most attractive to those who spend a
lot of time surfing the Internet. Other interest groups are represented, but it would
appear that they have not had the same influence as the large intermediaries in
particular18. Authors as individuals are heard in the debate, but usually when their
interests coincide with intermediaries, and that is when a financial incentive is at stake.
The tensions that can appear between these two groups was quite marked in the debate
over Napster. The collecting organisations acting on behalf of music publishers and
record companies were, and remain, adamantly opposed to Napster. A number of high
profile and successful bands, including Metallica and Dr Dre, joined this chorus of
disapproval. On the other hand, other musicians, whose works are either not known, or
less well known, were keen that Napster should continue to be available to fans to swap
their music files. Napster gave them an outlet for their works, despite the absence of
any direct financial return from the sharing of the music files.
legislative agenda. The influence of this body should not be underestimated. The EU, in its
preparation of the various directives that will have a profound impact on the way in which e-
commerce will develop in Europe has been in close contact with this body. This was stated as
such at the WIPO Conference on Intellectual Property and E-commerce in Geneva in September
1999. See also Braithwaite and Drahos Global Business Regulation Cambridge University Press 2000,
who argue that 'global business regulations emerge from various 'epistemic' communities of experts that met
regularly all over the world. They have a shared understanding of regulation in any particular sphere that leads
them not merely to advise but to direct as well' p54. Litman Copyright Non-compliance (or Why We Can't 'Just
Say Yes' to Licensing) 1997, 29 NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 237.
http: //www.msen.com/~litman/no.htm.
15 Samuelson Copyright Digital Data and Fair Use in Digital Networked Environments
http://www.droit.montreal.ca/crdp/en/equipes/te.../samuelson.htm pointing to a symposium
held in 1993 by WIPO on The Impact ofDigital Technologies on Copyright Taw' at Harvard Law
School. She comments that an unbalanced approach was taken in the questionnaire, and that no-
one who questioned the future of copyright in a digital age was asked to speak.
16 Clark in various papers including The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine in The Future of
Copyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996.
17 The Recording Industry Association of America is particularly vocal http://www.riaa.org.
18 See EU Legal Advisory Board (LAB) response to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society adopted by the Commission on July 19 1995. LAB held a
meeting of the Intellectual Property Task Force in Luxembourg on 21 September 1995 to discuss
the Green Paper. The comments are in the response to be found at
http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/ipr/reply/intro.html. 'TAB regrets that the parties invited to express
their view at the 'Superhighways' hearing did not include (proportional) representation ofmajor information users,
such as libraries, intermediaries, universities, and end users'.
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It is also said that users are represented in the debate, through the reasonably powerful
library lobby19. Few, however, seem to have been arguing on behalf of the future
author, who depends on having access to a thriving public domain on which to draw in
creating new works. There have been some eloquent protests on behalf of the future
author, most notably from the academic community20. But sadly these are often
dismissed as authors who have no need to obtain a financial reward from their
endeavours, because they are paid by their institutions,21 and for whom recognition by
peers is more important.
The influence exerted by the intermediaries has had a profound influence in shaping the
digital copyright agenda.
2.1 The commentators
The arguments used to justify or criticise the application of copyright to the Internet
range across a spectrum.22 At one end, some consider that copyright is irrelevant
because creation and exploitation of creative works depends on relations rather than
rights. At the other end are arguments that copyright is irrelevant on the Internet
because all creative works will, in the future anyway, be protected by digital fences
which will allow intermediaries to control, by technical means, each and every
reproduction and use of a creative work. Thus the need to rely on the bundle of rights
granted by the law of copyright becomes redundant23. There are a number of shades of
difference in between these perspectives.
The view that copyright is irrelevant on the Internet was most eloquently articulated by
John Perry Barlow24. Broadly, his argument is that copyright protection for works
19 Eg SCONUL, based in London and which 'works to improve the quality and extend the influence of the
university and national libraries of the UK and Ireland1. http://www. sconul.ac.uk.
20 The US academic community appear to be particularly involved in the US legislative process.
21 Bell, Fair Use vs Fared Use The Impact ofAutomated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine
1998, 76 North Carolian Law Review 557.
22 Samuelson describes the views as 'starkly divergent' in Copyright Digital Data and Fair Use in
Digital Networked Environments.
Attp: / /www.droit.umontreal.ca/crdp/en/equipes/ te.. ./samuelson.htm.
23 Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Eaw Could be
Unimportant on the Internet 1997, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Vol 12: Issue 1.
http://www/law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/12-1/schlachter. html.
24See also Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights, 1984, 2.03
WIRED 84. Negroponte, The Bit Police: Will the FCC Regulate Licenses to Radiate Bits? 1993,1.2
WIRED 112.
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disseminated over the Internet is irrelevant and unenforceable because of the ability to
produce perfect digital copies of works on a one-to-one basis. The development of the
Internet, and the exploitation of creative material, will involve the creation and
development of relationships, rather than enforcement of rights. Barlow uses as an
illustration the example of his own success as a songwriter for the band The Grateful
Dead. He explains how The Grateful Dead allowed fans to tape their concerts, thus
giving copies of their work away for free. Rather than having the effect of reducing
income to the group and prompting a decline in popularity, this increased their success
hugely. Fans would purchase memorabilia and original CDs (presumably for the better
quality), and come to their concerts in droves25. Thus their popularity developed
through relationships with their fans, rather than by enforcing rights against them. By
analogy, so Barlow argues, such relationships, rather than ownership and enforcement
of rights, can be developed on the Internet to the benefit of the intermediaries and
authors.
Echoes of this argument can be seen in the writings of Esther Dyson, one-time chair of
the Board of Directors of the Internet Corporation for Advanced Names and Numbers
(ICANN)26, who argues that:
'value shiftsfrom the transformation ofbits rather than bits themselves, to services, to the
selection ofcontent, to thepresence ofotherpeople, and to the assurance ofauthenticity - reliable
information about sources ofbits and theirfutureflows. In short, intellectual assets and
property depreciate while intellectualprocesses and services appreciate* .
Because the Internet makes copying so easy, the value of creative works will no longer
lie in being able to control reproduction. Rather, it will be found in the add-on services,
such as allowing readers to interact with authors over the Internet, or by selling a range
of goods associated with the author, or by ensuring that information can be found with
ease. Although the writers who sit on this side of the argument are sometimes accused
of advocating doing away with copyright on the Internet, this is not the nub of their
25 A similar argument could be made for the release of the CD Rom. Some say that this was a
mistake on the part of the record companies as each CD Rom is effectively a master copy.
Despite this, since the release of CD Roms, the market has increased exponentially. Sales of
recorded music rose from $3.8 billion in 1983 to $412.2 billion in 1993.
26 htp://www.icann.org. ICANN was set up, among other things, to manage the domain name
process on the Internet. For a fuller discussion on the formation and functions of ICANN see
Waelde, Trade Marks and Domain Names: There's a Tot in a Name in Law and the Internet:
Regulating Cyberspace Edwards and Waelde eds. Hart Publishing 2000.
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position. Rather, it is that copyright may or may not apply, but it is in any event
irrelevant, or at least uncertain in application and difficult in enforcement. Rather than
concentrating on enforcing rights on the Internet, those who create works should be far
more receptive to alternative ways in which business can be done and economic rewards
achieved28.
At the other end of this spectrum are those who argue that the technology of the
Internet can control and enforce the distribution of creative works. Electronic
copyright management systems or 'digital fences' will support ownership rights, and,
more importandy, prohibit use and reproduction ofwork by third parties unless
authorised by the copyright owner. There are a number of variations on this view. One
is that the law of copyright is not actually necessary at all. Rather, these technical
measures are all that is needed to make the property of the intellectual property owner a
source of revenue29. What is therefore required are laws to oufiaw circumvention of
these technical measures30; in other words, making it unlawful to try and defeat the
protection. Another variation is that the digital fences themselves should be regulated
by law to ensure fairness31. This could be done by programming them to conform to
the existing law of copyright32. For example, when a work fell into the public domain,
this would be programmed into the system to allow free use of that work at the
appropriate time. Or, if new laws are chosen to protect creative material in the digital
age, then these management systems must be programmed to take these rules into
27 Dyson, Intellectual Value http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6805/articles/int-prop/dyson-wired-7-
95.html.
28 One suspects that the advocates of these arguments would not hesitate to use traditional law of
copyright should it meet their ends. Indeed, Barlow has said that if fans started to sell copies of
works belonging to the Grateful Dead for commercial return, they would not hesitate to start
enforcement action. Ms Dyson distributes a monthly newsletter, but it is by way of hard copy to a
limited circulation who pay for the privilege rather than over the Internet. Perhaps she does not
trust the Internet as a means of distribution to keep the information confidential. Mann, Who Will
Own Your Next Good idea? http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98sep/copy.htm
29 Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge us to Rethink
Digital Publishing 1997, 12 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1.
30 It has been argued that because rights management system containers can be used to lock up
information that should be freely available or accessible there should be a right to hack into these
systems to get this information Cohen, Copyright and the jurisprudence ofself help 1998, 13 Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 1089.
31 Lessig, Code and Other Taws of Cyberspace US Basic Books 1999.
32 Developments in the Taw - The Taw of Cyberspace 1999, Harvard Law Review 1574 (author not cited
in article).
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account, such as allowing access to information for certain groups, or for the purpose of
ascertaining the ideas in the work33.
In between these positions are a number of other opinions. One is that different zones
will develop on the Internet34. On-line communides, such as usenet news groups, will
exercise powers of self-governance. Because they are largely unregulatable, they will
develop shared norms which will be enforced by members of the community rather
than by the legal system. These norms may or may not follow the contours of existing
laws, such as copyright. However, because such groups are self-regulated, so they will
develop, and manage, their own 'Cyberspace' law. Other zones, such as the web, should
be subject to existing rules from the non-Cyber world, with additions applicable
specifically to the Internet. These rules can then be enforced, either by traditional
means, or by way of dedicated Internet mediation and arbitration systems35.
A number of academic commentators, notably from the US, point out that the law of
copyright developed for a purpose: to provide a private incentive to create more works,
and to promote the public interest in encouraging the dissemination ofworks. New
rules may be necessary to protect creative works disseminated over the Internet. But
the balance found in the existing law should be reflected in these new rules. Thus, there
must be limitations on the rights granted to protect works, and the power to inhibit
access to these works. Such commentators tend to reflect the view that the law of
copyright should apply, but that traditional balances in, and indeed justifications for, the
grant of protection are being lost in current legislative developments.
3. The legislative agenda
The three documents to be discussed show how early the agenda became set for the
way in which creative works would be protected on the Internet. They exhibit a
uniform move towards increasing protection for right holders reflecting a widely held
33 Lessig has coined the term The Code is in the Code'. Broadly this appears to mean that the laws
(code) should be written into the code (programs) that make up the architecture of the Internet.
Lessig, Code and Other Caws of Cyberspace US Basic Books 1999.
34 Johnson and Post, Caw and Borders - The Rise ofCaw in Cyberspace 1996, 48 Stanford Law Review
1367 argue that Cyberspace should be seen as a 'distinct place' for copyright and other laws. This
would allow for the development of new forms of copyright suitable for the Internet.
35 Post, engineering a VirtualMagistrate System, http://www law.vill.edu/ncair/disres.
Goldsmith and Lessig, Grounding the VirtualMagistrate, http://www.law.vill.edu/ncair/disres.
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view that the copyright protection of creative works on the Internet is considered an
essential element in the globalisation of e-commerce.
3.1 The National Information Infrastructure Report 1995 (Nil Report)
The Nil Report resulted from an initiative by President Clinton to further his
Administration's goals for the National Information Infrastructure (Nil) of the USA36.
Principles for government action were described inNilAgendaforAction1'1 and Gil
Agendafor Cooperation38. The aim was 'to develop comprehensive telecommunications and
informationpolicies andprograms that wouldpromote the development of the Nil and best meet the
country's needs'. The task force was divided into three groups, one of which was the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights39. The remit of the group was to
examine the intellectual property implications of the Nil, and make recommendations
on any appropriate changes to US intellectual property law and policy40. The final
report focused primarily on copyright law and its application and effectiveness in the
context of the Internet41.
36 Nil refers to the National Information Infrastructure, and is the term used for the Internet in
the Nil Report.
37 Information Infrastructure Task Force, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action (Sept. 1993).
38 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation
(Feb. 1995).
39 Chaired by Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
Bruce A. Lehman.
40 In the course of its work, the Working Group identified issues in other areas, such as
defamation and obscenity, which were considered separately by the Information Policy
Committee.
41 The Committee stated: The 'National Information Infrastructure,' as it is discussed in this Report,
encompasses digital, interactive services now available, such as the Internet, as well as those contemplatedfor the
future. To make the analyses more concrete, however, the Working Group has, in many instances, evaluated the
intellectualproperty implications of activity on the Internet, the superstructure whose protocols and rules effectively
create (orpermit the creation of) a 'network of networks.' This reflects neither an endorsement of the Internet nor
a derogation of any other existing orproposed network or service that may be available via the Nil, but, rather,
an acknowledgment that a currently functioning structure lends itselfmore readily to legal analysis than a
hypothetical construct based on future developments'At p8 n5.
The description of current US law in the Nil Report has been questioned by some eminent
writers. For example: Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy OnLine: A Young Person's Guide 1996, 10
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 47. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the Information Superhighway'
Authors Exploiters and Copyright in Cyberspace. 1995, 95 Columbia Law Review 1466. Litman, The
Exclusive Eight to Read 1994, 13 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 29. Loundy, Revising
the Copyright Eaw for Electronic Publishing http://www.leepfrog.com/E-Law/revising-HyperT.html
Copyright issues raised on the Internet in the US are also considered in depth by Hardy in Project
Eooking Forward: Sketching the Future of Copyright in a Networked World (US Copyright Office 1998)
final report http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/reports.
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The Nil Report is a lengthy document, consisting of 185 pages including annexes. The
bulk of the Report is taken up with a discussion of existing copyright law in the USA,
identifying the gaps where the existing law might not apply, and making
recommendations for reform. Broadly, the committee considered that existing laws
applied to digital transmission of creative works. Copyright owners thus had the right
to control most unauthorised dissemination, subject to clarifying the definitions of
publication and transmission42, and tightening up library privileges43. One of the most
cmcial recommendations was that provisions relating to technical protection measures
should be introduced44.
In order to implement the proposals in the Nil Report, and to deal with obligations
arising under the WCT, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was enacted in the US in
199845. This Act introduces provisions for the protection of copyright management
and information systems46, deals with Internet service provider liability47, permits
decompilation of computer software programs for computer maintenance and repair48,
and deals with ephemeral recordings, distance education, libraries and archives49. The
passage of the Act allowed the US to deposit its instrument of ratification of the WCT
1996 with WIPO in Geneva in September 199950.
3.2 The arguments in the Nil Report for the application of copyright to
the Internet
The drafters of the Nil Report considered three arguments as to the proper application
of copyright in the digital world. The first was that copyright protection should be
reduced, because the public wants information to be free and unencumbered, and the
42 Nil Report p 156 The Working Group recommends that the definition of 'publication' in Section 101 of the
CopyrightAct be amended to recognige that a work may be published through the distribution of copies of the
work to the public by transmission
43 ibid.
44 ibid p 163.
45 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA).
46 DMCA ss 101-105.
47 DMCA ss 201-205.
48 DMCA s 301.
49 DMCA ss401-403.
50 A conference also took place on Fair Use, and a final report was produced in November 1998
Final Report to the Commissioner on the Conclusion of the Conference on Fair Use
November 1998 ISBN 0-9668180-2-4. The purpose was to develop guidelines for fair uses of
works protected by copyright by librarians and educators The main achievement of this
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law should reflect that public interest (the John Perry Barlow argument)51. The second
argument was that copyright protection should be reduced, because copying was so
easy: 'Since computer networks now make unauthorised reproduction, adaptation, distribution and
other uses ofprotected works so incredibly easy, , the law should legitimise those uses orface
widespreadflouting"'. Finally, there was the argument that intellectual property laws of any
country are inapplicable to works on the Internet, because all activity using these
infrastructures takes place in 'Cyberspace,' which is self-governing and whose members
'will rely on their own ethics - or 'netiquette' - to determine what uses ofworks, ifany, are improper53.
Both the second and third arguments were dismissed by the drafters of the Nil Report
as irrelevant. In reply to the second, it was stated that the ease of reproduction of
creative works on the Internet did not mean that such reproduction should be
legitimised if not authorised. It is also easy on the Internet to obtain credit card details,
to use for on-line shopping; but that does not mean that this should be made lawful. As
for the third argument - that Cyberspace is without law - commentators generally agreed
that, far from being a law-free zone, the Internet was in fact full of competing laws.
Returning to the first argument, the Committee responded to the view that 'information
wants to be free', by saying:
While, atfirst blush, it may appear to be in the public interest to reduce theprotection granted
works and to allow unfettered use by thepublid4' [such an analysis is incomplete].
'Protection ofworks ofauthorship provides the stimulusfor creativity, thus leading to the
availability ofworks of literature, culture, art and entertainment that thepublic desires and
thatform the backbone ofour economy andpolitical discourse. If these works are notprotected,
then the marketplace will not support their creation and dissemination, and thepublic will not
receive the benefit oftheir existence or be able to have unrestricted use ofthe ideas and
information they convey
The way to ensure that such works are made available to the public is to have ' effective
copyrightprotection *6.
conference was the development of fair use guidelines for educational multimedia. Proposals
were also made for fair use guidelines for digital images.
51 Nil Report p 15.
52 ibid p 16.
53 Ibid pi 9.
54 ibid p 5.
55 ibid p 16.
56 ibid p 17.
76
In this argument, there are echoes of a number of the traditional justifications for the
protection of creative works, in particular the Utilitarian theory57. If protection for
creative works is granted, so authors will have the incentive to create more such works.
In turn the public will be enriched by having unrestricted use ofthe ideas and infonnation
encompassed in these works. But the trend is for 'effective copyright protection', that is
to say, to increase the rights over the works. There is a move away from the balance
between creating a limited incentive for the author, and the public interest in
dissemination, to an increase in the property rights. This is more rooted in the
economic theory underpinning copyright58. But it will be recalled that this theory does
not justify the grant of property rights because they provide a limited incentive to create
more works, but because such a move is said to be economically efficient.
It would have been useful had the Committee at this juncture entered into a detailed
discussion as to whether the current law, or, as things have been moving, increased
protection for copyright owners is in fact the best way forward for the development of
the use and exploitation of the Internet59, or if a new paradigm for the protection of
creative works should, or could, have been developed. Despite the influential
arguments that preceded the Report, it appears to have been assumed by the drafters of
the Report that the law of copyright exists and should be applied to the new medium,
and, to the extent that the rights of copyright owners needed more rights to control
dissemination ofworks, these should be enacted. There was never any discussion of the
way in which the medium changed the dynamics for the production and dissemination
of protected works; or that there might be alternative goals worthy of pursuit rather
than protection by copyright; or that copyrightper se might not be the most generally
advantageous method for the protection of works; or that shifting economic patterns
might call for alternative methods of protection to be found; or that public and private
investment in the method of distribution (the Internet) might require a change to the
model with which we have been familiar for many years. There was minimal analysis of
the prevailing theories of intellectual property law, as to why and to what extent rights
should be granted, and what the balancing factors should be60. There were no 'what if
57 For a discussion of the Utilitarian theory, see chapter 2 of this study.
58 For a discussion see chapter 2 of this study.




scenarios as to what might happen if nothing was done and existing laws alone were
relied upon. Nor was there any attempt to ascertain whether different balances between
author, intermediary and user might be found. There was no consideration of the
different elements that make up the Internet as a whole, such as usenet newsgroups, e-
mail facilities and the web, each ofwhich has its own characteristics and communities.
Such an analysis might have been difficult when the Report was drafted, as the Internet
was then in the relatively early stages of its evolution. A number of the developments
that have taken place since could not have been foreseen, such as the dispute over
Napster61, or the development of new technology which allows computers to link to
other computers, and extract information directly from those other computers without
using information contained on a web site62. But very strong legislative commitments
have been made to copyright owners, to allow them to protect their business interests.
These are far stronger than have been made before in the non-Cyber world. In so
doing, the balances to be found in the law of copyright, and the justifications on which
such balances rested, appear to have been overlooked.
3.3 International Developments
Two early international agreements concerning the 'digital agenda' were the WCT and
the WPPT. WIPO has a number of Committees of Experts. The Committee charged
with oversight of copyright and related rights had been discussing, since 1991, a possible
protocol to the Berne Convention, to reflect some of the more modern advances in the
creation and exploitation of creative works. The Berne Convention had last been revised
in 1971 in Paris, since when the Internet had developed.63 These negotiations within
the Committee of Experts concentrated for several years on terrestrial concerns. It was
only in 1996 that the committee started to focus on the protection of works distributed
over the Internet64.
61 This case has been discussed in chapter 2 of this study.
62 For an example see http://www.wego.gnutella.com.
63 Dixon and Hansen, The Berne Convention Enters the DigitalAge [1996] 11 EIPR 604.
64 For an interesting discussion on the state of play in 1995 see Ficsor, Towards a Global Solution:
The DigitalAgenda of the Berne Protocol and the New Instrument. The paper was presented at a
colloquium on 6-7 July 1995 and appears in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment
Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996.
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3.4 The WCT
The WCT is a relatively brief Treaty, consisting of 22 Articles, and 9 Agreed Statements.
A number of the Articles are merely restatements of the existing law65. Thus, Article 2
restates the generally accepted rule that 'copyrightprotection extends to expression and not to
ideas, procedures, methods or operation ormathematical concepts as suchOther articles were
added to clarify the law where there was some doubt about interpretation and inclusion
in the existing Treaties. Article 4 provides that computer programs are to be protected
as literary works66. Yet other Articles introduce a measure of harmonisation into the
laws of contracting States, for instance on the right of rental for computer programs,
films and phonograms67.
There are two real advances concerning digital works. These are contained in Article 8
and Articles 11 and 12, and concern the right of communication to the public, and the
protection of technical measures designed to control access to and use of creative
works, and rights management information respectively.
It is Article 8 which contains the required measure, separating the work which is
protected by copyright from the physical article in or on which it is held. Article 8
provides that:
authors ofliterary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right ofauthorising any
communication to thepublic oftheir works, by wire or wireless means, including the making
available to thepublic oftheir works in such a way that members of thepublic may access these
worksfrom aplace and at a time individually chosen by them 68.
Thus there is no requirement under this article that the work be fixed in any tangible
form. Rather it is the communication to thepublic and the making available of the literary and
artistic work that is a right reserved to the author. The effect of these new rights is to
give to the author (or other right holder) not only the exclusive right to authorise when
a work will be made available over the Internet, but also the exclusive right over every
65 WCT Article 2 concerning the scope of copyright protection.
66 WCT Article 4 stating that computer programs are protected as literary works within Art 2 of
the Berne Convention.
67 WCT Article 7.
68 For a full discussion on Article 8 see chapter 5 of this study.
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further movement of that work. This, in turn means that the author can licence every
further reproduction.
Article 11 contains the requirements relating to the protection of technological
measures. It provides:
'Contracting Parties shallprovide adequate legalprotection and effective legal remedies against
the circumvention ofeffective technologicalmeasures that are used by authors in connection with
the exercise oftheir rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in
respect oftheir works, which are not authorised by the authors concerned orpermitted by law'.
This article ensures that where rights holders protect a work against unauthorised
reproduction through the use of technology, then it will be unlawful to circumvent that
technology to make use of the work. That is unless the action is authorised by the right
holder, or the circumvention is permitted by law.
Finally, Article 12 of the WCT provides that where a work is disseminated over the
Internet in conjunction with information about that work, for instance the name of the
author, or the conditions under which the work may be re-used, then it will be unlawful
to remove that information. This article is designed in part to maintain the integrity of
the information disseminated in conjunction with the work, but perhaps more
importantly, a number of the databases being designed by right-holders depend on such
information being automatically available in conjunction with the work. The process of
managing rights (and payment) can become almost automatic so long as that
information remains reliable.
3.4.1 The balance in the WCT
By contrast with the concerns of the drafters of the Nil Report, where the discussion
revolved around US law and US interests, negotiations and outcomes atWIPO had to
accommodate interests of both Civilian and Anglo-American legal systems69. The Berne
Convention had always been protective of authors70, and one could expect the WCT to
69 Although no reservations are to be admitted to the Treaty, there are 9 Agreed Statements. This
might suggest that it was difficult to attain international consensus on the terms of the Treaty.
For general comment see Reinbothe Martin-Prat and Von Lewinski, The New WIPO Treaties: A
First Resume [1997] 4 EIPR 171.
70 For a discussion on the Berne Convention, see chapter 2 of this study.
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reflect the same concerns. Indeed, because tire WCT is a special agreement within the
meaning ofArticle 20 of the Berne Convention71, the focus is on the interests of the
author. This is reflected in the preamble to the WCT:
'Desiring to develop andmaintain theprotection ofthe rights oj authors in their literary and
artistic works in a manner as effective and uniform aspossible;
emphasising the outstanding significance ofcopyrightprotection as an incentivefor literary and
artistic creation;
and recognising the need to maintain a balance between the rights ofauthors and the larger
public interest, particularly education, research and access to information as reflected in the
Berne Convention
There are echoes here of the Civilian approach to protection, in that the focus of
protection should be the authors. However, there no reference to moral rights in the
WCT, showing that economic concerns were uppermost in the minds of the
negotiators.
3.5 The WPPT
Although the focus in this study will be the WCT, it is also worth making brief mention
of the WPPT, as the Copyright Directive in the EU is intended to implement
obligations found in both Treaties. The WPPT concerns the rights of performers and
producers of phonograms72. This Treaty provides that performers and producers of
phonograms should have the right to authorise fixation of performances, and the rights
to authorise reproduction, distribution, rental and, for the Internet, to make available
fixed performances by wire or wireless means. Equitable remuneration is to be paid to
both performers and producers of phonograms for the direct, or indirect, use of
phonograms published for commercial purposes, for broadcasting, or any
communication to the public73. Protection for performers lasts until the end of a period
71 WCT Article 1(1). Article 20 of the Berne Convention states: 'The Governments of the countries of
the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to
authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain otherprovisions not contrary to
this Convention. The provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these conditions shall remain applicable'.
72 Because of the wording of the Berne Convention, WCT and WPPT, performers of audiovisual
works lack any explicit protection in the Treaties. Attempts have been made over the past two
years to negotiate a Treaty in this area. The latest negotiations ended without any agreement
being attained. For a discussion see see von Lewinski The WJPO Diplomatic Conference On
Audiovisual Performances:A First Resume [2001] 7 EIPR 23. Measures similar to those provided for
performers were introduced into the EC in Council directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992
on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of
Intellectual Property.
•73 WPPT Art 15.
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of 50 years from the end of the year in which the performance was fixed in a
phonogram74, and for producers of phonograms for 50 years from the end of the year in
which the phonogram was published or in which it was made75. There are also
common provisions concerning technological measures76 and rights management
information77. The separation between the two Treaties follows the paths taken by the
Berne Convention and the Rome Convention respectively.
3.6 The EU78
The EU has been working on a harmonisation programme in the field of copyright and
related rights since 1988. Specifically for the digital agenda, the Commission published
an action plan 'Europe's way to the Information Society'79 in 1994. This was followed
by a Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society in 199580,
and a Follow up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society in 199681.
The latest part of this programme is the European Parliament and Council Directive on
the harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society (the Copyright Directive)82. The purpose of this Directive is said to be
twofold83. First it will create harmonised legal protection within the internal market in
accordance with the EC Treaty. Second it will resolve the uncertainties surrounding the
applicability of existing legislation to electronic media. The Copyright Directive is also
intended to be the means by which Member States implement the obligations imposed
under the WCT and WPPT. However, in some ways it goes very much further84, but in
other ways not far enough85.
74 WPPT Art 17(1).
75 WPPT Art 17(2).
76 WPPT Art 18.
77 WPPT Art 19.
78 For a general discussion on the EU programme as at July 1995 see Vandoren Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society in the Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment
Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996.
79 COM (94) 347 final of 19 July 1994.
80 COM(95) 382 final of 19 July 1995.
81 COM (96) 568 final of 20 November 1996.
82 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society.
83 COM (97) 628 at 3.
84 For example harmonisation of the 'fair dealing' rights. See chapter 6 of this study.
85 It does not go as far as implementing some of the obligations found in the WPPT. For
instance, the Copyright Directive does not deal with the moral rights of performers to be found in
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The Copyright Directive deals with both rights of authors and rights of the producers of
phonograms, films and broadcasting organisations86. In this it differs from the Berne
Convention and theWCT where the focus is on the author. The international regime
for protection of neighbouring right holders, those who have rights in the media
through which authors rights are exploited, has been by way of the Rome Convention.
The WPPT dealt with phonograms. The provisions of the Copyright Directive are
applicable to both the basic author rights, and to neighbouring rights.
The Copyright Directive contains measures for harmonising the reproduction right,
including the temporary right of reproduction87; introduces the making available and
communication to the public rights88 in conformity with the WCT; harmonises the
distribution right89; seeks to harmonise a number of exceptions to the right, of
reproduction, communication to the public and making available to the public90; and
imposes obligations concerning technical measures and rights information91.
3.6.1 The balance in the Copyright Directive
Overall, the trend in the Copyright Directive is to increase rights for authors and right
holders. The recitals, which were revised many times during the passage of the
Copyright Directive through the legislative process attempt to deal with the focus of
protection. Even as finally drafted they evidence some confusion as to the purpose for
this increase.
Recital 9 makes some play of the traditional justifications:
'Any harmonisation ofcopyright and related rights must take as a basis a high level of
protection, since such rights are crucial to intellectual creation. Theirprotection helps to ensure
the maintenance and development ofcreativity in the interests ofauthors, performers, producers,
consumers, culture, industry and thepublic at large. Intellectualproperty has therefore been
recognised as an integralpart ofproperty'.
the WPPT Article 5. The UK Patent Office are in the course of obtaining views on how these
obligations should be implemented into UK law.
86 Called 'right holders' in the Copyright Directive.
87 Copyright Directive Article 2.
88 ibid Article 3.
89 ibid Article 4.
90 ibid Article 5.
91 ibid Articles 6 and 7.
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There is the clear assumption that there must be a 'high level ofprotection' as the rights are
'crucial to intellectual creation'. There is however, reference to 'authors' and indeed the
'public at large', although it is unclear as to what aspect of the 'public interest' this might
be referring to (if indeed it is), as consumers are also specifically mentioned. On
balance however, the recitals exhibit a tendency to favour the investment needed to
disseminate products over the Internet, rather than the rights of authors: Recital 10
confirms this:
The investment required toproduceproducts such asphonograms, films ormultimedia
products, and services such as 'on demand' services, is considerable. A.dequate legalprotection
of intellectualproperty rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability ofsuch a reward
andprovide the opportunityfor satisfactory returns on this investment'.
Copyright has always been at least pardy about the need for the intermediary to obtain a
return on the investment made in bringing the product to the market. But the
Copyright Directive goes further, and also suggests that a high level of protection of
intellectual property will foster 'substantial investment in network infrastructure, and lead
in turn to growth and increased competitiveness ofEuropean industry, both in the area ofcontent
provision and information technology and more generally across a wide range ofindustrial and cultural
sectors. This will safeguard employment and encourage newjob creation 02.
This would suggest a move away from protecting intellectual products so that more will
be produced, to protecting intellectual products so that investment in the Internet will
be stimulated, employment safeguarded and jobs created. The inclusion of these
external factors makes the overall justifications very different from those traditionally
used, focussing on the production of the works themselves.
As with the process of reform in the US, there appears to have been no discussion on
potential benefits that could be attained if protection were reduced; no suggestion of
possible alternative models for protection and exploitation of creative works; and no
consideration ofwhat effect increased protection and control might have on the creative
process. What is also noticeable is that any discussion on moral rights has been entirely
absent from the process to date, these rather being left to the province of national law93.
92 ibid Recital 3.
93 Recital 19 of the Copyright Directive states: The moral rights of rightholders should be exercised
according to the legislation of the Member States and the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
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For an instrument which purports both to harmonise national laws as between
Members States, and to implement the terms of the WCT and the WPPT, this omission
is marked. Recalling the discussion in chapter 2 of this study, concerning the
differences between the Member States, it is in the area ofmoral rights where it is most
noticeable. Particularly for the EU, this might have been an opportunity to discuss the
role of moral rights in digital dissemination where the link between the author and the
work could be much greater than in the terrestrial world. On the Internet, the author
can reach out directly to the consuming public without the need for the intermediary.
In this, moral rights may have a significant role to play in shaping the future of digital
copyright. However, given the stance taken by the lobbyists representing economic
concerns, this was not to be.
4. Observations
A number of observations can be made on these developments. First, these regulatory
models are not the only initiatives that have been developing. The Copyright Directive
is but one of a series on copyright. It does not deal with every aspect of copyright, just
those deemed important to the digital environment. However, their influence has been,
and will be, profound. The US and Europe between them support the most active
entertainment and publishing industries, and thus those that are particularly affected by
copyright issues on the Internet. The US set the agenda in the Nil Report. The
Copyright Directive will affect domestic legislation in fifteen Member States initially,
and a number of others in due course should the Community enlarge. The WCT, where
the negotiators were influenced strongly by the debate that had already taken place in
the US and the EU, will provide the benchmark for many other countries in the
protection of creative works. The 30 instruments of ratification or accession necessary
for the Treaty to enter into force have been deposited with WIPO. The Treaty will thus
take effect from 6 March 200294. There are likely to be many more. In other words, the
broad standard for protection at international, regional and individual State level appears
to have been set, and that is for increasing protection. The reason given is to ensure
that the Internet will continue to develop apace. This justification does not appear to be
rooted wholly in the traditional theories. Even the reasons for granting expansive
l^iterary and Artistic Works, of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty. Such moral rights remain outside the scope of this Directive'.
94 WCT Article 20.
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property rights advocated economic theory do not appear to be at the heart of the
argument. The increase in rights granted is not because it is economically efficient for
trade in the intellectual goods, but for expansion of the Internet itself. But the Internet
is not used only for trade in intellectual products. Many other activities take place there,
including general e-commerce, whether business to consumer, or business to business.
It is not easy to understand the reasoning that equates a rise in property rights in
intellectual products directly with the desire to expand the distribution system through
which they are disseminated. A similar argument might seek to justify granting rental
rights in videos and computer programs so that rental shops would thrive.
Second, it might have been the hope of some that by attaining agreement in
international treaties, so national laws would be harmonised internationally. However,
this is unlikely to happen in practice. In most Contracting States, the Treaties must be
implemented into domestic law to take effect. For the Member States of the EU, the
mode of implementation is the Copyright Directive. Individual Member States have to
transpose this into national law. In other words, for many Contracting States there are
at least two legislative hurdles to overcome before the provisions take effect. These are
then interpreted, in most cases, by national courts (subject to the European Court of
Justice being the final arbiter in matters of Community law). In other words, there are
layers of negotiation, interpretation and application before the spirit of the Treaties are
actually applied in practice. If one compares the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act
1988 and the Copyright Directive, which are both intended inter alia to implement the
same provisions of the same Treaties, many differences are apparent95. The question is
whether these provisions will mesh when put to use.
Third, the desire of Governments and intergovernmental bodies to regulate in this field
is worthy of comment. Looking at the dates at which the initiatives were commenced,
the US was very quick off the mark with the formation of the Committee responsible
for the Nil Report in 1994. Some commentators have noted that the aim of the
Clinton Administration was to have the report and legislation completed quickly in
order to give little time for consideration and reflection. In the event there was a
95 For example, the US has not introduced a specific 'making available' right as mandated by the
WCT Article 8, arguing that domestic law already covers this obligation. For in depth discussion
see chapter 6 of this study.
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lengthy legislative process which has been subject to much criticism and comment96. In
addition, the aim seems to have been to 'provide strong guidance as to where others
should go'97. To be the first to regulate in this area meant that others, when considering
their own legislation, would have little choice but to follow the lead given. In so doing,
the views of eminent commentators that such action may be pre-emptive and that the
US should wait and see how the Internet develops to determine whether legislation was
in fact necessary were ignored98.
Finally, where is this leading? The WCT, the WPPT and the Copyright Directive
represent an attempt at a marriage between two systems for the protection of creative
works, ie. the Anglo-American and Civilian, and differing justifications for protection.
The result seems to be a move away from the traditional ideas of balancing private and
public interests to an emphasis on private property rights because, so it is argued, they
support the development of the Internet. One difficult problem is that because the
development is not rooted in traditional theories, so it does not reflect the traditional
balances to be found in copyright law. The question then is what this rise in property
rights and control over dissemination leaves in the public domain and free for authors
to use in authorship.
Over the following chapters the possible effect that the implementation of this
programme may have on the public domain, and thus on authorship, will be analysed.
96 Samuelson, The Copyright Grab 1996, Wired 134.
97 Ibid.






It has been argued that existing copyright law contributes to authorship by leaving parts of
works 'free' for re-use, or as it is more often termed known, in the public domain. The
purpose of this, and the following chapters, is to analyse what is happening to the public
domain on the Internet. In this chapter the issues surrounding the development and legal
protection of the technical control systems, or digital fences, that can make access to those
parts ofworks in the public domain difficult will be highlighted. The ensuing four chapters
will analyse the substantive parts of the public domain, comparing the existing law with the
proposals and amendments that have been made for the digital era, and discussing the
difficulties surrounding use of the public domain.
2. Digital Fences
The controversy surrounding the development of 'digital fences' is well summed up in
the following quotation:
There will be a continuing technological struggle between contentproviders, their customers, their
competitors andfuture creators. Obviously it will sometimes be in the interest ofcontentproviders to
make it as hard aspossiblefor citizens to exercise theirfair use rights. They will try and build
technological and contractualfences around the material that theyprovide, notjust to prevent itfrom
being stolen, but to prevent itfrom being used in ways that have not beenpaidfor, even if those uses are
privileged under current intellectualproperty law The technicalmeans ofdoing this can be thought of
as digitalfences. Sometimes thosefences will be used to stop clear violations ofexisting rights.
Sometimes they will be used to enclose the commons or the public domain... Thus by making it illegal
or impracticalfor me to go around through or over thefence, the state adds its imprimatur to an act of
digital enclosure information isguarded by digitalfences which themselves are backed by a state
powermaintained throughprivate systems ofsurveillance and control.
1 Boyle, Eoucault In Cyberspace Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors 1997
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/foucault.htm. See also, Mackaay, The Economics ofEmergent
Property Rights on the Internet in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p
15. Lessig, Commons and Code Kpgnote Speech Given at a Conference on Media Convergence at Fordham Law
School New York 9 February 1999. For the views of publishers see Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the
Machine in the Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p 139.
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2.1 How digital fences work
'Digital fence' is one term used to describe a technological protection system developed
for the purpose of controlling access to, and use of, a work, or database, distributed
over the Internet. Other terms used to describe the same product include electronic
copyright management systems, and rights management containers. The term 'digital
fence' will be used in this study however. Digital fences range from the relatively simple
system ofwatermarking creative works, to much more complex products, which involve
both the creative work and the hardware through which it is disseminated.
Digital fences have been used for many years, particularly in association with music
CD's and software. In order to ensure that unauthorised copies of music or software
cannot be made, right holders have included technological protection systems on the
CD ROM or disk containing the music or software. These digital files contain
instructions which will allow only a certain number of copies (if any) to be made from
the original product, or from copies of the original. Right holders are developing new
and sophisticated types of digital fences, specifically targeted at dissemination of creative
works on the Internet The purpose is to protect against the perceived and actual threats
posed by digital technology2. The ultimate aim of those who develop these digital
fences is to allow the right holder to prevent indiscriminate and widespread
unauthorised copying of creative works on the Internet and to charge for access and
copying.
With the advent of the Internet, different types of digital fences are developing apace.
One method is the simple, but widely used, practice of digital watermarking. This is a
technique whereby encrypted information is incorporated into a digitised work, or some
alteration of a work is effected which is not visible to the naked eye. A surfer is unable
to remove or change the alteration. This system allows the intermediary to track and
identify unauthorised copies of the original work. Unauthorised copies, which may be
2 Dreier, Copyright Issues in a Digital Publishing World ISCU Press - UNESCO
http://associnst.ox.ac.uk/~icsuinfo/dreier.htm for the view that protection against misappropriation will
essentially consist ofmeasures against illegal decoders and devices circumventing access controls.
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available on the Internet, can be detected by sending out 'robots' which trawl through
content ofweb pages. If an infringing copy is found, the right holder may require the
Internet Service Provider (ISP) on whose server it is located to remove that copy3.
Copies that have been downloaded from the Internet, and which circulate amongst
users, will be capable of detection, as the right holder will be able to discover the digital
alteration to the work4. Thus, digitally watermarking a work tends to be a method of
ascertaining after the event when unauthorised reproductions are made, rather than
being a means whereby infringing uses can be prevented in the first place5.
Much more sophisticated are the digital fences which prevent access being obtained to a
work in the first place, if authorisation is not given, and which thereafter licence use of
that work on certain terms and conditions. A number of elements are apparent in the
composition of these digital fences6. The first is a database which contains information
about the work. This may include the name of the author, the copyright owner, the
work being protected, and other information necessary to authorise a third party to use
that work for a specified purpose. The database may also contain the conditions on
which a licence may be granted to use the work7. Such consent may be either on a case-
by-case basis8 or collective licence9. An extension of this system, and the most
3 In Europe, the E-Commerce Directive (COM (1999) 427) (E-commerce Directive) (which was due to be
transposed into the laws of Member States by January 17 2002), broadly provides that an ISP will not be liable
for transmitting, caching or hosting material so long as it is expeditiously removed if the ISP knows, or
becomes aware that any type of substantive law is being infringed. For a discussion on the effect of these
provisions in practice see Bortloff and Henderson, Notice and Take DownAgreements in Practice in Europe. Views
from the Internet Service Provider and Telecommunications Industries and the Recording IndustryWIPO Paper 1999
OSP/LLA/3 available on the WIPO website. In the US similar provisions (but relating to copyright only) are to
be found in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act incorporated as Title II of the DMCA.
For a discussion see Oktay and Wrenn,A Took Pack at the Notice - Takedown Provisions ofthe US DigitalMillennium
CopyrightAct One YearAfter EnactmentSfJTPO Paper 1999 OSP/LL\/2 Available on the WIPO website.
4 Ordnance survey maps are protected in this way. SCRAN also uses digital watermarking in its products.
'Digimarc & Copyright Protection http://www.digimarc.com/applications/copyright/copyright_in.html
explaining the ways in which digital watermarking of online content enables copyright owners to find
unauthorised copies of their work online and to prove, with the watermark, that the copies originated from
their work.
6 Gervais, Electronic RightsManagementSystemsSf/IPO/EC/CONF/99/SPK/10-A Available on the WIPO
website.
7 There are currently several initiatives underway to standardise the type of information that is required for such
a database (metadata) These include the INDECS project sponsored by the EU. The instructions will be
implemented by software. For full details see Commission staff working paper on Digital Rights Brussels 14
February 2002, SEC(2002) 197. The new version ofWindows Media 7 apparently contains instructions to limit
copying of music files. EMI have launched a number of new products in conjunction with this software.
http://www.bbc.co.uk.
8 CDPA Chapter V provides that copyright can be both licensed and assigned.
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advanced, relies on the database and licensing system described above, but also
incorporates the hardware (e.g. the computer, the modem, the printer) in which special
semi-conductor chips are incorporated. These systems are called by some 'rights
management containers'10, because the container placed around the work (the © chip)
automatically performs a number of functions. It can control access to the work
protected by copyright. It is capable of encrypting and decrypting the content. The
content itself (the work protected by copyright) is useless outside the container because
it is encrypted, and only the container has the key11. The container can store precise
instructions detailing which uses to permit, and which to deny12. Because the
instructions are in the container, which must be passed through every time the content
is accessed, the right holder can maintain complete control over every interaction
between the surfer and the content13. In time, it is anticipated that these digital fences
will incorporate a payment system, so the user can be automatically charged, and pay,
for each use of a protected work14.
These comprehensive digital fences are currently being developed15. Because the ©
chip needs to be inserted into the hardware, negotiations are on-going between various
branches of the creative industries and makers of the hardware to develop common
9 Many copyright owners licence or assign rights to one of the collecting societies to administer on their behalf.
For example, the Copyright Licensing Agency acts on behalf of publishers and authors in relation to
photocopying in large institutions such as companies and Higher Education Institutions.
10 Stefik, Trusted Systems Special Report Scientific American March 1997.
http://www.sciam.com/0397issue/0397stefik.html. Pareles, Trying to get in Tune with the DigitalAge; Recording
Industry Seeks a Standardfor Distributing Music on the Web Northern Light Business Research Centre New York
Times February 1, 1999. Reprinted in Northern Light.
http://www.nytimes.com/partners/microsites/dec/nl/223/standard.html.
11 For an explanation of cryptography see Hogg, Secrecy and Signatures Turning the Legal Spotlight on Encryption and
Electronic Signatures in Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce Edwards and Waelde eds
Hart 2000.
12 Gimber, Some Thoughts on the Implications ofTrusted Systemsfor Intellectual Property Law 1998, 50 Stanford Law
Review 1671.
13 Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property PJghts Challenge us to Kethink Digital Publishing
1997, Berkeley Technology Lawjournal Vol. 12 Issue 1.
14 For a discussion on payment systems see Miller, Payment in an On-Line World in Law and the Internet: A
Framework for Electronic Commerce Edwards and Waelde eds Hart 2000.
15 Clark, Net Law, A Cyberspace Agendafor PublishersWIPO/EC/CONF/99/SPK/ 12-B available on the WIPO
website.
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standards, through which the components necessary for each part of the system can be
integrated, and the works behind the digital fences exploited16.
If these digital fences work effectively, the complex rules surrounding international
litigation of infringement ofworks on the Internet would not be needed, or at least not
to the extent that they are at present in disputes such as those surrounding Napster17.
Creative works could not be uploaded and disseminated without consent because the
hardware and the software that make up the Internet, combined with the instructions
incorporated in the works themselves, would make such copying impossible. However,
a number of complex, interrelated issues arise in relation to the development and use of
these methods of protection.
The first is to what extent these fences should be protected by law against an act of
circumvention. The question concerns intermediaries because, without legal protection
against circumvention, the controls might be worthless once a work is disseminated on
the Internet. The question also concerns authors, as a result of the effect the digital
fences can have on both access to, and use of, the works behind the fence, in particular
the public domain. A second problem arises because the digital fences do not just
control unauthorised dissemination of a work. They also control access to that work.
Access can then be denied, perhaps on the basis that the work is confidential, or to
prevent a competing business from developing. Access can also be conditioned on
payment: not only for the first time that a work is viewed, but for every time thereafter.
Payment could also be required for each and every distinct act carried out with that
work: for instance, viewing on a screen, copying insubstantial parts of a work directly
from that work, saving a copy in the hard drive of a computer, or printing out a copy.
Thus, controlling access could prevent works and parts ofworks from falling freely into
the public domain. A third issue then arises. Because the digital fence controls access to
a work which is available over the Internet interaction on a one-to-one basis generally
occurs. Therefore, the right holder can contract directly with the surfer. Contractual
16 An article by Marks and Turnbull, The Intersection ofTechnology, Taw and Commercial Ticenses [2000] EIPR 198
describes the extent to which technical protection measures have been developed, and illustrates the extent to
which intermediaries perceive these measures will control copying of works over the Internet.
17 See the discussion on Napster in chapter 2 of this study.
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terms and conditions may accordingly be deployed to govern both access to, and use of,
a work. Such terms might limit the use that can be made of the work once accessed.
For example, a would-be author may be prohibited from using the work for the purpose
of criticism and review.
The ultimate aim of those involved in the development of digital fences appears to be
that all works disseminated over the Internet, and all hardware that makes up the
Internet, will incorporate the means by which dissemination can be controlled.
Obviously there will always be some works disseminated without authorisation, and
without technical controls. Some individuals may find it a challenge to release works
without permission others may do so in ignorance. However, as the elements that make
it possible to exert control over works become more widespread, the circumstances in
which it is feasible to disseminate works freely may well be curtailed.
The focus of the discussion in the next part of this chapter will be on the legal rules
developed to prohibit circumvention of digital fences, and the tension this produces
between questions of publication and confidentiality. The further problems that arise,
over use of materials in the public domain relating to the difficulties in obtaining access
to a work, and licensing controls limiting use, will be considered in the following
chapters.
3. Legal protection of digital fences
Despite continuing scepticism from commentators18, digital fences have been the
subject of a raft of legislative measures at international, national and regional level.
18 Tet contentproducers build their technicalfences, but do not legislatively re-inforce them until experience proves the existence of
one or more abuses in need ofa specific cure'. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and the Caws
Designed to Protect Them. 12 Berkeley Technology Law Journal. 161 p 169. See also MacKaay, The TLconomics of
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3.1 Standards of protection
Three different standards of protection for digital fences could be envisaged. The first might
oudaw any person circumventing that digital fence for a purpose not permitted by the law of
copyright. For instance, if the purpose of overcoming the digital fence was to make a copy
of the work to distribute to others without the right holder's authorization, that would not
be lawful. However, if the aim of overcoming the fence was to make a copy for the
purposes of research and private study, i.e. a permitted use under copyright law, then such
circumvention might be allowed. So circumvention would be permitted, so long as the
contours of copyright were followed. This standard is reminiscent of the cases that have
arisen challenging technology which facilitates copying works protected by copyright. In the
UK, manufacturers of double headed tape recorders have been found not to be liable for
authorising infringement of copyright, despite such copying being facilitated by these
machines. One crucial factor was that substantial non-infringing uses were possible with the
equipment19. A similar test chosen for protection of digital fences might suggest that so long
as circumvention, or a device or technology which facilitated circumvention, was for a lawful
purpose, then it should be permitted.
A second, and stronger, standard would be to prohibit the act of circumvention altogether,
whatever the motive20. This test would focus on the access control to the underlying work.
In choosing this type of standard there may be implications for the creation of new works,
because those parts of creative works which lie in the public domain would, along with the
rest of the creative work, be subject to the same restrictions on access.
A third standard, and the strongest, would be to prohibit not only the act of circumvention,
but also the making or circulation of any device which might be designed to overcome both
access to the work, and controls determining the underlying use of the work, no matter the
motive of the user. In this, both the anticipatory act of circumvention, such as the
development of a program designed to decrypt the controls on access to and use of the
Emergent Property Bights on the Internet in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed.
Kluwer 1996.
19 CBS Songs Etd vAmstrad Consumer Electronicspic [1988] AC 1013. For the US see Sony Corporation v Universal
City Studios 464 US 417 (1984).
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work, would become unlawful. The focus would no longer be merely on the act of
circumvention itself.
The stronger the test adopted for protection in the interests of the right holder, the
more difficult it might become for the author to gain access to, and subsequently to use,
materials in the public domain for authorship. The WCT, the Nil Report and the
Copyright Directive all contain measures which relate to the protection of digital fences,
but provide for different levels of protection.
3.2 The WCT
During the negotiations leading up to the finalisation of the WCT in 1996, the concerns
of right holders and authors in relation to the protection of digital fences were brought
to the fore21. One faction suggested that the standard appropriate for the protection of
digital fences was to outlaw technologies the primary purpose or effect of which was to
circumvent technical protection measures. Thus the standard of protection would be at
its strongest, and focus on the technologies which might facilitate circumvention, rather
than on the act of circumvention itself. This suggestion proved to be highly
controversial. One of the criticisms was the potential effect that such a measure would
have on access to materials in the public domain. Delegates considered that adopting
such a standard might have meant that the right holder could prevent any access to a
work, including access to a work to exercise one of the fair dealing limitations, or obtain
other material in the public domain22. A second concern was voiced by representatives
of the consumer electronics industry. If legislation outlawed technologies which made
circumvention possible, this could serve to place limitations on the products, and parts
of products, developed for the consumer market. At its most extreme, the cut and paste
function, vital to a word processing application, might be considered a technology
20 E.g. CDPA s 296.
21 For comment see Vinje, The New \T7P0 Copyright Treaty: A. Happy Result in Geneva [1997] 5 EIPR 230 at 234.
22 These are the same arguments that were raised before the drafters of the Nil Report.
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which could circumvent a technological protection measure, because it allows the user
to copy works protected by copyright23.
As a result of the negotiations, the most relaxed test for protection was agreed for the
WCT, which now provides:
'Contracting Parties shallprovide adequate legalprotection and effective legal redress against the
circumvention ofeffective technologicalmeasures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise
oftheir rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect oftheir works,
which are not authorised by the authors concerned orpermitted by law24.
In addition, the WCT obliges contracting parties to provide: 'effective legal remedies against
thefacilitation or removal or alteration ofelectronic rights management information or to distribute
copies ofworks on which such information has been altered '.2!
The focus is thus on the act of circumvention, and not on the technologies which might
make circumvention possible. In addition, the test relates to what is not 'permitted by
law'. This would suggest that it would be permissible to circumvent a digital fence if the
purpose was to access materials that lay in the public domain.
3.3 The US
In the Nil Report it was argued that digital fences should be protected by law because it
was in the public interest to do so. The nub of the argument was economic. The public
interest equates to the price at which access can be lawfully gained to a work. Because
consumers ofworks protected by copyright pay for the acts of infringers (in the sense that
there is a consequential uplift in price), so the price will fall if such infringement were
23 Although for the test articulated, the cut and paste function would not have its 'primary purpose or effect'
the overcoming of technical protection systems. The electronics industry representatives were concerned at
what the introduction of strong protection against devices which controlled copying might have on their
freedom to design gadgets for the consumer market. Browning, Africa 1 Hollywood 0 5.03, 1997, Wired 61
186. ]apan and other nations were up in arms aboutproposals that would effectively have turned the consumer electronics industry
into a branch ofpublishing'.
24 WCT Article 11 Obligations Concerning Technological Measures.
25 WCT Article 12 Obligations Concerning Rights Management Information. Right management information
means information which identifies the works, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the work or
information about the terms and conditions of use of the work and any number or codes that represent such
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less possible. This, in turn, would allow the public to have access to more works
protected by copyright, because the price would be lower26. As has been suggested in
the introduction to this study, this argument is unobjectionable. Right holders need to
obtain an economic return from the exploitation of creative works, or fewer would be
produced. It is in the interests of consumers that there are as wide a variety of works
available on the market place as possible, at a reasonable cost. When the actual cost of
distribution of creative works on the Internet is low, then by protecting access to those
works, so many consumers can each contribute a little to the costs of production. So
ultimately the price for the individual consumer may fall, while at the same time plenty
of new works should be created, giving the consumer yet more choice.
But the focus of concern in this study is on the author. In response to the concerns of
authors requiring access to material in the public domain, the Nil Committee argued
that, while technological protection may be applied to copies of works in the public
domain, such protection attaches only to those particular copies, and not to the
underlying work itself27. Therefore protection of digital fences was justified because it
was not the workper se that was the subject of protection. So, by contrast with the
approach taken in the WCT, the Nil Committee suggested the strongest standard
should be adopted. The focus was to be on oudawing circumvention for the purpose of
obtaining access to a work. In addition, the Committee suggested that there should be a
broad ban on products that could be used to circumvent digital fences.
Prior to the finalisation of the WCT, the Nil Report proposed that the US Copyright
Act be amended to include 'a new Chapter 12, which would include aprovision toprohibit the
importation, manufacture or distribution ofany device, product or component incorporated into a device
orproduct, or theprovision ofany service, theprimary purpose or effect ofwhich is to avoid, bypass,
information when any of these items of information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection
with the communication of a work to the public.
26 Although in Kenya, the high price apparently means that pirates can copy software protected by copyright!
'Microsoft tost thefirst softwarepiray case in Kenya as the defendant admitted copyingMicrosoft software but argued that the high
prices in Kenya were unfair. A. Commercial Court in Nairobi apparently accepted the argument and dismissed the case'
http: / /www. theregis ter.co.uk/000214-000001 .html.
27NII Report p 164 n 567. 'Copies ofthe work in the marketplacefreefrom copyrightprotection could befreely reproduced
(and, infact, the lower distribution costs ofthe Nil may encourage increased availability ofpublic domain works). Further,
97
remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, withottt authority of the copyright owner or the law, any
process, treatment, mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the violation ofany ofthe exclusive
rights under Section 106 [ofthe US CopyrightA.ct]
Despite the more relaxed approach adopted in the WCT, the US Administration
remained enamoured of the rigorous approach suggested by the Nil Committee. The
provisions have been enacted in Chapter 12 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
1998. Broadly, the relevant section provides, firstly, that no person shall circumvent a
technological protection measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under the Act28. The focus here is thus on the act of circumvention which would
facilitate access to a work protected by copyright. The second part prohibits trafficking
in devices or services for circumventing technology measures that control access29. Here
the focus is on the device or service which would serve to facilitate access. The third part
prohibits trafficking in devices or services for circumventing technology measures that
protect the rights of a copyright owner. Thus, this part focuses on devices which might
prevent or inhibit the copying of a work30.
3.4 The EU proposals and debate
Initially it appeared that history was repeating itself in the debate in the EU over the
protection of digital fences, in that the strongest standard of protection was favoured31.
technologicalprotection that restricts the ability to reproduce the work bj technicalmeans does notprevent reproduction by other
means (such as quoting, manually copying etc.)
28 Digital Millennium Copyright Act s 1201(a)(1).
29 Digital Millennium Copyright Act s 1201(a)(2).
30 Digital Millennium Copyright Act s 1201(b). There has been a storm of criticism over the potential effect of
these provisions. E.g. Ginsburg, Copyright legislationfor the DigitalMillennium 1999, 23 Columbia VLA Journal of
Law and the Arts 137 on the fact that it is an offence to circumvent the controls. Boyle, Youcault in Cyberspace
Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors 1997.
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/foucault.htm
31 The EC has already implemented a directive concerning circumvention of technical access controls.
Directive 98/84/EC on the Legal Protection of Conditional Access Services. This Directive (the date for
transposition into national law was 28 May 2000) requires Member States to prohibit and provide sanctions
against the manufacture and commercial dealing in illegal decoders, smart cards and the like. Draft Regulations
are currently being discussed. These Regulations would replace the existing s 297A of the CDPA with a new
section that would make it a criminal offence to make, import, distribute, sell let for hire, offer or expose for
sale or hire, have in ones possession, install, maintain or replace for commercial purposes or advertise for sale
any unauthorised decoder. An unauthorised decoder is any apparatus which is designed or adapted to enable
an encrypted transmission to be decoded. 'Unauthorised' in relation to this decoder means that the decoder
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However, during the gestation of the Copyright Directive a slighdy different approach
has been followed as a result of, at least in part, the intense debate that accompanied the
introduction of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 in the US32.
In 1997, in the Proposal for a Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, it was suggested that protection of digital fences was not to be
directed against the circumvention of technological measures as such (the standard
adopted in WCT). Rather the focus was to be on preparatory activities, such as writing
a program which could itself circumvent a digital fence. This was seen as fundamental:
'because the real dangerfor intellectualproperty rights will not be a single act ofcircumvention by
individuals butpreparatory activities to produce devices or offer services to circumvent53. So there was
to be a wide ban on the act of circumvention which would in turn allow a wide ban on
circumventing technologies. The provisions as implemented in the Copyright Directive
are to be found in Article 6. This article obliges Member States to 'provide adequate legal
protection against the circumvention ofany effective technologicalmeasures^. But in addition,
Member States are to:
'provide adequate legalprotection against the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental,
advertisementfor sale or rental, orpossessionfor commercialpurposes ofdevices, products or
components or theprovision ofservices which:
a. arepromoted, advertised ormarketedfor thepurpose ofcircumvention of, or
b. have only a limited commercially significantpurpose or use other than to circumvent, or
c. areprimarily designed, produced, adapted orpeformedfor thepurpose ofenabling or
facilitating the circumvention of, any effective technological measures'.
The phrase 'technological measure' is defined as:
will enable an encrypted transmissions to be accessed in an intelligible form without payment of the fee which
the person making the transmission charges for it. What these measures do not do (unlike the Copyright
Directive) is to outlaw the act of circumvention. See R vMainwaring [2002] FSR 20 for a discussion on the
meaning of unauthorised.
32 The US Administration admitted that its preferred legislation went beyond what was in the WIPO Treaty but
argued for the broader rule in part to set a standard that would help the US persuade other countries to pass
similarly strong rules. House Sub Committee Holds Hearings on WIPO Treaty Bills OSP Liability 54 BNA Pat
Trademark & Cop J 414 (9/18/97).
33 Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society - Proposal for a Directive 10 December 1997
http: //europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/intprop/intprop/II 00.htm.
34 The expression 'technologicalmeasures', means 'any technology, device or component that, in the normal course ofits
operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, in respect ofworks or other subjectmatter, which are not authorised by the
rightholder ofany copyright or any right related to copyright asprovided by law or the suigeneris rightprovidedfor in Chapter III of
the European Parliament and Council Directive 96/6/EC'.
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'any technology, device or component that, in the normal course of its operation, is designed to
prevent or restrict acts, in respect ofworks or other subject matter, which are not authorised by
the rightholder ofany copyright or any right related to copyright asprovided by law or the sui
generis rightprovidedfor [by the Database Directive]'.
It might appear from this wording that the standard differs from that to be found in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998. The definition does not refer to access, and
would appear only to prohibit circumvention and devices which facilitate reproduction
of a work where that is not 'authorised by the right holder or asprovided by law'. Thus,
circumvention of a technological measure in order to gain access to a work that had
fallen into the public domain might be permissible, perhaps because the work was no
longer protected by copyright. However, that is clearly not the intention, as the
Copyright Directive goes on to provide that a technological measure shall be 'deemed
"effective" where the use ofaprotected work ofother subjectmatter is controlled by the rightholders
through application ofan access control orprotection process, such as encryption, scrambling or other
transformation ofthe work or other subject matter or a copy control mechanism, which achieves the
protection objective'.
Thus, the focus here is also on protection against access to works, and is not limited to
circumvention for infringing purposes.
Perhaps influenced by the debate which had surfaced in the US as a result of the
adoption of the strongest standard of protection in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act 1998, where commentators were worried about the extent to which such controls
on access could limit availability of materials in the public domain, the EU has provided
that, in certain circumstances, specified classes of users are to be permitted to make
reproductions ofworks. In so doing, technical protection systems may be circumvented.
These provisions will be examined in full in chapter 5. However, for present purposes,
it is instructive to note that these measures do not extend to gaining access to the work,
but affect activities that may thereafter take place. The relevant provision35 states:
35 Copyright Directive Article 6 paragraph 4.
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'Notwithstanding the legalprotectionprovidedfor inparagraph 1, in the absence ofvoluntary
measures by rightholders, including agreements between rightholders and otherparties concerned,
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make available to
the beneficiary ofan exceptions or limitationprovidedfor in national law the means of
benejitingfrom that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to benefitfrom that
exception or limitation, where that beneficiary has legal access to theprotected work or
other subjectmatter concerned', [emphasis added].
Before a 'beneficiary of protection' (not further defined in the Copyright Directive) may
circumvent technical controls in the way provided for in this paragraph, legal access to
the work must first be obtained. The prohibition against circumvention thus remains in
place where the purpose of circumvention might be to gain access to the protected work.
Finally, in line with the obligations imposed under the WCT, and in common with the
provisions to be found in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, the Copyright
Directive obliges Member States to provide for adequate legal protection against the
removal or alteration of electronic rights management information that may be
contained in the work as disseminated over the Internet36: in other words, the
information in the database that forms the basis on which rights can be managed and
licensed.
4. Summary
Both the US and the EU have chosen to protect digital fences at the highest standard
possible. That is protection is given against both the act of circumvention and the
devices which may be available to facilitate such circumvention. In both, gaining (or
preventing) access to the work is the central feature. These standards have been chosen
despite the more relaxed test that was adopted in the WCT, which would appear to
allow circumvention of a digital fence if the law of copyright would so permit. What is
notable in the measures adopted by the US and EU is that there is no need for
infringement of copyright before the prohibition against circumvention takes effect. In
other words, no reproduction of a protected work need take place before the liability for
36 ibid Article 7.
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such circumvention will attach to the person who circumvents the controls37. In the
US, both civil and criminal penalties may attach to a person who breaches these rules38.
The Copyright Directive is silent on this point, leaving the matter to Member States.
5. Access, publication and confidentiality
Controlling access to a creative work has become a central issue in the push to exert
control over the dissemination of works on the Internet. This extends much further
than in the terrestrial world. Intermediaries have never had the power to authorise or
prohibit every access to a creative work, and such ability does not sit happily with one of
the main underlying goals of copyright: to encourage the dissemination ofworks in the
public interest. Progress is of little value unless its fruits are made available to the public.
In turn access is necessary because knowledge is cumulative. Public availability of
creative works promotes further progress39.
The good ofa book lies in its being read. A book is made up ofsigns that speak ofother
signs, which in their turn speak of things. Without an eye to read them, a book contains signs
thatproduce no concepts; therefore it is dumbm.
When control over a creative work becomes control over access to that work, there is a
possibility that the boundaries between the concepts of confidentiality and copyright
37 An interesting parallel can be drawn with the tale in Eco's The Name of the Rose. In that story, many and varied
devices were used in a medieval monastery to conceal the books that it contained. Thisplace offorbidden
knowledge isguarded by many and most cunning devices. Knowledge is used to conceal, rather than to enlighten. I don't like it'.
Eco The Name ofthe Rose Vintage 1998 p 176.
38 Tide 17 USC section 1203 provides for civil remedies and includes injunctions, damages and awards of
costs. Statutory damages can also be obtained (s 1203 (3)) 'in the sum ofnot less than $200 or more than $2,500 per
act ofcircumvention, device, product, component, offer, orperformance ofservice, as the court considersjust'. In addition, for
violation of section 1202, 'a complainingparty may elect to recover an award ofstatutory damagesfor each violation ofsection
1202 in the sum ofnot less than $2,500 or more than $25,000.' Section 1204 deals with criminal offences and
penalties and provides: '(a) Anyperson who violates section 1201 or 1202 willfully andforpurposes ofcommercial advantage
orprivatefinancialgain - (1) shall befined not more than $500,000 or imprisonedfor not more than 5years, or both, for thefirst
offense; and (2) shall befined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonedfor not more than 10years, or both,for any subsequent
offense'.
39 For discussion Cohen, Lochnerin Cyberspace: the New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management' 1998, Michigan
Law Review v97 i2 p462. Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits ofFreedom ofContract 1997, 12 Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 93. Ladnes and Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofCopyright Law 18 Journal of Legal
Studies 325. Lemley, The Economic ofImprovement in IntellectualProperty Law 75 Texas Law Review 989. Litman,
The Public Domain 1990, 39 Emory Law Journal 965.
40 Eco ibid at 396.
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become blurred. If a copyright owner can control every access to a work when
disseminated over the Internet, is that work then published, or is it confidential?
Copyright owners argue that no one who owns a work protected by copyright has to
make that work publicly available. An author can write a poem and then lock it in a
safe. No one has the right to demand access, and the author has no obligation to open
the safe and allow access to that work. That includes any individual member of the
public, and the public in general. Despite the fact that the work is not published, it is
still protected by copyright41. Equally, an individual could own a masterpiece by an
eighteenth-century artist, and have it hanging on her living room wall. That individual
has no duty, and no obligation, to open the doors and let passers-by view that work, and
no third party has a right to demand access to that work. Copyright may have expired,
and the work might be in the public domain, but access cannot be demanded to the
original for any purpose, including making a copy of it. A company working in a highly
specialised area of gold mining may produce a report and circulate it to a small number
of people under an obligation of confidentiality. The report might contain information
on the geographical possibilities of gold being found in a small Scottish village. The
company certainly does not want the information in the report to become public
knowledge, and is under no obligation to make it publicly available42.
In each case, the owner is perfecdy entitled to prevent third parties obtaining access to
the work. So what is different about the Internet? If a copy of a work is disseminated
over the Internet by the owner, why should it not be within the power of that owner to
decide who should and who should not obtain access? The tools at the disposal of the
intermediary are not a key to a safe or a front door, but the digital fence surrounding the
work, and the rules which make it unlawful to circumvent that protection.
But poems in a safe have never been made available to the public. The eighteenth-
century masterpiece hanging on a wall may never have been subject to public gaze, nor
41 In the UK, copyright subsists in a literary dramatic and musical works when it is recorded in writing or
otherwise. CDPA s 3(2).
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may there have been any reproductions made. A confidential report circulated to a small
number of people has never been made public. On the other hand, if the author
decides to publish the poems, to make and circulate copies of the painting, or to publish
the report, and use State-backed sanctions to control the subsequent copying of those
works without authorisation, these benefits come with the countervailing balances in
copyright law. The physical copies of the works must thereafter be allowed to circulate
freely without any further input from the owner. The works can be reviewed, criticised,
and copied (within limits) for private study and research43. The ideas and information
they contain may be freely used by others. Similarly, once works have been placed on a
server that is available to surfers to access via the Internet, they are available to the
public. The definitions of the new rights to be found in the WCT and repeated in the
Copyright Directive suggest that this is the case as they refer to 'communication to the public'
and 'making available to thepublic14
But there is a tension here that has not been resolved. On the one hand, works are
made available by publishing them on the Internet. On the other hand, control over
access to those works is within the remit of the copyright owner. It would appear that
publication or making available to the public over the Internet is not the same as
publication in hard copy form. Publication is defined in the Copyright Designs and
Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) as 'issuing copies of a work to the public'45, and, in the case
of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, includes 'making it available to the public
by means of an electronic retrieval system'46. Publication must not be 'merely
colourable', and must be intended to satisfy the reasonable demands of the public47.
Performance of a work is not counted as publication in the case of literary, dramatic and
musical works, nor is broadcasting or inclusion in a cable programme service, unless for
42 It may be that only limited circulation is necessary for the report to be considered published and thus subject
to the fair dealing provisions. PCR Ltd v Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] FSR 170; [1998] EMLR 407 Ch D. See
also the discussion in chapter 6 of this study on fair dealing in general.
43 The Church OfSpiritual Technology v Spaink. The District Court of the Hague Civil Law Sector Chamber D
96/1048 9 June 1999. Works which were distributed to over 25000 individuals were considered published and
thus free for third parties to use for the purposes of criticism and review. The fact that a confidentiality
requirement had been placed on the people who received the works did not detract from this.
44 WCT Article 8. Copyright Directive Article 3.
45 CDPA s 175(l)(a).
46 CDPA sl75(l)(b).
47 CDPA sl75(5). Francis Day &Hunter vFeldman [1914] 2 Ch 728.
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the purpose of an electronic retrieval system48. In other words, there must be some
permanence in relation to the publication for a work to be deemed published. Although
perhaps not drafted with the Internet in mind, it would seem clear from these
definitions that in the UK, placing a work on the Internet (the electronic retrieval
system) with the consent of the copyright holder would count as publishing the work49.
In the US the Copyright Act provides a definition of 'publication' to draw the line
between published and unpublished works. 'Publication' is the distribution of copies of
a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending50. As with the UK, a public performance or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication51. Thus, 'anyform ofdissemination in which a material object does not
change hands -peformances or displays on television, for example - is not apublication no matter how
many people are exposed to the work*2. Nevertheless, the Nil Report took the view that
there was no reason to treat works distributed to the public by means of transmission,
differently from works distributed to the public by other, more conventional means.53
Copies distributed via transmission are as tangible as any distributed over the counter,
or through the mail. Through each method of distribution, the consumer receives a
tangible copy of the work54.
It would therefore appear that placing a work on a server connected to the Internet
satisfies the tests of publication. Nevertheless the owner may still deny access to those
works through the use of a technological protection system. Is there therefore an
argument to say that the works are confidential? Certainly in the UK, the type of
information that can be subject to an obligation of confidentiality is broad enough to
cover trade secrets55, commercial records56, information of political significance57 and
48 CDPA s 175(4).
49 The courts have found under the previous Copyright Act of 1956, that: 'an artistic work is issued to thepublic and
so published when reproductions ofthe work areput on offer to thepublic'. British Northrop v Texteam Blackburn [1974] RPC
57 MegarryJ.
so US Copyright Act 17 USC s 101.
51 Ibid.
52NII Report p 21.
53 Ibid.
54 The copy may be tangible for the purposes of the definition of publication. However one still cannot rely on
the exhaustion of rights for onward transmission because that involves making a copy.
55 Morison vMoat (1851) 9 Hare 241.
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that in relation to personal relationships58. But in order for such information to be kept
confidential, it must also be imparted in circumstances which import an obligation of
confidence59. Could the mere placing ofworks behind a digital fence give those works
the necessary quality of confidence, or subject those who access those works to an
obligation to keep them confidential? The question of placing an obligation of
confidentiality on purchasers of a machine available for purchase in the market place
was considered in the UK in Mars v Teknowledgff®. Mars produced coin receiving and
changing mechanisms for machines operated by a computer program which detected
the size of the coin. The software could be re-programmed for changes in coin sizes.
Teknowledge purchased a machine, reverse engineered the software that had been
encrypted, and offered the reprogramming service to customers ofMars. The question
was whether these activities amounted to a breach of confidence in law61. Is an
engineer who finds encryption in a program upon which he is carrying out reverse
engineering put on notice that the maker regards what is encrypted as confidential? If
so, it would mean that an obligation of confidence might be imposed on anyone on
anyone who receives information by acquiring an article in the open market, or on any
third party who happens to come upon that article. This could equally apply to works
disseminated over the Internet in encrypted form. Are they to be regarded as
confidential? In the Mars case, it was held that no obligation of confidence was so
imposed. Anyone could purchase the machine, and anyone with the skill to de-encrypt
the program has access to the information62. Now admittedly in the case the purchase of
the machine prior to the reverse engineering was necessary, but nonetheless the court
found that encrypting a work does not per se make it confidential. By contrast, on the
Internet what it appears is being argued is that encrypting a work (placing it behind a
digital fence) makes that work confidential and presumably, by extension, subjects those
who access the work to an obligation of confidence.
56 Lamb v Evans [1893] 1 Ch 218.
57 Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 All ER 8, Att-Gen vJonathan Cape [1976] QB 752, Att-Gen v Guardian Newspapers (No 2)
[1990] AC 109.
58 PrinceAlbert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652.
59 Coco v Clark [1969] RPC 41 Megarry J. at 47.
60 Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [2000] FSR 138.
61 The other question was whether there was a common law defence to the agreed copyright infringement.
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These two important concepts, confidentiality and publication, appear to have been
confused in relation to dissemination ofworks over the Internet, and they are not
applied with any consistency. It is recognised that it is not lawful to break into a lock¬
fast place in order to steal secrets. But if those 'secrets' have been published, they are
no longer secret. On the Internet, works are published, so it should not be possible to
wrap them up in an obligation of confidence by means of a technological protection
system. Validation of these protection systems inhibiting access to works and
information leads to inconsistency by, on the one hand, arguing that works on the
Internet are published, but on the other hand, arguing that they are confidential.
5.1 UCITA, publication and confidentiality
This same tension, between publication and confidentiality, is apparent in UCITA. On
the one hand, it is argued that UCITA is merely a contract law statute, which does not
change or modify or create property rights. Thus, the contract is only good as between
two people63. But on the other hand, UCITA is direcdy specifically towards mass
market licensing, by validating standard form contracts used for transactions with the
general public64. This has led one commentator to say: The argument that the copyright
owner ofa mass marketed work can create a confidential relationship with the entire world is, quite
simply, ridiculous. A. restriction applied to the entirepublic amounts toprivate legislation 65. The
restriction is the ability to establish universal conditions of access.
6. Summary
Copyright owners see the development of digital fences as the only realistic means of
controlling distribution of creative works over the Internet. However, the legal
62 In the US one is permitted to reverse engineer to discover the trade secret. Kewanee Oil Company v Bicron Corp
416 US 470 476 (1974). 'A trade secret law. ..does not offerprotection against discovery byfair and honest means, such as
independent invention, accidental dischsure, or... reverse engineering'.
63 Ring Jr. and Nimmer, The 2B Guide August 26 1999 Revised version of document made available at the
NCCUSL conference in Denver July 23-30 1999 http://www.2bguide.com/docs/Q&apm.html p 2.
64 This, by the drafters own admission, is a revolutionary concept ibidplO.
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protection being developed is far from free from controversy. The limits of the laws
enacted in the US have already become the subject of a number of law suits. Content
providers are suing those who make available details of software programs that decrypt
the protection surrounding the digital works. It would appear that as fast as the content
providers take this action, so other decryption programs appear.
A case of particular importance which has tested the limits of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act 1988 (DMCA) and introduced in chapter 2 of this study, is Universal City
Studios Inc v Shawn Reimerdes66. The focus of the discussion in chapter 2 was on the
implications for linking. For the present purposes, the focus is on the liability in relation
to circumvention of the encryption program (Content Scrambling System or CSS)
designed to protect the contents of the DVD by the dissemination of the decryption
program, DeCSS. At first instance, the major motion picture associations accused the
defendants of violating the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA by making
details of the DeCSS code available on the web site, and by linking to other web sites
containing the same code. In the lower court the defendants were found liable for
infringing the terms of the DMCA section 1201(a)(2), which prohibits making available
technologies which are designed to defeat technological protections controlling access
to a work. DeCSS was found to be just such a technology. That court did appreciate
that prohibiting circumvention of access controls in some cases may make it impossible
to use the underlying work in a way which might otherwise have been fair67. However,
it was pointed out that the defendants were not being sued for infringement of
copyright, but for offering and providing technology that could overcome the controls
which guarded access to a creative work. So here there was clearly recognition of a
divide between gaining access to a work, and infringement of copyright, with stress being
laid on access68. On appeal69 the main challenge was to whether the DMCA was
65 Cohen, Some Reflections on CopyrightManagement Systems and Caws Designed to Protect Them 1997, Berkeley
Technology Lawjournal Vol 12 Issue 1. http://www/law.berkeley.edu/btij/articles/12-l/cohen-html.
66 00 Civ 0277 (LAK) http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/D02NYSC/00-08117.PDF.
67 ibid p 41.
68 For a full discussion see http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/07/biztech/articles/31rite.html.
For a discussion on how the case affects linking, see chapter 2 of this study. Apparendy, the DeCSS code has




constitutional, specifically whether that Act violated the US First Amendment™. It was
argued that computer code (in this case DeCSS) is 'speech' and thus entitled to First
Amendment protection. The court agreed that this was indeed the case. Flowever, the
protection provided by the First Amendment in these circumstances had to be
tempered because of the capacity of DeCSS 'to accomplish unauthorised unlawful access to
materials in which the Plaintiffs have intellectualproperty rights'71. The Court thus said that there
was a choice between impairing some communication and tolerating decryption. In
other words, using encryption techniques and prohibiting decryption did result in some
limit on the principle of freedom of speech, but a balance had to be struck between the
two. The court found the choice that had been made by Congress to implement the
DMCA was consistent with the limitations on the First Amendment as applied in this case.
The Appellants therefore lost, and the injunction granted by the lower court upheld.
So for the time being at least, the DMCA and in particular the anti-circumvention
provisions survive. To this point, the lobbying by the content providers in the US
appears to have been successful, and to have resulted in robust protection for the digital
fences surrounding access to creative works. However, the court faced critical
arguments from both sides of the divide. These go on the one hand to the heart of the
programme pursued by right holders for the protection of creative works on the
Internet, and on the other hand to the heart of the grievances of users ofworks who
consider that the protection surrounding creative works tip the balance of protection in
favour of right holders too far, notably to the detriment of authorship.
Even though the lawfulness of the programme directed towards the protection of these
digital fences has been upheld to date in the US, that does not preclude a constitutional
or other challenge in the future. Equally it does not preclude a challenge to the
Copyright Directive, possibly on the basis that it does not have proper legal basis in the
69 UniversalCity Studios v Eric Corley US Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit November 28, 2001.
http://www.2600.com/news/112801-files/UniversalBrief_3.pdf.
70 The US First Amendment provides that 'Congress shallmake no law abridging thefreedom ofspeech.' US
Constitution Amendment 1.
71 UniversalCity Studios v Eric Corley US Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit November 28, 2001.
http://www.2600.com/news/112801-files/UniversalBrief_3.pdf.
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EC Treaty72. Nonetheless, it is thus to the effect that these digital fences have on use of
works in the public domain for authorship that we turn in the following chapters.
72 See Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid. [2000] EIPR 11, p. 501.
Hugenholtz points out that the Copyright Directive, as with all previous directives in the field of copyright and
neighbouring rights, is based on articles 47.2, 55 and 95 (ex articles 57.2, 66 and 100A) of the EC Treaty. These
are the same legalfoundations that the Tobacco Advertising Directive (Directive 98/43/EC) was built on. In a case brought
before the European Court ofJustice, Germany has challenged that directive's legal basis and requested its annulment, pursuant to
article 230 (ex 173) ofthe Treaty. On October 5, 2000, the Court delivered itsjudgment. The Court notes that the Directive does
notfacilitate thefree movement ofgoods or thefreedom ofservices, and does not remove distortions to competition. In sum, the
Directive lacks aproper legal basis, and should be annulled'. Hugenholtz argues that the validity of the Copyright
Directive could be challenged on the same basis.
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Chapter 5
From hard copies to licensing digital bits (from copyright to contract)
1. Introduction
The previous chapter showed that it is now (or soon will be) unlawful to circumvent a
technological protection measure that guards access to a work disseminated over the
Internet, whether or not the underlying work is protected by copyright law or database
right. This, as has been explained, is one of the most important planks in the armoury of
right holders. But it was considered that such technical protection was not sufficient to
ensure right holders have full legal control over dissemination of works over the Internet,
at least not for many countries. The question arose as to whether placing digital works
on a server was already encompassed within the existing exclusive rights belonging to the
copyright owner, or whether it was a new right which should be protected accordingly.
Some argued that Internet dissemination was akin to broadcasting; others pointed to the
fact that broadcasting was a wireless technology, whereas the Internet (at least at present)
depends on wire transmission. In addition, Internet communication is on a one-to-one
basis, at the behest of the user, whereas the content of broadcasting is determined and
put out by the broadcaster on a one-to-many basis. Others still wondered if the
performance rights would cover Internet dissemination, only to come up against the
problem that the legislation in many countries requires a performance to be in public
before it infringes the exclusive right. In order to overcome these difficulties it was
suggested that new rights - 'communication to thepublic■ and 'making available to thepublic' -
should be introduced at Treaty level and thence into the domestic laws of contracting
parties. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss these new rights specifically in the
context of the principle of exhaustion of rights, as it will be argued that exhaustion in the
law of copyright contributes, however tangentially, to authorship. The second main
point to note from this chapter is that the 'new' rights facilitate the move to licensing of
works when disseminated over the Internet by stripping the work from the tangible
object in which it has hitherto been embodied.
Ill
1.1 Exhaustion of rights
The doctrine of exhaustion of rights is one that operates to a greater or lesser extent in
most jurisdictions1. The owner of copyright in a protected work has the exclusive right
to place the object in which the copyright work is embodied (or consent to the placing of
the object) such as the video cassette, book or computer program, on to the market for
the first time. This is what is known as the distribution right. However, once that work
has been first placed on the market, the right of distribution is exhausted, and the owner
of the copyright may not, thereafter, prevent the further movement of that object,
embodying the work, in the marketplace. The owner of the copyright may not object to
wholesalers selling to retailers; retailers to the public; and a member of the public giving,
lending (but not for commercial gain) reselling, or reading the purchased copy as many
times as required, all without payment to, or permission from, the copyright holder. The
copyright owner thus has the 'first sale' right as regards the physical object, but not the
second, third or subsequent sales. The exhaustion of this right does not, however, affect
the other rights embodied in that work which belong to the copyright holder. The
copyright owner will still have the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the purchaser
from making a copy of that work; adapting it; renting it out for commercial gain2;
broadcasting3, or carrying out any of the other exclusive rights4.
However, the exhaustion rule does not apply where the supply is one of services rather
than goods, as there is no physical object placed on the market. Authorisation is
required each and every time the service is supplied, or a performance takes place. An
example is the broadcast of a work. The area in which the work may be broadcast, for
how long, and how many times, is subject to agreement with the right holder, as each
broadcast is considered a separate act5. Thus, in Coditel v Cine-Vog Films6, a Belgian
company, Cine Vog Films, had obtained the exclusive performance rights to the French
1 E.g. in the UK, CDPA ss 16(b), 18. In the US, US Copyright Act 17 USC s 106(3). The right is 'to
distribute copies. . . by sale or other transfer ofownership.'
2 Warner Brothers v Christiansen [1988] ECR 2605. When rental right for films existed in Denmark but not in
England, a Dane purchased a video ofNever Say Never Again in England and took it back to Denmark to
rent it out. The owner of the copyright in the film and the manager of the exclusive rights in the rental in
Denmark obtained an injunction under Dutch copyright law. The ECJ found that Danish rental rights
applied equally to Danish and imported videos.
3 CDPA s 20.
4 See generally Cornish Intellectual Property para 13-56.
5 Cine Vog v Cotidel (No 1) [1980] ECR 881.
6 Coditel v Cine-Vog Films (No 2) [1982] ECR 3381 (CoditelII) See generally Anderman EC Competition Eaw
and IntellectualProperty Rights: The Regulation ofInnovation Clarendon Press Oxford 1998 p68.
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film, Le Boucher, for five years. When Cine Vog discovered that a Belgian cable
company had obtained a copy of the film from a transmission, and were re-transmitting
it by cable, Cine Vog was able to obtain an injunction to prohibit Coditel from showing
the film on Belgian television. In giving judgement, the ECJ noted that the product
comprised a literary or artistic work available to the public which may be infinitely
repeated. This presented difficulties for the copyright owner, which differed from the
circulation of works in hard copy form, such as books and videos. The right of a
copyright owner to consent to and require fees for any showing of that work was
considered to be part of the essential function of copyright in this type of literary and
artistic work7. The owners of the copyright in a film thus have the right to authorise
each and every broadcast and performance of that film in public, and indeed to charge
for such authorisation. Equally, rental is a different form of exploitation from
distribution. The rental right remains one of the prerogatives of the copyright owner,
notwithstanding sale of the physical recording, and is not exhausted by the distribution
of the object incorporating the work8. Indeed, the very essence of rental is that the
restricted act is performed many times with the same object.
1.2 The territorial limitations on exhaustion
At a political level, exhaustion of rights has been a difficult issue. In international
negotiations, the question has been whether, once a physical work is lawfully placed on
to the market anywhere in the world (or in any of the territories of the signatory states to
an International Treaty such as TRIPS), the right holder has any further rights to control
distribution of that copy. At the time of the negotiation of TRIPS, the issue was
considered controversial, and no agreement was attained as to whether a doctrine of
international exhaustion for physical goods should be applied. TRIPS merely provides
that 'nothing in this agreement shall be used to address the issue ofthe exhaustion of intellectualproperty
rights'k The same difficulties were encountered in the negotiations for the WCT. This
Treaty states that'authors ofliterary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right ofauthorising
the making available to thepublic ofthe original and copies oftheir works through sale or other transfer
1 In Coditel 11 the court also held that an agreement conferring an exclusive right to exhibit a film for a
specified period in the territory of the member states with absolute territorial protection is not necessarily
caught by Article 85(1) of the Treaty (now Article 81 (1)).
8 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp [1998] 3 CMLR 919. Nor is the rental right
exhausted when it is first exercised in one of the Member States of the Community. Case C-61/97
Foreningen afdanske Videogramdistributorer v Faserdisken. Judgement of 22 Sep 1998.
9 TRIPS Agreement Article 6.
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ofownership' and that'nothing in this Treaty shall affect thefreedom ofcontractingparties to determine
the conditions, ifany, under which the exhaustion ofthe right inparagraph (1) applies after thefirst sale
or other transfer ofownership ofthe original or a copy ofthe work with the authorisation ofthe authorn0.
Exhaustion of rights occurs nationally, within the UK, and on an EU-wide scale. Thus,
goods incorporating works protected by copyright are able to move freely around the
UK and the EU once the right holder has placed those goods anywhere on the market
within the EU11. If, however, goods are placed on the market without the consent of the
right holder, then the exhaustion rule does not apply12. In order to clarify the EU
approach, the Copyright Directive provides in the recitals:
'Copyrightprotection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to control distribution of
the work incorporated in a tangible article. Thisfirst sale in the Community ofthe original ofa
work or copies thereofby the rightholder or with his consent exhausts the right to control resale of
that object in the Community. This right should not be exhausted in respect ofthe original or of
copies thereofsold by the rightholder or with his consent outside the Community. ... .
The Articles provide:
The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect ofthe original of
their works or ofcopies thereof, except where thefirst sale or other transfer ofownership in the
Community ofthat object is made by the rightholder or with his consent''4.
By contrast, as there is no internationally agreed rule of international exhaustion15, a UK
copyright owner who places books on the market in the US, wherever those books have
been manufactured, can prevent those books from being imported into the UK or any
other part of the EU16. Equally, a copyright owner who places protected works on the
market in the EU has a right to prevent their export and importation into the US.
10 WCT Article 6.
11 Deutsche Grammophon vMetro [1971] ECR 487 where Deutsche Grammophon (DG) sold records in
Germany and France - but its French subsidiary Polydor charged a lower price due to market conditions.
Metro bought the records in France and re-imported them into Germany for resale at a lower price. DG
invoked its copyright in the records to stop the practice. The ECJ said that DG had exhausted its right in
the records by putting them on the market with its consent.
12 EMI Electrola v Patricia Im - undExport and Others [1989] ECR 79.
13 Copyright Directive Recital 18.
14 Copyright Directive Article 4 Distribution Right.
15 Countries that have no export for their books, for example Finland, favour international exhaustion as it
allows them to import cheaply. Countries with strong export markets for languages favour developing
orderly international markets and exclusive rights.
16 EMI v CBS [1976] ECR 811 where trade marks were in issue and the ECJ held that trade mark rights in
any Member State could be used to prevent the importation of goods from the US without offending
Article 30.
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However, the US has a slightly different approach to exhaustion. Where a work
protected by copyright has been lawfully made within the US, and exported for
consumption outwith the US, the right holder has no right to rely on copyright to
prevent its re-importation into the US17. However, where the copies are manufactured
outside the US with the permission of the right holder, then the US right holder can
prevent their re-importation into the US18.
1.3 The purpose of the exhaustion rule
In the EU, the exhaustion doctrine stems from the desire to allow the existence of
national intellectual property rights to continue, while at the same time recognising that
some limits are necessary on the exercise of those rights. Without exhaustion, markets
could be partitioned within the EU, and free trade in goods restricted. Although
copyright is a territorial right, the application of the Berne Convention19 and the non¬
discrimination rules in the EU ensure that the owner of the copyright in a work in the
UK is equally the owner of the copyright in that same work in France20. Without
exhaustion, the owner of the copyright in a work contained in a book in the UK could
prevent that book being exported to France after a first sale in the UK unless that
movement was authorised. Exhaustion within the EU prevents this market-partitioning
by use of copyright. Because goods can move freely within and between territories,
consumers are said to benefit because it is difficult to charge higher prices to consumers
in one territory as compared to another21. If prices differ, a parallel importer can export
a work from the territory where the prices are lower, to sell that work in a territory where
the copyright owner is trying to charge higher prices. The parallel importer can sell the
work at a lower price, thus benefiting the consumer. Thus a copyright owner cannot use
copyright to prevent the free flow of goods within designated territories, and has to sell
at the same or similar prices throughout those territories.
17 In the US inQuality King Distributors, Inc. V. Canga Research International, Inc. Certiorari Court OfAppeals
Ninth Circuit No. 96-1470. 1998 the court decided that for works protected by copyright where they were
lawfully made in the US, that exhausted the resale right even where the goods were exported and then re-
imported.
18 Ibid.
19 Berne Convention Article 5.
20 Phil Collins v Imtrat Cases C-92 & 326. [1993] ECR 1-5145.
21 Higher prices in the UK have been challenged in recent months by supermarkets. Britain's biggest
supermarket chain challenged the might ofHollywood, calling on Warner Home Video and otherfilm studio to abandon the
'poning' that inflates DVDprices in Britain', http://www.qlinks.net/items/qlitem6717.htm
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Where exhaustion does not operate, right holders (most notably the publishers22)
strongly defend the ability to partition the market. Publishers (and other copyright
owners), argue that the role of exclusivity is to encourage and to sustain investment in a
territory. Such investment ensures that stocks of a particular title will be available for
distribution. In addition, new titles can be marketed effectively, both building up the
reputation of an author and serving the interests of readers through making the works of
authors known. In other words, publishers argue that the ability to partition markets
means that consumers have a greater choice of products within their territory23.
1.4 Exhaustion and authorship
Exhaustion not only contributes to market efficiency, but is also a significant factor in
contributing to the free flow of works, information and ideas, which, in turn, can
influence authorship. The doctrine means that the owner of a physical object embodying
the work can read it, listen to it, or view it, as many times and for as long as required.
The physical article may be lent, or sold, giving wider access to the ideas embodied
within it. The copyright owner retains the exclusive first right of distribution. But the
exhaustion doctrine provides a balance. Because the owner's rights are at that time
exhausted, the works protected by copyright, and embodying the ideas, views, facts,
knowledge and information, are thereby allowed to circulate freely, be considered,
discussed, and re-used as a building blocks in the process of authorship. In this a certain
'leakage' might occur24: more than is lawfully permitted might be copied from the
tangible object, or a copy made for a friend. But this leakage is balanced: analogue
copies made from the original may not be of a particularly good quality. In addition,
although this 'leakage' is not authorised, it is part of the imperfect control25 that is found
in the balance between the interests of the author, the intermediary and the public, and
which contributes towards making authorship possible.
22 Clark, Net Law,A Cyberspace Agendafor Publishers Geneva September 14 to 16 1999
WIPO/EC/CONF/99/SPK/12-B.
23 Hugenholtz, Adapting Copyright to the Information Superhighway in The Future of Copyright in a Digital
Environment Flugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p96. In practical terms, if right holders were always to give
permission to the sale on of physical copies, the eventual chain of permissions and licences could be almost
unworkable. Exhaustion therefore contributes to allocative efficiency and orderly markets.
24 Dreyfuss, Doyou want to know a Trade Secret? DowArticle 2B will make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But
Innovation More Difficult)' (1999) 87 California Law Review 191 .A corepremise offederal innovationpolity.. ..[is]
that information leaks: That is, knowledgeflows inevitably into the domain ofthe public, where innovators can use what
others have learned and improve what thy have done', p 198.
25 Sufficient incentive , ....is something less than 'perfect control'. Lessig, IntellectualProperty and Code 1996, 11 St
John's J Legal Comment 635 at 638.
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2. The exhaustion doctrine and the distribution of goods by way of the
Internet
The Internet holds not only enormous possibilities, but also enormous difficulties for the
workings of the exhaustion rule, both for goods traded over the Internet, and for
transmission of digitised material. Although digitised material will be the focus of this
enquiry, physical goods, such as video cassettes, books, and computer programs on disk,
deserve brief comment.
2.1 Hard copies
It is not clear whether the doctrine of exhaustion operates in relation to hard copies of
works sold over the Internet. One example arises from the business run by
Amazon.com26. Amazon.com is a website based on the underlying business of, inter alia,
selling hard copies of books, videos and software. When the web site was first launched,
both the company operating the business, and its web site, were situated in the US27.
However, this did not stop any surfer, wherever she may have been in the world, from
purchasing books from the web site in the US, and having them shipped to the home
territory. This led Amazon.com into some problems, in particular with the sale of
banned material into certain territories. But the question arises as to whether the
exhaustion rule would operate to limit Amazon.com selling titles only to particular
territories. The exhaustion mle does not apply to retailers, nor to individuals purchasing
copies of works for their own personal consumption. Thus retailers can freely sell books
to anyone for personal consumption. There is nothing to stop an individual traveller
from the US visiting the UK, and purchasing a copy of a book or a video that is available
only in the UK and has not yet been released in the US. The traveller can re-import that
book or video into the US for personal consumption, and vice versa. So does the
exhaustion rule apply to a virtual book store selling hard copies of books all over the
world? When Amazon.com ships these hard copies to customers all over the world,
does it act as a retailer or as a parallel importer? Does it merely offer a shop window,
allowing surfers to enter its virtual doors and purchase any product, safe in the
26 http://www.amazon.com.
27 There are now a number of 'amazon.com' websites around the world. For instance, amazon.co.uk ,
amazon.de, amazon.fr.
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protection afforded to real-world travellers who purchase copies of books in other
territories, and then re-import them into their home territories for personal use? Or is
Amazon.com acting as a parallel importer in sending its products all over the world? If
the former, then the exhaustion rule applies, and the copyright owner has no right to
prevent the site from selling any tangible product to anyone anywhere in the world. If
the latter, then the territorial restrictions would apply, and Amazon.com could be
prevented, for example, from shipping certain books and videos from the US to any
purchaser in a Member State of the EU28.
It appears that the International Publishers Copyright Council (IPCC) consider
Amazon.com (and presumably similar organisations) to be parallel importers and would
like to control the practice of cross-border selling29. IPCC are endorsing a project set up
by an organisation called Book Data30, the mission of which is to compile a database of
information from publishers, detailing what products they produce, and what
permissions have been given, and to whom, to sell these products into specified
territories. The aim appears to be to allow a virtual bookseller to ascertain whether a
book, or other product, may lawfully be sold in a particular territory. If this project is
endorsed, it would appear to accept the proposition that a consumer is not permitted to
make a personal purchase from a site located in a territory in which a work protected by
copyright is available, for personal consumption in a different territory, in which the
copyright may be licensed to a different entity, or which may not have been licensed at
all to date.
If the publishers prevail in their view of the categorisation of stores such as
Amazon.com, the effect will be to inhibit the circulation of hard copies of creative works
purchased for personal consumption, from virtual booksellers.
28 Apparently Harry Potter and the Prisoner oj'Apkaban was released in the UK several months before it
became available in the US. This led to a large number of purchases being made from such virtual
bookstores as Amazon.co.uk much to the annoyance of the publisher who owned the rights in the US. As
a consequence Harry Potter and the Goblet ofFire was released in the UK and the US at the same time.
Quoted in Lynch The Battle to Define the Future of the Book in the Digital World First Monday
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_6/lynch/index html at fn 20.
29 Clark, Net Law, A Cyberspace Agendafor Publishers Geneva September 14 to 16 1999
WIPO/EC/CONF/99/SPK/12-B.
30 ibid. The web site can be found at http://www.bookdata.com. On studying the website the company
has a comprehensive range of information available about titles available from a number of regions of the
world. However, there is now no suggestion that the company is specifically formed, or has one of its
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3. Digital works
For the distribution of digital works protected by copyright over the Internet, the
question of exhaustion of rights has proved to be even more acute. One of the
problematic areas identified early on in the discussion on the application of copyright to
the Internet was how the exhaustion doctrine might work in practice for works
disseminated in digital form. If the exhaustion doctrine applies to the distribution of
digital works over the Internet (whether within defined territories or internationally), so
one distribution of a work might mean that the copyright owner would have no further
control over onward dissemination of that particular work. Take the example of a book,
digitised, and transmitted to one customer: that customer could make that work
available to others, by e-mailing it to a friend; by sending it to a distribution list to share
with others; or by placing it on a server for all to visit.
The initiatives taken, and views expressed in the WCT, the Nil Report and the Copyright
Directive, together serve to suggest that the exhaustion doctrine will have no place in
relation to the distribution of creative works in digital form over the Internet.
3.1 The Nil Report - reproduction
The first position, relating to the exhaustion of rights doctrine as it applied to digital
works disseminated over the Internet, was set out in the Nil Report. The arguments
used were based on the view that such dissemination involved at least one, if not more,
reproductions of that work:
' thefirst sale doctrine does not allow the transmission ofa copy ofa work (through a computer
network, for instance), because, under current technology the transmitter retains the original copy
ofthe work while the recipient ofthe transmission obtains a reproduction of the original copy
(i.e., a new copy), rather than the copy owned by the transmitter. the doctrine is
applicable only to those situations where the owner ofaparticular copy disposes ofphysical
possession ofthatparticular copy01.
prime aims to inform virtual booksellers of countries to which they can, and those into which they cannot
sell any particular title. It is not, however, doubted that the information could be used for these purposes.
31 Nil Report p 119. See 17 U.S.C. s 109(a). The owner ofaparticular copy orphonorecord... is entitled... to sell or
otherwise dispose of thepossession of that copy orphonorecord'. Columbia Pictures Indus, v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d
154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984). first sale doctrineprevents the copyright ownerfrom controlling thefuture transfer ofaparticular
copy once its material ownership has been transferred'.
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Thus, because the exhaustion rule applies only to physical copies ofworks, it cannot
apply to materials distributed over the Internet, because a physical copy is never sent.
Any onward transmission involves a further reproduction, and the exhaustion doctrine
has never permitted a new reproduction of a work to be made.
3.2 The EU
In 1995, the EU held the view that the distribution of digitised material over the Internet
amounts to the supply of a service, rather than the sale of goods,32 pointing to the ECJ
decision in Coditelv Cine-VogFilms^. The same arguments were applied to the
dissemination of a work over the Internet. The transmission of a work was considered
to be a supply of that work, akin to a broadcast, rather than the distribution of that work
in tangible form. Thus, once the copyright owner has given authorisation for a work in a
web page to be sent to an individual surfer, that in no way diminishes the right to
authorise, or to refuse to authorise, further transmissions of the same web page and the
work contained within it. Neither does the surfer, or any third party, have the right to
demand repeat transmissions of the same material. Just as with a film in the terrestrial
world, merely because it has been shown in one cinema, that cinema does not have the
right to show that film again, unless agreed with the copyright owner. Neither does it
give to the customer a right to see the film again without paying, or fulfilling other
conditions, once more. So the view at this time was that distribution of a work over the
Internet amounted to the supply of a service, rather than a reproduction of a work.
However, the argument did depend on a transmission over the Internet falling within the
recognised modes of distribution to which this rule applied, such as a performance,
broadcast or cable programme, and it was not clear that this was the case. Both
broadcasting and cable programmes depend on a single transmission, dictated by the
broadcaster or cable programmer. By contrast, on the Internet transmissions are
accessible by individuals at times chosen by them. Further, performances need usually to
take place in public before copyright is infringed. On the Internet, calling up a web site,
or 'performance' of that site normally takes place on a one-to-one basis. Also,
performance and broadcasting are temporary: the performance or the broadcast takes
place and then is over (unless further recorded in some way which without authorisation
32 EU Green Paper Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society COM (95) n382 final p47.
33 [1980] ECR 881. Ministere Public v Tournier [1989] ECR 2521. See generally Anderman, EC Competition
Eaw and IntellectualProperty Rights: The Regulation ofInnovation' Clarendon Press Oxford 1998.
120
would be an infringement). Surfing the Internet and calling up web sites, however, can
readily result in permanent reproductions being made. It was thus not clear whether
making works available over the Internet fitted into any of the recognised modes of
supply of creative works. There were others who argued that such a transmission was a
new way of distributing material, and thus not in itself caught by the existing exclusive
rights of the copyright owners. In line with this thinking, the EU indicated that the right
of communication to the public would be clarified and harmonised as between Member
States34.
Thus, measures affecting the 'communication to thepublic right' have been linked to a 'making
available to thepublic right' and were introduced at international level in the WCT35 which
in turn are found in the Copyright Directive discussed below. The US felt that its
domestic legislation already adequately covered these areas36, and so no specific
provisions were incorporated into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998.
These, in turn, are the rights which facilitate the licensing of each and every
communication of a work between the placing of the work on the server and the end
user.
3.3 The WCT
On the making available to the public right, and the communication to the public right
the WCT provides that:
'.. .authors ofliterary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right ofauthorising any
communication to thepublic oftheir works, by wire or wireless means, including making
available to thepublic oftheir works in such a way that members of thepublic may access these
worksfrom aplace and at a time individually chosen by them'.
This Article is designed to cover placing material on a server connected to the Internet,
which can be accessed and viewed by individuals when and where they please.
34 EU Green Paper Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society COM (95) n382 final.
35 For an introductory discussion see chapter 2 of this study.
36 Under the US statute, performances and displays are defined to be 'public' when they are 'transmitted or
otherwise communicated to members ofthepublic by any device orprocess whereby thepublic can receive the transmission or
communication at the same time andplace or at separate times in separateplaces'. USC Title 17, s.101. The statute
defines a transmission as 'communication ofapeformance by any device orprocess whereby sounds or images are received
at aplace byond the placefrom which thy are sent'. USC Tide 17, s.101.
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Here there is a change to the copyright framework concerning public performance. This
provision would appear to turn private performances, those that might take place within
the sphere of a private home, into public performances because the works in question
are available to the public. In the UK for a performance to be in public there needs to be
some grouping of people to witness the performance37. In France, authors are not
entided to prohibit free private performances exclusively within the family circle38. For
the WCT, this 'performance' is made available to the public because the work is placed
on a server. This would appear to change the status ofworks that have normally been
judged by their permanency such as books, articles and pictures. These can now be
'communicated to the public' as well as disseminated in hard copy form. This may mean
that for some works which are only ever made available over the Internet, such as books
and music, videos and software, no tangible article encompassing this work will ever be
available on the market.
3.4 The Copyright Directive
Following the reasoning in the WCT, the Copyright Directive provides in Article 3:
'Member States shallprovide authors with the exclusive right to authorise orprohibit any
communication to thepublic oftheir works, by wire or wireless means, including the making
available to thepublic oftheir works in such a way that members of thepublic may access them
from aplace and at a time individually chosen by them.
Member States shallprovidefor the exclusive right to authorise orprohibit the making available
to thepublic, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members ofthepublic may access
themfrom aplace and at a time individually chosen by them:
forpeformers, offixations oftheirpeformances;
forphonogram producers, oftheirphonograms;
for the producers of thefirstfixations offilms, of the original and copies oftheirfilms;
for broadcasting organisations, offixations oftheir broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are
transmitted by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite*9.
The difference between paragraphs 1 and 2 (paragraph 1 referring to the acts of
communication to thepublic and making available to thepublic, whereas, by contrast paragraph 2
37 For a discussion of'in public' see chapter 4 of this study.
38 French Intellectual Property Code L122-5.
39 Copyright Directive Article 2.
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only refers to the act ofmaking available to thepublic) arises because the Copyright Directive
deals with both author rights, and neighbouring rights. It has also been said that the
neighbouring rights, catered for in the second paragraph, are only intended to cover acts
ofmaking available the works to members of the public who are not present at the place
where the act ofmaking available originates, and not other acts, for instance
broadcasting40.
It has to be said that this distinction is far from clear, although is one that has been
discussed since the negotiation of the WCT. During those negotiations, the EC tabled
papers suggesting that the distinction should be expressed in the Treaty on the basis that
no case had been made for granting neighbouring right holders a communication to the
public right separate from the making available right41. In addition, during these
negotiations, it was suggested that the expression 'communication to the public' of a
work should mean making a work available to the public by any means or process other
than by distributing copies. Therefore the making available to the public right is within
the communication to the public right. On the communication to the public right, it has
been noted that:
'communication ofa work can involve a series ofacts of transmission and temporary storage,
such incidental storage being a necessaryfeature of the communication process. If at anypoint,
the stored work is made available to thepublic, such making available constitutes afurther act
ofcommunication which requires authorisation 2'.
Thus, each communication, even if intermediate, would be a new communication, and
thus require authorisation. This would cover the scenario where a work was cached and
then called up again by the user. That act of calling up the work again would be a new
communication, and thus require authorisation.
In relation to the making available right, it has been said that the relevant act is the
making available of the work by providing access to it. What is important
'is the initial act ofmaking the work available, not the mere provision ofserver space,
communication connections, orfacilitiesfor the carriage and routing ofsignals. It is irrelevant
40 Copyright Directive Recitals 15 and 15 bis.
41 WIPO May 1996 session of the Committees of Experts (document BCP/CE/VII/l-INR/CE/VI/1).
42 See generally the discussion on Article 10 of the negotiations leading up to the WCT: Draft Treaty on
CertainQuestions Concerning the Protection ofUterary andArtistic Works. 1996. Paper CRNR/DC/4 found on the
WIPO website.
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whether copies are availablefor the user or whether the work is simply madeperceptible to, and
thus usable by, the user^3.
Thus this part is intended to make it clear that interactive on-demand acts of
communication are within the scope of die provision. This, it is said, is done by
confirming that the relevant acts of communication include cases where members of the
public may have access to the works from different places and at different times. The
element of individual choice implies the interactive nature of the access.
In order to confirm that such acts of communication to the public, and making available
to the public, are not exhausted by any act, paragraph 3 ofArticle 4 provides 'The rights
referred to inparagraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act ofcommunication to thepublic or
making available to thepublic as set out in this .Article44'.
Perhaps in order to accommodate the concern that providing copyright owners with
these rights moved public communication into the private sphere, an interesting
provision was included in a Recital45 to an earlier draft of the Directive. This Recital had
emphasised the need for copyright owners to have an 'exclusive right to make available to the
public copyright works or any other subject matter by way of interactive on-demand transmissions,
characterised by thefact that members of thepublic may access themfrom aplace and at a time
individually chosen by them', but added the caveat'whereas this right does not cover
direct representation orperformance' (emphasis added). The words in emphasis
replaced the words in a previous draft' whereas this right does not coverprivate
communication'. It would appear that concessions were being sought for
communications (and thereby reproductions) exclusively within the private sphere,
much as exist now in the UK in respect of 'time shifting' for broadcasts46, or for
performances in private, and as the French have for performances within the family
sphere47. However, this Recital has now gone, possibly to the relief of copyright owners
who were, and remain, against any form of private communication exception. The
Copyright Directive now provides that reproductions in any medium may be made for
43 ibid
44 Copyright Directive Article 3.
45 Copyright Directive concerning Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 21 May 1999
(COM(1999) 250 final), OJ 1999, CI 80/6) Recital 16.
46 CDPA s 70.
47 French Intellectual Property Code L122-5.
124
private purposes, on condition that the right holder receives fair compensation48. There
is, however, no limitation purely for private entertainment and domestic purposes to the
public communication and public availability rights.
Thus, in terms of the Copyright Directive, placing a work on a server amounts to a
communication to the public, which requires authorisation each time it occurs. If a book
was released on to the market, normally it would be judged by its permanency, and hard
copies permitted to circulate. There may be no such hard copies available when works
are made available purely over the Internet.
4. The development of the temporary reproduction right
The developments discussed above will give the copyright owner the right to authorise,
or to refuse authorisation, for any and every transmission of digital works over the
Internet. Thus, if a work was made available over the Internet, and communicated to the
public (within the definitions discussed above) without the consent of the copyright
owner, there would be an infringement. Any subsequent transmission of that work
would also be an infringement.
If the work has lawfully been made available to the public, and the surfer has accessed
and downloaded a copy on to a computer, would the exhaustion doctrine apply to
permit further movement of that copy of the work? The surfer may have paid for the
copy, and, just as with tangible copies in the physical world, might like to lend it to a
colleague. The surfer might also want to store the copy on the hard disc of the
computer, and bring it up on the computer screen to re-read at a more convenient time,
or to share with others. The surfer might also want to copy the work to listen to in a
different place, for instance an MP3 file49 on a portable player. A number of these
activities may involve only temporary reproductions of the work, such as where a copy is
deleted once read. Others, such as copying a music file on to a portable player, involve
permanent reproductions, but for personal use.
The view taken in the Nil Report was that any transmission of a work from one person
to another, or from one medium to another, would involve a reproduction of the original
48 Copyright Directive Article 5.2.a. See also the discussion in chapter 6 of this study.
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copy and would thus be unlawful without consent. Further, it would not be possible
even to delete the copy that had been received over the Internet while at the same time
transmitting a copy to a friend (thus retaining only one copy in existence) because: In
this case, without any doubt, a reproduction ofthe work takesplace in the receiving computer. To apply
thefirst sale doctrine in such a case would vitiate the reproduction right**0.
So any further movement of the work received over the Internet would involve a further
reproduction51. In the Nil Report, it was argued that US law already reflected this view:
Tt has long been clear under U.S. law that the placement ofcopyrighted material into a computer's
memory is a reproduction ofthat material because the work in memory then may be, in the law's terms,
'perceived, reproduced, or.. . communicated. . . with the aid ofa machine or device*62. Further:
'When a work isplaced into a computer, whether on a disk, diskette, ROM, or other storage device or in
RAMfor more than a very briefperiod, a copy is made *3.
This view has been challenged by some commentators54. Nonetheless it would appear
that all but the most fleeting copies may be covered as reproductions in the US. The
effect is that the doctrine of exhaustion of rights never comes in to play. The surfer
never receives a physical copy of anything (such as the book or the video), and any
onward movement from the computer on to which the work has been downloaded
involves a further reproduction, and therefore would be an infringement if done without
authorisation by the owner of the copyright. Merely the 'use' of the work is licensed.
49 http://www.mp3.com.
5" Nil Report p 109.
51 Although putting a musical work lawfully received over the Internet onto an MP3 player to be heard at a
more convenient time can, in the US fall under the fair use limitation. Recording Industry Ass'n ofAmerica Inc.
v DiamondMultimedia Sys Inc. 29 F Supp 2d 624.
52 Nil Report p 75. In 1978, the CONTU Final Report noted, '[T]he application ofprinciples already embodied in
the language ofthe [current] copyright law achieves the desired substantive legalprotectionfor copyrighted works which exist in
machine-readableform. The introduction ofa work into a computer memory would, consistent with the [current] law, be a
reproduction ofthe work, one ofthe exclusive rights of the copyrightproprietor. CONTU Final Report at 40.
See also MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 671
(1994). Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988). Advanced Computer Services v.
MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
53 Nil Report p 76. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
54 Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A DemocraticApproach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace (1995-96) 14
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal. 215. Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read (1994-95) 13 Cardozo
Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 29.
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4.1 Temporary reproductions and the WCT
Spurred on by many copyright owners, who argued that the right to control temporary
reproductions was essential to control the distribution of work over the Internet, the US
lobbied hard for the insertion of a such a temporary right of reproduction in the WCT in
1996. An early draft of the Treaty contained an Article55 which provided that
authorisation of the reproduction of works, whether permanent or temporary, was a right
exclusive to the author. Exceptions to the right would have allowed signatory states to
legislate within the confines of the Berne Convention. Exceptions could have been
made, provided they did not prejudice the legitimate expectations of the author56. The
effect would have been to grant authors rights over temporary copies, with only limited
exceptions for users. It was argued by some delegates at the negotiations that the
proposal contained an entirely novel rule, and by others as merely representing existing
law57.
One of the fundamental objections to the inclusion of this article related to public access
to works and information disseminated over the Internet58. If enacted, every act of
pulling information on to a screen by a surfer would have been an infringement of
copyright. This result was considered too draconian and far-reaching by many delegates.
Another objection was that the proposed wording of the Article would not have allowed
exceptions to be provided for infrastructure and other service providers; transient copies
of packets of information passed around the network, copied by, and held on, servers
and host computers, would have constituted copyright infringement. The result was that
no agreement was attained for formal entry of an Article dealing with the temporary
55 The original Article 7(2), which was deleted before the adoption of the WCT proposed:
'Subject to theprovisions ofArticle 9(2) of the Berne Convention, it shall be a matterfor legislation in Contracting Parties to
limit the right ofreproduction in cases where a temporary reproduction has the solepurpose ofmaking the work perceptible or
where the reproduction is ofa transient or incidental nature, provided that such reproduction takesplace in the course ofuse of
the work that is authorised by the author orpermitted by law'.
56 Article 9 of the Berne Convention states: '(1) Authors ofliterary and artistic worksprotected by this convention
shall have the exclusive right ofauthorising the reproduction ofthese works, in any manner orform. (2) It shall be a matter
for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction ofsuch works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests ofthe author. (3) Any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproductionfor the purposes of this
Convention'.
57 See for example the arguments of Spoor, The CopyrightApproach to Copying on the Internet in Copyright in a
Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p 70. Also Vinje, The New WIPO Copyright Treaty: A
Happy Besuit in Geneva [1997] 5 EIPR 230 for comment on the controversy.
58 For a discussion on the objections see Goldberg, The New WIPO Treaties: A Report on the December 1996
Diplomatic Conference: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Peformances and Phonograms Treaty'. From
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reproduction right in the WCT. However, a statement was agreed in the following
terms: 'It is understood that the storage ofaprotected work in digitalform in an electronic medium
constitutes a reproduction within the meaning ofA.rticle 9 ofthe Berne Convention'.59 It is not clear
whether this was intended to cover temporary reproductions, although the reference to
'storage' might suggest not.
4.2 Temporary reproductions and the Copyright Directive
Within Europe the debate resurfaced, and a temporary reproduction right has been
introduced in the Copyright Directive. The EU, in the follow-up paper to the Green
Paper on Copyright and Related Rights60, stated an intention to harmonise the
reproduction right61. This paper recognised that there whereas all Member States
provided an exclusive reproduction right for all categories of right holders, the scope of
the right and the exemptions differed in relation to temporary acts of reproduction.
Thus the intention was that a harmonised temporary right of reproduction would be
introduced in all Member States, but this would in turn be limited by means of a legal
licence which might, or might not, provide for remuneration for the right holder62.
The UK already provides that a transient or temporary copy of a work amounts to an
infringement of copyright. This is as a result of the implementation of the EC Software
Directive on Computer Programs 63. This Directive obliged Member States to provide
Papers from proceedings of Fifth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and
Policy. Fordham University School of Law NewYork 3 and 4 April 1997.
59 The Agreed Statement on Article 7.
60 Follow up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society COM (96)
568 final 20.11.1996.
61 The four areas on the agenda for harmonisation were the reproduction right; the right of communication
to the public; provision of remedies against the circumvention or abuse of electronic management systems;
and the distribution right. The Copyright Directive achieves these aims.
62 The 'legal licence' aims provide that ISPs will not infringe where temporary reproductions are made
purely as a result of the technical workings of the Internet and of their equipment. To this end, Article 5(1)
of the Copyright Directive provides: 'temporary acts of reproduction such as transient and incidental acts of
reproduction which are an integral and essentialpart ofa technologicalprocess, including those whichfacilitate effective
functioning of transmission systems, whose solepurpose is to enable use to be made ofa work or other subject matter, and which
have no independent economic significance, shall be exemptedfrom the right set out inArticle 2'. Its inclusion has,
however, been protested by right holders. They argue that many temporary acts of reproduction occur on
a daily basis. Site licenses, whereby copies of programs are made from a central server each time a
computer is switched on, are based around the act of temporary reproduction. Right holders would rather
see liability issues for ISPs dealt with under the provisions in the E-Commerce Directive. Article 5,
however, remains in the Copyright Directive.
63 91/250 [1991] OJ L122/42 implemented by way of Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulation 1992 SI
1992 No 3233 amending the 1988 Act. As Cornish argues this development Gar driven the copyright in copies to
apoint where it virtually overlaps with the notion ofperformance ( but without being tied to the concept ofpublic availabilityj'
Cornish Intellectual Property para 13-29.
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that the right holder should have right to do or authorise 'thepermanent or temporary
reproduction ofa computerprogram by any means and in anyform *4. This was translated into
UK65 law in by providing that'copying includes the making ofcopies which are transient or
incidental to some other use ofthe work *>6. In other words, the transient copy refers to all
categories of works, not just computer programs. The provision has caused discussion as
it could mean that surfing, which in many cases only involves a temporary reproduction
on a computer, could constitute an infringement. Many commentators believe that,
despite this provision, there must be an implied licence to cover many activities relating
to the Internet, such as surfing, where those works have been placed on the Internet with
the consent of the right holder67.
To harmonise the laws in Member States of the EU, not all of which contain a general
temporary reproduction right, the Copyright Directive provides that: 'Member States shall
providefor the exclusive right to [authors and neighbouring rightholders to] authorise orprohibit direct or
indirect, temporary orpermanent reproduction by any means and in anyform, in whole or inpartf,s.
This temporary right of reproduction means that a copyright owner will have (if she does
not already under domestic law) the right to authorise, or to refuse authorisation for, a
surfer to view a web page on a computer. If such temporary reproductions are not
authorised, then surfing would infringe this right. This right has implications for a
number of activities and people. A temporary reproduction is made by the person who
digitises the work to place to on the Internet; by the ISP whose equipment makes
continuous temporary copies of works, as these works travel around the network; and
the surfer browsing the Internet, bringing up pages on to the screen of the computer.
Even where a surfer is permitted by the copyright owner to make a hard copy of a work
disseminated over the Internet, it would appear that the doctrine of exhaustion will not
apply to permit that copy to circulate. The Copyright Directive Recital 19 provides:
The question ofexhaustion does not arise in the case ofservices and on-line services in particular. This
also applies with regard to a material copy ofa work or other subjectmattermade
64 Computer Programs Directive Article 4(1).
65 CDPA s 17.
66 CDPA s 17(6).
67 MacQueen, Copyright and the Internet in Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce
Edwards and Waelde eds Hart 2000.
68 Copyright Directive Article 2.
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by a user ofsuch a service with consent ofthe rightholder. ..every on-line service is infact
an act which will have to be subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right soprovides.'
(emphasis added).
Thus, it would appear, even if a surfer makes a hard copy of a work, where the consent
of the right holder has been given to the making of that copy, then that copy is not
subject to the exhaustion rule. That copy could therefore not be lent to a colleague or
resold without infringing this right.
4.3 Making available, communication to the public, temporary
reproductions and exhaustion
Taking these rights together, it would appear that the doctrine of exhaustion will not
operate in relation to digital works made available over the Internet. At the point of
placing a work on a server the copyright owner is able to authorise when a work should
be made available over the Internet. Thereafter, the copyright owner will be in a position
to determine if that work can be accessed and used by the surfer. If a surfer makes a
temporary or permanent copy without permission, that will infringe the rights of the
owner. Equally, any further reproduction of that work, whether temporary or
permanent, is a right reserved to the copyright owner. Thus the surfer, who may have
lawfully accessed and downloaded a copy of that work, cannot 'lend' that work to a
friend without authorisation. Equally, that surfer cannot print out a copy for personal
use or to lend to a friend as that would also result in a reproduction of the work69. Even
the loan of the computer to a colleague to view the work could be inhibited, as bringing
the work on to the screen of the computer would make a further temporary
reproduction. No physical or tangible copy of a work is disseminated over the Internet,
and thus there is no copy on which the exhaustion doctrine can operate. The reach and
control of the law extends to private use of works 70, for which a charge could be levied
for each access71.
m The novel by Stephen King 'Riding the Bullet'was made available only on computer and hand held
instruments like the palm top. The technology built around the book prevents any copies being made.
http://www.laestrelladigital.com/news/doc/1047/1 :COMP27/1:COMP270327100.html
70 Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A DemocraticApproach to Copyright Daw in Cyberspace (1995-96) 14
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 215. Litman, The Exclusive Right to Rxad (1994-95) 13 Cardozo
Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 29.
71 Some have made this point during the various debates in the US. This new right could wellprove to be the legal
foundationfor a society in which information becomes available only on apay-per-use basis'. H7094 Congressman Riley.
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Digital fences surrounding the work, coupled with further contractual terms on use of
the underlying work, could serve as the mechanisms by which the communication to the
public right, the making available to the public right, and the temporary reproduction
right can be enforced. As digital fences become more sophisticated, there would appear
to be no reason why the market could not be partitioned by copyright owners.
Exhaustion in relation to tangible copies of works operates to ensure that does not
happen in relation to specified territorial areas. But as it does not apply to services,
copyright owners can control release ofworks, not only to particular territories, but also
within those territories. A film owner can currendy release a film at expensive inner-city
cinemas, before releasing it to those in outlying areas. The film may be released in
cinemas before copies are made available on DVD's and videos, broadcast, or included
in a cable programme72. Highly refined price discrimination between and within
territories may become possible, under the control of the right holders. At the moment
this does not happen on the Internet because there does not appear to be a reliable
method ofmaintaining territorial boundaries. However, it is perhaps only a matter of
time before such possibilities become apparent.
5. Authorship
At the outset of this chapter, it was suggested that exhaustion contributed to the free
flow ofworks, and thus to authorship. Thus, exhaustion does not mean that copies of
works, or of parts of works can be made. However, it does mean that there is a relatively
free movement of hard copies of works, once those works have been placed into general
circulation. On the Internet, these works are never placed in general circulation, and no
tangible copy is disseminated on which the exhaustion doctrine can operate. In addition,
the technological controls may mean that there will be no room for the leakage that
traditionally occurs. Admittedly, one of the difficulties in pointing to this leakage that
occurs in hard copy form and its consequent contribution to authorship, is that it is not
a good platform on which to call for similar leakage on the Internet. Simply because
unauthorised reproductions may be made does not mean that such reproductions should
be condoned. However, the leakage that occurs in relation to hard copies of works does
72 DVD's are currently 'zoned' by the rights holders. This means, for example, a DVD purchased in the
US could not be played on a DVD player purchased within the EU. This practice is currently under
investigation by the European Commission because the effect is that rights holders can charge different
prices in different zones. For a report see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/enghsh/business/newsid_1382000/1382152.stm.
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so within a framework that has allowed for balancing rights in favour of the owner.
Given that on the Internet there will be no leakage, so this should argue for greater
balancing freedoms in favour of the user of the work, in particular where an author
wishes to glean inspiration for the creation of future works. Without such freedom, an
author may be hampered in the search for inspiration.
6. Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been two-fold. It has been to discuss exhaustion and the
contribution that it makes to the public domain and to authorship. Secondly it has been
to analyse the changes that have been made to the exhaustion doctrine as it will operate
in connection with works disseminated over the Internet and explain how, in turn, that
provides the necessary platform for a paradigmatic shift in the way in which right holders
can protect works: from copyright to contract. Over the next chapters the main parts
of the public domain will be analysed and their contribution to authorship discussed. In
that debate, it will become noticeable that the boundaries of the public domain have
shifted away from the would-author towards facilitating more control in favour of the
right holder. In that move, both the protection of technical controls and the validation
of licensing ofworks are vital factors.
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Chapter 6
Fair dealing, fair use and the public domain
1. Introduction
Perhaps one of the most widely recognised elements of the public domain concerns what
is called fair dealing in the UK and fair use in the US. Broadly, these exceptions to
copyright protection, found both in Anglo-American and Civil law systems, allow an
author when creating a new work, or using the existing work to enhance knowledge, to
borrow a substantial part of the expression of that existing work without permission
from, or payment to, the copyright owner.
2. Fair dealing and authorship
Bearing in mind the derivative nature of creativity, fair dealing can be seen as a vital tool
in that process. For instance, the UK category of criticism and review1 allows an author
to copy what might be qualitatively the heart of an existing work, and repeat it in a new
work with a review or a criticism of the substance and ideas contained in that work. It
allows consideration and reflection of the first work in a second, without needing to seek
permission of the author. The criticism might be negative, but so long as done fairly
prevents the first author from using copyright in the original work to censor the
comment. The recombination of expression and ideas in the second work might reach a
wider, or different audience, facilitating the spread of knowledge. Similarly with fair
dealing for the purpose of reporting news2: because issues of current concern can be
copied and re-used, the information can reach a wide audience. Alternative comment
and views can be aired, giving the public a variety of sources on which to draw. The third
category, fair dealing for the purposes of research and private study, is also immensely
valuable for authorship3. Being able to copy a substantial amount of a protected work,
take it to the privacy of one's own work space, read it, re-read it, mull it over, scribble
comments on it, show it to others, discuss it, learn from it, combine it with other works,
is for the advancement of knowledge, not just for the individual who pleads the privilege
1 CDPA s 30.
2 Ibid.
3 Some guidelines exist for what authors and publishers consider to be fair dealing. For details see
Photocopyingfrom Books andJourna/sThe British Copyright Council, http://www.cla.co.uk.www/ farideal.htm.
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in the first place, but also for the wider consuming public, who might then have the
benefit of further works drawing on the first. The balances represented in the law of
copyright through inter alia the fair dealing defences/limitations support and nurture a
healthy authorial culture.
The fair use defences and their potential demise on the Internet has prompted passionate
debate4 in the US. There has been less debate in EU Member States. This is possibly
because, as will be discussed, the fair dealing provisions in the US are broad open-ended
categories. By contrast, they are narrower in the UK, and narrower still in authors' rights
systems. Thus there may not be as much reliance, or at least not as much acknowledged
reliance, on these limitations to copyright protection when creating new works, as there
has been in the US. The burning question in the US has been: will fair use function on
the Internet? The focus in this chapter will be on fair dealing5 and fair use.
Although an exclusive right of reproduction is conferred on authors in the Berne
Convention6, signatory States are permitted to legislate for exceptions to this right, 'in
certain special cases which do not conflict with the normal exploitation ofthe work by the author, and so
4 Bell, Fair Use v Fared Use: The Impact ofAutomated Tights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine 1998, 76
North Carolina Law Review 557. Elkin-Koren, Copyright Polity and the Limits ofFreedom ofContract 1997,
Berkeley Technology Law Journal Vol. 12. Schlachter, The IntellectualProperty Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why
Copyright Taw Could be Unimportant on the Internet 1997, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Vol. 12. Litman,
Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't 'Just Say Yes' to Licensing) 1997, 29 NYU Journal of International
Law & Policy 237.
3 These are not the only statutory limitations on copyright and which allow re-use of protected works.
The CDPA chapter 3 ss 28-77 contains an assortment of privileges including library privileges CDPA
ss37-44, certain uses for educational purposes CDPA ss32 - 36A, public administration CDPA ss45-50,
computer programs and databases CDPA ss50A - 50D, acts carried out on the assumption that copyright
has expired or the author has died CDPA s57, public readings CDPA s59, and time shifting of broadcasts
and cable programmes CDPA s70. In many cases, the intention is that licensing schemes should be set up
to licence the use ofworks under these sections. These include the copying of abstracts of technical or
scientific articles CDPA s60: provision of sub-titled copies of broadcast or cable programmes CDPA
s74: and recording by educational establishments of broadcasts and cable programmes CDPA s35. To the
extent that licensing schemes are not available, then fair dealing may be relied upon as a defence in an
action for infringement of copyright. However, once a licensing scheme is in place, then this must be used
for the purposes of substantial copying. In pursuance of this policy various schemes have been created
Examples of licensing schemes in operation include: 1993 SI No 74 Copyright (Recording for Archives of
Designated Classes of Broadcasts and Cable Programmes) (Designated Bodies) Order 1993. 1989 SI No
1012 Copyright (Recordings of Folksongs for Archives)(Designated Bodies) Order 1989. 1990 SI No 879
Copyright (Certification of Licensing Scheme for Educational Recording of Broadcasts and Cable
Programmes) (Educational Recording Agency Limited) Order 1990 as amended by 1992 SI No 211, 1993
SI No 193 and 1994 SI No 247. 1993 SI No 2755 Copyright (Certification of Licensing Scheme for
Educational Recording of Broadcasts) (Open University Educational Enterprises Limited) Order 1993
(previously 1990 SI No 2008).
6 The right is 'the exclusive right ofauthorising the reproduction of these works in any manner orform'. Berne
Convention Article 9 (1).
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long as such takings do not unreasonablyprejudice the legitimate interests ofthe author9. This has
been said to be a three-step test, because (1) it applies only in special cases, (2) the
exceptions must not conflict with normal exploitation, (3) the takings must not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the existing author. The formula is
repeated in the TRIPs agreement and in the WCT8. The fair dealing limitations are
considered to fall within this three-step test.
Contrasts can be drawn between the approach ofAnglo-American systems and Civilian
systems to fair dealing. Anglo-American systems generally view fair dealing provisions as
a limitation on the grant of the property right in the work. By contrast, Civilian systems
tend to view the fair dealing provisions as an exception to the grant of the right to the
author. This stems in part from the differing historical development between the
systems. As one Dutch writer has commented: 'Viewedfrom the perspective ofpublic interest,
limitations are inherent to copyright law, viewedfrom theperspective ofthe copyright owner's interest, they
are exceptions to copyright lawThus, on the one hand, a property right is never considered
as granted in those parts ofworks subject to fair dealing or fair use. On the other hand,
in the authors rights systems, the property right is given, but then taken away. This
difference in approach finds expression in domestic legislation. In the Anglo-American
systems, in particular the US, the categories of fair dealing are considered broad and
open-ended. By comparison, the Civilian systems tend to list specifically what activities
are permitted to be carried out in relation to protected works without permission. There
is also an interesting difference in the approach taken in the US, as compared with the
UK. In the US the categories of fair use are wider than those in the UK. In the UK fair
dealing has grown up in the form of tightly worded defences to infringement in the 1988
Act10. The categories, as introduced above, are research and private study11, criticism or
7 The understanding of the current hierarchy of the 3 step test is where a proposed use threatens the
normal exploitation of a work then the consideration of the test comes to an end and any contemplated
exception permitting the proposed use is not authorised by the test. Rickeston, The Berne Conventionfor the
Protection ofLiterary andArtistic Works: 1886-1986 (1987) p483. For comment Heide, The Berne Three Step
Test and the Proposed Copyright Directive Opinion [1999] EIPR 105.
8 TRIPS Article 13.
9 Grosheide, Mass Market Exploitation ofdigital Information by the Use ofShrink Wrap and Click Wrap Licenses. A
Dutch Perspective onArticle 2B UCC in Grosheide and Boele-Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: Europees
Privaatrecht 1998.
10 CDPA ss29-31.
11 Research and private study is not further defined in the CDPA. In the Australian case of De Garis v
Neville Jeffres PidlerPty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292 the court took the view that 'research' meant diligent and
systematic enquiry or investigation into a subject in order to discover facts or principles', and 'study' as the
application of the mind to the acquisition of knowledge by reading, investigation or reflection; the
cultivation of a particular branch of learning science or art; a particular course of effort to acquire
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review12 and reporting current events13. By contrast, the US has a broader notion of fair
use, and the categories are open-ended14. Thus the relevant statutory provision refers to:
'thefair use ofa copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies orphonorecords or by any
othermeans specified by that section, forpurposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting', teaching
, scholarship or research .. ,'16 (emphasis added). Such is the flexibility of the doctrine in
the US it has been said that it could be used cin arguably any circumstance'X1. M creature of
common law, fair use conforms to no simple test, bright line rule or systematicpresumption™.
The purpose of this part is to compare how fair dealing and fair use function in the
'terrestrial' world, and examine the rationales for their existence, before turning to look at
how they might function on the Internet.
knowledge; or an examination and analysis of a particular subject p630. In Television New Zealand v
Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91 p 105 the New Zealand High Court said that research involves
the study of things including written materials or those captured in electronic form. In the UK, the
research and private study exemption only applies to case where an individual makes a copy of a work for
his own research or private study and not, for example to the making ofmultiple copies for distribution to
other persons University ofLondon Press Ltd. V University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601 p613-4.
12 The early origins of comments on this defence indicate some confusion with the notion of substantial
copying. Thus in Chatterton v Cave [1877-78] 3 App Cas 483 p492, Lord Hatherley said that books are
published with the expectation that they will be criticised and reviewed, and therefore quoting from them is
fair use so long as the amount quoted was not substantial. Independent Television Publications Ltd v Time Out
Ltd [1984] FSR 64 where Whitford J said that once the conclusion is reached that the whole or a
substantial part of the copyright work had been taken, a fair dealing defence is unlikely to succeed.
Criticism and review need not be confined to the literary style of the work, but may extend to the thoughts
underlying it, for example the ideas or philosophy. Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 p93. But of course,
copyright does not in any event extend to ideas, only to their expression.
13 In Newspaper Licensing agemy Ltd vMarks & Spencer Pic [1999] TLR 60 Lightman J considered that the
words 'reporting current events' were of a wide and indefinite scope and should be interpreted liberally.
Case reversed on appeal on the grounds that the copying done of the typographical arrangement did not
constitute a substantial amount of the work as a whole. [2001] Ch. 257 [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1256 [2000] 4 All
E.R. 239 [2000] . See also Pro Seiben MediaAG v Carlton UK Television Ltd [1999] FSR 610 (CA).
14 The doctrine of fair use was first recognised in US in 1841 in Poison v Marsh, 9 F Cas 342 (CC Mas
1841)(No 4901) where the defendant copied a twelve volume historical work on George Washington by
editing it down to two volumes. 353 pages had been copied verbatim. In finding for the plaintiff the court
took the view that granting fair abridgement would unduly reduce the economic incentives of authors to
produce. Moreover, there was no specific public interest in producing the work as no new work was
created nor productive meaningful transformative use: In deciding questions ofthis sort, look to the nature and
objects ofthe selection made, the quantity and value ofmaterials used, and the degree in which the use mayprejudice the sale,
or diminish theprofits, or supercede the objects, of the original work' p348.
15 Fair use was considered in a case concerning news reporting on the Internet. The court, however, found
that the fair use defence did not succeed.. LA Times v Free Republic 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484, 56
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1862; 29 Media L. Rep. 1028.
"•'Copyright Act USC 17 sl07.
17 Phan, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet? 1998, 98 Columbia Law Review 1998, 169 at p 182.
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2.1 Fair dealing and fair use
As mentioned above, fair dealing19 in the UK and fair use20 in the US are privileges that
allow a user of a work protected by copyright to copy substantial21 proportions of that
work for specified purposes without the consent of, or direct payment to, the copyright
owner. Any new work created can be further disseminated without the permission of the
copyright owner in the first work. In other words, the fair dealing provisions allow an
author to copy the expression of ideas fashioned by authors that came before, and use
the expression of those ideas in creating new works. Thus where passages from a book
are fairly included in another, or where news is re-broadcast22,or where one work is
incidentally included in a second23, the user may distribute copies of the new transformed
work without permission from, or payment to, the original copyright owner.
There are some similarities in the subject matter of the cases that come to the courts for
consideration under the fair dealing and fair use principles. Under the narrow UK
categories have been questions over the publication of photographs in a newspapers
which were taken from another newspaper24. In similar vein was the case in the US
where one magazine scooped the serial rights in a story belonging to another25. In
neither case was the defence of fair dealing/use successful. But there are questions to
come before courts in the US where a case for fair use is made out, but would not be in
the UK. Thus, in the US, a court has held that videotaping by individuals, at home, of
off-air television broadcast programming for the purpose of 'time shifting', is fair use26.
18 Leval, Fair Use 1990, 103 Harvard Law Review 1105.
19 CDPAss 28-31.
20 US Copyright Act Title 17 USC s 107.
21 CDPA s 28.
22 In some circumstances, it may be permissible to take the whole of an existing work. Hubbard v Vosper
[1972] 2 QB 84; Beloffv Pressdram [1973] 1 All ER 241.
23 CDPA s 31(1). But see CDPA s 31(3) which provides that music and song lyrics are not to be regarded
as incidentally included 'if it is deliberately included'. In Hawkes <& Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Service
Ltd[1934] Ch 593, bars from the march 'Colonel Bogey' were included deliberately in a newsreel as
background music, and therefore copyright was infringed. This case was decided under the 1911 Act.
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, para 2.160, suggest that the case would be decided differently under current
legislation.
24 Francois-Marie Banier v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 812.
25 Harper & Row Nation magazine's scoop of Time magazines first serial rights in President Ford's
memoirs held infringing notwithstanding newsworthiness of the account of the Nixon pardon set out
therein. Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 549-50 (1985).
26 Sony Corp. ofAmerica v Universal City Studios 464 US 417, 455 (1984) holding that 'time shifting' of
television shows protected by copyright constitutes fair use under the US Copyright Act, and thus is not an
infringement. The US courts have also opined that 'space shifting' is fair use. Space shifting is copying a
work from one medium to another, in this case from a computer to an MP3 player. RecordinglndustiyAss'n
ofAmerica Inc. v DiamondMultimedia Sys Inc. 29 F Supp 2d 624.
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This does not fall under the fair dealing provisions in the UK, but there is a specific
exemption in the CDPA27. Other cases reach similar outcomes. In the US an
unsuccessful attempt was made to argue that a school's practice of taping educational
broadcasts for later use in classrooms was fair use28. In the UK, the same result would
be achieved as there is a specific provision encouraging licensing the taping of off-air
broadcasts for educational purposes29. And finally, reverse engineering of a computer
program to discover the interface to create an interoperable program, is fair use in the
US3". In the UK it is subject to a specific statutory provision which permits
decompilation of a program by a lawful user, if the purpose for such decompilation is to
discover the interface to enable the creation of a new and interoperable program31.
2.2 The factors in the Anglo-American approach in determining whether
a case is made out
A comparison between the UK and US approach shows a number of similarities as to
the factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a particular use is fair. But in
neither case is it easy to determine exactly when a defence of fair dealing will be
successful32.
In the UK legislation there are no guidelines as to what factors should be taken into
account in determining a case of fair dealing. By contrast, in the US, specific factors are
listed in the Copyright Act si07. These are: the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the
27 CDPA s70.
28 Encyclopaedia Britannica Edic Corp v Crooks 558 F Supp 1247 WDNY (1983)
29 CDPA s 35(2)
3(1 Sega Enterprises Etd vAccolade Inc 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir 1992) p 1523. For a Critique of the case see
Miller, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, Databases and Computer Generated Works: IsAnything New Since
CONTU? [1994] 26 IPLR. See also Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v Connectix Corporation 203 F.3d 596,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1744, 53 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705 where the US 9th Circuit Court ofAppeals ruled
that Connectix was entitled to reverse engineer products for the Sony Playstation. The decision overturned
a lower court decision that prohibited the practice.
31 CDPA s 50B. Mars UKLtd v Teknowledge Ltd [2000] FSR 138.
32 Nogenerally accepted definition offair use ispossible and each case raising the question must be decided on its ownfacts'.
HR Rep No 1476 94th congress 2nd Sess at 65 (1976). Campbell vAcujf-Rose Music Inc 114 S Ct 1180 1182
(1994): 'the task is not to be simplified with bright line rules, for the statute like the doctrine it recognises callsfor case by case
analysis'. See generally Loundy, Prevising the Copyright Lawfor Electronic Publishing 1995, 14 J. Marshall J.
Computer & Info. 1.
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portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work'3.
In the UK, fair dealing protects a reviewer or commentator who may want to use a work
to illustrate comments made on that work34. But where the motive might be to damage
the copyright owner, or to take unfair advantage of a work, or to compete commercially
with the owner, a case of fair dealing will not be made out35. This 'commercial purpose'
factor is one that has grown in importance in recent years, particularly in the US. There
the courts have gone so far as to state that 'every commercial use ofcopyrighted material is
presumptively unfair26. In the UK this was considered important in AssociatedNewspapers
Grouppic v News Group Newspapers Ntct1. The Daily Mail had printed a number of letters
which had passed between the late Duke and Duchess ofWindsor. One was copied in
an edition of The Sun. The court found that the purpose was to attract readers, and was
therefore not fair dealing. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Newspaper licensing Agency v
38
Marks <& Spencer said 'a dealing by aperson with a copyright workfor his own commercial
advantage — and to the actual orpotential commercial disadvantage ofthe copyright owner— is not to be
regarded as fair dealing' unless there is some overriding element ofpublic advantage whichjustifies the
subordination ofthe rights of the copyright owner". Commercial use does not, however, preclude
a successful defence of fair dealing in either the UK or US. In British broadcasting Corp. v
British Satellite Broadcasting LlcC the defendant, a satellite broadcaster, frequently
transmitted significant excerpts of BBC sports bulletins4". The court found that the use
of the material was fan dealing, because it was pertinent to the news reporting character
of the programme. Although the defendant was a competitor of the BBC, there was no
intention of poaching viewers. In the US in Campbell vAcuff-Rose Music Inc.41 the court
held that a commercial parody may qualify as fair use, if the use of the copyright material
transformed the original to the extent that an independent work was created. There also
33 For a general discussion on Fair Use in the US see Leval, Fair Use 1990, 103 Flarv. L. Rev. 1105.
34 Copinger & Skone James on Copyright {1991) 13th ed Para 10-10.
35Johnstone v BernardJones Publications [1938] Ch 599 p607. Laddie Prescott and Vitoria The Modern Taw of
Copyright and Designs (1995) 2nd ed Vol 1 Para 2.158 Butterworths.
36 Sony Corp ofAmerica v Universal City Studios Inc 464 US 417 (1984) p451.
37 [1986] RPC 515.
38 [2000] 4 All ER 239,257 (Chadwick LJ). The case was confirmed by the House of Lords but on the
grounds that infringement of typographical arrangement depended on a qualitative rather than quantitative
assessment. Newspaper TicensingAgemy vMarks & Spencerpic [2001] UKHL 38; [2001] 3 W.L.R. 290; [2001] 3
AH E.R. 977.
39 [1992] Ch 141.
40 The excerpts lasted between 14 and 37 seconds.
41 114 S Ct 1180 1182 (1994).
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had to be some critical comment on the original material. If activities are for non-profit
educational activities in the US there is a presumption favouring fair use42. By contrast in
the UK these uses have to fall under the research and private study or criticism and
review provisions, or one of the other limited statutory provisions, or else be licensed if
such a scheme is available.
The amount and importance of the work taken, have also been considered important
factors. UK courts have persistently said that this element depends on the facts of each
case, since it is impossible to define exactly what amounts to fair dealing:
'You must considerfirst the number and extent of the quotations and extracts. Sire they
altogether too many and too long to befair? Thenyou must consider the use made ofthem. If
they are used as a basisfor comment, criticism or review, that may be afair dealing. Ifthey are
used to convey the same information as the author, butfor a rivalpurpose, that may be unfair.
Nextyou must consider theproportions. To take long extracts and attach short comments may
be unfair. Tut short extracts and long comments may befair*'.
All factors considered, taking large extracts may well be fair44 where the level of the
review and criticism is high.
What the cases do show in both jurisdictions is that there are no hard and fast standards
that can be applied to determine when a particular case will be successful on the grounds
of fair dealing. Rather, each case needs to be considered on its own merits.
'A.lthough no simple definition ofair use can befashioned, and inevitably disagreement will
arise over individual applications, recognition ofthefunction offair use as integral to copyright's
objectives leads to a coherent and useful set ofprinciples. Briefly stated, the use must be ofa
character that serves the copyright objective ofstimulatingproductive thought andpublic
instruction without excessively diminishing the incentivesfor creativity. One must assess each of
the issues that arise in considering afair use defence in the light of the governingpurpose of
copyright law4'.
The criticism of this approach is that it leaves much uncertainty for those who would
plead fair dealing, and for those who oppose it. Copyright owners may be tempted to
42 Salinger v Random House 811 F 2d 90 (2d cir) concerned biography of Salinger whereby 'dazzling' passages
of the original writing were taken. Fair use was found mainly on the overall instructive character of the
biography.
43 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 per Lord Denning MR p94.
44 Time Warner v Channel4 [1994] EMLR 1. But for a critique see Bradshaw, Fair Dealing and the Clockwork
Orange Case: A Thieves Charter in Readings in Intellectual Property [1995] 17 EIPR 304.
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complain that their works are 'stolen' by the decisions of the court, which rely on facts
and impressions without any guidelines, and that courts have almost complete discretion
in deciding what amounts to fair dealing. Those who wish to rely on fair dealing as a
defence, are often faced with expensive court battles to prove their case.
What is noteworthy from the decided cases is that, in the UK at least, the majority
concern the extent to which the media (newspapers, broadcasters) can copy from another
source and claim fair dealing for those activities. There have been surprisingly few cases
in other areas, notably concerning research and private study, or cridcism and review
where the media has not played a part. This could be for one of two reasons: either
authors, in creating new works simply do not engage in 'copying' from the work of
another, or, and the most likely explanation, is that it is clearly accepted that there are
limitations on the property right in existing works, and it goes without saying that those
elements can be used in creating new works. Without being able to borrow from what
exists, authorship would not be possible. What also matters is the justification for those
takings. Does fair dealing/fair use arise merely in response to market failure, or are there
broader policy oriented goals served by their inclusion in the copyright framework? And
if so, what are they?
3. The Justifications for the fair dealing/fair use defences in the UK and
US
It would appear that there is no single overall justification or theory for the existence of
the fair dealing rights that would explain either why they exist in the legislation of Anglo-
American countries, or the boundaries on their application. Rather a number of
justifications have developed, sometimes attempting to give an over-arching theory,
sometimes attempting to explain single judgements by the courts. These theories draw in
large part on the overall justifications for copyright protection46. Thus, the fair dealing
provisions are said to operate as part of the public/private interest bargain struck by the
43 According to Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard ibid at pi 110, the fair use doctrine is: 'intended to avoid
the rigid application of the copyright law when such an application would defeat the law's underlyingpurpose'.
46 For a general discussion see Rights Eimitations and Exceptions: Striking a Proper balance Imprimatur
Consensus Forum 1997 generally, and Fierce Creatures Copyright Exemptions: Towards Extinction in Institute
for Information Law University of Amsterdam. Paper delivered at conference 30-31 October 1991 by
Hugenholtz.
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law of copyright, in place of the implied consent of the author, or as the expression of a
fundamental human right.
Exemptions are instruments infinding the necessary balance betweenproperty rights in
information and safeguarding thepublic interest. Private copy exemptions areprimarily aimed
atprotecting the individual'sprivate sphere Ubraryprivileges, archival exemptions, rights of
news reporting and quotation rights are intended, inter alia, to safeguard our cultural heritage
andfoster thefreeflow ofinformation. Other exemptionsprotect basic academicfreedoms or
serve essential educationalpurposes*7.
Many commentators, particularly from the US, have argued that the fair dealing
limitations are essential to the overall scheme of copyright48:
Eair use should not be considered a biyarre, occasionally tolerated departurefrom thegrand
conception ofthe copyright monopoly. To the contrary, it is a necessarypart ofthe overall
design * .
3.1 Fair dealing as market failure
In application to the Internet, one of the most prominent, and hody debated, views for
the existence of the fair dealing limitations is that they arise purely in response to market
failure. Seeking consent to re-use substantial parts of a work on every occasion would be
cosdy. Thus, fair use has arisen in response to the circumstances in which bargaining
may be excessively expensive5".
This theory has been strengthened in recent years in the US as a result ofAmerican
Geophysical Onion v Texaco Inc51. In this case, eighty-three publishers of sciendfic and
technical journals joined in a class action copyright infringement suit against Texaco,
alleging that unauthorised photocopies of individual articles had been made by
47 See Hugenholtz, Adapting Copyright to the Information Superhighway in The Future of Copyright in A Digital
Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p 94-95.
48 Although in the digital age, many commentators are now arguing that the fair dealing privileges stem
purely from market failure and therefore should not be tolerated. See the discussion infra.
49 Leval Fair Use at 1110. Some provisions falling under the head of fair use would appear to have no
basis in any theory at all. For instance, in the US where performances of musical works by 'non-profit
agricultural or horticultural organisations, in the course ofan annual agricultural or horticulturalfair or exhibition' does not
infringe copyright. US Copyright Act Tide 17 USC 110(6). Perhaps best explained an indication of the
bargaining that occurs during the legislative process, rather than as part of a coherent theory.
50 Gordon, Fair Use asMarket Failure: A Structural and EconomicAnalysis ofthe Petamax Case and its Predecessors
[1982] 82 Columbia Law Review 1600.
51 No 92-9341,1994 WL 590563 (2"d Cir. Oct 28 1994).
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employees of the company and circulated amongst scientific research staff. The case
turned upon the fourth factor of the US fair use defence which requires the court to
consider 'the effect of the use upon the potentialmarketfor or value of the copyrighted work'. The
Court held that the publishers had created a 'workable marketfor institutional users to obtain
licensesfor the right to produce their own copies ofindividual articles viaphotocopying'. This made it
difficult for Texaco to argue that their photocopying had no effect on the revenue stream
of the plaintiffs. The court said: 'the right to seek paymentfor aparticular use tends to become
legally cognisable under thefourthfair usefactor when the meansforpayingfor such a use is made easier'.
Commentators have taken this case52 as demonstrating that US courts have 'concluded that
thefair use defence shouldgive way when copyright owners can conveniently collect licensingfees61.
The expense and difficulties of seeking consent has certainly been recognised as a factor
in UK legislation. In some circumstances, substantial copies of certain works can be
made for specified purposes without infringing copyright. For instance, recording a
broadcast or cable programme on behalf of an educational establishment is permissible
without authorisation54. However, when there is a licensing scheme in place to collect
fees for such reproduction, copyright will be infringed unless a licence has been
acquired55. So market failure underlies the permission to copy as it would be too
expensive to seek consent every time. However, once the market has corrected that
failure by developing a collective licensing scheme, copies can no longer be made without
paid-for permission. But these market failure exceptions which encourage licensing
schemes are limited in UK legislation. They are in addition to the fair dealing categories.
This would suggest that market failure is not the only reason for fair dealing.
52 Also Princeton University Press vMichigan Document Services Inc99 F 3d 1381 6th Cir 1966 photocopying for
classroom use.
53 Bell, Fair Use v Fared Use: The Impact ofAutomated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine 1998,
76 NC L Rev 557. See also Elkin-Koren, Copyright Polity and the Umits ofFreedom ofContract 1997, Berkeley
Technology Law Journal Vol 12. Schlachter The IntellectualProperty Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright
Uaw could be Unimportant on the internet 1997, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Vol 12. Litman Copyright
Noncompliance (or Why we Can't 'just Say Yes' to Licensing) 1997, 29 NYU Journal of Internationa Law &
Policy 237.
54 CDPA section 35(1).
55 CDPA section 35(2).Examples of licensing schemes in operation include: 1993 SI No 74 Copyright
(Recording for Archives of Designated Classes of Broadcasts and Cable Programmes) (Designated Bodies)
Order 1993. 1989 SI No 1012 Copyright (Recordings of Folksongs for Archives)(Designated Bodies)
Order 1989. 1990 SI No 879 Copyright (Certification of Licensing Scheme for Educational Recording of
Broadcasts and Cable Programmes) (Educational Recording Agency Limited) Order 1990 as amended by
1992 SI No 211, 1993 SI No 193 and 1994 SI No 247. 1993 SI No 2755 Copyright (Certification of
Licensing Scheme for Educational Recording of Broadcasts)(Open University Educational Enterprises
Limited) Order 1993 (previously 1990 SI No 2008).
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If fair dealing arises purely in response to market failure, then economists should agree
that once the market is functioning in such a way that all copying can be metered and
paid for (such as through collecting societies, by way of levies on recording equipment,
or through one-to-one licensing on the Internet), fair dealing would no longer be needed.
However, that is not the case. Although the rise in granting property rights over
intellectual products is generally attributed to economic argument, some economists do
recognise the value of leaving elements in the public domain:
'the less extensive copyrightprotection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator can
borrowfromprevious works without infringing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of
creating a new work ifcopyrightprotection effectivelyprevents all unauthorised copyingfrom a
copyrighted work, the effect would be to raise the cost ofcreating new works and thus,
paradoxically, perhaps, lower the number ofnew works created"6.
So the fewer property rights there are in existing works, and the wider the public domain,
so the lower the financial costs in creating a new work'7. In turn, the public domain is
enriched and authorship facilitated.
Those who support the theory that fair dealing arises purely in response to market failure
consider it has no place in relation to works disseminated over the Internet. No longer
will authors need to take parts ofworks without consent. Rather, the development of
digital fences, coupled with contractual controls on the use of creative works, will mean
that every taking can be both controlled and authorised by the copyright owner (by
contract). Instead of limited property rights granted under copyright, copyright owners
will have an unrestricted property right in their works, the fair use provisions simply
having been an historical anomaly, essential where full control was not possible. Digital
fences and contract will prove to be more efficient than the fair use defences, which in
turn will increase access and use, and reduce costs58.
56 Ladnes & Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofCopyright Eaw [1990] 22 IPLR 447 at 455.
57 fair use can be understood as attempts to promote economic ejficiemy by balancing the effect ofgreater copyrightprotection
against the effect oflessprotection - in encouraging the creation ofnew works by reducing the cost ofcreating them' ibid.
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3.2 The bargain
However, there is a body of opinion against the view that every fair dealing limitation
arises as a result of market failure. These commentators consider the fair dealing
provisions are part of the bargain that has been struck between authors, and the public,
with the intervention of the State. In return for the State granting statutory copyright
protection for certain works, rights which are good against the world, and which would
be unenforceable by private bargain, authors must allow the public to use a certain
amount of these works without return. In this way, fair use encourages authorship:
'thefundamentalgoal ofair use, as with the CopyrightA.ct as a whole, is the encouragement of
creativity. Fair use is not a general 'safety valve' designed tojudicially eliminatefrom copyright
protection uses that have nothing more to recommend themselves than that they make the
reproduction ofcopyrighted works easier and cheaper"9.
This argument is persuasive. Although recent years have witnessed a rise in the property
right in creative works, nonetheless, that right still is, and always has been, limited.
Allowing authors and users to take a substantial part of a work for fair dealing purposes
is part of that bargain. Limited property rights were granted because the author and
publisher could not control the dissemination of works without State help once those
works were in the hands of third parties. However, the theory does run into difficulties in
relation to the dissemination of works over the Internet, because it is possible for the
owner to control all uses without State help through the use of digital fences and one-to-
one electronic contracting. So if the owner does not need assistance in controlling the
dissemination ofworks, why should a limitation on the property right be accepted? One
answer might he in pointing to the legislation in place protecting against the
circumvention of digital fences: State assistance is therefore still required. But a further
argument is that the limitation on the property right is a policy choice that has been
accepted for many years. Should a copyright owner be able, or permitted, to opt out of a
bargain when it suits the interests of that one party only? It is one matter as to whether a
copyright owner can technically limit fair dealing by a combination of digital fences and
contract. It is quite another matter whether such limitations should be permitted. The
58 Bell Fair Use v Fared Use: The Impact ofAutomated Fights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine 1998, 76
North Carolina Law Review 557.
59 Party, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Taw, The Bureau ofNational Affairs Inc. Washington DC 1985
Requoted from Katz, Reprography and Fair Dealing [1993] 15 EIPR 67 p71.
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argument also avoids the fact that use of existing materials is essential for new creations:
the limited property right assists is that re-creation.
3.3 Implied consent
A third theory is that fair dealing operates in place of a copyright owner's implied
consent. In other words, if the copyright owner was asked for permission to carry out a
certain act in relation to a work protected by copyright, consent would be freely given6".
However, as it is not practical to get hold of all the authors whose consent is required in
all the circumstances in which consent may have to be obtained, the author impliedly
agrees to the use to which the work is to be put. The limitations on what can and cannot
be done under the guise of fair dealing are then designed to coincide with the consent
that the author would have given if asked.
This justification, whilst persuasive in some circumstances, does not hold good in every
case. Certainly authors of books, directors of films, composers, artists, and other
primary copyright creators, may be anxious to have their works reviewed and criticised,
thus impliedly giving consent for the use of a substantial part of the work for these
purposes. The greater the publicity, the better for all concerned. Similarly, academics,
scientists, historians and others are generally pleased to have their work researched and
studied, thought about, reviewed and perhaps criticised, all in the name of increasing the
depth of public knowledge. However, there are circumstances in which the copyright
owner would certainly not have given consent if asked: for instance, where a work is
parodied61, or where the copyright owner has withdrawn a licence for the work to be put
on general release62. The author has not given consent in these cases, either expressly or
impliedly. Nonetheless, the law permits taking of a substantial part of those works under
the head of fair dealing.
If the implied consent theory holds true in relation to works disseminated over the
Internet, then this justification could be easily accommodated in relation to digital works.
Consent can be given (or refused) through digital fences and contract. But this, in turn,
60 Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539 549-50 (1985).
61 Campbell vAcuff-Rose Music Inc 114 S Ct 1180.
62 Time Warner v Channel4 [1994] EMLR 1.
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may lead to further problems of a copyright owner preventing re-use of a work for
alternative purposes: the underlying motive may be to prevent critical comment.
3.4 Human rights
Of growing importance in recent years, and gaining prominence as a justification for the
fair dealing provisions, is the theory that they are connected with fundamental human
rights63. In particular, fair dealing guarantees freedom of speech64. The US guards the
constitutional right to freedom of speech jealously, although on occasion there can be
tension between this constitutional right and copyright65:
'..what comes naturally to copyright- what has always been there, embedded in the history ofcopyright,
and what remains when all is said and done — is the deliberate, ifselective, suppression and advancement
ofspeech66'.
This justification is most clearly seen in operation in the UK in cases concerned with
reporting current events. In Fraser v Evans67, where the Sunday Times (the defendant)
63 The EU Legal Advisory Board has expressed the view that: 'many existing copyright exemptions do not exist
because ofmarketfailure, but to protect human rights and basic societal needs. In the opinion ofthe TAB, exemptions are
not exception?. http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/ipr/reply/general.html. See also Institute for Information
Law Faculty of Law University of Amsterdam Contracts and Copyright Exemptions 1997 at p 20-21.
http://www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/IMP_FTP/except.pdf contending that constitutional law including
ECHR article 10 could serve in certain circumstances as an additional limit to the exercise of exclusive
rights in cases where restrictions imposed by copyright owners on the use of protected material affect
users fundamental rights and freedoms: 'the interests of rightholders, society and the economy as a whole have to be
carefully balanced.... considerations ofinformationalprivacy andfreedom ofexpression arepractically absentfrom the Green
Paper. ..the extent and scope [ofthe rights inArticles 8 and 10 ofthe ECHR] are clearly at stake if... the economic rights of
right holders is to be extended or interpreted to include acts ofintermediate transmission and reproduction, as well as acts of
private viewing and use ofinformation'. Article 10 of the ECHR is reproduced below. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respectfor hisprivate andfamily life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no
interference by apublic authority with the exercise ofthis right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests ofnational security, public safety or the economic well-being ofthe country, for the
prevention ofdisorder or crime, for theprotection ofhealth ormorals, orfor theprotection of the rights andfreedoms ofothers'.
64 Tire European Convention on Human Rights Article 10 protects freedom of expression and provides:
7. Everyone has the right to freedom ofexpression. This right shall includefreedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference bypublic authority and regardless offrontiers. This article shall notprevent States
from requiring the licensing ofbroadcasting television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise ofthesefreedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions orpenalties as areprescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests ofnational security, territorial integrity orpublic safety, for the
prevention ofdisorder or crime, for theprotection ofhealth or morals, for theprotection of the reputation or rights ofothers, for
preventing the disclosure ofinformation received in confidence, orformaintaining the authority and impartiality ofthe
judiciary.
63 E.g. the US Governments efforts to prevent the Pentagon papers from being published New York Times
Co v United States 403 US 713 (1971). Howard Hughes attempts to suppress biographies Rosemount
Enterprises Inc v Random House Inc 366 F2d 303 (2d Cir 1966). These were unsuccessful, but a successful
challenge was where J.D. Salinger brought an action against a biographer who was prevented from
publishing letters on file in a library Salinger v Random House Inc 811 F2d 90 (2d Cir 1987).
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proposed to print short extracts from a confidential report, Lord Denning M.R. stated
the importance of the rationale as follows:
There are some things that are ofsuchpublic concern that newspaper, thepress, and indeed
everyone is entitled to make known the truth and to makefair comment on it. This is an
integralpart ofthe right offree speech and expression. It must not be whittled away. The
Sunday Times ought not to be restrained™.
In Pro Sieben MediaA.G. v Carlton U.K. Television Ttdf, concerning a report about Mandy
Allwood who was pregnant with a number of babies, and criticism in a follow-up report
of'cheque book journalism', the court, in allowing the defence of fair dealing to succeed,
considered that the words 'reporting current events' were of a wide and indefinite scope
and should be interpreted liberally70.
Now that the Human Rights Act 1988, implementing the European Convention on
Human Rights (the Convention) is in force in the UK, its provisions have already raised
the question of freedom of expression71 in defence to an action of copyright
infringement. This was one of the issues that came before the court in the UK in
Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.72. The Sunday Telegraph sought to rely on the Human
Rights Act to resist attempts by Lord Ashdown to protect his copyright in a leaked
document. The Sunday Telegraph relied on defence of inter alia fair dealing, contending
that the defence was required to be interpreted in a way compatible with the
Convention'3. In particular, the Sunday Telegraph argued that Article 10(2) of the
Convention provided that any restriction on the right to freedom of expression had to be
limited to that which was necessary in a democratic society. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal upheld the judgement of the lower court which had found that the Daily
Telegraph had infringed Lord Ashdown's copyright. However, some of the comments
made in relation to the law of copyright might be questioned. Notably, Lord Phillips MR
stated several times that it is only the form of a literary work that is protected by
66 Lange, At Play in the Fields ofthe Word: Copyright and the Construction ofAuthorship in the Post-Literate
Millennium 1992, Law and Contemporary Problems Vol 55 No. 2 pl39.
67 [1969] 1 QB 349 at 363.
68 See also Pro Sieben MediaA.G. v Carlton U.K. Television Ltd. [1999] F.S.R. 610.
69 ibid.
70 See also the Court ofAppeal in Newspaper Licensing Agency vMarks and Spencerpic [2001] Ch. 257; [2000]
3 W.L.R. 1256; [2000] 4 All E.R. 239 [2000], affirmed by the House of Lords [2001] UKHL 38, [2001] 3
WLR 290; [2001] 2 AH ER 977.
71 As found in Article 10 of the Convention reproduced above.
72 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, [2001] 3 WLR 1368.
73 As required by s.3(l) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
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copyright. 'Copyright does not normallyprevent the publication of the information conveyed by the
literary work. Thus it is only thefreedom to express information using the verbalformula devised by
another that isprevented by copyright;4It is certainly the case, and is accepted, that copyright
does not protect ideas but merely the form in which those ideas are expressed. However,
there is no rule that the actual words in a literary work must be used before copyright in
that work can be infringed. Thus, the copyright in a literary work can be infringed by
turning it into a play; the copyright in an artistic work can be infringed even if nothing in
75
the second work exactly reproduces any part of the first . The judgement given by the
Court of Appeal was thus coloured in that there was a focus on the actual words used.
In giving judgement, the Court of Appeal looked not only to the defence of fair dealing
for the purposes of news reporting, but also to the wider public interest defence to be
found in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988: Nothing in thispart affects any ride of
lawpreventing or restricting the enforcement ofcopyright on the grounds ofpublic interest or otherwise''6.
This defence has been used to refuse relief to the copyright owner in cases where a work
77
is considered to be obscene , or where information contained within the work is
78
deemed misleading . It has also been said that public interest considerations can lead to
a refusal to grant copyright protection where there is a balance in favour of dissemination
79
of that information. Beloffv Pressdram is a case is similar on its facts to Slshdown. A
journalist wrote a private memorandum to colleagues about a Minister's view on
succession to the leadership of a political party. This was printed verbatim in an article
attacking the journalist. On the facts, the public interest defence failed, as it was said that
the defence only justifies disclosure of 'matters relating to the country's security, breach oflaw,
including statutory duty, fraud and othermatters destructive of the country or itspeople, including matters
medically dangerous to the public, and other misdeeds ofsimilargravity'. The public interest
defence was subsequently narrowed in Hyde Park Residence v Yellanct^. This case
concerned the publication by a newspaper (The Sun) of photographs of Princess Diana
and Mr Dodi Fayed with the times at which they appeared in the photograph recorded
on the still. The photographs had been taken by a security video camera owned by Mr
74 Ashdoum v Telegraph Group Ltd /2001] EWCA Civ 1142, para 31.
75 Designers Guild Umited v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Umited (Trading as Washington DC). 2000 WL 1720247
(HL), [2001] 1 AH E.R. 700, [2001] F.S.R. 11. Hoffmann LJ.
76 CDPA si 71 (3).
77 Glyn v Weston Feature Film [1916] 1 Ch 261.
78 Slingsby v Bradford Patent Truck [1906] W.N. 51. CA.
79 [1973] 1 AD ER 241 p 249.
80 [2001] Ch 143.
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A1 Fayed. The Sun published the photographs as they argued that they showed the
claims being made that Princess Diana and Mr Dodi Fayed had remained at a particular
location for a lengthy period of time were untrue. The claim that such publication was in
the public interest, although it was an infringement of copyright, was rejected. Aldous LJ
said that those circumstances in which a public interest defence could be used should
derive from the nature of the work itself, and not from ownership of a work. The court
would be able to refuse to enforce copyright if the work is: '(i) immoral, scandalous or
contrary to family life; (ii) injurious topublic life, public health and safety or the administration ofjustice;
81
(Hi) incites or encourages others to act in a way referred to in (ii) In the Ashdown case, the court
considered that this test was too narrow: that the circumstances in which the public
interest may override copyright are not capable of precise categorisation or definition.
Furthermore, the court also said that: 'now that the Human RightsAct is inforce, there is the
clearestpublic interest in giving effect to the right offreedom ofexpression in those rare cases where this
82
right trumps the rights conferred by the CopyrightAct . The rare cases were not fully specified.
Nonetheless the effect of the judgement appears to be to broaden those grounds on
which a public interest defence to a charge of infringement of copyright can be pled:
such a defence can be based on freedom of expression in addition to those grounds
identified by Aldous LJ. In Ashdown, the Court found, however, on the facts that this
was not applicable to the instant case.
On the defence of fair dealing, the Court of Appeal held that exceptions to copyright
must be read in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights:
'rare circumstances can arise where the right offreedom ofexpression will come into conflict with the
protection afforded by the CopyrightAct, notwithstanding the express exceptions to befound in theAct.
In these circumstances, we consider that the court is bound, insofar as it is able, to apply the Act in a
manner that accommodates the right offreedom ofexpression
In the event, the court found that although the publication of the material might have
been for the purposes of reporting current events, it was not fair dealing even read in
light of Human Rights obligations. The judgement does thus, however, hold open the
possibility ofwidening the circumstances when a fair dealing defence might be
applicaple, where freedom of expression is under threat. As a consequence, and because
of the slightly misleading focus on the actual words used in the judgement, it is perhaps
81 Hyde Park Residence v Yelland [2001] Ch 143 at p 168.
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only a matter of time before further cases are brought before the courts seeking to
elucidate the boundaries between freedom of expression, public interest and fair dealing.
Whether the public interest defence is capable of providing comfort to authors must,
however, be open to debate. The result of a public interest defence is that copyright is
not enforced: in other words the owner is not given the relief sought. What is then to
stop the owner from hiding that work behind a digital fence and denying access to
anyone but a select few? Certainly, if the work is considered immoral, and subsequendy
leaks out into the open, there would be no redress if further copied. Equally, there are
no countervailing circumstances under which would-be authors might be able to require
access to a work to use parts in authorship. For the defence of fair dealing, the human
rights debate might offer more assistance. As the distribution of creative works and the
potential to engage in fair dealing alters markedly on the Internet, it may be that in this
context freedom of expression will develop to provide some comfort for authors faced
with an ever diminishing stock of raw materials with which to ply their trade.
Already the Internet has had a number of cases which illustrate a tension between
freedom of speech, and copyright protection. An early example concerned Nottingham
County Council social services department8 : The department commissioned a report by
a body known as the joint enquiry team, which comprised members of the police force
and social services. The purpose was to investigate evidence of Satanic abuse in the
county. The report contained certain revelations: it was leaked to the press and
subsequently released on the Internet. Nottingham County Council claimed copyright
infringement (although the case does not appear to have proceeded to trial). The report
was then mirrored on over 35 sites, with commentary which painted the council as
censors, unconcerned by the public interest and freedom of information84. In the US
case of Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Une Communication Services Inc. 85a contributor
to a discussion group posted works protected by copyright belonging to the plaintiff,
using Netcom, an Internet service provider. Religious Technology Center sued for
copyright infringement on the basis of the copies made in this technological process.
The court found that while 'browsing technically causes an infringing copy ofthe digital information
82 Para 58.
83 Gwatkin, The Jet Report. The Suppressed Findings of the Joint Enquiry Team - Evidence ofSatanic RitualAbuse in
Nottinghamshire http: / / www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~dlheb/introduc.html. Craddock, UKActivists Let 1000
Mirror Sites Bloom .Wired News http://www.wired.com/new.politics.story.
84 Cohen, Cyber Censorship: No ticketsfor Speeding on the Information Superhighway 1999, South African Law
Journal 710 at p 722.
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to be made in screen memory ', it was the functional equivalent of reading, and, in the absence
of a commercial or profit-depriving use, was probably fair use. The result might have
been fair use, but the motive of the action appeared to have been to censor adverse
comment about the founder of the Church of Scientology, Ron Hubbard. In other
words, the motive for using the law of copyright was to censor critical authorship86.
These tensions between copyright and freedom of speech are similar to those that have
arisen in relation to the interaction between copyright and confidentiality on the Internet,
discussed in chapter 4. As yet, they have not been resolved: with the Internet, and
technical controls on access to and use ofworks, it may be that they will be exacerbated.
What is not at all clear yet is the extent to which a plea of freedom of speech might be of
assistance to the author who is faced with increasing numbers of works disseminated
over the Internet controlled by technological means, and where it is within the authority
of the copyright owner to permit or deny access and to license subsequent use.
4. Fair dealing and Civilian systems
Author's rights systems in continental Europe tend to have a general right or tolerance of
private use, but otherwise do not have general fair dealing defences. Permitted uses of
protected works concern the economic rather than the moral rights of the author. The
French Intellectual Property Code prescribes the private performances and private use of
protected works that may take place without authorisation87, albeit that such use may be
subject to royalty payments on the equipment that makes such copying possible. It also
allows limited re-use ofworks, and brief quotations to be taken, so long as they are
justified by the critical, polemical, pedagogical, scientific or informational character of the
work in which they are incorporated. Parodies, pastiches and caricatures are also
permitted88. These provisions relate to both the economic rights granted to authors and
85 907 F Supp 1361 (ND Cal 1995).
86 See also Religious Technology Centre vTerma 908 F. Supp 1362 (E.D. Va 1995) and the discussion on linking
in chapter 2 of this study.
87 Although payment is required for private reproductions ofworks under the neighbouring rights through
a system of compulsory remuneration for private copying. French Intellectual Property Code Book 3 Title
1.
88 The wording in the French Intellectual Property Code L 122-5: Once a work has been disclosed, the authormay
notprohibit: Private andgratuitous performances carried out exclusively within thefamily circle: Copies or reproductions
reserved strictlyfor theprivate use of the copier and not intendedfor collective use, with the exception ofcopies ofworks ofart to
be usedforpurposes identical with thosefor which the original work was created ...On condition that the name of the author
and the source are clearly stated: Analyses and short quotationsjustified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or
informatoy nature ofthe work in which they are incorporated: Press reviews: Dissemination, even in their entirety, through the
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the neighbouring rights89. No mention of these limitations are to be found in the chapter
of the Code dealing with moral rights90. However, it would appear that where a work is
re-used under one of these exceptions, then the moral right of the author may not be
used to interfere with that re-use91.
One question arises. The fair dealing provisions in the Anglo-American systems, and in
particular the US, are seen as vital to authors in the creation of new works. The French
Code appears to have much narrower categories, and yet France still seems able to
sustain a thriving cultural output. Why should this be? An explanation might lie partly in
the way in which the cultural industries have developed over the years in the different
systems. The US, in comparison with many European countries, is a young country.
Consequently, its history and cultural tradition is modern in comparison with France.
This means that it does not have a long cultural tradition on which to draw. Rather the
US has tended to be an importer of cultural goods from elsewhere, which intermediaries
such as the film industry have, in turn, changed into products which are consumed by the
public and in turn, re-exported. In this, wide categories of fair use are important to give
these intermediaries sufficient room for manoeuvre in this transformation. By contrast,
European countries have a much longer tradition of creation ofworks containing
creative expression. These in turn are considered personal to the author, who is given
control as a result. Allowing a third party to change or alter that work without
permission is considered an exception to the right of the author in that work. Thus the
tradition is for protecting the basic author's work, rather than permitting others to create
derivative works from that original. In turn, exceptions to the control exercisable over
the work by the author are permitted only in certain limited circumstances. Nonetheless,
the mere fact that exceptions are catered for in legislation suggests that these States
consider that in some circumstances, the public interest must be satisfied and that
authors need existing works to use in the creation of new ones. The exceptions do not
derive solely from market failure.
press or by telediffusion, as current news, ofspeeches intendedfor thepublic made inpolitical, administrative, judicial or
academicgatherings, as also in public meetings ofapolitical nature and at official ceremonies. Parody, pastiche and caricature,
observing the rules ofthe genre. (Taken from the collection of laws on the WIPO website).
89 French Intellectual Property Code ibid and L211-3.
90 French Intellectual Property Code Book 1 Title 11.
91 Queneau v L [1997] Info.T.L.R 257.
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Despite the different traditions, there are similarities between the UK fair dealing
provisions, and the Civilian exceptions, even though the terminology differs. This is
particularly so since the UK courts have said that activities pled under the fair dealing
limitations must fall squarely into one of the categories to be relevant. Thus, the UK
research and private study looks much like the French reproduction for private purposes.
The UK criticism and review category is similar to the French use of quotations which
can be used so long as justified. In this there is a divergence from the US approach
where the categories remain open ended. This in turn, may have an effect on the
arguments from these jurisdictions directed towards the function and operation of fair
dealing on the Internet.
5. Summary
A number of factors have come together to persuade some that fair use and fair dealing
should have no place in relation to works disseminated over the Internet. The first is
because the boundaries of fair dealing and fair use are so uncertain. The second, and
central, argument relates to the function of fair dealing: that fair dealing stems purely
from market failure. Because, on the Internet, digital fences can prevent any taking from
a protected work without the consent of the owner of the copyright, so the use of digital
fences means that every taking can be controlled and licensed, i.e. the market can now
operate.
It would be convenient if fair dealing could be explained purely in terms of market
failure. If this was the case, then there would be no difficulty in denying access to works
placed on the Internet, or denying access except at a price, or charging for every taking
from, and use of a work. There might be questions as to whether access was really
available, and there might be arguments over the price, but the principle would remain:
copyright owners would be justified in controlling all uses of existing works. However,
as argued above, fair dealing and fair use do not stem purely from market failure. Rather
these limitations on the property right in the Anglo-American systems, and exceptions in
the Civilian traditions, are there for a variety of purposes. That they are there, and that
access to, and use of, parts of those works cannot generally be controlled, or metered, by
the copyright owner once the work has been published in the terrestrial world, means
existing creative works, within limits, can be used in the formulation of new ones. But
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the shape of these limitations and exceptions are changing quite dramatically on the
Internet.
6. The proposals for fair dealing on the Internet
The purpose of this part is to examine how fair dealing and fair use might function on
the Internet. The enquiry will focus firstly, on the proposed changes to the fair dealing
doctrine; second, on how fair dealing and fair use might interact with digital fences; and
third, on how contractual controls might curb the exercise of fair use.
There are two opposing views as to the function and role of fair use in the digital era,
both of which were articulated by US commentators. The first is:
1 believe that what is at stake today in this argument overfair use is the verypreservation of
the constitutionally based incentivefor authors to create new works andfor entrepreneurs in
information based ventures toprofitfrom the creative expressions ofthe mind. The dawn ofthe
digital age is not the time to re-debate the issue ofa right to take another'sproperty andmeans
oflivelihood without compensation. Whatyou and others likeyou in the creative content
communityface today in Washington is nothing less than a crisisfor copyright as we have come
to know it - an attempt by some to establish a radical new regime thatputsfair use ahead of
property rights92.'
The second is:
'.. ..fair use andfair dealing doctrines may be increasingly useful asflexible instruments with
which to balance the interests ofauthors in the continuedfixity oftheir works and the interests
ofowners ofcopies ofcopyrighted works who may want to take advantage ofdigital tools to enjoy
theplasticity ofworks in the digital medium,just as it will to deal with other situations arising
in digital networked environments, such as making non-commercial copies ofsome copyrighted
texts distributed on the Net. Countries that do not havefair use orfair dealing doctrines may
find it more difficult to adapt their copyright laws to dealing with questionsposed by digital
technologies because they lack a balancing mechanism ofthis sort. Since it is necessary to make
copies ofdigital works in order to use them, a copyright law that regards all uses ofdigital
versions ofcopyrighted works as infringements may be too rigid to be enforceable or to command
respecf3'.
These quotes sum up the opposing arguments. The one is that fair use is an exception to
the property right granted to creators of works, and any detraction from that property
92 Lehman, Protecting Intellectual Property in a Global Economy: Some Thoughts and Comments Fordham University
School of Law Sixth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy (1998).
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right should be limited. This encapsulates the views of those who consider fair use
should be limited in the digital era94. The other is that fair use is an essential part of a
bargain struck with the State, should continue into the digital era, and should if anything
be expanded.
6.1 The WCT
The extent to which fair dealing should apply in the Internet environment has taxed
regulators since the first Treaty, the WCT, dealing with dissemination of works over the
Internet, was negotiated in 1996. The formula from the Berne Convention, expressing
the circumstances under which the exclusive right of the author to control reproduction
of a work may be limited, has been repeated in the WCT95. This Treaty permits
Contracting Parties to provide: 'limitations ofor exceptions to the rightsgranted to authors of
literary and artistic works under [the WCT] in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of that work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests ofthe author96.
Perhaps, concerned during negotiations that the Berne Convention might advocate wider
exceptions than considered appropriate for the digital age, the WCT exhorts contracting
parties when applying the Berne Convention to: 'confine any limitations ofor exceptions to
rightsprovidedfor therein to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation ofthe
work and do not unreasonablyprejudice the legitimate interests ofthe author91. But, somewhat
inconsistently, the WCT Agreed Statements98 provide that Contracting Parties can: 'carry
forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their
national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Heme Convention' and to 'permit
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network
environment'. So while the Articles of the WCT might seem to suggest that the exceptions
to the exclusive right of an author should be limited, the Agreed Statements seem rather
to point the other way, that existing limitations and exceptions should be carried through
to the Internet, and, if anything, extended.
93 Samuelson, Copyright, Digital Data, and Fair Use in DigitalNetworked Environments in The Electronic
Superhighway: the Shape ofTechnology and Eaw to Come. Poulin, ed., Kluwer 1995.
94 It is notable that this argument comes from a US commentator where fair use has tended to be
considered a limitation on the property right, rather than an exception to it.
95 WCT Article 10.
96 WCT Article 10(1).
97 WCT Article 10(2).
98 WCT Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10.
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6.2 Digital fences and fair use
A number of issues arise in the interaction between fair dealing and fair use and digital
fences. One central question is how a fair dealing privilege can be exercised in relation to
a work disseminated on the Internet if access to that work is protected by a digital fence.
In this a number of points of tension are apparent.
The first is that access to exercise fair use may be limited, or subject to a payment.
Neither fair use, nor fair dealing have operated to date to give a positive right to gain
access to, or use of a work. Rather, they have acted as a defence to a charge of
infringement of copyright in certain circumstances. But if access to a work cannot be
gained, then fair dealing cannot be exercised.
The second point of tension is that, even if intermediaries were willing to permit access
to a work to exercise a fair use privilege, a digital fence cannot (yet) be configured to
permit access for those purposes, but not for others. The fair use limitations in particular
do not have defined parameters: the defence could be applicable in a diverse range of
circumstances. Therefore it would be difficult or impossible to programme fair use into
a digital fence.
A third point arises, in that fair use has generally not permitted a copy to be made of the
whole of a work". Rather what is permitted is to make a copy of a substantial part. If
fair use were to be exercised in relation to a work disseminated over the Internet, this
would entail making a copy, even if only temporary, of the whole of a work. Although
some assistance may be given to authors in the UK, where a court has indicated recently
that it might be proper to take one copy of a whole of a work, if the purpose is to use
extracts in a way that is legitimate100.
99 In the case of research and private study the Copyright Licensing Agency in the UK suggests that
authors and publishers will consider as fair a single photocopy, made for the purposes of research or
private study, of up to one chapter from a book (or five percent of the literary work, if greater),
http://www.cla.co.uk. In relation to the electronic environment, the Publishers Association and the Joint
Information Systems Committee of the Higher Education Funding Councils of the UK have produced
guidelines that suggest viewing the whole of a document on a screen is fair dealing. However, fair dealing
would cover printing only part and not the whole of that document.
http://www.ukoln.ac.uk/services/elib/papers/pa/licence/faimote.html.
,0() Pro Sieben v Carlton UK TV [1999] EMLR 109 per Walker J at 127.
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Another problem is that it is not clear whether a work is published on the Internet, or
whether it is confidential until accessed lawfully. It has already been mentioned that
there remains a question as to whether works placed on the Internet surrounded by
technical controls can be considered published, or whether they remain confidential until
lawfully accessed. Fair use does not operate in relation to unpublished works: at least
not to the extent that it does in relation to published ones1"1. UK law has rather
vacillated on this point, moving from a position in British Oxygen Co Ctcl v liquidAir
Ltd.'"2 where Romer J said:
It would be manifestly unfair that an unpublished work should, without the consent ofthe author, be the
subject ofpublic criticism, review or newspaper summary,
to a modified rule in Hubbard v Losper"4, where Lord Denning MR said:
'I am afraid I cannotgo all the way with those words ofLomerJ. Although a literary work may not be
published to the world at large, it may, however, be circulated to such a wide circle that it is fair dealing'
to criticise itpublicly in a newspaper or elsewhere. This happens sometimes when a company sends a
circular to the whole body ofshareholders. It may be ofsuch general interest that it is quite legitimatefor
a newspaper to make quotationsfrom it, and to criticise them, or review them, without thereby being
guilty ofinfringing copyrighti .
Another view, concentrating on the seriousness of the infringement of copyright, was
taken in Belojf v. Pressdam Ltd°6, where a defence of fair dealing was rejected:
The law by bestowing a right ofcopyright on an unpublished work bestows a right to prevent its being
published at all; and even though an unpublished work is not automatically excludedfrom the defence of
fair dealing, it isyet a much more substantial breach ofcopyright than publication ofapublished
work '">7.
101 PCR Ltd v DowJones Telerate Ltd [1998] FSR 170. In Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84, the plaintiff, the
founder of the Scientology cult, sought to restrain the defendant from publishing a book which contained
substantial abstracts from the plaintiffs literature which had been circulated to cult members, but which
was confidential. The action for interim injunction for infringement of copyright was unsuccessful on the
basis that the defendant had an arguable defence on the ground of fair dealing for the purposes of criticism
and review. In relation to this case, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria para 2.158, argue that the principle should
not be applied indiscriminately in all cases. Lor example, if it was proposed to publish innocuous trade secrets the
balance ofconvenience may welljustify thegranting ofan interlocutory injunction even though the defendant had an arguable
case ofair dealing'.
102 [1925] Ch D 383.
103 ifeiiRomer J at 393.
104 [1972] 2 Q.B. 84.
105 ibid p 94.
i°6 [1973] \ A11 E R 241.
107 ibid at 263.
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It also becomes clear from the cases that the intention of the person claiming fair dealing
will be a relevant factor in determining whether the dealing is fair.
Thus the cases establish, and I believe it right, that it is appropriate to take into account the motives of
the alleged infringer, the extent andpurpose ofthe use, and whether that extent was necessaryfor the
purpose of reporting the current events in question. Further ifthe work had not been published or
circulated to thepublic that is an important indication that the dealing was notfair*m.
Therefore, if a work made available over the Internet but guarded by technical controls is
considered confidential until accessed lawfully, fair use and fair dealing might not apply,
or might be limited in operation. But to the extent that fair dealing will remain, the
courts which will be called upon to adjudicate in disputes over the coming years should
have an appreciation of the arguments surrounding publication versus confidentiality, lest
over-broad claims in the second category negate the defence altogether.
The final point to be addressed is to what extent can fair dealing be limited by licence
terms supported by the use of digital fences?
6.3 The Nil Report.
The Nil Report contained no general proposals for limiting or expanding the US fair use
doctrine in the digital era apart from a recommendation to change some definitions for
public libraries109. There might be a number of explanations for this. Either the
Committee considered that the fair use defences were an important part of the regime of
copyright and so should continue to apply on the Internet. Or, in line with their view
that the fair use limitations are a 'murky'110 part of copyright law, so their application on
the Internet could be controlled by copyright owners through the development of digital
fences which would in turn be protected by law against circumvention111.
Much of the attention in the US has been directed to the question as to whether, and
when, it might be lawful to circumvent a digital fence to obtain access to the underlying
work in order to exercise fair use. The question was raised in the Nil Report, where the
108 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2000] 3 WLR 215.
109 Nil Report p 225.
110 The most significant and, perhaps, murky of the limitations on a copyright owner's exclusive rights is the doctrine ofair
use'. Nil Report p 57.
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Committee opined that: 'ifthe circumvention device isprimarily intended and usedfor legalpurposes,
such asfair use, the device would not violate theprovision, because a device with suchpurposes and effects
wouldfall under the 'authorised by law' exemption'"'. This would suggest that circumvention
devices could be manufactured which would allow access to works, if the reason for
access was to exercise fair use rights. However, there are inconsistencies in the Report. It
also states that: 'thefair use doctrine does not require a copyright owner to allow or tofacilitate
unauthorised access or use ofa work"1. Indeed, one of the most potent arguments in favour
of the owner seized upon during the course of the debate leading to the DMCA was that:
'thefair use doctrine has nevergiven anyone a right to break other lawsfor the statedpurpose of
exercising thefair useprivilege. Fair use doesn't allowyou to break into a locked library in order to
make fair use' copies ofthe books in it, or steal newspapersfrom a vending machine in order to copy
articles and share them with afriendiXA.
Further there are suggestions in the Nil Report that fair use would be limited in
application on the Internet: 'technologicalmeans of tracking transactions and licensing will lead to
reduced application and scope ofthefair use doctrine^. This suggests that because digital fences
can track and monitor usage, so such use may be licensed. In other words, fair use is
simply a manifestation ofmarket failure, and on the Internet the means to correct that
market failure are available.
The debate continues to provoke passion in the US. Some commentators appear to
accept the inevitability of digital fences, and argue that US courts may eventually
distinguish between circumvention aimed at getting unauthorised access to a work and
circumvention aimed at making non-infringing uses of a lawfully obtained copy116. For
example, fair use would provide a poor excuse for breaking into a computer system for
getting access to a work one wished to parody. However, if one had lawfully acquired a
copy of a work and it was necessary to bypass a technical protection system to make fair
use from that copy, this would arguably be lawful, at least under US law117. Others
111 Cohen, WIPO Treaty Implementation in the United States: WillFair Use Survive? [1999] 5 EIPR 236
discussing the possible effect of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act on fair use.
112 Nil Report pi64.
113 Nil Report p 231.
114 Adler. Testimony Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Judiciary Committee on H.R. 2281 105th Cong 2d Sess September 17 1997.
115 Nil Report p 82.
116 Samuelson, IntellectualProperty and the Digital Fconomj: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be
Revised, 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, pp. 519-566.
117 Ibid.
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continue to resist the implications of being unable to gain access to a work to exercise
the fair use doctrine, pointing to the great difficulties this entails for such activities as
teaching and research118. Because the debate has caused such controversy, a study was
carried out into the potential effect digital fences and anti-circumvention rules may have
on the exercise of fair use1'9. The House Committee on Commerce on the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 19981"" provided that the prohibition against
circumvention 'shall not apply to persons who are users ofa copyrighted work which is in aparticular
class ofworks, ifsuchpersons are, or are likely to be, adversely affected by virtue ofsuchprohibition in
their ability to make noninfringing uses ofthatparticular class ofworks under this title y2'. To
ascertain whether there were any such 'class of works' which should be exempted from
the prohibition against circumvention, the relevant section of the DMCA (section
1201 (a)(1)(A))122 was not to be brought into force until October 28, 2000. During this
time the Librarian of Congress was charged with making a determination as to which (if
any) classes of works should be exempted123 . After extensive consultations, two classes
of works were exempted from the prohibition on circumventing access controls. These
are:
• Compilations consisting of lists ofwebsites blocked by filtering software
applications.
• Literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by access
control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction damage or
obsoleteness.
During these consultations it had been argued that an exemption should be introduced to
permit circumvention of access control measures for the purpose of accessing materials
in the public domain, in particular where the use of that work might fall under the head
1,8 Cohen, Copyright and the jurisprudence ofSelf-Help 13 Berkeley Technology LawJournal, pp. 1089-1143.
119 DMCA ss 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) were brought into force immediately. Section 1201(a)(1) was the
focus of the enquiry.
120 HR Rep No 105-551 pt. 2 at 36 (1998).
121 The full text of the Federal Register release and other related information is available at
http://www.loc.gov/copyright/1201 /anticirc.html.
122 USC Title 17 section 1201(a)(1)(A) provides: (1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technologicalmeasure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. Theprohibition contained in thepreceding sentence shall take
effect at the end ofthe 2-yearperiod beginning on the date of the enactment ofthis chapter.
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of 'fair use'. However, the Librarian had difficulty with this proposal. The first problem
was because the exemption was sought in respect of certain classes of users, or uses for
certain purposes. This was beyond the scope of the Librarian's task, which was to
determine whether to exempt any particular class of works, and not to consider the use
to which the work was to be put. Secondly, those who argued for the exemption could
not demonstrate that they had been unable to engage in such uses because of access
control measures. The concerns related to use of a work once accessed, rather than to
failure to obtain access. In other words, the technological controls that prevent access to
the underlying works did not thereby prevent non-infringing uses.
In relation to the second main fear, that access controls would result in a 'pay-per-view'
business model, the Librarian pointed out that contributors to the debate had failed to
show any hard evidence of the model in operation. There were merely 'speculative and
alarmist' fears. What was more, such a pay per use model could be 'use facilitating'124.
Consumers given the choice between paying $100 for permanent access to a work, or $2
for each individual occasion, may prefer the latter. This in turn may make access to the
work more widely available, thus enhancing use. 'The record in thisproceeding does not reveal
that 'pay-per-use' business models have, thusfar, created the adverse impacts on the ability ofusers to
make non-infringing uses ofcopyrighted works that wouldjustify any exemptionsfrom theprohibition on
circumvention'. However, it was also hinted that: Ifsuch adverse impacts occur in thefuture, they
can be addressed in afuture rulemakingproceeding'.
There are two interesting points that arise from the results of this study. The first was
that the focus was on access to works, and not on subsequent use. Thus, there is a
recognition that these two steps are distinct and require separate consideration. It is
control over access that is the most important factor for right holders. The same issue is
also the most contentious for authors. The second point arises in relation to the 'pay-
per-view' model highlighted by the Librarian. It is notable that it was argued that this
model may facilitate use for consumers. This, as has been discussed, is unobjectionable,
and economic argument would suggest that it is correct. If all consumers pay a litde, and
there is a reduced risk of infringement and piracy, so the costs to the right holder and to
123 Federal Register Vol. 65 No 209 Friday 27 2000/ Rules and Regulations 37 CFR Part 201 Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies; Final
Rule.
124 Ibid at 64564.
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the consumer can fall, while at the same time facilitating an increase in the numbers of
works available. However, this does not address the position of the authorwhose
interests differ from those of the consumer. A pay-per-view business model which in
effect requires an author to pay for access to works for the purpose of fair dealing would
not appear to be a model which encourages creativity.
6.4 Digital fences, fair use and licensing
A second major issue is the use of digital fences to facilitate contractual limitations on
fair use. This could arise in two ways. Either contractual controls on access and/or
contractual controls on the use of a work once access is obtained. For instance, access
or use may be permitted subject to agreeing that no parody be made of a work: or that
the work not be reviewed elsewhere: or that the work may be criticised, but only
favourably125. In the US these arguments have gone on in the course of negotiation of
UCITA126. In particular, critics ofUCITA argue that the fair use provisions in US
copyright legislation will become otiose127. Contract will trump copyright by allowing
licensors to contract out of fair use128.
Consider a web site which contains a variety of articles by academics. One of the
standard terms incorporated in the contract which governs access to the site and use of
the articles incorporated in the site might state:
123 Karjala, Federal Pre-emption ofShrinkwrap and On-Une Licenses 1997, 22 Univeristy ofDayton Law Review
511 at 513. Tn the digitalfuture, access to many works may be available only topeople who 'contract' in advance, for
example not tofurther distribute the work or anything contained in the work not to quotefrom the work and soforth'.
126 For an overview of the arguments that have raged in the US over UCITA see Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and Contract Lawfor the Information Age: Foreword to a Symposium 1999, California Law Review Vol 87
No 1 pi. Lessig points to the opinion ofJudge Easterbrook in Pro Cd v Zeidenberg 86 F 3d 1447 1453-55
(7th Cir 1996) who, he argues has said plainly that fair use rights can be modified by contract. Lessig Code
and OtherLaws ofCyberspace US Basic Books 1999 p 306.
127 Not all commentators are critical of UCITA . Towle, The Politics ofLicensing Law 1999, Houston Law
Review 36:121 says: 'Article 2B is the most important and intellectually impressive legislative proposal in current memory'
at 121. Nimmer, Article 2B Preface Meeting the Information Age
http:/ /www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/1201 /prefll 201 .html
Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between ContractAnd IntellectualProperty Law, 1998 ,13 Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 827.
128 Elkin Koren, Copyright Polity and the Limits ofFreedom ofContract 1997, 12 Berkeley Technology Law
Journal 111.
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'AllRights Reserved. Nopart ofthe contents ofthis web site may be reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without writtenpermission except in the case ofbriefquotations embodied in critical articles
j ■ *29and reviews .
Such a term would appear to attempt to negate the majority of the elements of the fair
use doctrine that have been identified above, as well as limiting other uses of works
which are lawful. Copyright is not infringed by taking an insubstantial part of a work. A
brief quotation may therefore not require permission. If it is considered to be
qualitatively the heart of the work, the taking might be fair if it was for one of the
permitted purposes.
The way in which contract might override fair use and other elements of the public
domain in the US is framed in terms of pre-emption130. As a result of the system of State
and federal legislation, rules have been developed to deal with the cases in which the two
conflict. In the US contract is State law, while intellectual property is the province of
federal law. UCITA provides: 'A. provision ofthis [Act] which ispreempted byfederal law is
unenforceable to the extent ofthepreemptionV3'. This would suggest that, in the event of a
conflict between the two, the rules on copyright would pre-empt contract terms which
tried to limit fair use132. Several eminent writers, on the other hand, are firmly of the
view that, despite what UCITA says, it will be possible to contract out of copyright in
general, and fair use in particular. This may be because the law is unclear as to the extent
to which copyright may be pre-empted133: or because users of works will simply accept
what is being offered by way of licences, which will then become the norm whatever the
law of copyright says134.
129 The publishers statement on the first page of Lessig Code and OtherCaws ofCyberspace Draft of 1999
stated 'All Rights Reserved. No part ofthe contents of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without
writtenpermission except in the case ofbriefquotations embodied in critical articles and reviews'. The book has now been
published with an amended statement. See also Elkin-Koren, Copyright Polity and the Limits ofFreedom of
Contract ibid.
130 For a detailed examination of the different types of pre-emption see Samuelson and Opsahl, The Tensions
Between intellectualProperty & Contracts in the Information Age: An American Perspective in Grosheide and Boele-
Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: Europees Privaatrecht 1998. Rice Public Goods Private Contract and Public Poliy:
Federal Preemption ofSoftware License ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering 1992, University of Pittsburgh Law
Review Vol 53:543 for a general discussion on pre-emption.
131 UCITA s 105(a).
132 See also USC Title 17 s 301.
133 Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World 1995,1 Richmond Journal of Law &
Technology 2.
134 Many writers already argue that these default provisions in the law of copyright are regularly overrun by
contract in that many do not take into account works or part of works that may not be protected at all see
eg. Harper, Will We Need Fair Use in the Twenty First Century ?
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/fair_use.htm pl2 of 32. For a criticism Lessig, Pain in
the OS, The Industry Standard (Feb 5 1999).
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One court decision in the US might just prove that contracting out of fair use will be
possible135. This case concerned Matthew Bender Inc andjurisline.com. Jurisline had
used data from the Lexis Law on Disc CD Roms produced by Bender, in order to create
case law databases at its website. Bender suedjurishne.com for breach of the licence
terms. Jurisline.com argued that use of the material was lawful because under copyright
law the works were in the public domain. Copyright law should therefore pre-empt the
contract terms prohibiting use of the data. However, the court found that the licence
agreement was valid and enforceable, and not pre-empted by the law of copyright.
Jurisline.com was thus in breach of the provisions of the licence. This case is similar to
Pro CD v Zeuknberg 36, which also concerned licensing of factual material (names,
addresses and contact details of businesses within defined areas). In that case the licence
terms which limited the uses which could be made of the information were found to be
valid. These terms had been infringed by Zeidenberg who, contrary to those terms, had
extracted a substantial amount of the data in compiling his own web-based database.
These cases both concerned licensing of material in the public domain which was not
capable of protection by copyright. What appears yet to be decided is the enforceability
or otherwise of a term in a contract which prohibited using a work for one of the fair use
purposes. However, such contractual restrictions are not necessary to limit fair use. The
mere existence of digital fences means that intermediaries can place restrictions on access
by way of technology, rather than by contract.
6.5 Summary
Historically, fair use has been considered an integral part of copyright law in the US. But
it has been seen as a defence to an action of infringement, rather than as a right to
demand access to a work to exercise a right. Fair use appears to remain unchanged in the
digital era, although the extent to which it may ultimately be altered by contract remains
unclear. However, its exercise may be more difficult. For authors, problems may be
http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,3423,OO.html. arguing that such mass market
licenses proposed by the seller is not freedom of contract, but rather contract according to what the seller
proposes.
135 For a discussion see: http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB961462062359036505.htm.
http://www.nylj.com/stories/00/06/062000al.htm.
136 86 F 3d 1447 (7th cir 1996).
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encountered in gaining access to works disseminated over the Internet, and thereafter
using those parts that fall into the public domain. Current authors and right holders are
protected, but this is perhaps at the expense of those in the future.
6.6 The Copyright Directive
As compared with the US, there has been less vocal debate in the UK over the extent to
which digital fences might alter fair dealing in relation to works made available over the
Internet. There may be a number of reasons for this. One is that, by contrast with the
US, the EU has proposed in the Copyright Directive that the fair dealing limitations for
Member States be changed. The proposals have been made partly with the intention of
harmonising laws ofMember States137, and partly with the intention of limiting the scope
to plead fair dealing in relation to activities on the Internet138. Focus has therefore been
on these changes, rather than the interaction between fair dealing and digital fences.
Another factor may be the differences in approach to fair dealing between the Civilian
systems and the UK. As the exceptions in the Civilian systems are more specific, and in
many cases their exercise may be subject to payment, so they lend themselves much
more readily to be operated in conjunction with technological controls on access. The
UK, in having broader categories, may be a lone voice in Europe in considering that
there may be difficulties for the operation of fair dealing on the Internet.
The proposals for fair dealing in the Copyright Directive have undergone fundamental
changes since first introduced. It appears that those involved in the negotiations in the
EU may have been influenced by the debate in the US as to the effect of digital fences
on fair dealing. In addition, participants in the negotiations for the Copyright Directive
have had the opportunity to witness some of the litigation occurring in the US, in
particular in relation to Napster139 and DeCSS140. This may have had an effect on the
shape of the proposals as they have developed. As a result, at least some of the anxieties
articulated in the US may not be applicable in Europe.
137 Copyright Directive Recital 21.
138 ibid Recitals 22 and 29.
139 For a discussion on the Napster case, see chapter 2 of this study.
140 For a discussion on the litigation surrounding DeCSS, see chapters 2 and 4 of this study.
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6.6.1 Exceptions/limitations in the Copyright Directive
6.6.2 Permitted reproductions
The Berne Convention three-step test, permitting exceptions to be made to tire exclusive
right of authors in the reproduction of a work, has been repeated in the Copyright
Directive141, but with one telling difference. The Berne Convention (and WCT) refer to
rights of authors. By contrast, the Copyright Directive refers to the legitimate interests
of authors and rightholders. This phrase may have been used because, as discussed, the
Copyright Directive covers not only rights of authors, but also the rights of neighbouring
right holders, producers of phonograms, films and broadcasting organisations. However,
use of this terminology may depart from the standards found in other International
Treaties. The Rome Convention142 has specific areas in which rights of phonogram
producers might be limited, including private use and use solely for the purposes of
teaching or scientific research143. This article in the Rome Convention was applied to
phonogram producers in the TRIPS agreement144. What the effect of applying the
'authors' formula' to exceptions for neighbouring right holders will ultimately entail is
not at all clear.
6.6.3 Exceptions or limitations
The terminology in Article 5 of the Copyright Directive refers to 'exceptions or
limitations'. This arises as a result of the differing views taken as to the purpose of the
provisions. As previously discussed, the Anglo-American approach is to view them as
limitations on the property right granted to the copyright owner. By contrast, author's
rights systems view them rather as exceptions to the property right. The dual
terminology in the directive is no doubt an attempt to satisfy the negotiators. For the
purposes of the ensuing discussion, the term exceptions will be used.
141 Copyright Directive Recital 29 and Article 5.4.
142 For a brief discussion on the Rome Convention, see chapter 2 of this study.
143 Rome Convention Article 15.
144 TRIPS Agreement Article 14.6.
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The exceptions in the Copyright Directive are to be found in Article 5 and provide
exceptions to the exclusive rights of reproduction145, communication to the public and
making available to the public146, and distribution147. While it was not obvious at some
points during the passage of the Copyright Directive whether the exceptions were
designed to replace all existing fair dealing provisions in domestic legislation, it has now
become clear that is the case148. Apart from a few examples149, the Copyright Directive is
intended to provide a complete code for fair dealing both on and off the Internet.
Article 5.1 of the Copyright Directive exempts from the reproduction right temporary
acts of reproduction which are transient or incidental to the functioning of the
Internet150. The purpose of the inclusion of this article was to ensure that Internet
Sendee Providers (ISPs), and others who own and operate equipment that make the
Internet function would not be liable for such technological processes as caching, or for
copies made on servers as works are transmitted around the Internet. It is not yet clear
how the ISP liability provisions will interact with those to be found in the Electronic
Commerce Directive, but no doubt will be clarified once the necessary implementing
measures are drawn up151. However, this Article is not the focus of the present
discussion. More important for authorship are those found in Articles 5.2 and 5.3.
Article 5.2 provides that Member States may provide for limitation to the exclusive right
of reproduction in cases ranging from:
'reproductions onpaper or any similar medium, effected by the use ofany kind ofphotographic
technique or by some otherprocess having similar effects, with the exception ofsheet musical
work, provided that the rightholders receivefair compensation;'
to
145 Copyright Directive Article 2.
146 ibid Article 3.
147 ibidArticle 4.
148 ibid Recital 22.
149 ibid Recital 25 provides that: 'Existing national schemes on reprography, inhere thy do exist, do not create major
barriers to the InternalMarket. Member States should be allowed to providefor an exception in respect ofreprography'.
150 Copynght Directive Article 5.1 states: Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2 [ofthe Copyright
Directive], which are transient or incidental, which are an integral and essentialpart ofa technologicalprocess, whose sole
purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between thirdparties by an intermediary or, a lawful use ofa work or other
subject matter to be made, and which have no independent economic significance, shall be exemptedfrom the right set out in
Article 2.
151 For a discussion on how this provision might operate in tandem with the E-commerce Directive, and
an analysis of some of the unanswered questions see Hugenholtz, Caching and Copyright. The Right of
Temporary Copying, [2000] EIPR 11.
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' in respect ofspecific acts of reproduction made bypublicly accessible libraries, educational
establishments or museums, or by archives, which are notfor direct or indirect economic or
commercial advantage;'
It is noteworthy that implementation by Member States of the measures contained in
Article 5.2 is not mandatory: if the purpose is to produce a uniform law, it may well not
do so. Some might also argue that the permissive nature of the exceptions underlines the
low importance attached to their existence. A more persuasive reason might be found in
looking to the extensive negotiations and lobbying surrounding their incorporation into
the final Directive. Earlier drafts contained fewer measures pertinent to this area. It was
only at a fairly late stage during the Directive's gestation that it became apparent that
existing national measures in this area were to be supplanted by those found Directive.
Once this became clear, those who considered the exceptions important to the law of
copyright, including would-be authors, worked hard to ensure that representative
measures were included in the final instrument. This was against the background of right
holders who lobbied hard, if not for their total exclusion, at least for them to be limited
as far as possible.
One important measure found in Article 5.2.b, provides limitations to the reproduction
right may be made 'in respect ofreproductions on any medium made by a naturalpersonforprivate
use andfor ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightholders
receivefair compensation '. This would appear to be the measure in the Copyright
Directive that is closest to the current UK exception for private study for individuals.
However, it is hedged with a number of conditions. One is that right holders must
receive fair compensation. If this is the measure that is intended to equate to fair dealing
for the purposes of research and private study, and the UK Government decides to
implement it in domestic law, it changes the current law, from a defence to a charge of
infringement of copyright for the purposes of private study, to a compulsory licence for
which the right holder must receive compensation. When it was added to the Copyright
Directive, it may be that the drafters had in mind the French Code which permits private
reproductions of phonograms, for which a charge must be paid by way of a levy on
equipment, rather than the UK private study exception. This would mean that if, for
example, a copy of an MP3 file were placed on the Rio, so that the surfer could listen to
that at a more convenient time, the right holder would need to receive fair compensation
for that reproduction. This has always been a 'chargeable' reproduction under UK law,
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as such private copying has not been considered fair dealing. By contrast, this 'space
shifting' would appear to remain categorised as fair use in the US, so long as the act was
carried out by the owner of the original copy152. A second point is that it is relevant only
to the right of reproduction, and not to the communication to the public and making
available to the public rights. This would appear to prevent a library making copies of
works available on terminals in a library, to be consulted by researchers under this
heading153.
Much more extensive are the exceptions to be found in Article 5. 3. This article permits
exceptions to be made to the exclusive rights of reproduction and communication to the
public and making available to the public. The details are therefore applicable to works
placed on servers and disseminated on the Internet, as well as to other forms of
reproduction. Article 5.3 provides a list of circumstances for which Member States may
provide for limitations to these exclusive rights. These are:
(a) usefor the solepurpose of illustrationfor teaching or scientific research, as long as the
source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible and to
the extentjustified by the non-commercialpurpose to be achieved;
(b) uses, for the benefit ofpeople with a disability, which are directly related to the
disability and ofa non-commercial nature, to the extent required by the specific disability;
(c) reproduction by the press, communication to thepublic ormaking available of
published articles on current economic, political or religious topics or ofbroadcast works or other
subject matter of the same character, in cases where such use is not expressly reserved, and as
long as the source, including the author s name, is indicated, or use ofworks or other subject
matter in connection with the reporting ofcurrent events, to the extentjustified by the
informatorypurpose and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless
this turns out to be impossible;
(d ) quotationsforpurposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a work
or other subject matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public, that, unless
this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the author's name, is indicated, and that
their use is in accordance withfairpractice, and to the extent required by the specificpurpose;
(e) usefor thepurposes ofpublic security or to ensure theproperpeformance or reporting of
administrative, parliamentary orjudicialproceedings;
(f) use ofpolitical speeches as well as extracts ofpublic lectures or similar works or subject
matter to the extentjustified by the informatorypurpose andprovided that the source, including
the author's name, is indicated, except where this turns out to be impossible;
(g) use during religious celebrations or official celebrations organised by apublic authority;
(h) use ofworks, such as works ofarchitecture or sculpture, made to be located
permanently inpublicplaces;
152 In UMG Recordings Inc and others v MP3.com Inc 92 F Supp 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.) RakoffJ found that
IVIP3.com had infringed copyright belonging to record companies when they (MP3.com) made a
compilation of copies of thousands of songs, and then made those songs available to users of their 'Beam-
It' and 'Instant Listening' Services. The copies were made by MP3.com, and not by the owner of the
original recording, and thus did not fall under the head of'fair use' in the US.
153 There are other measures that affect libraries, discussed infra.
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(i) incidental inclusion ofa work or other subject matter in other material;
(j) usefor thepurpose ofadvertising thepublic exhibition or sale ofartistic works, to the extent
necessary topromote the event, excluding any other commercial use;
(k) usefor thepurpose ofcaricature, parody orpastiche;
(I) use in connection with the demonstration or repair ofequipment;
(m) use ofan artistic work in theform ofa building or a drawing orplan ofa building
for thepurposes of reconstructing the buildingj
(n) use by communication ormaking available,for thepurpose ofresearch orprivate study,
to individual members ofthepublic by dedicated terminals on thepremises ofestablishments
referred to inparagraph 2(c) ofworks and other subject matter not subject topurchase or
licensing terms which are contained in their collections;
(o) use in certain other cases ofminor importance where exceptions or limitations already
exist under national law, provided that they only concern analogue uses and do not affect thefree
circulation ofgoods and services within the Community, withoutprejudice to the other exceptions
and limitations contained in thisArticle.
This list is lengthy, but that is because it is designed to replace existing exceptions found
in domestic laws of Member States. The merger of the UK and the Civilian systems is
fascinating. There are clear influences from the French approach, for example in the
exception for: 'thepurpose ofcaricature, parody orpastiche'. Equally, there is evidence of the
slightly broader UK fair dealing categories. Thus there is an exception for illustration for
teaching and scientific research, another for news reporting, and another for purposes
such as criticism and review. Each has certain conditions attached, for example that the
name of the author and the source must be indicated. Assuming the UK Government
was minded to provide for these exceptions within the parameters of the Directive, what
will the fair dealing provisions look like for those in the UK, and how will they compare
with the existing provisions?
Subject to the discussion above, there is no provision directly equivalent to the UK
research and private study exception. However, there is the limitation 'for the solepurpose
ofillustrationfor teaching or scientific research'. The word scientific is likely to be broader than
appears at first sight, and relate to knowledge in general, and so to as broad categories as
the existing limitation in the UK. In addition, use for the purpose of illustrationfor teaching
would be permitted. The UK has no such exception at present154. There is also the
exception for 'use by communication ormaking available, for thepurpose ofresearch orprivate study,
to individualmembers ofthepublic by dedicated terminals on thepremises ofestablishments referred to in
154 A report in 1977 by the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (Chairman Sir Ron
Dearing), Higher Education in the Eearning Society (1997), argued for free and immediate use by teachers and
researchers ofcopyright digital information', para 13.34. The recommendations have not, to date, been
implemented. See MacQueen, Copyright and the Internet in Law & the Internet: A Framework for Electronic
Commerce Edwards & Waelde eds. Hart 2000.
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paragraph 2c ofworks or other subject matter not subject to purchase or licensing terms which are
contained in their collections'55'. This would appear to be relevant to libraries which may
make works available on dedicated terminals within their establishments. However, such
use, it would appear, could be limited by contract, although how it might be limited is far
from clear. For instance, the purpose of taking out a subscription to an electronic
journal is to make the works encompassed in that journal available on a computer: why
else take the subscription? So the possible limitations cannot refer to not making it
available in the library on a terminal. It may be that what is contemplated is that the
terminal in the library should thereafter control the making of subsequent copies by the
researcher. For instance, the library might be required to ensure that the terminal on
which the work is made available does not allow a researcher to print a copy of the work.
Thus the researcher would be precluded from making a physical copy for the purposes
of research and private study.
The UK criticism and review limitation would appear to be well catered for. Thus
Member States may make exceptions to both the reproduction right and the making
available to the public right for 'quotationsforpurposes such as criticism or review'. However,
this is subject to an important proviso. The quotation must: 'relate to a work or other subject
matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public, that, wheneverpossible, the source,
including the author's name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance withfairpractice, and to the
extent required by the specificpurpose'. The words 'such as' compare favourably with the
current UK section, which is limited specifically to 'criticism and review', and suggest
that the limitation would be available in a broader range of circumstances. However, the
work being quoted must have been lawfully made available to the public. In some ways this is
no different from current UK law. As has been discussed, works which are
confidential156 are not subject to the criticism and review exception, at least not to the
same extent as published works. But it does raise the tension again, as to when a work,
which has been made available over the Internet, has been lawfully made available to the
public. If that work sits behind a digital fence, is that confidential, or has it been made
available to the public? If the work has been made available only to a few select
155 Article 5.2.n above.
156 PCR Ltd v Doiv Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] FSR 170. A number of reports on coco crops had been
produced by PCR Ltd and distributed to a limited number of subscribers. DowJones acquired copies of
these reports, and used some of the material in them to produce three articles. The plaintiff alleged breach
of confidential information and copyright infringement. The court found that as the journalist was not
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recipients, has that been lawfully made available to the public? In the UK, a claim of
confidentiality in respect of a work may fail where that work has been published, notably
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where it is the Crown seeking to prevent disclosure . But it does not therefore follow
that a work disclosed to a limited number of people has been 'lawfully made available to
the public' within the terminology discussed above. The lack of definition suggests that it
will only be a matter of time before more cases like Religious Technology Center v Netcom1"*
arise, where the copyright owner claims that a work has not been lawfully made available
in an attempt to censor critics. As a final point on this particular exception, the use of the
quotations must be only to the extent 'required by the specific purpose'. Again,
seemingly a limitation, but perhaps no different from the UK fair dealing exception,
where the criticism and review must deal fairly with the work.
The news reporting exception also appears to be as wide as current UK law: 'use ofworks
or other subject matter in connection with the reporting ofcurrent events, to the extentjustified by the
informatorypurpose and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns
out to be impossibleThe wording in the Copyright Directive limits the exception to 'the
extent justified by the informatory purpose', but may differ little from current UK law.
The article may actually be wider, as it also provides that: 'reproduction by the press,
communication to thepublic ormaking available ofpublished articles on current economic, political or
religious topics or ofbroadcast works or other subject matter ofthe same character, in cases where such use
is not expressly reserved, and as long as the source, including the author's name, is indicated'.
However, reproduction under the Copyright Directive in these circumstances is limited
to cases where such use is not expressly reserved. Instead of a possible limit at the point of
access to a work, this news reporting provision could be limited through terms imposed
by contract after access is obtained. The addition of this wording here might suggest that
it was in the minds of the drafters that criticism and review cannot be limited by
agreement, but news reporting can. A few simple terms governing access to any web
site, for example those of Reuters or the BBC, stating that no information or works or
part thereof to be found on the site were to be reproduced, extracted or re-utilised in any
other medium, would seem to be sufficient to prevent the operation of this exception,
even if implemented into domestic law.
aware of the confidential nature of the information that claim failed. However, given the reports had been
published - albeit to a limited number of people, then the defence of fair dealing was open.
157 LordAdvocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd. [1990] 1 A.C. 812 [1989] 3 W.L.R. 358 [1989] 2 All E.R. 852
1989 S.C. (H.L.) 122.
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At first sight, and looking to the wording of the Articles discussed above, it would appear
that the UK fair dealing limitations may be well catered for in the Copyright Directive.
But, as suggested, there are a number of unanswered questions as to how these will work
in practice which will depend firstly, on the application of digital fences, and second, the
extent to which it may be possible to limit the exceptions by contract.
6.7 Digital fences and fair dealing
The picture becomes much more complex when the fair dealing provisions in the
Copyright Directive are considered along with those for digital fences.
Member States are to provide legal protection both in respect of the act of circumvention
of a digital fence, and the circulation of devices designed to facilitate such
circumvention1A Digital fences are thus protected to the extent that they control the use
of a work, and comprise an access control hmiting access to that work. The arguments
that have arisen in relation to access to a work for the purposes of exercising one of the
fair dealing limitations in the US apply equally to access to a work under the Copyright
Directive. No doubt with these arguments in mind, Article 6.4 of the Copyright
Directive appears to be aimed at ensuring that those who are entitied to exercise one of
the fair dealing exceptions can exercise then rights.
Article 6.4 of the Copyright Directive aims at facilitating the exercise of some of the
exceptions to be found in Article 5, while at the same time upholding the integrity of
digital fences. The first paragraph ofArticle 6.4 provides in part that:
''Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make available to the
beneficiary ofan exceptions or limitation providedfor in national law in accordance with article 5.2a, 2c,
2d, 2e, 3a, 3b or 3e the means ofbenefitingfrom that exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to
benefitfrom that exception or limitation, where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or
other subject matter concerned'.
A 'beneficiary of the exception' would appear to be a third party who wishes to exercise
one of the exceptions specified. Concentrating on Article 5.3, the exceptions referred to
158 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
159 Copyright Directive Article 6.1 and 2 See also the discussion in chapter 4 of this study.
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are those for the illustration for teaching or scientific research, for the benefit of people
with a disability, and for the purposes of public security and parliamentary or judicial
proceedings. So despite the fact that the circumvention of digital fences is to be made
unlawful, it would appear that those who wish to take advantage of an exception for the
purposes of inter alia illustration for teaching or research, must be able to do so.
However, before being able to do so, the beneficiary of the exception must have legal
access to the protected work. So it would appear the help given in respect of exercising
the exception refers, for example, to overcoming controls which would otherwise
prevent a copy being made for the purposes of scientific research; for example, if the cut
and paste functions or the print command on a website were disabled. The help is not
given in respect of overcoming the access control. So the copyright owner might still
refuse access, or condition access on payment. Depending on how the digital controls
and business models of intermediaries develop, this exception might either become
unusable because the user cannot afford to pay for access, or develop in the form of a
compulsory licence with remuneration payable to the intermediary each tame it is
exercised16". The payment may not be explicidy required to exercise fair dealing, but be
rather for access. This is not quite how fair dealing for the purposes of research and
private study is currenfiy understood in the UK. Certainly, in most cases, a payment for
the book or other work must be made at some point. However, if that book is
purchased, or a copy obtained from a public library, then no further payment need be
made to make a copy of a substantial part for the purposes of research. Ifworks are
only released on the Internet, then it would appear that a payment could be required each
time this exception is exercised.
The provision in Article 5.3.n appears to have been designed to avoid this outcome in
respect of libraries. Thus, the reproduction, making available and communication to the
public rights may be limited in respect ofworks made available over dedicated terminals
in the library, where those works are to be used for the purpose of research or private
study. This could mean, for instance, that books made available in electronic form in
libraries could be accessed at dedicated terminals. Reproductions that were made would
not infringe these rights so long as they were for the purposes of research and private
study. However, that in turn is subject to the proviso that the exception only applies to
160 In a previous draft of the directive, a limitation was permitted for the sole purpose of illustration for
teaching or scientific research, so long as the right holder received compensation. Although, as currently
drafted, the limitation looks different, the effect may well be the same.
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works 'not subject to purchasing or licensing terms'. It would appear that a digital publisher
could stipulate that no copy be made for the purposes of research and private study, or
that a payment is required each time, or that the works should not be made available on
these dedicated terminals. As far as payment is concerned, none of the exceptions in
Article 5.3 specifically state that their exercise is conditioned on payment, although, as
discussed above, the copyright owner could so condition access. This is in contrast with
Article 5.2, where private copying, paper-based copying, and copying in certain
institutions is dependent on the proviso that rightholders should receive fair
compensation. However, Recital 36 states that ''Member States mayprovideforfair
compensationfor rightholders also when applying the optionalprovisions on exceptions which do not
require such compensation'. So, if the UK or any other Member State chooses to implement
any of the fair dealing exceptions, they may opt for a requirement that a fee be paid for
each use. Recital 35 does recognise that in certain circumstances, a payment might not
be appropriate, however: In certain situations, where theprejudice to the rightholder would be
minimal, no obligationforpayment may arise'. It would appear thatfair dealing, when not
limited by contract, may become fared dealing6'.
The obligation in the first paragraph of Article 6.4 also raises the question of what
appropriate measures a Member State must take in order to ensure that a beneficiary of
protection can benefit from an exception. Article 6.4 in part requires that Member States
ensure that a beneficiary of protection has the means available to benefit from an
exception specified in the Copyright Directive. One way might be to develop State-
authorised circumvention tools which could be made available for these specified
purposes. However, it would appear odd that such circumvention devices could be
developed to allow certain uses of a work for fair dealing , when those who develop
digital fences argue that those same digital fences cannot be configured for fair dealing.
An alternative would be to have some form of human intervention, responsible for
deciding when such a use was acceptable. This type of suggestion was made a few years
ago, when one writer proposed the creation of a digital property trust162. Broadly, the idea
161 The term 'fared dealing' is a variation of the term used by Bell in the title to his article: Fair Use vs. Fared
Use: The Impact ofAutomated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 1998, 76 North Carolina Law
Review 557.
162 Stefik Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge us to Rethink Digital
Publishing 1991, 12 Berkeley Technology LawJournal 137. Mark Stefik is the principal scientist at Xerox
Palo Alto Research Centre Park in California. His paper provides a very interesting viewpoint from a
person who is intimately involved in developing new technologies. Stefik acknowledged that the
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was that a trust would be established, charged with being a 'guardian of fair dealing'. If a
user wanted to exercise fair dealing rights, an approach would need to be made to the
members of the digital property trust. The user would have to convince the trust that he
understood what fair dealing was about, and that the proposed use of the protected
work fell within the necessary guidelines. The guardian of fair dealing would assess the
application and decide if it was genuine. If it was, they would then have the authority to
require the owner to grant the use to the user. If it was not, the request, and the use,
would be denied. It may be that this type of proposal would satisfy owners. However, it
could have negative implications for authorship. The user would be required to go to the
expense and trouble of contacting a trust. Processing the application would take time
and cause delay. The burden of showing what is fair dealing would lie on the applicant.
Fair dealing would become an affirmative request, rather than a defence to an action for
infringement. The trust would act as arbiter as to what is, and what is not, fair dealing.
By the time a decision was returned, the applicant might just have given up. Certainly
the proposal may work in some circumstances, for instance where large investment is to
be put into the second work. But on many occasions, where the author, perhaps a busy
researcher, is seeking flashes of inspiration from a variety of sources in a limited time
scale, it might just prove to be too burdensome. Everything would require to be planned,
and cleared, in advance. It remains to be seen what proposals will be forthcoming from
Member States in implementation of this obligation.
6.8 Digital fences, exceptions and licensing
One further question remains as to whether it would be possible, under the Copyright
Directive, to limit by contract how the limitations could be exercised, either at the point
of access to the work, or at the point of use. Some of the questions have been discussed
above. One further part of the Copyright Directive suggesting that such action might be
possible for at least some exceptions, is contained in the fourth paragraph ofArticle 6(4).
This paragraph states that the 'first and second subparagraphs [ofArticle 6.4], shall not apply to
works or other subject matter made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that
members of thepublic may access themfrom aplace and at a time individually chosen by them'. The
first and second paragraphs of Article 6.4 place the obligation on Member States to
development of comprehensive technological protection systems could mean that fair use right could not
be exercised as it would not be possible to program the system to conform with the fair use rules.
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provide the means by which a beneficiary of protection can benefit from a number of the
exceptions including making reproductions on paper163, and for the purpose of
illustration for teaching and scientific research164. Article 6.4 would appear to imply that
works may be made available over the Internet on certain terms and conditions proffered
by the owner. If this is the case, and an author agrees to them, for instance by clicking
on an 'I agree' icon (a click-wrap licence), then diose terms and conditions will govern
use of the underlying work by the author. If there is such agreement, then the author
will not be able to use any of the exceptions discussed above. Thus, an owner might
stipulate that 'no part of the works made available on this web site may be used for the
purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research'. It would appear that these
conditions would govern the relationship between the parties.
Such a conclusion means that the provisions of the Copyright Directive are more strict in
relation to these exceptions than the others. There is nothing now in the Copyright
Directive to suggest that, subject to the discussion above, any of the other exceptions, if
adopted into national laws ofMember States, could be limited by contract. This is in
contrast with a previous draft of the Directive which stated explicitiy in the Recitals that
the fair dealing exceptions were not to prejudice right holders and users entering into
contractual relations. This appeared to suggest that it would be possible to reduce (or
expand) fair dealing by contract. This Recital has now gone. So, the other exceptions
might become subject to compensation, but not to being limited by contract. By
contrast, if an author enters into an agreement not to use a work for the purposes of
scientific research, then the terms of that contract could override the exceptions, and the
digital property trust would not have competence on behalf of that author.
6.9 Fair dealing and databases
However, those comments should be taken in conjunction with the proposals in the
Copyright Directive in relation to databases, which, it would appear, could limit every
limitation. Under the Database Directive, certain elements in relation to user rights are
entrenched in law. The maker of a database may not prevent a lawful user from
extracting and re-using insubstantial parts of that database, whether evaluated
163 Copyright Directive Article 5.2.a.
164 ibid 5.3.a.
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qualitatively or quantitatively165. This cannot be limited by contract. In addition,
Member States had the option under the Database Directive to allow for the extraction
of a substantial part of the contents of a database for limited purposes, including
extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research166.
It appears that this could now be limited under the Copyright Directive. Article 6.(4)
paragraph 5 states: Thisparagraph shall apply mutatus mutandis to Directive 96/9/EC
ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council of 11 March 1996 on the legalprotection of
databases'67
Given that web sites and individual web pages fall under the definition of a 'database'168,
regardless of the content, it would appear that it might be possible to limit the fair
dealing provisions by contract. Thus, if an owner chose to place restrictions on
extraction of information from the database where it was to be used for the purposes of
illustration for teaching or research, it may be permissible to do so. If accepted, these
terms would govern the relationship between the parties, and the author, teacher or
researcher would not be able to seek the assistance of the digital property trust.
6.10 Fair dealing and the UK
It has been noted that there is some debate in the US as to whether it would be possible
to limit fair use by contract. This question appears not to have been considered directly
in the UK169. The Copyright Tribunal considered a case in which the Performing Right
165 Database Directive 96/9/EC Recital 49 and Article 8. In the UK, copyright in the structure of a
database is not infringed by a person who copies that structure if it is necessary for the purposes of access
to and use of the contents. The database right is not infringed by the fair dealing of a substantial part of
the contents if they are extracted (but not re-utilised), for the purpose of illustration for teaching or
research and not for any commercial purpose. For favourable comment in relation to this element of the
Database Directive see Samuelson Copyright Digital Data and Fair Use in DigitalNetworked Environments
http://www.droit.umontreal.ca/crdp/en/equipes/te.. ,/samuelson.htm. The other area in which 'user'
rights may be said to be entrenched is in relation to computer programs. Broadly Council Directive (EEC)
No 9/250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs provides that it is not unlawful
to copy a program for the purposes of decompilation if it is necessary to find the information necessary to
create an independent program which can be operated with the decompiled program or with another
program. CDPA s50B(2)(a) See also further restrictions in section 50B.
166 Database Directive Article 9.a.
167 This subparagraph also applies to Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on Rental
Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property.
168 For the definition of a database see chapter 2 of this study.
169 In Denmark a copyright owner cannot attempt to expand the copyright monopoly through contracts.
In DeN VDrukkerij 'de Spaarnestad' v Feeinrichting Favoriet' Hoge Raad 25 January 1952No95A magazine
publisher had put a notice in his publications prohibiting the legal acquirer from re-using the pnnted
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Society had requested that Southern Television pay royalties on ephemeral recording
made in the course of broadcasting despite the explicit exception of this activity from
infringement under the 1956 Copyright Act 17°. The Tribunal disapproved of the
practice171. This would suggest that that it is not possible, by contract, to extend the
boundaries of the law of copyright. By analogy, if fair dealing is a boundary, it should
not be capable of being altered by contract.
There are anecdotal tales of licences being granted by copyright holders which take no
notice of the underlying fair dealing provisions, or otherwise override copyright to the
extent that they claim payment for uses which are fair dealing, or seek to prohibit uses
which are permitted172. But these may rather represent the desire of the licensee to use
works protected by copyright, and obtain something of an insurance policy against being
sued, as opposed to an acceptance of the ability to contract out of the rights.
As there has been surprisingly little debate in this area, and a good deal of uncertainty
exists, the UK Government might consider introducing a provision into domestic law
explicitly providing that the limitations cannot be contracted away. However, such a
move would run counter to many of the measures being introduced in the Copyright
Directive discussed above. This will be canvassed further in chapter 9 of this study.
material in subsequent reading portfolios. The defendant nonetheless published a portfolio and distributed
it to his clients. The Plaintiff sued on the grounds of copyright infringement. The court found in favour
of the defendant on the basis that the plaintiffs copyright was exhausted as soon as he had made his
magazines available to the public. He therefore had no right to restrict the user's subsequent actions and
the notice was therefore contrary to the exhaustion doctrine under the Dutch Copyright Act. Quoted in
Contracts and Copyright Exemptions. Institute for Information Law Amsterdam 1997 ISBN 90-74243-11-8 p
30.
170 UK Copyright Act 1956 s6(7).
171 Case 2/1958 Quoted in Cornish, Intellectual Property para 12-58.
172 O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption ofSoftware Ucense Terms
1995, 45 Duke Law Journal 479-558 argues that it is becoming established in practice for electronic
publishers to attempt to alter the bargain struck by the copyright regime through licence agreements, and
for libraries to agree to contractual terms which may restrict their users right to make copies under the fair
use exemption. See also Grosheide, Mass Market Exploitation ofDigital Information by the Use ofShrink Wrap
and Click Wrap Ucenses. A Dutch Perspective onArticle 2B UCC in Grosheide and Boele-Woelki (eds),
Molengrafica: Europees Privaatrecht 1998 at 305. What happens to copyright under a consortia license? The short
answer is:you negotiate a licence that overrides copyright. With the right licenseyou should not have to worry about copyright'.
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6.11 The implications of the proposals in the Copyright Directive for the
public domain
On the one hand, the proposals in the Copyright Directive represent a genuine attempt
by the EU to balance the interests of the owner and author: the owner in the need to
protect a work disseminated over the Internet, and the author in the need to use parts of
works for authorship. If the justifications for the grant of property rights in creative
works have not been lost in the legislative process, these attempts suggest that the EU do
not view fair dealing limitations purely in terms of market failure, but rather appreciate
that they do have a public interest function in facilitating authorship, which in turn will
ensure that a wide variety of works are available for education and the furtherance of
knowledge. On the other hand, the way in which these proposals might work conjures
up some concerning images. In this there remains one central feature that has not
satisfactorily been tackled: the question of access to materials in the public domain for
use in authorship.
7. Summary
The differences in the approaches to the fair dealing/fair use exceptions as between the
US and the EU are telling. The US has largely left the terrestrial fair use provisions
untouched: the EU, on the other hand, is attempting to construct a new framework for
these rights at this stage. This is, in part, explained by the desire of the EU to harmonise
the limitations as between the Member States, incorporating varying historical
backgrounds and legal traditions. In part it is also explained by the ever increasing move
towards granting full property rights to owners.
As fair use is not limited in the US, authors might be considered to be in an enviable
position. However, the limitation on the exercise of these rights through the operation
of digital fences, coupled with the possibility of being able to limit the rights by contract,
means that these limitations may be just as difficult, if not more so, to operate in practice.
Within the EU regulators do not seem to have suggested that fair dealing should
disappear. Instead, the complex structure described above has been put in place which
certainly at least pays Hp service to the doctrine. However, control over access coupled
with the fact that it appears it will be possible to make the fair dealing limitations subject
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to contractual restrictions do not sit happily with the concept of the public domain. This
leaves the question open as to whether the public domain remains, but is restricted, or if
it is disappearing. What is perhaps particularly interesting is the seeming convergence
between the Anglo-American and author's rights systems, not in the substantive law, but
in the effect that the protection of digital fences has on access to the underlying works.
The once 'free' fair dealing and fair use provisions in UK and US law become subject to
access restrictions. The extension for each jurisdiction concerns the use that may be
made of the underlying materials through contractual restrictions.
For the public domain, and in particular for an author's use of the materials in the public
domain, the changes are fundamental. Fared dealing, contractual limitations and
potential difficulties over access to creative works, may operate together to limit the
materials available necessary to create new works. Taken on their own, the proposals for,
and limitations on, fair dealing on the Internet might be considered restrictive. But taken
together with the complex alterations to other elements of the public domain, the





Fair dealing is one limitation or exception to the copyright monopoly. Although, as has
been discussed in the last chapter, the boundaries are far from clear, they can perhaps be
more easily stated than those under scrutiny in the present chapter. This chapter
concerns the boundaries on the copyright monopoly, and thus elements in the public
domain, found by examining three central concepts in copyright law. The first is the
requirement that a work be original for copyright to subsist; the second is that
insubstantial parts of works protected by copyright may be copied without infringing the
right; and the third is that ideas are not protected but only their expression. There are
no clear demarcation lines between these, particularly where infringement of copyright is
under scrutiny1. Each however, does provide a limitation on the property rights granted
to current authors. The level at which these doctrines operate determines which works,
or parts ofworks, are accorded protection, and which are not, and thus fall into the
public domain. For instance, the higher the level of originality required from the author,
the fewer the number of works that will be accorded protection: the lower the level of
originality, the more widespread protection becomes. The more substantial the part of
an existing work can be taken in fashioning new works, the lower the protection for the
author: the less substantial the part, the greater the cover.
An example may help to illustrate the point. Take a painting of sunflowers in a yellow
vase. Van Gogh may have been the first artist to have the idea that these flowers would
make an excellent subject for a painting. Sunflowers in a yellow vase of course pre¬
existed Van Gogh's idea to paint them. But if he was the first to commit his brush to
canvas, would this then prevent any other painters painting pictures of sun flowers?
Sunflowers in yellow pots? Yellow pots? Any still life picture of flowers? Any picture of
flowers in oils? Or any picture of flowers? Van Gogh's expression of the idea was
sufficiently original, and sufficient skill and labour was expended, to attract copyright
protection in the painting. If the idea is protected, as well as the expression of that idea,
so all subsequent paintings of sunflowers in yellow pots would infringe copyright (at least
for the term for which the painting was protected). If copyright protection extends to
1 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria ,The Modern Law ofCopyright and Designs Butterworths 2nd ed para 2.57.
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taking any part of the expression, so any subsequent painting of a sunflower may infringe
copyright. The more extensive the protection, so the less there is left to the public
domain from which others may draw inspiration, style, technique and some expression,
in creating new works2.
The ideas-expression dichotomy, the requirement of originality, and the limitation that
only the taking of a substantial part of the expression infringes copyright, mean that
copyright protection in respect of that painting and the subject encompassed in the
painting is limited. As a result, there exist many and varied paintings of sunflowers,
yellow vases, and sunflowers in yellow vases3. The three doctrines thus attempt to
balance past rights - Van Gogh's in his painting; current rights — more recent paintings
of sunflowers and yellow vases; and future rights - the next generation of paintings of
sunflowers and yellow vases. So for authorship, while copyright protects existing works,
it is broad enough to support and facilitate the creation of new works, without allowing
the monopoly of existing right-holders to inhibit that creation.
Limitations on the creative property right are vital for exploitation and protection of
works in the digital environment from two perspectives. The first is that, as the
parameters of the property right shift, to make it possible for owners of existing works
protected by copyright to extend the property right in those works. The public domain
is diminished. For instance, as works are altered to make them suitable for digital
dissemination, these alterations may result in a new work being created, thus starting a
new period of copyright protection. The would-be author may face many overlapping
copyrights in existing works, which could further diminish the availability of those parts
available for re-use. The second is that as the parameters move in favour of the right
holder by giving new or extended rights in an existing work, so it becomes possible for
that right holder to exert greater control over the onward use of elements of existing
works, well beyond terrestrial limitations. Once again, the effect of this is the diminution
of the materials necessary for authorship.
2 Somewhat ironically, a web site containing pictures by Van Gogh is currently the subject of dispute as it is
alleged that a third party has extracted a substantial part of the contents of the original web site and used
that content in creating a new web site. DigitalArt Heist? Van Gogh Web Sites in Rights Battle.
http: / /www.qhnks.net/items/qliteml 0625.htm.
3 For an indication as to how Van Gogh's painting has inspired others, see
http://www.vangoghgallery.com/misc/sunflowers.htm
184
The purpose of this part is to examine these boundaries in the non-Cyber world, and
then analyse what happens to them in connection with digital dissemination.
1.2 The boundaries
The first question to be tackled is when a new work can be considered to be original. A
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work must meet this threshold before attracting
copyright protection4. Those works which are not original fall into the public domain,
free for use by others in authorship5. Although defining the level of originality required
has been attempted on a number of occasions by the courts, it is not an issue that has
caused too many problems when deciding whether something is protected by copyright,
and when it is not. In the UK an author is required to expend 'skill judgement and
labour' in the creation of a work6, a fairly low level of originality:
The word 'original' does not.. .mean that the work must be the expression oforiginal or
inventive thought The originality which is required relates to the expression ofthe
thought the work must not be copiedfrom another work
It has been suggested that the UK standard of originality will rise due to the provisions
of a number of European directives which require that a work should be 'the author's own
intellectual creation * in order to attract protection. This is a level that is closer to the
authors' rights systems test for originality9. That besides, and despite the current very
low level in the UK, there are some works which fall outwith the ambit of copyright
protection. Titles of books, films and plays,10 together with single words11 and facts12,
have been denied copyright protection. These 'little bits' of works thus fall into the
4 CDPA si(1).
3 But note the discussion on the Database Directive below.
6 Cornish, IntellectualProperty para 10-05.
7 University ofLondon Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at 608 Peterson J. But even for
computer generated works, the author still requires to expend some effort, although it is the
entrepreneurial, rather than the creative effort that is rewarded. The author is the person 'by whom the
arrangements necessaryfor the creation ofthe work are undertaken'. CDPA s 9(3).
8 Council Directive EEC No 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases.
9 'Authors' rights systems take as their startingpoint the intellectual act offormulating a 'work' and, therefore, tend to
maintain in their law some initial criterion relating to creative expression.' Cornish IntellectualProperty para 10-10.
10 Francis Day v Twentieth Century Fox [1940] AC 112 at 123 (The Man Who Broke the Bank at Monte Carlo -
tide of a song); Hogg vMaxwell (1867) 2 Ch App 307 (Belgravia - name of periodical); Dick v Yates (1881)
18 Ch D 76 CA (Splendid Misery - title of novel).
11 Exxon Corp v Exxon Insurance Consultants International [1982] Ch 119; [1981] 3 All ER 241.
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public domain13. Questions at the margins which have caused particular problems relate
(among other things) to compilations such as telephone directories.
The Berne Convention provides that protection shall be granted for compilations of
information, but that protection shall not extend to the contents as such. Thus there is a
recognition that the information, or data contained within the compilation should not be
protected, but the structure might be if it met the required level of originality. The extent
of protection that might be accorded to such directories has not been fully answered in
terms of copyright law in the UK14, but in Waterlow Directories Limited v. Reed Information
Services Limited15, an interim injunction was issued prohibiting the defendants from
publishing a directory containing a list of names and addresses, some ofwhich had been
gleaned from the plaintiffs' directory on the same subject. Unfortunately, the question of
originality of content was not argued in the case, but appeared to be assumed as
discussion revolved around the question of whether a substantial part of the plaintiffs'
directory had been copied. But of course, within the EU the issue is not nearly so
pressing for those who compile such directories since the introduction of the Database
Directive. As discussed16, this Directive gives to the maker of a database the right to
prevent the extraction and re-utilisation of the whole or a substantial part of the contents
of the database whether or not the contents are original. It appears possible that the
numbers of names and addresses extracted and re-used in the Waterlow Directories case
may well qualify as a substantial part of a database, and thus infringe the suigeneris right.
The originality standard in the US may be slightly higher than that in the UK. In the US
in Feist Publications v Rural Telephone17 copyright protection was denied for a telephone
directory. This decision was applauded by some as meaning that the facts, in the form of
the names and addresses were freely accessible and thus in the public domain18. It has,
however, been criticised by others because those who compile these facts, for which
effort, time and resource may be expended, receive no protection for the resultant
12 Ravenscroft v Herbert [1980] RPC 193 (Brightman J): 'an author has no copyright in hisfacts, nor in his ideas, but
only in his original expression ofsuchfacts and ideas'.
13 Subject to other forms of protection in particular by way of trade marks and incorporation into a
database.
14 In Australia it has recently been decided that a directory qualifies for copyright protection on the basis of
'industrious collection' (para 93) of the facts presented in the directory. Telstra Corporation Limited v Desktop
Marketing Systems Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 612.
15 [1992] F.S.R. 409.
16 See the discussion on the Database Directive in chapter 2 of this study.
17 Feist Publications v Rural Telephone 499 US 340 1991.
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product19. However, there have also been changes in this area in the US. As discussed,
UCITA would permit licensing of this information, whether it is protected by the law of
copyright or not20.
So the relevance of originality to the extent that works which are not original fall into the
public domain appears only to be important at the margins. In addition, with the
introduction of the Database Directive even those parts normally considered to be in the
public domain for copyright law may not be in the public domain as it is traditionally
understood.
More problematic is the question of whether a new 'original' work can be created from a
work which already exists and is protected by copyright, perhaps by adding new elements
to the first work. The issue is important when considering the dynamic nature of the
Internet and digital dissemination. Digitisation facilitates the making of amendments and
alterations to works on an on-going basis, both in relation to individual works such as an
article, and to a web site as a whole. Indeed, the most popular web sites tend to be those
which are regularly updated. This question has arisen in connection with non-digitised
works in relation to the creation of new editions ofworks. In Black vMurray & Son21
Lord Kinloch said:
T think it clear that it will not create copyright in a new edition ofa work, ofwhich the
copyright has expired, merely to create afew emendations of the text, or to add afew
unimportant notes. To create copyright by alterations in the text, these must be extensive and
substantial, practically making a new book'.
So minor additions will not suffice to qualify the amended text for protection by
copyright because they do not result in a new original work. Rather, it appears that what
is necessary are quite substantial alterations. The issue was considered again in Interlego
AG v. Tyco Industries Inc.22 where the question was whether drawings of bricks, which had
been protected by design right, could attract copyright protection anew as a result of the
addition of a few changes to the drawings together with explanatory material. Before
such copying and additions could attract copyright protection for the work as a whole,
18 But see the discussion on UCITA and licensing in chapter 1.
19 For a discussion on the requirement of originality see Sherwood-Edwards, The Redundancy ofOriginality
1994 IIC Vol 25 p658.
20 For discussion see chapter 2 of this study.
21 (1870) 9 M 341.
22 [1989] AC 217, [1988] 3 AH ER 949.
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Lord Oliver said that: '[tjhere must in addition be some element ofmaterial alteration or
embellishment which suffices to make the totality ofthe work an original work.' It is thus possible to
obtain copyright protection for a second work which has been derived from an earlier
one.23 But perhaps an important point is that the material which has been derived from
the first may be considered to have only 'thin' copyright protection at the most. Or to
put it another way which is important for authorship, almost an exact representation of
the second work would have to be made in another in order to infringe copyright in the
second work — although copyright will still subsist in the first24. So an author may still
use facts derived from an existing database, so long as the totality used does not amount
to a substantial part of the original database. Equally, if copyright protection has expired
on an original work, and a new edition is produced, any additions will not necessarily
lead to a new period of copyright protection for the work as a whole, although the
additions, such as head notes and commentary, may qualify for their own protection.
This has implications for authorship. As suggested, because works which are digitised
and disseminated over the Internet can be regularly and continuously amended, changed
and updated, the right holder may seek to exert continuing copyright protection for the
work. Nonetheless, the public domain elements in the revised work remain, and can be
used by the would-be author in an independent creation.
A final question arises relating specifically to originality, and that is whether a slavish
copy of something else can be original and thus attract its own copyright protection.
This is a question that has been around for a long time, and again has implications for
the would-be author seeking to re-use materials found on the Internet Often, it is works
which exist in hard copy form that are digitised and made available over the Internet.
Could that act of digitisation attract its own copyright protection, where to the naked eye
the resultant product may look like an exact representation of the original? This
question, in relation to the term of protection of copyright, will be explored in the next
chapter. For the present discussion it is the originality element that is important.
Generally it would appear that direct copies cannot confer originality on a work. In
British Northrop Ltd v Texteam Blackburn Ltd,25 Megarry J stated: IT drawing which is simply
23 Warwick Film Productions lJd v FLisinger [1969] 1 Ch 508.
24 Kenrick & Co v Lawrence & Co (1890) 25 QBD 99.
25 [1974] RPC 57 at 68.
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tracedfrom another drawing is not an original artistic work'. Similarly, Lord Oliver, in Interlego v
Tyco26 commented:
Take the simplest case ofartistic copyright, apainting or aphotograph. It takesgreat skill,
judgment and labour to produce agood copy bypainting or toproduce an enlargedphotograph
from apositiveprint, but no one would reasonably contend that the copypainting or enlargement
was an "original" artistic work in which the copier is entitled to claim copyright. Skill, labour
orjudgment merely in theprocess ofcopying cannot confer originality'.
By analogy, this should mean that the process of digitisation of existing works which are
protected by copyright cannot be sufficient to attract copyright protection27. So while
permission would need to be sought to digitise an existing work protected by copyright
because the act of digitisation involves a reproduction, the digitised work, being a copy
of the original, should not of itself be protected by a new copyright separate from the
protection accorded to the original. Certainly, as discussed above, if there are additions
to the original, then it may be that those additions will attract their own protection.
1.3 Substantiality
The question of originality seldom comes up in isolation in case law but is often
associated with the problem as to whether a substantial part of the original work has
been copied, or whether a new (original) work has been created in the second28.
Copyright in a work is generally only infringed if a person carries out one of the
restricted acts29 in relation to the whole or a substantial part of the protected work30.
Insubstantial copying therefore does not infringe copyright, and does not require consent
of the author or right holder. This is important for authorship as the would-be author is
thus able to re-use insubstantial parts in new creations. However, that begs the question
as to what is an insubstantial part of an existing work.
26 Ibid.
27 But see the discussion in chapter 8 of this study.
28 Laddie Prescott and Vitoria, para 2.57. 'Originality is ofargreater relevance to the topic ofinfringement, where there
has been incomplete or inexact imitation'.
29 For restricted acts in the UK, see the discussion in chapter 2 of this study. Secondary infringements of
copyright include importing infringing copies, CDPA s 22; possessing or dealing with infringing copies,
CDPA s 23; providing means for making infringing copies, CDPA s 24; permitting use of premises for
infringing performances, CDPA s 25; providing apparatus for infringing performances CDPA s 26.
30 CDPA section 16(3)(a).
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The test for substantial infringement can be either a quantitative, or more often a
qualitative test31. The higher the test to overcome, so the more elusive the property right
becomes for the author, and the more can be copied without infringing copyright.
However, it is not easy to determine what is and is not a substantial part of a work. A
very small part of the whole of a work can be considered qualitatively a substantial
amount for the purposes of infringement, if what is copied is the heart of the work, or is
a very recognisable element32. In this, there is some blurring of the lines between
questions of what is a substantial part of a work for the purposes of infringement with
the third strand under discussion in this chapter, the ideas /expression dichotomy. The
cases which have considered whether the copyright in plays and novels has been
infringed illustrate the difficulties quite well. Because the questions focus on the plot,
there has been no question of a reproduction on paper. Rather it is the theme, or idea,
that is under consideration. If that theme is considered commonplace, so there will be
no infringement33. Thus, where a film was alleged to have reproduced a series of
incidents in a prior play, including 'husband forgets wedding anniversary; buys wife
flowers; quarrel; wife leaves husband; relation attempts to patch up quarrel; husband and
wife meet in hotel' and so on, ending up with a final reconciliation after being accused of
theft and almost being arrested, it was found that nothing of 'any substantial originality'
had been taken, and there was no qualitative infringement of copyright34. However
where a story about a nightingale, whose breast was pierced by a thorn so her blood
stained a white rose red was represented as a ballet on a stage, the court found that there
was infringement of copyright in the story35. The story was original, and a substantial
part of that originality had been infringed.
This same merging of these doctrines can be seen in Designers Guild Jjd v Russell Williams
(Textiles) IJcD where the question was whether the design of a textile had been copied
from another. In this case, Lord Hoffmannn stated:
'...there are numerous authorities which show that the 'part' which is regarded as substantial
can be afeature or combination offeatures of the work, abstracted from it rather thanfowling
a discretepart.....the original elements in theplot ofaplay or novelmay be a substantialpart,
31 Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 All ER 465 at 469 per Lord Reid.
32 Hawkes & Sons (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Service Ltd [1934] Ch 593.
33 Laddie Prescott and Vitoria ibid para 2.87.
34 Dagnail v British and Dominions Film Corpn Ltd [1928-35] MCC 391.
35 Holland v Vivian van Damm Productions Ltd [1936-45] MCC 69.
36 [2001] 1 All ER 700, [2000] 1 WLR 2416.
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so that copyright may be infringed by a work which does not reproduce a single sentence ofthe
original'.
This is similar to the discussion above on the difficulty of determining whether what has
been copied is merely the theme or idea encompassed in the plot of a play, or whether
what has been appropriated is actually the expression of that idea. Indeed, Lord
Hoffmann went on to say: 'Ifone asks what is beingprotected in such a case, it is difficult to give
any answer except that it is an idea expressed in the copyright work'. Here, the discussion on what
is a substantial part of the original work merges with the idea expressed in the work. On
the subject of ideas in copyright law, it is generally well accepted that ideas are not
capable of protection by copyright37. It is only the expression of those ideas that are
protected38. Ideas are free for all to use and build upon as they will.
Ifnature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others ofexclusiveproperty, it is the
action ofthe thinkingpower called an idea which an individualmay exclusivelypossess as long
as he keeps it to himself: but at the moment it is divulged, itforces itself into thepossession of
everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himselfof it. Itspeculiar character, too, is that no
onepossesses the less, because every otherpossesses the whole of it'.39
Perhaps, strangely, the Berne Convention does not deal with the ideas-expression
dichotomy. TRIPS, on the other hand, provides that: 'Copyrightprotection shall extend to
expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods ofoperation ormathematical concepts as such4"'. This
formula is repeated in the WCT 41. In the US, the Copyright Act provides: In no case does
copyrightprotectionfor an original work ofauthorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method ofoperation, conceptprinciple or discovery, regardless oftheform in which it is described,
explained, illustrated or embodied in such work4'.
However, defining the boundary between an idea and the expression of that idea is as
complex as trying to define those between originality and substantiality. The formulation
in Designers Guild indicates how difficult it is to separate the two. In the US the same
37 Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Eaw and Practice 4-11 (1989) at 78-42. Landes and Posner, An Economic
Analysis ofCopyright Eaiv 1989, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325 at 347-353. Although note the discussion in
Laddie Prescott and Vitoria ibid para 2.73 who opine that the maxim 'there is no copyright in ideas'is subject to
confusing analysis.
38 'Copyright does not extend to ideas, or schemes or systems, or methods; it is confined to their expression; and iftheir
expression is not copied the copyright is not infringed'. Hollinrake v Truswell (1894) 3 Ch 420 at 427 per Lindley LJ.
39 Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Issac McPherson (Aug 1813) in Thomas Jefferson, Writings 1286 1291-92
Peterson ed. Library of America 1984.
40 TRIPS Agreement Article 2.
41 WCT Article 2.
42 Title 17 USC at 102(b).
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problem arose as early as 1789 in the case of Baker v Selde«43. That case concerned the
extent of copyright in a book which contained information on the procedures designed
to operate a new system of book-keeping. The court found that copyright in the books
did not confer rights in the book-keeping system itself, nor in the forms which were
copied in the book. Both of these elements belonged to the public:
The very object ofpublishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world
the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would befrustrated ifthe knowledge
could not be used without incurring the guilt ofpiracy ofthe book (they ) are given to the
public; notgivenfor thepurpose ofpublication in other works explanatory of the art, butfor the
purpose ofpractical application'.
It has been suggested that the question to ask in determining whether what is being used
in idea, or the expression of an idea, should be: 'to ask oneselfwhether the defendant's work not
only was copied (apurely historicalfact), but so closely resembles the original inpoint of its overall
structure that it looks as ifitprobably must have been. On the other hand, the mere presence ofa
general idea, common to both, however ingenious, does notpresuppose any infringement^. This again
shows the difficulty in distinguishing between an idea, the expression of that idea, and
whether a substantial part of that expression has been copied. Perhaps slightly more
useful are the suggestions from Judge Learned Hand in the US when he said:
Upon any work and especially upon aplay agreat number ofpatterns of increasinggenerality
willfit equally well, as more and more ofthe incident is left out. The last may beperhaps no
more than the mostgeneral statement ofwhat theplay is about and at times consist ofonly its
title, but there is apoint in this series ofabstractions where they are no longerprotected, since
otherwise theplaywright couldprevent the use ofhis ideas to which, apartfrom their expression,
hisproperty is never extended45.
A similar attempt was made in Plix Products Ptd v Prank M Winstone 46to draw the
boundary between ideas and their expression and in so doing tries to tease out
distinctions between different types of ideas:
43101 US 99 (1879).
44 Laddie Prescott and Vitoria ibid para 2.79.
45 Nicols v Universal Pictures Co 45 F 2d 119 at 121 (1930) per Judge Learned Hand. This last has strong
parallels with the test that was applied in the first major case in the UK which was called upon to determine
whether there had been infringement of the copyright in a computer program: there was talk of 'levels of
abstraction' and the need to get to the kernel ofwhat was protected by copyright, abstracting from and
filtering out what was not protected nor protectable. John Richardson Computers v Flanders [1993] FSR 497.
46 [1986] FSR63.
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There are infact two kinds of 'ideas' involved in the making ofany work which is susceptible of
being the subject ofcopyright. In thefirstplace there is the general idea or basic concept ofthe
work. This idea isformed (or implanted) in the mind of the author. He sets out to write a
poem or a novel about unrequited love or to draw a dog listening to a gramophone... Then there
is a secondphase - a kind of 'idea'. The author ofthe work will scarcely be able to transform
the basic concept into a concreteform - i.e. 'express' the idea - withoutfurnishing it with details
oform and shape. The novelist will think ofcharacters, dialogue, details ofplot and soforth.
All these modes ofexpression have theirgenesis in the author's mind - these too are 'ideas'.
When these ideas ... are reduced to concreteform, theforms they take are where the copyright
resides47'.
Thus the first kind of idea, which is abstract and unformed, forms the kernel of what will
come later. The second kind of idea is when the author starts to add detail to the general
or abstract idea. These, when only in the mind of the author, are not protected. Once
expressed, then copyright protection will attach to the work.
In Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams Textiles Ltd48 Lord Hoffmann also attempted to
define ideas. On the one hand he said that: 'copyright work may express certain ideas which are
notprotected because they have no connection with the literary, dramatic, musical or artistic nature ofthe
work'. He went on to give the example of an inventive concept expressed in a literary
work which others (in the absence of patent protection) would be free to express in
works of their own. The second proposition he made was that: 'certain ideas. might not
beprotected because they are not original, or so commonplace as not to form a substantialpart ofthe
work!. It is particularly in this last sentence that the inter-twining of the three concepts -
originality, substantial part and ideas-expression dichotomy - becomes apparent.
Merging the above analyses, three types of ideas in creative works become apparent. The
first focuses on the level of abstraction in a work: the more abstract, the more likely it is
to be an idea, rather than the expression of an idea. The second, drawn from Lord
Hoffmann in Designers Guild, is where ideas are those which have no connection with the
underlying work itself; and the third, also drawn from Designers Guild, is that unprotected
'ideas' are those which are commonplace. In each case, if it is only the idea that is taken
from the existing work, there is no infringement of copyright.
It has to be said that the above analysis does serve to demonstrate that the boundaries
between originality, a substantial part, and the ideas-expression dichotomy are not clear.
47 At p 93. Less helpful are the comments of Lord Hailsham in LB Plastics Ltd v Swish Products Ltd [1979]
RPC 551 at 629 who merely stated that: 'it is trite law that there is no copyright in ideas'.
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That holds true, not only when attempting to define the demarcation lines between the
three concepts, but also when determining clearly whether they will operate either to
deny copyright protection, or whether it will be found that a second work infringes (or
does not infringe) a first. Nonetheless, between them they represent important
limitations on the property rights of current owners in existing works, as well as leaving
some elements unprotectable. All the theories discussed in chapter 2 support this
limitation of the property right. Given the extent to which one work merges into
another in practice, it might be concluded that it is hard to support the current breadth
of the property right in creative works. Nonetheless, because the property right is
limited, so the public domain is enriched. As authorship is the transformation and
recombination of old ideas into new, using as building blocks what others have done in
the past, so the use of at least some parts of existing works in the creation of new is
possible49.
Neither the WCT nor the Nil Paper contain measures that would affect these standards
as such at international, or national level. However, UCITA and the Database Directive
in particular, together with some parts of the Copyright Directive, may have an impact.
The central issues revolve around how the doctrines will operate in conjunction with
digital fences, access controls, and contractual limitations.
2. Originality, insubstantial elements, ideas and digitisation
Drawing on the analysis above, and turning first to the act of digitisation of works
protected by copyright, it has been suggested that the act of digitisationper se should not
result in a new copyright subsisting in the digitised work. Copyright may subsist in
material added to that work for digitisation, but nonetheless, those parts of the public
domain which can be used by the would-be author would still be available not only in
relation to the original work, but also in relation to the amendments. Thus, when a work
is digitised and disseminated over the Internet, the would-be author should be in no
worse a position in relation to the ability to re-use ideas, insubstantial parts and
unoriginal elements of these works for authorship. However, there may be more serious
consequences for the would-be author when these elements of the public domain
48 ibid
49 Litman, Copyright asMyth 1991, University of Pittsburg Law Review Vol. 53 p235.
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interact with the provisions of the Database Directive in conjunction with contract and
digital fences.
2.1 Originality, insubstantial elements, ideas, the Database Directive
and UCITA
As discussed, copyright protection does not extend to facts, or data, or unoriginal
insubstantial parts of works, or to lists of single words. However, both the Database
Directive in the EU and UCITA in the US affect the protection of these materials. Both
cover unoriginal material. A database includes: 'a collection ofindependent works, data or other
materials arranged in a systematic ormethodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other
means"". UCITA permits licensors to licence: 'data text images sounds mask works or computer
programs including collections and compilations ofthem'. In neither case is it necessary for the
information, or data, or other elements, to be original. Therefore unoriginal works, not
subject to protection by copyright, may be incorporated into a database in the EU, or
licensed under the terms of UCITA. These unoriginal works may therefore, if
disseminated over the Internet, not fall freely into the public domain. This could include
such information as listings of names and addresses, compilations of historical facts, raw
scientific data, and much more. Now it certainly is the case that the incorporation of this
data into a database disseminated over the Internet will not render it exclusive in many
cases. In other words, it can still be obtained elsewhere. For example, the database
maker who wants to compile a list of names and addresses of practising solicitors can
obtain that information from sources other than a database compiled by a competitor
company. However, unless the maker of the original database is wilting to license the
information (at a price), perhaps the only way it could be obtained without infringing the
database right in the existing database is for the would-be database maker to visit each
existing solicitors' practice that she wished to include in the new directory.
The following scenario might help to illustrate the point. There are currently two
existing publications containing just such information about solicitors enrolled in
Scotland: the Blue Book and the White Book51. The publishers of the White Book
could not update the information it contains by extracting and re-utilising information
50 Database Directive Article 1.2. CDPA s 3A.
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contained in the Blue Book as that would infringe the maker's database right52. Equally,
the publishers of the White Book could not consult a telephone directory and extract and
re-utilise a substantial part of the contents from there, as that would infringe the rights of
the maker of the telephone directory. In addition, the publishers of the White Book
could not extract and re-utilise the contents of the database of solicitors maintained by
the Law Society of Scotland as that would infringe the Law Society's rights in their
database. This is so despite the fact that neither the makers of the telephone directory
nor the Law Society are in direct competition with the publishers of the White Book. So
the would-be compiler is left travelling around the country-side, knocking on doors. An
example of how this could work in practice in a non-competing business is provided by
British Horseracing Board Ltd v WilliamHill Organisation Umitsa63, discussed in chapter 2.
There, the information about the racehorse industry was supplied to the British
Horseracing Board by the participants in the industry. Extraction and re-utilisation of a
substantial part of the contents by William Hill Organisation amounted to an
infringement of the database right belonging to the British Horseracing Board. If
William Llill wanted to collate its own data, it would have to have sought returns to be
made to them by the participants in the industry, or to physically collate it.
In the US, information might be licensed under the UCITA framework. UCITA, it
would appear, does not provide any restrictions on the size or portion of information
that may be licensed. Presumably, therefore, one fact, one title, one image, may all be
subject to being controlled by licensing terms. This has implications, not only for the
originality limitation on the copyright monopoly, but also for the rule that taking of
insubstantial portions of a work does not infringe. Paradoxically, licensing unoriginal
information under UCITA would appear to give more control over that information
than copyright gives to original works.
It appears that some of the concerns voiced by those critics opposed to the introduction
of legislation to protect databases in the US may come to fruition under UCITA. One of
the particular problems articulated was the way in which legal protection for the contents
of a database might inhibit extraction of raw data for the purposes of further research. If
51 These have historically been compiled by separate publishers, Butterworths and T&T Clark. However,
T&T Clark has recently been taken over by Butterworths, so it is likely that there will be only one
publication in the future.
52 For a discussion on what the compilers of a competing directory of solicitors could not do under the law
of copyright see Waterlow Directories Limited v. Reed Information Services Limited [1992] F.S.R. 409 Ch D.
196
a right is granted in the information compiled in a database, and controls are placed on
both access to and re-use of that information, so an intermediary can control access, and
require payment for further reproduction and use of that data54. The preference in the
US, from the academic community, researchers and users alike, is to have an approach
based on misappropriation rather than property. Only acts which cause 'substantial harm
to the actual or neighbouring market' of database proprietors would be impermissible55.
Those working in the educational, scientific and non-profit fields (including libraries)
would be able to extract and use the contents of a database56, and would only be liable to
the proprietor if they in fact simply sought to avoid paying for the use of the database, or
otherwise used the contents to create a competing product57. This approach is illustrated
in the discussion above concerning the compilation of a directory of solicitors. The
compiler of the White Book could not, in the UK, use existing databases such as the
telephone directory and that held by the Law Society, to update its own product, even
though it would not be in a market that was competing with those products. For the US
(as in the EU) in the absence of an approach based on misappropriation, and with
UCITA, it would appear that the concerns of the academic commentators may become a
reality.
So unoriginal works, facts and data may be incorporated into an electronic database.
However, within the EU, the maker of a database may not prevent the lawful extraction
and re-utilisation of an insubstantial part of that database, which would include the
unoriginal facts and data used for authorship. At first sight it may appear that in relation
to this right, would-be authors in the EU are in a better position than their brethren in
the US58. However, problems do arise. The first is that the right of extraction and re-
utilisation of insubstantial parts only applies to databases which have been 'made available
to thepublic'. This immediately raises the question as to when a database has been so
made available. The same tensions are apparent as those discussed in relation to
questions over publication and confidentiality discussed in chapter 4. If a database is
53 [2001] EWCA Civ 1268; 24059 2001 WL 825162.
54 For an analysis of the EU Database Directive and discussion as to the competing US proposals see
Reichman and Uhhr, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and
Technology 1999, 14 Berkeley Technology Lawjournal 793.
55 Hatch Database Discussion Draft HR 2281 Draft of October 5, 1998 sl302.
56 ibid si304.
57 ibid sl304(a).
58 Database Directive Article 8.
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placed on a server, has that been made available to the public? Or is it still confidential
until such time as the would-be author accesses it?
In accessing the database, the would-be author may be required to agree to contractual
terms governing use of the contents. Although the Copyright Directive does not
explicidy refer to insubstantial parts of works, nor to the rule to be found in the
Database Directive which allows the extraction of insubstantial parts, it is clearly
recognised that databases will be made available to the public 'on agreed contractual terms59.
It would appear that this might apply to a term limiting any extraction or re-utilisation of
the contents of a database, however insubstantial, and which incorporates unoriginal
parts. Such a term might state: 'Reproduction, copying or extracting by any means ofthe whole or
parts ofthispublication [database] must not be undertaken without theprior written permission ofthe
publishers60This would appear to limit the extraction of insubstantial parts, whether
measured qualitatively or quantitatively, no matter the substantive content of that
insubstantial part. Thus the limitations on the property right disappear in relation to
digital dissemination, and right holders are able to control (protect) use of the contents
of the database, no matter the quantity extracted. However, there is perhaps a way
around this rather surprising result. As discussed in the last chapter, it would appear that
Article 6(4) paragraph 4 of the Copyright Directive, allowing a maker to limit by contract
certain fair dealing limitations to be found in the that Directive, only applies to those to
which the powers of the 'digital property trust' (discussed in the last chapter) would
apply. An example is fair dealing for the purposes of illustration for teaching, among
others. What it does not appear to apply to is other limitations, such as the extraction of
an insubstantial part of the contents of a database or an insubstantial part of a work
protected by copyright. Thus, in line with the provisions in the Database Directive,
where a database has been made available to the public, a lawful user may not be
prevented from extracting and re-utilising an insubstantial part61. Quite how this
interacts with that provision which would appear to allow the fair dealing limitation for
the purposes of illustration for teaching to be narrowed by contract, is far from clear. If
59 Copyright Directive Article 6.4 para 4.
60 Statement in Intellectual Property lawyer 2000 CCH New Law.
61 Database Directive Article 8.1. The implementing regulations in the UK The Copyright and Rights in
Databases Regulations 1997 Article 19 provides that 'A lawful user ofa database which has been made available to
thepublic in ay manner shall be entitled to extract or re-utilise insubstantialparts ofthe contents ofthe databasefor any
purpose'. A lawful user is defined as 'any person who (whether under a licence to do any ofthe acts restricted by any
database right in the database or otherwise) has a right to use the database'. The reference to 'whether under a licence....or
otherwise' suggests that a person who does not have a licence to extract contents of the database still has the
right to extract insubstantial parts.
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however, the reasoning is correct - that it is not possible to limit by contract the
extraction of an insubstantial amount of the database or of the works protected by
copyright - then it would be useful if a clear legislative provision could be incorporated at
the time of implementing the Copyright Directive into domestic law.
On a practical level, some may argue that contractual restrictions on use (if valid) do not
matter. Once access to a database has been gained, then insubstantial parts may be
extracted, no matter the terms of the agreement by which access to the contents of that
database were gained. But if these terms are found ultimately to be enforceable, such an
attitude is to invite would-be authors to flout the agreement into which they had entered.
That is not a comfortable position to be in. The possibility of introducing measures
controlling contract terms that could be used in conjunction with digital dissemination,
and which might avoid this conclusion are canvassed in chapter 9.
Other questions arise over the extraction of insubstantial parts. The technology that
guards the work may prevent physical copies being made. For instance, the print
function may be disabled, as may the technology which allows parts of works to be cut
from one and pasted into another. Thus, it would not be possible to make a direct copy
of an insubstantial part of a work, or contents of a database. Certainly that would not
prevent a would-be author from making manual copies, or taking photographs of a
screen image, or taping music on to a stand-alone recorder. But it is strange that authors
might be forced to work in such ways, especially when compared with the technological
advances inherent in the Internet. In addition, if such restraints are adopted through the
use of technology, so in reality the would-be author is prevented from extracting public
domain elements from the digitised work, that is, to accept that working practices are
driven by right holders. Further, and to the extent that these technological measures
become used routinely in association with digital dissemination of creative works, it is to
accept that in practice the limits dictated by copyright and database policy are determined
by right holders, rather than decided by society through democratic processes
The operation of all three doctrines, to the extent that they are carried through to the
digital era, depend on gaining access to the underlying work. This returns the debate to
the central question of access to a work protected by a digital fence. How access to
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works can be effected: who can access any particular work; and how much that access
will cost. These questions will be considered in chapter 9.
3. Summary
The limitations on the copyright monopoly apparent in the terrestrial world nurtured
through originality, the ideas-expression doctrine, and insubstantial takings, do mean that
information, parts ofworks, and ideas encompassed in works created by past and current
authors, fall into the public domain. Mediating between rights in this way has sustained a
thriving cultural and informational society. However, on the Internet, the ways in which
these will be expressed may change quite radically. Not only can unoriginal information
and parts ofworks be protected by digital fences, but contract conditions may limit use
of insubstantial parts of works and unprotected material. The gates would appear to be





The subject of this chapter is the term of protection of copyright which relates to the
length of time for which a work is protected. When discussing the public domain, it is
the expiry of copyright protection due to the passage of time that most commentators
will consider. Once that term has expired, the whole of the work is thereafter free for
third parties, including the author, to use as they will. New works can be copied and
adapted from the first: for example, a new edition of a novel can be printed, or a film
can be based on that novel, or a photocopy taken of a painting. The heirs of the author
of the work which has fallen into the public domain have no right to prevent a third
party from making a direct copy of the work, nor any adaptation. No royalties need to
be paid for the use of the work. Having works fall into the public domain is thus vital
for authorship, but perhaps for different reasons from those discussed for other parts of
the public domain. Those parts discussed in the previous chapters are more immediate,
and can contribute to keeping debate, discussion and knowledge current. A work that is
published today can be reviewed and criticised immediately, insubstantial parts of and the
ideas encompassed in the work taken without delay, and re-used in other works
tomorrow. Works in which copyright protection has expired, and which are then re-used
and transformed, tend to be those works which are enduringly popular, whether they be
literary, artistic, musical or dramatic works. Because no royalties need be paid to the
author, they can be circulated freely and cheaply, worked and reworked, and may find a
wider or different audience. Authors who re-work material in this way may have a new,
or revived copyright in part of what they produce. For instance, a publisher who prints a
book will, in the UK, have copyright in the typographical arrangement of that book1.
The investment made in keeping the work in circulation is protected. But that would not
prevent any other publisher from reproducing the same work2.
1 CDPA s 8(1).
2 For instance, the producer and director of a film adapted from one of Shakespeare's plays, such as
Romeo and Juliet, will have copyright in that film. But again, that would not prevent another producer and
director making another film based on the same play.
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The term for which creative works are protected has always been limited, in the sense of
being for a fixed period, but long. The period of protection has been justified because of
the limited scope of the rights granted in a creative work, including those limitations
discussed in previous chapters. However, the period at which that term has been set is
neither dictated by any of the theories underlying copyright, nor cast in stone. Rather it
is a product of debate and negotiation. The Berne Convention provides that the term of
protection shall be a minimum of the life of the author plus fifty years3. This was the
term of protection in the UK until 1995 when, as a result of the EC directive
harmonising the term of copyright protection throughout Europe4, the term was
extended for literary dramatic musical and artistic works5, and films6, to the life of the
author plus seventy years. For sound recordings, broadcasts and cable programmes, the
term extends to fifty years after the date in which the broadcast cable programme or
sound recording was made or released7. Fifty years was also the term in the US until 1998
when the U.S. Copyright Term Extension Act8 extended protection to the life of the
author plus seventy years.
Each time the period of protection has been extended, there have been arguments both for
and against such an extension9. The most recent debate in Europe was no exception10. In
this round, three formal arguments were given for extending the term. The first was that
the original time scale for protection being the life of author plus fifty years, found in the
Berne Convention, was designed to cover two generations of the author's descendants.
However, because authors now live for longer, so this should be increased to seventy years.
The second related to die perceived need to harmonise copyright 'at a high level ojprotection"
which would 'ensure the maintenance and development ofcreativity in the interests ofauthors, cultural
industries, consumers and society as a whole'. Third, there was the view that there should be 'a
3 Berne Convention Article 7(1) applied by virtue to Article 9 of the TRIPS agreement to TRIPS signatory
states.
4 Council Directive (EEC) 93/98 of 29 October 1993 Harmonising the term of Protection of Copyright
and Certain Related Rights. Phil Collins v IMTRATHandelsGmbH [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 773.
5 CDPA si2(1).
6 CDPA sl3B.
7 CDPA ssl3A and 14.
8 The extension of the term was challenged in Eldred v Reno US Court ofAppeals District of Columbia
February 16, 2001 Case No. 99-5430 in part on the basis that the extension was unconstitutional. The
challenge failed. The documents can be viewed at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/ .
l; See the discussion in chapter 1 of this study for some of the views that have been expressed over the
years.
10 Cornish, IntellectualProperty para 9.54 - 9.55.
Dawson, Copyright in the European Union - Plundering the Public Domain 1994, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly
Vol 45 No 2,193.
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legal environment conducive to the harmonious development of literary and artistic creation in the
Community'. In other words, any disparities in the length of protection between Member
States should be ironed out.
The longer the term of protection becomes, the more akin copyright becomes to a
perpetual property right. Yet few works are of such enduring market value to attract a
financial return for even as much as five years, let alone for seventy years after the death of
the author11. Many intermediaries base their revenue predictions on a short term,
sometimes no longer than five years. In addition, the longer the term is, and the more
descendants there are from the audior, tire more difficult, and expensive it can be to find
out who owns the copyright in a particular work, and who therefore needs to be contacted
for permission to use that work, or substantial parts of it in creating new works.
'...Should the author's rights be divided, to infinity, among all his heirs?. . . How shall one
unite so many divers consents, when it may be necessary to treat? Who will undertake tofind so
many scattered individuals, to regulate their respective interests, and to bring their different wills
to agree?. . . When the habitual course ofhuman transactions shall have brought a work into
the hands ofspeculators, and concentrated all the copies ofit in theirpossession, . . . [n]ot only
will it become lawfulfor the avarice ofevery heir toparalyse the circulation ofa work; not only
may his avidity retard orpromote itspropagation; but everypowefulparty everyjealous
government, every rival author, every speculation ofcompetition, will have thepower, by the aid
ofa little money, to destroy it entirely. . . . The works ofgenius will no longer belong to
humanity; they will become mere merchandise, to be quoted on the exchange "2.
Paradoxically, the longer the term of protection, the more difficult it may be for those
intermediaries whose livelihoods depend on re-packaging existing works, to do just that.
With the maturing of the copyright industry, those who exploit rights have historically
been able to obtain assignations of the copyright in the works in question from the
author. Thus, once the author dies, they can continue to re-use the rights and are not
dependant on seeking consent from 'many scattered individual?. If, in the future, authors
manage to retain some control over ownership of copyright, so this might swing the tide
of right holders' opinion towards a shorter period of protection13.
11 Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study ofCopyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs 1970,
84 Harv L Rev 281.
12 Ou, Prom Wheaton v. Peters to Eldred v. Reno: An Originalist Interpretation of the Copyright Clause at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/OuEldred.pdfwhich footnotes this statement ofAugustin-
Charles Renouard, in Theory ofthe Rights ofAuthors (8,1839).
13 A recent case decided in the US may have just this effect. In New York Times Co v Tasini (00-201) the
Supreme Court ruled that a group of newspaper and magazine publishers infringed the copyright of
freelance contributors by making their articles accessible without permission in electronic databases after
publication. The case turned on the interpretation of Title 17 USC s 201(c) which provides that: 'Copyright
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1.2 Term of protection for databases
Copyright protection may be Limited for creative works, but it is possible that the
database right in the EU could be perpetual. The database right lasts until the end of the
period of fifteen years from the end of the year in which the database was completed14,
or fifteen years from the point at which it was made available to the public15. However,
where there have been substantial changes to the database, including those resulting from
the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, and which require
substantial new investment, then that is to be considered as a new database and qualify
for its own protection.16 Thus, a regularly updated web site is likely to go on attracting
database protection for as long as that updating continues plus fifteen years. This
extension in the term is not then limited to those parts that are updated. Thus, unless a
web site is no longer updated, no part of the contents will fall into the public domain,
except possibly those insubstantial parts that can be extracted by a lawful user.17
UCITA too seems to suggest that it might be possible to obtain an unlimited period of
protection for creative and uncreative works. Given that UCITA permits the licensing of
inter alia creative works, non-creative works and data, there appears no reason (and
nothing in UCITA would suggest otherwise) why licensing of the content of any
particular database should not just go on and on. The period may be limited, depending
on the business model preferred by the right holder. For instance, access can be gained
in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinctfrom copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially
in the author ofthe contribution. In the absence ofan express transfer ofthe copyright or ofany rights under it, the owner of
copyright in the collective work ispresumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution
aspart ofthatparticular collective work, any revision ofthat collective work, and any later collective work in the same series'.
The court found that this section did not authorise the copying in question in the case because the
databases in which the articles were held, reproduced and distributed the articles standing alone, and not in
their original context. Thus, if the publishers wanted to licence others to reproduce the articles, they had
first to seek permission from the authors. The fact that the publishers argued that if the case was decided in
favour of the authors this would have devastating consequences for the dissemination of digital works by
punchinggaping holes in the electronic record ofhistorf had no bearing on the question to be decided. 'Speculation
aboutfuture harms is no basisfor this Court to shrink authorial rights created by Congresd. New contracts with
freelance authors allow for digitisation and incorporation into databases. However, older contracts which
did not contain this provision are affected. If the copyright period had been shorter, then the publishers
may not have had to seek permission from the countless authors who contributed articles to their
publications. As a result of this case a number of electronic newspapers will apparently remove large parts
of their archived material from their electronic databases.
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/26/technology/26BIZC.html.
14 Database Directive Article 10 Database Regulations 17.
15 Database Directive Article 10(2) Database Regulations 17(2).
16 Database Directive Article 10(3) Database Regulations 17(3).
17 But see the discussion in chapter 7 of this study.
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to a particular database for a defined time. But this could be subject to rolling contracts -
year on year, decade on decade.
1.3 Term of protection and digitisation
The Internet heralds a remarkable opportunity to make available works on which the
term of copyright protection has expired. Works which might languish forgotten in
libraries, or popular works which are still read, enjoyed by millions, and from which
inspiration and expression can be gleaned, could relatively quickly, cheaply and easily be
made available to those millions in digitised form. There are a number of examples of
such collections on the Internet, accessible for free, and from which surfers and authors
may take what they want for many purposes. One example is The Perseus Project18
which illustrates the possibilities of linking source material in ancient languages,
translations and commentary. The goal of this project is 'to bring a wide range ofsource
materials to as large an audience aspossible'. The compilers of the web site state that they
'anticipate thatgreater accessibility to the sourcesfor the study of the humanities will strengthen the
quality ofquestions, lead to new avenues ofresearch, and connect more people through the connection of
ideas'. Another example is the Valley of the Shadows, at the University ofVirginia which
details the American Civil War using works and information drawn from a wide variety
of sources19.
However, it may also be that the same act of digitisation which makes these works in the
public domain available over the Internet also results in the commencement of a new
period of copyright. Many of the arguments relevant to an extension of the term of
protection in this manner are the same as those used in the last chapter when looking at
the overlap between originality, substantiality and ideas. There it was suggested that the
act of digitisation itself would not confer sufficient originality on the digitised work to
qualify for its own copyright protection. It has also, however, been argued that the act of
digitisation is, in itself, sufficient to meet the test of originality, and thus for copyright
protection. This is particularly so in where the underlying work that is being digitised is
itself in the public domain because the original term of copyright protection has expired.
18 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
19 http://jefferson.village.virginia.edu/vshadow2/. The materials on the site are made available under the
following conditions: These materials have been made availablefor use in research, teaching, andprivate study. You may
reproduce (print, make photocopies, or download) materialsfrom this websitefor these purposes withoutpriorpermission on the
condition thatyouproperly cite the source in all copies'.
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What therefore is being argued by some is that digitisation extends the term of copyright
because that act is sufficient to start a new term of copyright. In other words, the
concern of the previous chapter has been, in part, to ascertain when a new work has
been created from an existing one. With digitisation and the term of protection what is
produced is not a new work as such, but a faithful representation of an existing one.
This view, that digitisation of existing creative works is sufficient for protection by
copyright, is illustrated by the position taken by the owners of a large repository of
pictures made available over the Internet: the Bettman Corbis archives in the US20.
These archives include more than 16 million images from a variety of sources, some of
which are in the public domain because of the date of death of the author, others of
which are still protected by copyright. The original archive is in private ownership, and
not accessible to the public. The owners of the archive have digitised many of these
images. They are now available over the Internet on the Bettman Corbis website. The
owners of this web site claim that all of the images, whether the originals are in the
public domain or not, are protected by copyright in the digital file that has been created
to transform the original image into a form necessary for transmission over the Internet.
Many of the old original photographs were apparently in a poor physical condition.
Therefore substantial authorship may have been required to enhance the quality of the
underlying image in the digital file. Other images, in better condition, required creative
decisions to be made to make them suitable for digital distribution. Colours may have
been changed, shadows removed, or enhanced and so on21. Therefore, the argument
goes, a new copyright subsists in the digital image, or at least those parts of the image on
which this substantial authorship has been expended22.
But, can, or indeed should such 'digital remastering' qualify for protection by copyright
for those underlying images on which the term of copyright protection has expired?
What is in essence being done is to reproduce an existing work, and make it into a form
that is suitable for transmission over the Internet. A number of cases considered in the
last chapter have a bearing on this matter. A further case of note is the US case of
20 http://www.corbis.com.
21 It has been noted in chapter 1 of this study that there are differences between the law of the EU and the
US on the subject of databases. This example is used to illustrate the arguments taken by the compilers of
the database to assert rights over materials in the public domain.
22 These statements were made by Dave Green Corporate Counsel Corbis Corporation on the cni-
copyright@cni.org discussion list on 11/01/00.
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Bridgeman Art Ljbrary hid v Corel Corporation22'. This case concerned photographs taken by
Bridgeman Art Library of works and pictures within its collection. Many of these were in
the public domain as copyright protection had expired. Corel Corporation copied these
photographs and reproduced them on various items for sale to the public. Bridgeman
sued for infringement of copyright. The court found that the photographs taken by
Bridgeman lacked the creative spark necessary for the subsistence of copyright.
Therefore there was no infringement by Corel. The case has been the subject of
criticism from a number of quarters, possibly as a result of the implications that it could
have for those whose business is built around an activity akin to that undertaken by
Bridgeman, such as museum shops and galleries selhng copies of works of art on which
copyright has expired24. Others have applauded the case, on the basis that it is not
possible to extend the term of copyright, claiming a new copyright on top of one that
may have expired25. For authorship the result could be important as it would leave
copies of these works free to be re-used, particularly so when the original work is
inaccessible.
Perhaps one of the important points to be taken from the case was that the photographs
taken by Bridgeman were intended to look as much like the original as possible. In other
words, they were intended faithfully to reproduce the underlying original work of art.
This is, in essence, exactly what the owners of the Bridgeman/Corel archive seek to do:
produce slavish reproductions of original images which are in the public domain, albeit
with alterations to make them suited to the digital environment.
A case which suggests that UK law might differ on this point is Antique.sportfoho. compic v
Fitch2(\ This case concerned the preparation of a website by Fitch for
Antiquesportfoho.com for the purposes of selling antiques over the Internet. In the
design of the website, as well as in promotional material, Fitch used copies of
photographs of antiques found in an existing publication. Some of these were copied
directly; in other cases, Fitch had traced the antiques from the photograph. The court
23 BridgemanArt Libraiy Ltd v Corel Corporation 36 F Supp 2d 191 and 25 F Supp 2d 421 (SDNY) 1998. In
this case, the court held that UK law applied to determine the question of originality. However, the case
was reopened shortly afterwards whereupon the court applied US law to determine this question. US
District Court southern District ofNew York February 18 1999. The conclusion was the same. The
photographs lacked the creative spark necessary for the subsistence of copyright. For a criticism of the
decision see Garnett 'Copyright in Photographs' [2000] EIPR 229.
24 ibid.
25 Deazley, Photographing Paintings in the Public Domain: A Response to Garnett [2001] EIPR 179.
26 Antiquesportfolio.compic v Rodney Pitch and Co Ltd [2001] FSR 23.
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found that copyright did subsist in the photographs of the antiques, albeit that the
creative spark needed to take the photograph was low. Therefore, reproduction of these
on the website infringed. However, where Fitch had traced the underlying items
displayed in the photographs, the court found that these reproductions did not infringe
copyright because those parts of the photograph that contributed to originality (and thus
to protection by copyright) which included the lighting, angle and focus27, were not
carried through into the drawing.
The conclusion reached in this case sits quite happily with the comments made by Lord
Oliver in Interlego v Tyco (ibid) who stated that: 'no one would reasonably contend that the copy
painting or enlargement was an "original" artistic work in which the copier is entitled to claim copyright'.
In yintiquesportfolio.com, the court recognised that where an underlying image is
reproduced, no matter the skill exerted by the copyist, that does not qualify for copyright
protection. At the same time, the court recognised that photographs themselves do take
skill and effort to produce, albeit that the originality element may be low. Thus the
photographer is protected while at the same time, the underlying image is in the public
domain available for re-use by the author.
So what would be the effect of these cases on the claims by the Bettman Corbis archive
that the act of digitisation is sufficient to start a new period of copyright protection
running for those works in the public domain? Where it becomes important for the
would-be author is when the original images for which the term of copyright protection
has expired are not available from other sources, as is the case with many of the images
digitised by the Bettman Corbis archive. Bridgeman v Corelmight suggest that the claim
for copyright protection in the US would not be upheld: that the effect of the
digitisation was merely to produce a slavish copy of the original. Thus digitisation would
not lead to a new period of copyright protection. In the UK, as a result of
A.ntiquesportfolio.com v Fitch, that act of digitisation may well qualify for protection as a
result of the decisions needed to reproduce the underlying image to its best advantage:
expertise equivalent to decisions made in relation to lighting, angle and focus by the
photographer. If the reasoning is correct, conversion of any analogue works such as
digitally reproduced and re-mastered original analogue recordings, the conversion of
27 The court relied on Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 14th ed (1999) where those authors
considered that the requirement of originality may be satisfied 'by little more than the opportunisticpointing of the
camera andpressing ofthe shutter button 'at 3.104.
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films and perhaps even the conversion of text to digital form, could result in a new
period of protection by copyright commencing from the point of digitisation, at least in
the UK.
One possible argument might arise to prevent this conclusion. If digital re-mastering
could be equated with the work of those who restore old paintings, rather than with the
creative effort expended by photographers, then it might be possible to avoid the
conclusion that a new term of copyright protection commences. As far as this writer is
aware, no-one has yet suggested that the work involved in the restoration of a painting
should result in a new period of copyright protecting either the fully restored painting,
nor indeed those parts so restored, despite the creative effort that is undoubtedly needed
for such work. If however the conversion of an analogue work to digital form is
considered as resulting in a derivative work, then, in the UK, there must be some
qualitative material alteration or embellishment before copyright can subsist in the
derivative work28. Copyright would be limited to that alteration or embellishment29. But
should what is in effect the use and manipulation of computer programs really qualify as
a derivative work? The ''qualitative material alteration' only applies to the need to make
alterations to make a work suitable for the new medium. That standard differs from the
expertise in relation to lighting, angle and focus employed by the photographer, and
could not be considered to be a qualitative change to the original work.
Suffice it to say that the arguments have not as yet been aired in a court of law.
However, if the proponents are successful in arguing for digital re-mastering to qualify
for copyright protection, then the period of protection of existing works, especially those
that are at or are near their original term will be greatly increased. Where those works are
available other than in digital form, then the Internet as a means of distribution will give
the author no benefits. Where however the originals of those works are locked away in
vaults (such as in the Bettmann Corbis Archives), the digital age may be disadvantageous.
1.4 Term of protection and digital fences
A work on which the term of protection has expired may be incorporated into a web site
on which there are access controls in the form of a digital fence. This digital fence will
28 lnterlegoAG v Tyco Industries Inc [1989] AC 217.
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be protected against both the act of circumvention and the distribution of devices
designed to overcome the digital fence30, whether the work is protected by copyright or
database right or not. Therefore, although the work lies in the public domain, the web
site owner may control access to that work. On this inaccessibility, the comments of the
makers of the Bettman Corbis archive are instructive, and represent a view that may be
taken by others:
'Corbis does not intend to restrict individualsfrom lawfully reproducing copies ofpublic domain
material acquiredfrom other sources'.
In some cases, copies of works may be available from other sources, libraries and
museums being obvious examples. However, in other cases, the web site may be the
only place where the work is available. In this case, the maker of the database may be in
a monopoly position in the supply of that particular work31.
1.5 Term of protection and licensing
Even if digitisation does not start a new term of copyright protection running, the maker
of a database in the EU who compiles a website containing copies of works in the public
domain will have the database right in those contents, and could restrict a would-be
author from extracting or re-utilising substantial parts of that database32. The fair dealing
provisions, to the extent that they remain, may be subject to contractual restrictions, or,
if the contents are not protected by copyright may not apply at all33. Therefore, even if
copyright protection has expired, it may be that the rules surrounding re-use are even
more limited than if they were still under protection.
2. Summary
Since copyright was first placed on a statutory footing, battles have been fought over the
length of time for which protection should be accorded to a creative work. These
contests are far from over. It would appear that the way the legislation is developing for
29 Warwick Films v Eisinger [1969] 1 Ch 508.
30 For discussion, see chapter 4 of this study.
31 It might be that compulsory licensing may be required through the application of competition law. RTE
v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR 1-743. For a further discussion on the potential application of
competition law see chapter 9 of this study.
32See the discussion in chapter 7 of this study.
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the protection of creative works over the Internet, many works may never fall fully and
freely into the public domain. If the term of protection has expired in the terrestrial
world, then the act of digitisation may start a new period of copyright running. Even if
that argument is not accepted, those works which are in the public domain can be
incorporated into the database right of the website maker in the EU, and may be the
subject of licensing restrictions under UCITA. Controls on access could mean that the
works are inaccessible, subject to payment for access, and have licensing terms attached.
For authors, this may mean that it will be difficult to re-work popular works, especially
where the originals or copies are not available from other sources.
The copyright term has, historically, been justified pardy because of the other limitations
to be found on the property right. But those limitations, as discussed over the last
chapters, may not work in the same way in relation to works disseminated over the
Internet as compared with those disseminated in the terrestrial world. In all cases, the
control that can be exercised by the copyright owner is increased quite considerably.
Such a conclusion might suggest that the term of protection should be reduced,
particularly for works disseminated over the Internet, rather than increased. However,
such a solution is perhaps unlikely, as many may consider that such a move may amount
to expropriation of private property and thus contrary to the European Convention on
Human Rights34. But without such a balance, it appears that copyright owners may be
able to exercise lengthy and unlimited monopoly rights in creative works.
Although it is impossible to predict exactly what the public domain will look like in
relation to works disseminated over the Internet in the coming years, it seems inevitable
that it will differ significantly from what it looks like in relation to hard copy works.
Copyright owners will have the rights, and the technology, to exert control over each
dissemination and each use of those works. Each part may be limited (or expanded in
the case ofworks on which the term of copyright has expired) by technology and by
contract. Copyright owners may require payment for each access and use. Equally, they
may target some markets for some works, and exclude others. Authors creating the next
33 See the discussion on fair dealing in chapter 6 of this study.
34 The first Protocol to Article 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms states: "Every natural or legalperson is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment ofhispossessions. No one shall be
deprived ofhispossessions except in thepublic interest and subject to the conditionsprovidedfor by law and by thegeneral
principles ofinternational law'.
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generation of works may have to change habits significantly in order to adjust to the
dissemination of digital works. Permission, payments, and restrictions may become a
feature ofworking practice, with the spectre of civil, and possibly criminal sanctions in
the event of failure to comply.
Copyright owners and current authors might rest assured that works will remain within
their control. But the moves are perhaps, short sighted. The authors and content
providers of today may also be the authors and content providers of tomorrow. There
may be a small minority who consider that we have reached a peak in terms of creation,
and future works should simply consist in repackaging what exists today. But for the
majority who believe in progress, and the vital contribution of the public domain to that
progress, would do well to consider how the public domain can be nurtured on the
Internet, for the sake of future generations.
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Chapter 9
The public domain on the Internet
1. Introduction
In the discussion concerning Napster in chapter 2, it was suggested that if works are
disseminated over the Internet with no controls, then the complex rules surrounding
jurisdiction, choice of law and appropriate remedy facing a copyright or database owner
may serve, in practice, to deny an effective remedy for infringement of rights in those
works. As a result of these problems, a framework designed to control the flow of those
works has developed. This framework has as a core feature legal protection for digital
fences erected around the work. In addition, the recognition that works are protected,
no matter that they are divorced from the tangible copy in connection with which they
have historically been embodied, means that the contract by virtue ofwhich the digital
bits can be licensed attains increasing importance. As a result, it becomes possible for
the copyright owner to control access to works, and to license not only ever}' reproduction
but also every use of the underlying work. Users of those works, most notably would-be
authors, may find themselves subject to both civil and criminal penalties for any attempt
to circumvent the legal controls to gain access to, and use of, the whole or parts of those
works, including the parts traditionally associated with the public domain.
The effect of this framework is to change the traditional balance to be found in the law
of copyright between the current author, intermediary and the end user. Historically,
copyright has encouraged dissemination ofworks, in both the general public interest in
having works available, and the private economic interest of the author and intermediary.
In so doing, copyright protection has not extended to control over every part, or every
use of a work. Those parts which the copyright owner does not own, or over which the
copyright owner cannot exert control lie in the public domain, have been free for future
authors to use in the creation of new works. However, the new framework changes the
balance. The public domain is no longer 'free' in the traditional sense of the word.
Instead, to the extent that the public domain remains, both access and use is capable of
being licensed by the right holder. The question arises, is there still a public domain as
understood in the traditional sense? One current philosophy appears to be that all users
should pay a small bit for any use of any part of a work — hence the public domain is
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licensed. The alternative view is that the public domain ceases to exist. Rather all parts
of all works form part of the property right of the copyright owner. But this shift lacks a
theoretical basis. Even during the recent debates, the traditional theories of copyright
have been trumpeted by those who seek to exert greater control; but most of the
traditional theories embrace the public domain.
During the progress of the debate, there has been a war of both words and actions
between the intermediaries, who argue that every hard-won right is justified and essential,
and those who would seek to maintain the traditional balances, or to inject new balances
suitable for the digital era. Currently it would appear that the more the intermediary
seeks to assert control over a work, in particular by the use of digital fences, the faster
certain users of the Internet work to try and prove that these fences cannot prevent
access and dissemination. The result is a series ofmoves and counter-moves by each
party which ultimately benefits no-one.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss ways in which balance might be facilitated within the
framework that has developed, in particular how the public domain might evolve and
grow on the Internet. The first line of enquiry will concentrate on what is or should be
the role of copyright on the Internet. In chapter 1 the traditional justifications for the
law of copyright were analysed. However, other theories, that may be more applicable to
the distribution of works over the Internet, are emerging, and deserve consideration.
The second line of enquiry will consider the access issue: that by the use of digital
fences, intermediaries may control access to the underlying works. Three avenues will be
explored: the possible denial of access, that charges may be levied for that access, and
the interrelated question of the further diminishing of the elements of the public domain
by contract. Finally, in discussing the increasing practice of licensing use of the work,
possible regulatory controls will be canvassed.
2. What is the role for copyright?
The relationship between intellectualproperty rights and technology poses a very important
question: If laws are dependentfor their emergence and validation upon technological
innovations, might not succeeding innovations require that those very lawspass back out of
existence?
1 Palmer, IntellectualProperty: A Non-Posnerian haw and EconomicsApproach, 1989,12 Hamline Law Review 261
271-73.
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Three distinct means of regulating the distribution of creative works on the Internet have
emerged: copyright, contract and technological management systems. All three have
always existed together. Works protected by copyright are subject to contractual
licensing, and since the advent of technology whereby copies can easily be made, copy
control devices have been built into both software and hardware2. Exploitation has
traditionally been based on the premise that copyright is the standard from which the
others flow: copyright law provides the backdrop against which contracts have been
negotiated, and technical measures to control copying implemented. The latter two have
generally (although by no means always) followed the contours of the first. Now this is
changing, so that it is the technological measures that have the upper hand, followed by
contract, with copyright, incorporating all its public policy objectives, playing only a
minor role, to be used when works are released without authorisation of the right
holder3. The raw material necessary for the creation of new works will either disappear,
or to the extent they remain, be parcelled in the rights belonging to the copyright owners
as an item for trade4.
2.1 Justifications
The explanation for the change in emphasis of the role of the law of copyright is the
increase in property rights in creative materials granted to copyright owners5. The
justification is that first identified in the Nil Report and repeated in the Copyright
Directive: strong intellectual property rights are necessary for the distribution of works
over the Internet, and, in the final analysis, for the development of the Internet itself.
Historically, the grant of copyright has been justified because it encourages the
dissemination ofmore works. Around that justification, and the rights granted, the
2 Reidenberg, Governing Networks and "Rule Making in Cyberspace 1996, 45 Emory Law Journal 911. Digital
Audio Technology poses a threat to copyright. Therefore code is built in to the technologies to control
perfect unlimited copying. When a machine is used to copy a CD a serial number is recorded in the tape
machines memory. Ifmore copies are made than is permitted, so the quality deteriorates.
3 Copyright is about who controls information and informationflows Drahos, Don't Leave it to the experts. Financial
Times 8 March 2000.
4 Netanel, A. Perspective on Interpretation: TRIPS, The XFIPO Copyright Treaties and Freedom ofExpression
Fordham University School of Law Sixth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law
and Policy 16 and 17 April 1998.
5 Lemley, RomanticAuthorship and the Rhetoric ofProperty 1997, Texas Law Review 75 pp 873-906 criticises the
approach taken by Boyle in Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Taw and the Construction ofthe Information Society
Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1996. Boyle tries to justify copyright on the grounds of romantic
authorship. Lemley explains that this is not what actually happens. What happens is a growth in property
rights.
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publishing and entertainment industries have grown and thrived. But copyright was not
granted in works direcdy for the purpose of building cinemas, or developing
broadcasting or cable programme companies. These industries have grown on the back
of copyright, but have not been directly justified by the grant of copyright. The
justification for increasing property rights in creative works on the Internet has become
confused with the development of the medium through which they are disseminated.
The original policy objectives behind the grant of copyright have become subsumed in
the push by many governments to encourage their nationals to 'get on-line'.
As with those who protest at the growth of property rights in creative works, so there are
those who dissent from the wider drive to expand e-commerce. But the private sector
interest in the Internet leaps forward. The possible merging of a number of important
corporations such as AOL/Time Warner suggest that the market may soon be
dominated by a few large players6. There are also signs that music and book publishers
may be looking towards the Internet as their only method of distribution, at least for
some of their products. EMI have made some of their repertoire available only over the
Internet7. Time Warner has unveiled a new venture aimed at online publishing. Through
iPubhsh.com, Time Warner have said they will explore new avenues for the production,
distribution, and sale of fiction and non-fiction material, developed strictly for the Web8.
Other companies in the news and information industries are moving towards a more
fully based Internet environment, such as Encyclopaedia Britannica9 and Reuters10.
But this is part of a much wider debate as to the future direction of the Internet and the
role that it will play11, ofwhich its use as a means of distributing creative works,
information and knowledge is only a small, but significant part. On the one hand, the
6 The EU investigated this merger under its competition powers. Some were concerned at the control the
merged company might have over both access to, and content on the Internet, and lack of bandwidth for
competitors.
7 Financial Times, 30 July 2000.
8 Giants Set to Embrace Electronic Publishing. New York Times, 28 May 2000.




11 Drahos, Information Feudalism in the Information Society 1995, The Information Society lip 209. Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society 106 Yale Law Journal 283 (1996) analysing copyright law and policy in
terms of its democracy enhancing function: 'Copyright is in essence a state measure that uses market institutions to
enhance the democratic character ofsociety'. Shapiro, Who owns Cyberspace (& can they control it?): Street Corners in
Cyberspace. The Nation July 3, 1995 reprinted
http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/internet/whoowns/streetcorners.html. arguing that public spaces should
be available in Cyberspace for democratic dialogue.
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Internet has been hailed by many as holding out the possibility of information exchange,
and communication in which all can share: not only individuals, companies, and
Governments, but also the developed and less developed nations. In this, it is a many-
to-many means of communication, rather than the traditional one-to-one, or one-to-
many modes. But the strictures placed on information flows have, it is said, the potential
to divide the world into those who 'have', and those who 'have not'12: those who have
access to the information and ideas available and can afford to pay for them will increase
their stock of 'having', while those who can afford neither access in terms of the
equipment necessary, nor the charges for access, fall further behind13.
Some writers have attempted to stall the changes that have occurred. There has been the
debate, most particularly in the US, over preservation of the fair use rights14; the extent
of the protection granted to digital fences and the effects on access to information has
been criticised15; the loss of the exhaustion doctrine lamented; and the effect of the
database legislation in the EU and UCITA in the US derided. Proposals have been made
by legislators and criticised by commentators; the legislation once passed has been
criticised again by commentators. The critics have not managed to stall the process, and
if they have failed at this stage, it will be almost impossible to reverse the measures that
have been passed, to return to a more balanced approach for the protection of creative
works.
12 For there to be any chance of people in developing countries taking advantage of the Internet there will
have to be substantial investment. OECD chiefwarns against creation ofdigital divide. Speaking at the
Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development's (OECD) Forum 2000 in Paris, Ignazio
Visco, chief economist at the OECD, has warned that the digital divide between information-rich countries
and their technologically under-developed counterparts is set to widen.
http://www.qlinks.net/items/qlitem7856.htm.
13 ibid.
14 Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap "Licenses 1995, 68 S California Law Review 1239. Nimmer, The
Metamorphosis ofContract into Expand 1999, 87 California Law Review 17. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and
Contract Lawfor the InformationAge 1999, 87 California Law Review 1. Lemley, Beyond Pre-emption The Federal
Law and Policy ofIntellectual Property Licensing 1999, 87 California Law Review 111.
15 Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the DigitalMillennium 1999, 23 Columbia VLA Journal of Law and the
Arts 137 on the fact that it is an offence to circumvent the controls. It has been argued that the provisions
of the DCMA have been drafted as a result of 'high rhetoric, exaggerated claims, andpowerpoliticsfrom
representatives ofcertain established butfrightened copyright industries' in Samuelson Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention "Regulations Need to Be Revised' 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, p
519. Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors 1997.
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/foucault.htm.
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To this end, and having accepted the march of progress, other writers have sought to
limit, in the public interest, the legislative measures that have been put in place16. In
other words, what has been legislated is accepted, but ways in which the worst excesses
of the exercise of rights could be controlled are considered17. This is particularly so in
the US, where theories about abuse of rights and copyright misuse doctrine have been
analysed18 to see how these might be used to control the exercise of 'copyright' in the
digital era.19. Copyright misuse doctrines in this context result in copyright being
unenforceable if the copyright owner has engaged in certain reprehensible acts in
connection with licensing or enforcement. So, for instance, in Lasercomb v Reynolds,2® a
US court held that a licensor's anti-competitive clauses in its standard licensing
agreement constituted misuse of copyright, and that defence was available to those who
were not parties to the standard licensing agreement. Again in the US, 'misuse of
copyright' was found in an attempt to extend copyright beyond its boundaries by a
plaintiff who was attempting to use copyright to obtain a patent-like monopoly over
unpatented microprocessor cards21. Other writers have argued that on the grounds of
public policy copyright might not be enforced22 and in the UK this defence has been
used as a means to exert some control23. However, in Hyde Park Residence Rid v Yelland 24,
the Court ofAppeal determined that if copyright was not to be enforced on the grounds
of public policy, then the circumstances must arise from the nature of the work itself:
for instance, it must be immoral25. Certainly the scope of this public interest defence
16 See generally also Contracts and Copyright Exemptions Imprimatur Institute for Information Law Amsterdam
December 1997 ISBN 90-74243-11-8 p21.
17 For a comment on types of controls to be found in a number of EU countries see Guibault, Pre-emption
Issues in the DigitalEnvironment: Can Copyright limitations be Overridden by ContractualAgreements Under European
Eaw? in Grosheide and Boele-Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: Europees Privaatrecht 1998.
18 Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Re-emergence ofMisappropriation and Other Common Eaw Theories of
Protectionfor Intellectual Property 11 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 401.
19 Useful as such comment might be, neither have a significant foothold in common law jurisdictions
Dworkin, judicial Control ofCopyright on Public Policy Grounds in Intellectual Property and Information Law
Essays in Honour ofH Jehoram. Kabel and Mom eds Kluwer 1998 pl37.
20 Easercomb America Inc v Reynolds 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
nDSC Communications v DGI Technologies 81 F 3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
22 Dworkin ibid citing Glyn v Weston Feature Films [1916] 1 Ch 261 and AG v Guardian (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER
652. CDPA s 171(3).
23 In the UK the public policy controls on copyright are limited, and have been described as an 'unruly horse'
which should only be mounted in exceptional circumstances. Dworkin, Judicial Control ofCopyright on Public
Policy Grounds ibid at 147.
24 [2000] TLR 104 (CA). 104. The Court of Appeal also held that there was no public interest defence
separate from that of public policy, and that where an act was found not to be fair dealing, then a public
interest defence would not be upheld. But see Ashdown infra.
25 One writer has suggested starting again, and defining a new paradigm of copyright control based on what
people really believe copyright to be all about Litman, Copyright as aMyth 1991, 53 University of Pittsburgh
Law Review 235 discussing view that copyright law is counterintuitive to authorship process.
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appears to have been widened in Ashdown v Daily Telegraph26, although the parameters
remain opaque.
Despite the rather uncertain boundaries, these suggestions are useful in their own way,
and do represent a recognition that limits should be placed on the enforceability of
copyright. But each tends to take a piecemeal approach, and in their application to the
Internet problems can be foreseen. The theories concentrate on those circumstances in
which copyright will not be enforced. If applied to the Internet, the work itselfmay still
be protected by a digital fence. So even if copyright were not enforceable, the work
would not thereby be 'liberated'. The owner might simply place the work behind a
digital fence and control access and use by way of these technical protections and
contract. Any 'user rights', such as they are, may then not be applicable in this context.
The owner might therefore have more, and not less, control over the work27. Given
these shortcomings, it would be preferable to focus on encouraging the public domain
within the framework that has developed at international and national level.
The justifications for protecting creative works when disseminated over the Internet
appear to have moved a long way from the original theories supporting the protection of
such works. As suggested, what seems to have happened is that copyright law and the
development and expansion of the Internet itself have become synonymous. The train
of thought seems to run: if the Internet is to reach its full potential, creative works
disseminated over the Internet must be adequately protected, because without such
protection rights holders in particular will be reluctant to participate in the development
of the Internet. Without the participation of these players, so the utility of the Internet
will be reduced. Therefore, the general development of the Internet depends on creative
works being adequately protected. Perhaps recognising this argument, and wishing the
Internet to evolve to provide more than a distribution method for creative works, a new
theory, the Social Planning theory, is developing which takes account of this debate.
26 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, [2001] 3 WLR 1368. See chapter 6 fn 40.
27 If the work was placed on the Internet without authorisation, then presumably copyright could not be
used to chase further reproduction. In this, the owner might be disadvantaged.
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2.2 Social Planning theory28
Broadly, those who adhere to this theory see the current debate between those who
regard expressive works as commodities, and those who argue that new technologies
render copyright irrelevant, as a debate that is more suited to the historical function of
copyright than to the ownership and exploitation of property rights in creative works on
the Internet. The social planning theorists advocate, as an alternative, a democratic
paradigm under which copyright is an important tool which can help to shape political
and social discourse on the Internet29. The theory paints a picture of 'ajust and attractive
culture'. Property rights can help to foster, and to achieve this aim. Such a culture is one
in which citizens have access to a wide array of information ideas and forms of
entertainment: there is also access to a broad range of intellectual products for self-
determination and self-expression: and a rich artistic tradition is positively nurtured to
allow its members opportunities for creativity and subtlety in communication and
thought. The availability of such a diversity of materials engenders a culture which
enables its citizens to participate in decision-making at all levels, and thus enhances the
democratic character of society as a whole30.
This theory takes into account the origins of the Internet, and the hopes that many have
as to what it can do for all the participants. The argument is that the Internet is a special
place. Because of its origins, because it is not owned by anyone, and because of the main
guiding philosophy at conception, that it would facilitate the exchange of information
and views, so it should be treated as a place apart, and rules developed accordingly.
None of those who adhere to this view argue that controls should be absent. Rather, the
controls should be different. Thus, some control over creative material is essential
because some property rights are necessary for self-determination in any society. But the
question remains as to what control and how that should be exercised?31 Because, in
common with other philosophies, this theory rests on subjective criteria32, there is no
pre-determined answer to any of the difficult questions that arise in relation to the extent
28 Fisher, Theories ofIntellectual Property in New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property, Munzer
ed. Cambridge University Press 2001. Ch 6.
29 Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society 1996,106 Yale Law Journal 283.
10 Ibid.
31 Fisher, Property and Contract on the Internet 1998, 73 Chi.-Kent. Law Review 1203 at 1216 asks: What are the
features ofajust and attractive culture? The difficulty ofanswering that question is, I think, theprincipal reason the method
has notgained more adherents'.
32 For a resume of these theories, see the discussion in chapter 1 of this study.
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of the control that should be exerted, or be capable of being exerted, over creative
works. If one of the aims is to ensure that there is unhindered social discourse, this
should call for a public domain, unhampered by property rights of copyright owners.
This might include limitations that do not in substance look much different from those
found in the terrestrial world, such as the fair dealing limitations, and the
ideas/expression dichotomy.
A further problem with the theory (as with others), is that it is possible to mould
elements to suit individual aims. One writer33 has drawn together a number of features
that would contribute to this society, one ofwhich is respect. This feature, he argues,
means that society should grant and protect the right of attribution: where an author has
created a work, that act should be recognised. Equally, an author should not be credited
with having produced a work, when that is not the case. These arguments accord with
moral right obligations under the Berne Convention. However, the writer goes on to
argue that that this is the extent to which moral rights, as currendy understood, should be
protected. An author should not be permitted to object to mutilation of a work (the
right of integrity). This is because re-use of a work in a just society is more important
than the ability of the author to control such re-use. This argument is typical of the
views held by many who adhere to the Anglo-American tradition, most notably those
from the US34. A supporter ofmoral rights from the Civilian tradition might equally
argue that the right of integrity, a natural right, is essential for self-determination and self-
expression, another, seemingly equally important aspect of the same theory.
There are other elements to the theory that raise difficult questions, and potential
conflict. It has been argued that rights over intellectual creations are in some way
necessary for sovereignty, security and privacy35. 'Some sovereignty over a range ofpersonal
possessions is essential to dignity56' even to the extent that 'these cannot bejustified'. The
European Convention on Human Rights also gives individuals certain fundamental
human rights, such as the right to privacy and freedom of expression. If care is not taken
with the extent of the grant of property rights in intellectual products, so it is argued,
33 Fisher, Theories ofIntellectualProperty ibid .
34 For a resume of these arguments, see the discussion on moral rights in chapter 1.
35 Justifying Intellectual Property 1989 Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 at 45.
36 Dworkin, Uberalism in Public and Private Morality ed. Cambridge University Press 1978 at 139.
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these human rights may be infringed37. But there is no answer as to which should prevail
- copyright or the human right - in the event of conflict. For example, if property rights
are granted to protect privacy, that could also encourage censorship and deter free
speech - a problem that has been discussed in previous chapters38.
The expression of the theory, unhindered access to these 'free elements', is similar in
substance to the theory that argues for the liberation of the global commons which
stems in part from the teachings of Locke. In chapter 1, Locke's justifications for the
grant of property rights in creative products were discussed. His theory, that mixing
labour with elements in the commons made the resultant product capable of ownership,
has proved to be influential in both the Anglo-American and Civilian systems. However,
in Locke's view there were limitations on what could be owned as a result of this mix of
labour with raw materials. He considered that, after the appropriation of material from
the commons, there must be enough and as good left in common for others 39, and no
more material than can be used should be taken from the commons40. In other words,
you cannot appropriate all the raw materials and leave nothing for others to build upon
in the future. His theory did elaborate on what should be left in the commons.
However, the traditional limitations on the property right examined over the last chapters
have ensured that the commons exist as a pool from which authors can draw41.
But what of the commons, or the 'global commons', on the Internet? The content of the
global commons has been debated in the international trade arena42 in response to the
growth of world international trade and investment. The benefits to be gained from this
growth have been questioned by environmentalists and other pressure groups who see
37 EU Legal Advisory Board paper: The LAB notes with concern that considerations ofinformationalprivacy and
freedom ofexpression and information arepractically absentfrom the Green Paper. The LAB wishes to underline that these
are basicfreedoms expresslyprotected by Articles 8 and 10 ofthe European Convention on Human Rights and thereforepart
ofEC Law. In the opinion ofthe LAB these extent and scope ofthese rights are clearly at stake, if the economic rights
ofright holders is to be extended or interpreted to include acts ofintermediate transmission and reproduction, as well as acts of
private viewing and use ofinformation'. ECHR Article 10 was considered in Church ofSpiritual Tech v Spaink No
961160 Summary judgement of the President of the District court of the Hague March 12 1996. The court
found that the defendant did not violate Dutch copyright law by quoting in a web page a church of
Scientology document and thus that the court did not need to decide whether the defendants action was
protected by ECHR Article 10.
38 It is interesting to note that kiAshdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, [2001] 3 WLR
1368 one of the arguments used to justify the use of the work was that it was fair and in the interests of a
democratic society. See the discussion in chapter 6 of this study.
39 Locke, Second Treatise Chap 5 sec 27.
40 Locke ibid sec 31.
41 See also Spector, An Outline ofa Theory Justifying Intellectual and IndustrialProperty Rights [1989] 8 EIPR 270 at
272.
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themselves as 'guardians of the commons43'. The global commons, they argue, contains
all those non-exclusive goods held in common by the collective population of the planet
where private ownership is not feasible44. The goods include such things as the air that
we breath, biological diversity, and 'knowledge' such as the theorem of Pythagoras.
These are goods that have tangible impact on the quality of human life and on which
society places positive value. In order to maximise societal value, one should neither
assign property rights in these goods, nor trade them as if they were private commodities.
In addition public goods are free because they are non-rivalrous. Use by one does not
deplete the good available for use by another. In relation to creative works, the actual
content of the global commons appears not to have been defined45. There appears to
have been no debate on the topic during any part of any legislative process. As with the
'free elements' suggested by the Social Planning theory, the contents of a global
commons may not look too different from the public domain as understood in the
terrestrial world.
In seeking to justify the public domain, the Social Planning theory clearly draws on the
approach first taken by Locke. A point of convergence is that 'free places' must be
available for the collective good. Both theories appear to be premised on the basis that
access can be gained to raw materials. That, on the Internet, may depend on overcoming
digital fences. A core difficulty for both is that it appears digital fences cannot be
configured to allow for access for justified or agreed purposes46 without giving free
access to the whole work. This is just the result that copyright owners have been
resisting, and the reason why the development of technological controls and legal
protection for those controls discussed over the previous chapters have been developing
apace.
Discussion on underlying theories for the existence and development of any law or set of
laws is vital for the law-making process. A view that the need for any particular law or
area of law is 'self-evident', leads to the inevitable question: why?47 But simply because
42 Boyle, The Politics ofIntellectualProperty: Environmentalismfor the Net? 1997, 47 Duke LawJournal 87.
43 Graham NationalTreatment ofForeign Investment: Exceptions and Conditions 31 Cornell Int'l Law Journal 566.
44 ibid at 599.
45 But see the oblique reference to Intellectual Property Rights in Nye, Navigation in the InternetAge
Financial Times 3 February 2000.
46 Stefik ,.Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and DigitalProperty Rights Challenge us to Rethink Digital
Publishing 1997, 12 Berkeley Technology Lawjournal 137.
47 McCarthy, The Rights ofPublicity and Privacy New York: C. Boardman, 1992, Section 1.1 [B] [2], describes
the right of publicity as: 'a self-evident legal right, needing little intellectual rationalisation tojustify its existence'. at 1-5.
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any one theory cannot supply an overarching justification for orderly development of the
law does not mean that the theories are without value. Developing the law based on one
theory or another can provide attractive solutions to problems that might arise. But
perhaps more importandy theory can supply a reason for the development with a
particular end goal in mind. Currendy, as regards authorship, it would appear that not
one of the theories pays particular heed to this element of the literary process. Each
does in its own way (apart perhaps from the most extreme form of the economic theory)
take cognisance of the author, the intermediary, and the public interest, and tries to
balance each of these. In this there seems to be the implicit assumption that the author
needs materials from which to create afresh. It is perhaps Locke who has come the
closest to recognising this factor, when he argued that as much and as good needs to be
left in the commons for others to use48. The public domain and its contribution to
authorship has been discussed over the last four chapters, and it has been argued that the
developments of the digital age have tipped the balance in favour of the intermediary. It
is true that the interests of the author to earn an economic return from existing works
have also been of concern to regulators and legislators, and through a combination of
digital fences and licensing controls, this factor can be enforced. In addition, the public
interest in having a variety ofworks available at a reasonable price would seem satisfied:
because expansive consumer markets become accessible to publishers, and because
dissemination can be controlled, so prices to the consumer could fall. But, as has been
stressed in this study, the consumer, the existing author and the intermediary do not
share all of the interests of the would-be author. That author needs those elements in
the public domain for authorship: it is this element of the copyright framework that is
most under threat. For an author, access to and use of existing creative works is
essential.
3. The access problem.
In the Nil Report, it was argued that strong rights for the protection of creative works
were needed in order to ensure that the public could have 'unrestricted use ofthe ideas and
information they convey49'. But by granting increased property rights over creative works,
and validating the means to protect access to them, unrestricted use is a long way from the
48 For a discussion on Locke's theories, see chapter 1 of this study.
49 Discussed in chapter 3 of this study.
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reality. Use ofworks is not unrestricted because access to the underlying work can be
controlled.
The access problem has three main aspects. The first is the ability (or right) of a
copyright owner to refuse access. The second concerns the price of access. The third is
that access might be subject to contractual controls which do not recognise the
limitations on the right of the copyright owner to control use of parts of that work which
fall into the public domain50.
3.1 Access: publication vs confidentiality
One tension, highlighted in chapter 4 of this study, is that which arises between
'publication' of a work on the Internet, and claims of confidentiality. Normally, when a
work is published in the terrestrial world, that work is public and a tangible copy exists.
Despite the definitions in the WCT, which refer to 'making a work available' and
'communication to the public'51, a work, when made available on the Internet, may not
be public, or published, in the sense traditionally understood in association with the law
of copyright. Equally, no hard copy of that work may exist. A copyright holder or
database maker may refuse access to a work on the grounds that it is confidential. This
would appear to be at the heart of the arguments made by those who seek legal
protection of digital fences. Works placed behind those fences are 'confidential' and no-
one has the right to break into a lockfast place in order to steal those secrets52. This is
despite the fact that a 'public' distribution system, the Internet, is used for the
dissemination of those works.
The question arises as to when it might be possible to demand access to a work that has
been placed on a server because it has been made available to the public, or when access
to a work can be refused, at any price, because that work is confidential. Not all works
should be subject to mandatory access. There may be genuinely confidential information
made available to a limited number of people. But some thought must be given to the
50 Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property US House of Representatives Executive Summary of
Statement of the Nation's Libraries on HR 2441 Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995 Feb 8 1996: 'instead
ofsociety's currently balanced regime ofshared information resources. ...a new, commerciallygroundedphilosophy will 'trump'
the CopyrightAct and all information, no matter how small the unit, can and will be licensed or otherwise accessed only
pursuant to contract' p573.
51 WCT Article 8.
52 See the discussion in chapter 4 of this study.
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boundaries between publication and confidentiality, lest spurious claims of confidentiality
arise which may have more to do with censorship or anti-competitive practices.
In the quest for an appropriate standard, the wording of the TRIPS Agreement might
provide some assistance. On the one hand it is recognised in that Agreement that anti¬
competitive practices could result from the protection of intellectual properly. The
Preamble states care should be taken to ensure: 'that measures andprocedures to enforce
intellectualproperty rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade54'. However, the
Agreement also recognises that genuinely confidential information should be protected.
In this respect, confidential information is that which:
a. is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in theprecise configuration and assembly of its
components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal
with the kind ofinformation in question
b. has commercial value because it is secret; and
c. has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by theperson lawfully in control ofthe
information, to keep it secret54.
This standard might suggest itself as an appropriate starting point when considering what
information to be found on the Internet is genuinely confidential. There is the advantage
that TRIPS is an international agreement, and already has many signatories, so something
of an international accord has been attained. However, it cannot provide a complete
answer, particularly when the wording of paragraph (c). is considered. A copyright
owner could argue that 'reasonable steps' consist of placing the work behind the controls
facilitated by a digital fence. In which case, all works might be considered confidential.
The first two paragraphs would, however, allow those who prepare confidential company
reports, for example, to argue that they are genuinely confidential.
Other guidelines could be suggested. For instance, if a work made available on the
Internet can be accessed by any person, albeit in return for a price, that should be
regarded as published. But such a simple test would no doubt be open to manipulation.
For instance, if the teachings of a religious sect were available at a price, other conditions
may be placed on accessibility, such as membership of a named organisation. Or the
price might be paid in some way that was not directly related to accessing the work, for
instance membership dues of a club.
53 TRIPS Agreement Preamble.
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Another way might be to require the owner of the work to make a decision as to whether
the work is to be protected by copyright, prior to it being made available over the
Internet. If it is, then the work is to be regarded as being published when placed on that
server, and thus subject to the public domain obligations that the law of copyright has
imposed, at least historically. The copyright owner would then be able to rely on the law
of copyright to control further dissemination of that work. If the owner elects instead
that the work should be confidential, and thus not subject to mandatory access, then the
copyright limitations would not apply. The advantage for the provider of that work
would be that access could not be insisted upon. However, if the work becomes publicly
available, the owner would have to rely on the laws of breach of confidence and contract
to chase unauthorised reproductions of that work.
The answers to the question as to when a work should be regarded as published, and
when an owner should successfully be able to claim that it is confidential, are far from
clear. However, courts in the various jurisdictions, when faced with these questions,
should remain alive to the potential abuses that could be wrought if excessive claims of
confidentiality were successful. Not only may censorship and anti-competitive practices
result, but elements of the public domain, in particular the fair dealing limitations would
be jeopardised still further.
3.2 Access: refusal to supply
Even if a work is not deemed to be confidential, the copyright owner might still refuse to
supply it to a third party (as opposed to refuse to give access to the work). Where works
are not rendered exclusive by virtue of their being under the control of one entity, then
the refusal to supply is unlikely to cause problems. For instance, if the question is
whether a recording of a particular piece of classical music will not be supplied by one
record publisher, then a recording of the same piece of music may be obtained from
another. Alternatively, a recording of a different piece of music might be chosen. In
other words, there is cross-elasticity in the market for the particular work. However,
where refusal to supply could become problematic is when information, perhaps factual
information, is both created and held by one entity, and that entity refuses to supply that
54 TRIPS Agreement Article 39.2.
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information to a third party. In British Horseracing Board Ltd and others v William Hill
Organisation limited?5 the information that William Hill sought to use may not have been
created by the British Horseracing Board, but that was the central repository for it. The
question of refusal to supply did not in this case arise, but if it had, then competition law
may have been called upon to provide an appropriate remedy for the bookmakers
because of the difficulties of obtaining that information elsewhere.
The refusal to supply works protected by copyright did arise and was considered by
competition law authorities in the EC in the judgement of the European Court ofJustice
in Magill.56 In this case, the court had to tackle the question of the refusal to license
listings of forthcoming television programmes protected by copyright. Three TV
broadcasting companies, RTE, BBC and ITP, refused to license the information
contained in their television listings for publication in a comprehensive TV guide which
Magill wished to develop for the newer market. On appeal to the Court of First Instance
in Europe, that court found that the TV companies were in a dominant position on the
market for TV listings by virtue of their factual monopoly over information on which the
programmes were based. The refusal to supply in such circumstances was an abuse
under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome57. The remedy was to license the listings at an
appropriate rate58
On appeal, the ECJ found that the exclusive right of reproduction is part of the author's
rights. Thus, a refusal to grant a licence even by a firm in a dominant position cannot in
itself constitute abuse of a dominant position. However, in exceptional circumstances,
the exercise of an exclusive right may amount to abusive conduct. In Magill, three
factors made these exceptional circumstances:
1. there was no actual or potential substitute for a weekly guide offering listings for the
coming week
2. there was no objective justification for the refusal to supply
55 55[2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 12; [2001] R.P.C. 31. For a discussion on this case see chapters 1 and 6 of this study.
56 RTE and ITP v EC Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718, [1995] FSR 530.
57 Now Article 82 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
58 During the course of judgement by the Court of First Instance, that court discussed the 'essentialfunction'
of copyright, which is to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for creative effort while
respecting the aims ofArticle 86. Case [1991] ECR 11-485.
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3. the TV companies reserved to themselves the secondary market for listings by
excluding competition and denying access to the necessary basic information. They had
a de facto monopoly on one market consisting of an essential facility59
However, there may be limitations to the supply of copyright works that can be
demanded. Firstly, the work in Magill consisted of fact-based information. The low level
of originality required to attract copyright protection meant that these listings were
protected by copyright. Where works under consideration exhibit a greater degree of
originality, a court may be more circumspect about granting compulsory licences 60. In
addition, where fact-based information is not in question, there may be products that can
be substituted for the work under consideration. The second possible limiting factor is
that by exercising copyright in this manner, the television companies prevented a new
market from being exploited. Magill wanted to sell weekly listings of television
programmes, rather than limit the dissemination of the information to daily listings.
Finally, the power exercised over the listings by the television companies was ancillary to
their main activity, broadcasting61. Where the copyright owner engages in its primary
market area, the exploitation of creative works, then the courts may be far less willing to
require supply of those works against the wishes of the owner, as that is exactly the type
ofmonopoly that copyright is designed to give.
To keep in step with these guidelines, some database makers may adjust their behaviour
so that they do not refuse to supply substantial parts of the contents of the database:
particularly where the information is fact-based. But it is not clear how much more
useful the ruling is. In particular, for authors seeking random access, wishing to copy
insubstantial parts of works, glean ideas, or exercise one of the fair dealing limitations,
competition law may not prove to be so useful.
The courts in the US have shown themselves equally willing to apply competition law to
monopolies and monopolistic practices which involve copyright. The recent (and
ongoing) Microsoft case is an example62. In this case, one of the problems the court in the
US had to address was Microsoft's refusal to allow their competitors access to the source
59 For a discussion on the potential implications see Anderman, EC Competition Eaw and IntellectualProperty
Rights. The Regulation ofInnovation Clarendon Press Oxford 1998 p211.
6(1 Ibid.
61 Cornish, IntellectualProperty para 18-16.
62 United Sates ofAmerica vMicrosoft Corporation Civil Action No 98-1232 (TPJ).
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code of their operating system and certain application systems. Having found that
Microsoft occupied a dominant position, which it had abused, one of the orders made by
the judge was that communication interfaces, technical information and application
programming interfaces should be disclosed to competitors63. These parts of the
computer programs developed by Microsoft are protected by copyright. Despite reverse
engineering of computer programs in the US being fair use64, Microsoft had argued that
these interfaces comprised trade secrets.
As with Magill, the case concerned information that could be considered factual rather
than creative, despite the fact that it is protected by the law of copyright. Witholding
publication of, or access to, a creative work is one of the prerogatives of an owner of
copyright. How far a court would go in mandating access and supply in relation to more
creative works, or to authors, against the wishes of a copyright owner remains to be
tested.
3.3 Access: refusal of access
A copyright owner might refuse access to a creative work disseminated over the Internet
on the grounds that the work is confidential. This problem has been discussed above.
Where claims of confidentiality do not arise, and refusal to supply is not in question,
refusal of access to creative works might not pose too much of a problem, especially
where access is sought to products disseminated by the entertainment industries. Many
copyright owners will have made, and packaged, products specifically for the purpose of
as wide a dissemination as possible. The question for the author then becomes one of
price of access, and what it is that is being paid for.
3.4 Access: open access, but not free access
The emerging theories for the grant of property rights in creative works over the Internet
do appear to call for access to those works. The purpose of access may be re-use of the
works in the creation of others, or it may be to ensure that a wide variety of stimuli are
Final judgement at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/judgement/ms-fmal2.html
63 Ibid note 2.b.
230
available to promote a just and attractive culture. The theories which support a global
commons also call for access to those parts of works which cannot be owned. Both of
these appear to be premised on the assumption that such access will be free.
In the main, access to works protected by copyright has never been free in the sense in
that at some point, a payment has to be made. If a book is borrowed, the person from
whom it is obtained will have already paid the book store for the copy of that book65. If
a copy of an article from a journal is made, for the purposes of research and private
study, the library will already have paid for the copy of the journal. The publisher of a
book may have to deposit a number of copies with the National Library of Scotland and
other copyright libraries, and thus make them available to be consulted by others. But
the library is already paid for through public funding. In many countries, private copying
is funded through a levy on the price of the blank tape or CD66. Exhibition in public
galleries is supported through public funding, and an entrance fee may have to be paid.
The BBC is funded though the television license fee. Cable or satellite television
depends on subscription charges. An entry fee may be required for a cinema or theatre.
Operators of web sites who stream music may have to pay a fee for that service67. Those
who rent a work are likely to have to pay for the privilege68. Whatever payment is made
might be immediate, in the sense of having to hand over cash, or further removed, in the
sense of being supported by taxes, or spread out over a longer term, as paying tire
license fee for the BBC in instalments. In each case a payment is required. Why should
it be different for works disseminated over the Internet?
MSony Computer Entertainment Inc. v Connectix Corporation 203 F.3d 596, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1744, 53
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705.
65 Lessig, Code and Other Caws ofCyberspace New York Basic Books 1999 pl39. Today, whenyou buy a book,you
may do any number of things with it. You can read it once or 100 times. You can lend it to afriend. You can Xeroxpages in
it or scan it intoyour computer. You can burn it, use it as apaper weight oryou can sell it. You can store it onyour shelfand
never once open it'.
66 French Intellectual Property Code Book III Tide 1. In the US payment has to be made on all digital
home recording devices. Audio Home Recording Act 1992 USC 17 Chapter 10.
Recording Industry Ass'n ofAmerica Inc. v DiamondMultimedia Sys Inc. 29 F Supp 2d 624.
67 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 17 USC ss 106(6) and 114 and Digital
Millennium Copyright Act 1998. See generally Spaulding, Copyright Protection ofMusic on theMove
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/mp3/. UMG Recordings Inc vMP3.com Inc US District Court, SDNY (RakoffJ),
4 May 2000, and the discussion in chapter 1 of this study.
68 For the position in the EU see EC Directive on Rental, Lending and Related Rights 92/100. UK law
gives rental and lending rights in literary, dramatic, musical and most artistic works, films and sound
recordings. CDPA s 18A. Rental is the temporary provision of copies for direct or indirect economic or
commercial advantage' on terms that they will or may be returned. Thus electronic provision is excluded.
Cornish IntellectualProperty para 11.28.
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The concept of 'paying to read', which is what the right to charge for access appears to
amount to, sits uncomfortably with the public domain and the global commons and the
inhibiting effect this could have on authorship. It does, in essence, represent a shift in
the cost to be paid at some point, but in so doing it becomes a 'per use' or 'per idea' cost
rather than a 'per copy'cost69. For the consumer this is not a problem, but perhaps
critically, for the author, the cost may represent a charge for access to and use of the
public domain.
In the terrestrial world, images, sounds, text, pictures, and other material bombard us all
the time. These make authorship possible. These images are imbibed, shared,
developed, and new works created which further enrich the public domain. If each time
a researcher wanted to access and read an article that might be important for the ideas
that it contains, a payment were required, how many researchers would actually be able
to afford to read and research widely? If an historical novelist in search of facts for a
forthcoming book had to pay for each hit on a web site that might contain relevant
information, and equally might not, how deep and far reaching would that research be?
If a new band in search of inspiration for a new song had to pay to have music streamed,
how much would the band afford to be able to listen to? And if an artist wanted
inspiration from other painters, but had to pay in order to view each and every image,
how much inspiration might she be able to afford? Having to pay to read does not
facilitate random access. In addition, because making a work available over the Internet,
and any subsequent copying of that work involves different rights, a charge could be
made for each use of the work. Making the work available on the server could be subject
to a charge. Making a temporary reproduction could be subject to a charge.
Downloading a work could be subject to a charge. Any further copying could be
chargeable. These charges involve metering those parts of the work that historically have
been considered to be in the public domain. Further, because the exhaustion doctrine
does not operate in relation to works disseminated over the Internet, it amounts to
metering the public domain each and every time it might be accessed. It matters because
increased rights have been made available for rights holders in connection with digital
dissemination of works over the Internet. A new and very different business model is
developing for the dissemination of creative works over the Internet whereby access is
controlled, and use licensed. In this, the public interest in the form of the economic
69 See Spoor, The CopyrightApproach to Copying on the Internet In the Future of Copyright in the Digital
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return for authors and rights holders, together with the interest in ensuring that there are
a variety ofworks available, are met. That part of the public interest not met is the part
that requires raw materials to be available for future creation: in other words, the needs
of would-be authors.
Free access to surf, and listen to, works on the Internet (those which are not genuinely
confidential) would, at a stroke, solve the problems of subjecting the public domain to
charging, and ensure that those elements were freely available. Those who were not
prepared to allow such free access would not undertake the cost of putting material on
the Internet, and then close off access. But mandating for free access is not a viable
option. Consider the news and information gathering company, Reuters70. That
company recendy announced the intention to develop the Internet side of their business
by making available information over the Internet, by e-mail and on their web site. If
Reuters were obliged to make this information available for all to read, they would not be
able to receive a return on their investment71. And that will be true of countless other
companies. If payment to view cannot be obtained, then it is possible (although not
necessarily the case) that information gathering and dissemination will be reduced 72. As
one commentator has noted: Ho suppose that [the uncalculating exchange ofideas] .. will supplant
the needfor informational, educational and entertainmentmaterial which isgenerated upon the
expectation ofa market return is the stuffofdreams'
Others have argued that free access is a misnomer, and that access has never been free.
The right holder has always been able to control access through such mechanisms as
limited print runs of a particular work. In addition, the extent to which any individual
work can be accessed and used by individuals depends on their being relatively closely
Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p67.
70 http://www.reuters.com.
71 One could try and make distinctions in the mode of delivery of the information. For instance, there
would be no obligation to give free access to information sent in e-mails - only to information on web sites.
But this exercise which seeks to concentrate on technology specific solutions would soon be surpassed by
advances in technology, which might render any such distinctions otiose. This writer is not advocating that
information in e-mails should be free for all to read. Rather the argument is that if you want to raise
distinctions on such things as 'push' or 'pull' technology (one of the differences between e-mails and web
sites) then you have to be very sure that the technology will remain the same. Information gatherers might
otherwise be tempted to call a web site an e-mail. Technology develops far to fast for technology specific
solutions.
72 Sherwood Edwards, The Redundancy ofOriginality 1994, IIC Vol 25 658 at p670 arguing that the refusal to
grant property rights in facts results in fewer new facts being collected and made available on the market.
On the other hand it may lead to wider dissemination of what is already there.
73 Cornish, IntellectualProperty para 9-44.
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connected74. In relation to the former point, limiting a print run has undoubtedly more
to do with keeping prices high, rather than controlling access. In relation to the latter,
this may be quite true. However that control in the non-Internet world has never been
perfect: control in the Internet era is in danger of becoming just that.
3.4.1 Self regulatory solutions
But if open free access cannot be mandated, it can at least be encouraged to develop and
be maintained. To this end, there are a number of strategies that could be pursued.
Self-regulation might be one option. The Internet has had a long history of self-
regulatory solutions to legal and practical problems that have been encountered. Flame
wars, prevalent in Usenet news groups, are one example. When discussion in a news
group becomes heated, these tirades are controlled by 'Netiquette', a form of social
pressure developed by the users of these groups to control the behaviour of others to the
satisfaction of all75.
Self-regulation directed towards open access is one that has been openly pursued on the
Internet in relation to software. Partly in response to the hold that Microsoft has over the
market for software, the Internet community has been developing the 'Open Source
Movement'76. This movement is premised on the basis that the source code of computer
software should be freely available and freely modifiable77. This broadly means that all
third parties are free to develop the software, but any developments to that software, in
turn, have to be made freely available and modifiable. What is interesting is that the
movement does use copyright and contractual solutions to achieve this aim and which
are an essential factor in keeping the software free78. Thus, one of the best known parts
74 Brennan, 'Locksmiths and Safecrackers in Cyberspace 2000, Digital Technology Law Journal Vol. 2 No 1
http://wwwlaw.murdoch.edu.au/dtlj/index.html.
75 Quittner, johnny Manhattan Meets the Furry MuckersWIRED March 1994 at 92.
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/muds.html.. Lessig Code and other Laws ofCyberspace ibid.
ppl07-109. Dibble, A Rape in Cyberspace The Village Voice 23 December 1993.
76 http://www.opensource.org. For a general overview of the open source movement see Wallich, The Best
Things in Cyberspace are Free Scientific America March 1999.
77 For the arguments in favour of the open source movement see Operebs, The Open Source Definition in
Open Source: Voices From the Open Source Revolution. DiBona, Ockman, Stone eds.O'Reilly and
Associates Inc 1999.
78 Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the
ImplicationsforArticle 2B 1999, 36 Houston Law Review 179.
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of this movement 'GNU'79 requires all those who want to participate in the project to
attach a licence to the program they work on. This licence does not place the material in
the public domain as such, but rather provides that any one who wishes to distribute or
use a program under the GNU project must distribute it along with terms stating that a
user has the freedom to ran the program for any purpose, to modify the program to suit
whatever needs arise, to redistribute copies, and modified versions of the program. The
purpose of insisting on the use of these conditions is to ensure that ownership of the
work that is carried out on making improvements cannot be 'captured' by commercial
interests. Thus using copyright (or copyleft as it has been termed80) in this way ensures
that it reverts to one of its original goals: the dissemination of creative works.
A similar model used to encourage free access to works protected by copyright is being
promoted at the Berkman Centre at Harvard University81. A coalition called 'copyright's
commons' has been set up with the aim of invigorating the public domain through a
number of projects, including one to ensure free access to creative works disseminated
on the Internet. The campaigners encourage authors and right holders to place the
symbol [cc] on their works. To do so invites others to use and build upon these works.
However, one difficulty with this particular campaign might he with the licence that the
coalition appears to be encouraging authors to grant to others.
Ifyouplace a [cc] icon at the end ofjour work,you signal to others thatyou are allowing them
to use, modify, edit, adapt and redistribute the work thatyou have created'.
There is no explicit limitation to redistribution for non-commercial purposes in this
licence. But perhaps more tellingly, no author from a Civil law system, nor any author
who values the integrity of a work, would sign up to this provision. The grant by the
author is even in excess ofwhat authors from the Anglo-American systems are used to.
Perhaps the [cc] campaign might encourage adherents if this 'licence' were modified to
provide that a [cc] at the end of the work signified that an author was encouraging others
to use the ideas incorporated in the work; to review and criticise the work: to parody the
work; or to use the work in the course of research, study and teaching. But it was not
79 GNU was apparently chosen following a hacker tradition, as a 'recursive acronym' for: 'GNU's Not
Unix.' http://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html.
80 The term 'copyleft' is used by Richard Stallman, one of the founders of the Open Source Movement to




authorising mutilation of work; nor to pass it off as your own; nor to distribute it
commercially. Despite these limitations, the open source and [cc] campaigns make
valuable contributions to access problems.
Governmental and international support of these campaigns could assist in promoting
awareness. Such support might be granted in the form of Government or internationally
approved Charter marks (much like the Investors in People Standard)82. Those who
supplied free access would receive public recognition. Such public recognition might
also raise the visibility of web sites and therefore might well be of interest to right
holders. Recent research shows that although the number ofweb pages grows
exponentially, surfers concentrate on a fairly small number of well established web sites,
such as Yahoo! and AOL.com. So attaining visibility in the market place is difficult. If
web sites gained accreditation, this might help them in their quest83.
3.4.2 Government-sponsored information
Governments themselves could have an important role in ensuring that at least some
works are freely available on the Internet, and from which elements of the public domain
can be taken. A number have developed, and are developing such repositories. For
instance the UK Government has an active programme to ensure there is a vast
repository of information available on-line particularly directed at school-age children.
This type of initiative is certainly not free, in the sense that it is paid for through public
taxes. Flowever, the benefit for many is that the charge is not immediate. In addition,
not every use, and each taking from the public domain is metered, nor perhaps, limited
by contract. The content is, however, dictated by Government policy. In this, it may not
provide the materials the author seeks.
82 One example of a State backed campaign to encourage retailers to be trustworthy in the interests of
consumers is the one run by Which?, the consumers magazine. Which? gives a seal of approval to online
retailers who agree to protect consumer privacy, ensure that payments are secure, disclose sufficient details
to let consumers make an informed buying decision, and allow customers to cancel orders.
83 One could envisage tax policy being used in creative ways to encourage free access to the public domain.
See Abbott, The WTO TripsAgreement and Global Economic Development Chicago Kent Law Review Vol. 72:385
1996 discussing an IPR related tax policy and arguing that: It is also worth noting that IPR's based taxes might be
used in the OECD countries to balance the rights ofIPR holders and the public', p 402.
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3.4.3 Libraries
Public libraries, where the cost is absorbed by the state purse, may be able to fulfil the
function of facilitating random access. Public libraries have historically fulfilled the role
of providing access to creative works for those who might not otherwise be able to
afford it. However, suggestions that public libraries should fulfil this role are met with
litde enthusiasm. Perhaps this is because it overrides the philosophy of the Internet.
The great advancement of the medium is that it has always been seen as a method of
communication that is available to all, no matter where or who you are. It spreads
information wherever it goes on a many-to-many basis. To argue that its benefits can
only be realised by visiting a public library negates those advantages.
How public libraries may fulfil their role in relation to digital works has been considered
in the Copyright Directive. As discussed in chapter 5, exceptions to the 'making
available to the public' and communication to the public' rights for the purpose of
research and private study may be made on: 'dedicated terminals on thepremises of[public
libraries]'. But this only applies to: 'works or other subject matter not subject to purchase or licensing
terms which are contained in their collections'. This does raise the spectre of copyright owners
providing, by contract, that works should not be made so available. Purchasing or
licensing terms may provide that these works are not to be made available in this manner;
or that they are not to be subject to the research and private study exemption.
Multiple charging, for each and every access to a work, and for each taking from the
public domain, might be affected by Recital 24bis of the Copyright Directive, which
provides:
In certain cases ofexceptions, rightholders should receivefair compensation to compensate them
adequatelyfor the use made oftheirprotected works or other subject matter. When determining
theform, modalities andpossible level ofsuchfair compensation, account should be taken ofthe
particular circumstances ofeach case. When evaluating these circumstances, a valuable criterion
would be thepossible harm to the rightholders resultingfrom the act in question. In cases where
rightholders have already receivedpayment in some otherform, for instance aspart ofa license
fee, no specific or separate payment may be due. The level ofair compensation should takefull
account ofthe degree ofuse of technologicalprotection measures referred to in this Directive. In
certain situations where theprejudice to the rightholder would be minimal, no obligationfor
payment may arise.
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This recital would appear to hold out the possibility of limiting the number of times that
payment may be required for accessing works available on terminals in public libraries.
Thus, an author who wished to extract a substantial part of a work for the purposes of
criticism or review might be able to do so without paying (or having a payment made)
over and above what has been already been paid by the library to license the material.
But how such a provision could be legislated for is far from clear. Governments do
regulate prices to final consumers, but normally only when the service supplied is in the
form of a monopoly. For instance, before competition was opened up in the markets for
gas and electricity, the price paid by consumers was set by a government-imposed
formula. The regulation was considered necessary because the industry was in transition
from a government-owned monopoly to a freely competitive marketplace. As the
market moves further towards a competitive state, so the regulatory interference
decreases. Governments do not regulate prices in the free market, although domestic
and regional competition policy might have an effect on both excessive and predatory
pricing84, but only at the margins, and where a supplier is abusing a dominant position85,
or a cartel has formed86. If the terms and prices offered to libraries are part of a licensing
scheme operated by a collecting society87, then the bodies set up to have oversight of
such schemes88 might be best placed to consider the terms of this Recital. However, it is
far from clear whether collecting societies will have a role to play in the licensing of
works offered over the Internet. Publishers and other intermediaries might prefer to
disseminate their own content.
In addition, it is not only the creative works found in libraries that are used for
authorship, and authorship is not limited to those who patronise public libraries in search
of inspiration. Take music composers. Libraries may operate lending schemes whereby
recordings of works may be borrowed. But will EMI make those recordings that are to
be released only on the Internet available to public libraries? Other sources of
information may not be available from libraries, for example the service provided by
Reuters. There appears to be no obligation on owners to make available web sites on
these dedicated terminals. In any event, the budgets of libraries may not extend to the
costs involved.
84 Anderman, EC Competition Eaw and Intellectual Property Rights. The Regulation ofInnovation ibid.
85 Treaty of Rome Article 82 (formerly Article 86).
86 ibidArticle 81 (formerly Article 85) In addition, competition law aimed at cartels deals with agreements
between two or more economic undertakings, rather than an economic undertaking and a consumer.
87 For example the UK Copyright Licensing Agency, http://www.cla.co.uk
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Public libraries have and will continue to have a vital role to play in the availability of
creative works in the digital era. However, they cannot provide a complete answer to the
access problems under discussion.
3.4.4 Market forces
At present, there are a number of high-profile companies which supply free access to
users on the Internet. This might suggest that market forces will ensure that there is a
wide variety of works freely available. Dorling Kindersley89 and Encyclopaedia
Britannica90 are examples91. Dorling Kindersley has complete books available for
viewing on line for no charge. One suspects that the intention is that surfers will not
want to read everything from a screen, only enough to know that they want to buy the
hard copy. Encyclopaedia Britannica have moved over the years from a model where
they sold books in hard copy, to providing the encyclopaedia on CD Rom, then to a fee-
based usage for access to the encyclopaedia on the Internet, and finally to free access on
the Internet92.
However, events might just overwhelm right holders. Internet companies which own
creative works are currently losing money on their Internet ventures. Revenue for these
companies depends on a variety of different sources, such as advertising and telephone
charges. However, the model for both of these is changing. There are only a finite
number of advertisers interested in publicity on the Internet, and it has been said that
70% of advertising revenue is directed towards 10% ofweb sites93. There is not
sufficient advertising to go around all the developing web sites to keep businesses viable.
Web site owners have also depended for income on a proportion of the telephone
88 In the UK the Copyright Tribunal CDPA si 49.
89 http://www.dk.com
90 http://www.britannica.com.
91 There are many others. For instance the Austlii site providing free access to a database of Australian
acts, case law etc. However, not everyone is interested in the law!
92 The Economist has cited this as a model of how a company can decline in the digital world. Viewed
from the perspective of the free flow of ideas it is an excellent model. Interestingly, the Economist has
recendy placed back and current copies of the magazine on the Internet, for free.
http://www.qlinks.net/items/qhtem7555.htm.
93 Financial Times 11 March 2000.
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charge made for access to the Internet94. But in many jurisdictions, telephone charges
are dropping as wider and more affordable access to the Internet is sought. Thus this
source of income is diminishing. Almost no Internet company has yet made a profit, and
indeed many are turning in substantial losses. At some point this bubble has to burst95.
The shareholders of these companies, who have invested millions, are going to want to
see a return. The most obvious way in which that return can be obtained is to charge for
access to and for the exercise of each and every protected act. And once one right
holder starts to charge, so a sea change in attitude might follow. Charging might become
the norm rather than the exception96. Music publishers, in particular, in response to the
perceived and actual threats posed by free dissemination as practised by Napster, are
increasing their efforts to find a workable business model which will allow for Internet
distribution ofworks, while at the same time permitting charging for use of the works97.
Some might argue that, despite the attendant difficulties for authorship, charging for
access is the only feasible solution. After all, the Internet now offers unparalleled access
to information. The quid pro quo may now be that copyright owners can enforce and
charge for rights they (should) have always had. Everyone should pay a litde no matter
what the work is to be used for, rather than a smaller number paying more. This could
be 'use-facilitating' rather than the opposite98. But such an argument really avoids the
point. First, copyright has never been purely about market failure. Rather it pursues a
far wider range of public policy goals as discussed in chapter 2. Second, with the loss of
the exhaustion doctrine on the Internet and consequential licensing, every taking from
the public domain (to the extent that the public domain remains) can be metered.
Charges and restrictions are placed on material not owned by the copyright owner and
which should circulate at least relatively freely. Third, as has already been argued, this
view is valid in balancing the interests between the author, the intermediary and the user,
when the user is a consumer. When the user is the would-be author, the justification loses
94 For a discussion see Carlyle, 1Segal Regulation ofTelecommunications: The Impact on Internet Services in Regulating
the Internet in Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce Edwards and Waelde eds. Hart
2000.
95 Given the hiatus in the financial markets for internet related stock, it would appear that it already has.
Consider the collapse of shares in dot com companies over the last two years.
96 A new publishing web site has been set up Inside.com, an online magazine covering the media industry.
A subscription is required of $19.95 per month. Financial Times 23/5/00.
97 Napster, closed since July 2001 and subsequently taken over by Vivendi. As discussed in chapter 1 it is
apparently set to open 'early in 2002' with a new fee paying service.
98 For the views of the Librarian of Congress in the US see chapter 4 of this study.
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its appeal. But in the absence of this essential balance, the question then is, how much
will access cost?
4. The price of access
Copyright owners argue that, once fully automated systems are available, and they are
reliable, then it will be possible to give open access to those wishing to view or listen to
the work". The argument is premised on open access, not free access100. As regards the
price of that access, there are a number of forces that might combine to keep it low, or
negligible.
4.1 Let the market sort it out
One response to the price for access question is that it will not be an issue. It is in the
interests of copyright owners to have their work accessed, and in order to reach as wide
an audience as possible, so the price of access to the work will be kept reasonable. In
addition, competition in the marketplace for creative works disseminated over the
Internet will mean that prices will be kept low. Such competition may come, not only
from competitors in the market place, but also from works made available through
public funding, such as libraries, and Government information services. So long as these
are kept free, and other copyright owners and database makers are competing with these
services, so those in the private market place will be forced to keep prices low.
In addition, because the Internet offers wide distribution, and holds out the possibility of
charging for many and varied uses, these factors could combine to ensure that many
people will each pay a little towards the costs of producing creative works, rather than
more being paid by fewer participants in a limited market. Some economists go
further101 and argue that, because there is substitutability across works protected by
copyright, so demand curves would be flat. This in turn would force content providers
99 Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment
Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 pi 39.
100 See Dommering, Copyright Being WashedAway in The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment
Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p 10 where he argues that 'the multimedia network requires a different approach and
the development ofcriteriaforfree use'.
101 Harvard Law Review Association Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defence: The Role ofAntitrust Standards and
FirstAmendment Values 1991, 104 Harv Law Review 1289. 'Thefact that copyrightprevents.. .worksfrom being
copied does not mean that authors and composers enjoy marketpoweri.
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to push access costs back towards marginal costs102. Price discrimination might be
possible:
'"Expanded controlmay increase theprivate cost ofreading, viewing and listening to authors'
expression to such an extent that, in some cases andfor somepeople access becomesprohibitively
expensive. [But] digital technology may makepossible highly refinedprice discrimination that
could, in theory, alleviate thisproblem'"'3.
But it is exacdy this price discrimination that can partition markets, both between
different markets and within the same market. With the disappearance of the exhaustion
doctrine, there is nothing to stop the rights holder from charging discriminatory prices
for equivalent digitised services. Unless they occupy a dominant position, or have a
relevant market share and have entered into some form of cartel, there is nothing that
competition law could do to prevent such behaviour.
Further, it is perhaps just those works that are valuable for authorship which will
ultimately prove to be the most lucrative for publishers able to charge prices totally
unrelated to economic incentive. One example might be the journal 'Nature' published
by MacMillan. This journal is essential reading for researchers and teachers in the
science and medicine professions. An individual subscription costs around £400 per
journal. A site licence for a University for one year can cost up to £8000, depending on
the numbers of staff and students within that University104. If the University decides to
take the electronic subscription (which includes one hard copy) and to drop all other
hard copy subscriptions (around 10), the price to the University has doubled, although
for that year access to the publication within the University may be significandy
enhanced. The licence, however, only lasts for one year. If at the end of that year the
University finds that it can no longer afford the price of access, which could be
significantly increased by the publisher, not only does it not have access to the electronic
version, but neither does it have the hard copies that used to adorn the shelves. The
library can, of course, refuse to take an on-line subscription. However, in these
circumstances, the benefits of the digital age are denied to just that interest group that
copyright is designed to support. Price discrimination in these circumstances may be
102 Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine 1988, 101 Harvard Law Review 1659. The degrees of market
power enjoyed by copyright holders vary considerably.
103 Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society 106 Yale Law Journal 283 at 295
104 Information received from electronic licensing division of the main library at the University of
Edinburgh.
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possible allowing the library to be charged what it can afford, but here it leaves the
uncomfortable feeling that the producer is exploiting the de facto dominant position that
it holds in relation to that particular digitised product. This scenario has echoes of the
views put forward by Lord Camden in Donaldson v Beckett va 1774, who argued against the
introduction of a property right in literary works: 'All our learning will be locked up in the
Hands ofthe Tonsons and the Hintots ofthe Age, who will set what Price upon it theirAvarice chuses
to demand, 'till the Public become as much their Slaves, as their own Hackney Compilers are'"h. If the
reference to 'Public? were replaced by reference to the 'would-be author', then the same
concerns are apparent today.
4.2 Add-on services
Some content providers have moved to publishing entire works on the Internet, not for
free, but at or below the price that might be paid for a tangible copy. One example can
be found at www.onlineoriginals.com. In exchange for a fee this company will e-mail the
text, which can then be read, printed out, searched and indexed. However, the text may
not be distributed to a third party106. This company sells other services: for instance,
contributors and readers can participate in organised events and exchange e-mails.
Models such as this depend upon add-on services to keep readers interested, and paying
the fee. They are reminiscent to those suggested by Dyson: 'value shiftsfrom the
tranformation ofbits rather than bits themselves, to services, to the selection ofcontent, to thepresence of
otherpeople, and to the assurance ofauthenticity - reliable information about sources ofbits and their
futureflows. In short, intellectual assets andproperty depreciate while intellectualprocesses and services
appreciate. y07. The user pays, not just for tire product itself, but for the service provided by
the publisher. The cost of access to the creative work is kept relatively low, because the
user pays for the other services.
105 Quoted in Rose, The Author as Proprietor, in OfAuthors and Origins Sherman and Strowel eds. Clarendon
Press 1994 p 43.
106 This negates the exhaustion doctrine in relation to a tangible copy that the copyright owner has given
permission to be made. The argument presumably remains that no tangible copy ever changes hands
between the owner and the purchaser - what changes hands is a copy of a copy.
107 Dyson, Intellectual Value 1995 Wired 3:07. http://www.wired.eom/wired/archive/3.07/dyson.html.
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4.3 Global compulsory licences
One suggestion that has started to emerge in some literature is that of an imposition of a
'royalty' on the purchase of hardware (such as a computer and modem) or levied by way
of access providers108. Such 'royalties' would be ingathered by collecting societies and
then distributed to their members. In this case, it would be all right holders whose work
was distributed on the Internet. The imposition of a royalty or levy on blank recording
media is used in a number of European countries109 but has so far been resisted in the
UK. Broadly, the levy is designed to cover private copying of audio and audio visual
works, very little taping of which, it is said, could be justified as fair dealing for the
purposes of research and private study as that exemption does not cover sound
recording and film copyright110. Thus for those countries which do permit private
copying, the economic interests of the authors and right holders are protected by way of
the imposition of the royalty or levy on the recording media that makes such copying
possible, such as the video or cassette tape. However, the debate over such levy is far
from settled. Those who oppose the levy argue that these media are used for many
purposes other than copying of protected material, and that the levy represents little
more than a special interest tax111. Those who are in favour of it see it as representing no
more than the return to which the right holder and author is entitled.
However, in its potential application to the Internet, a number of factors should be
borne in mind. Firstly, in those countries where the levy applies, because it is put on to a
formal footing, so private copying is permitted, or at least tolerated. If a levy were to be
imposed on the hardware that makes up the Internet, then, by analogy, so private
copying should be tolerated. It is not at all clear, and perhaps unlikely, that private
copying would be in the contemplation of those who push this line of thought. Rather,
it appears that the levy would be to compensate those who lost revenue through the
unauthorised and unremunerated copying using facilities such as those provided by
Napster. There would thus be no direct benefit for those who paid the levy. Secondly, it
is notable that one of the advantages that right holders take from the Internet is the
108 See for example Fisher, DigitalMusic: Problems and Possibilities
http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/coursepages/tfisher/Music.html. Fisher considers the
matter of tax and royalty systems, but then seems to dismiss it.
109 For instance Germany, Austria and France. Kreile (1992) 23 IIC 449.
110 CDPA s 29(1) Cornish, IntellectualProperty para 13-19.
111 See generally Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest Max Planck Institute Germany 1994.
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making of individual licences. They are unlikely to want to give up the potential for such
control, and indeed individualised payment for specific uses in return for a blanket fee
that may bear no relation to underlying use112. Thirdly, the ability for individual right
holder control is significandy increased by the introduction of protection against the
circumvention of technical devices used to protect access to a work. Certainly,
unauthorised copying goes on and will no doubt continue. But, in the absence of the
right to make private copies because a levy is imposed, what that levy would in fact
amount to would be a tax on every purchaser of hardware designed to compensate right
holders for those who continued to make private copies but with no additional benefit to
themselves.
In light of the extensive framework that has been put into place to allow right holders to
disseminate works over the Internet, and to have control over payment for and use of
those works, it does not seem equitable that a compulsory levy be placed on those who
use the Internet for perfectly legitimate purposes113.
5. Terms of access and use of the work
Price of access to a creative work is not the only feature that may have an impact on the
accessibility of materials in the public domain. Over the previous chapters, both the
Copyright Directive and UCITA have been discussed in relation to the debate as to
whether it is possible, by contract, to limit the public domain. Neither instrument
resolves the question. The Copyright Directive would appear to imply that, in certain
circumstances concerning the exercise of at least some of the fair dealing limitations,
contract terms could alter the boundaries, or provide that fair dealing was not to be
exercised in conjunction with specific works. UCITA certainly has a section which
provides that copyright will pre-empt contract terms where those terms seek to extend
copyright. However, that at least some limits imposed by copyright can be altered is
112 Note Geller, Conflicts ofCaw in Cyberspace: International Copyright in a digitally Networked World in The
Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment Hugenholtz ed. Kluwer 1996 p 27, who argues that there is
no role for compulsory licences in relation to the Internet because it is possible to licence individually.
There is thus no economically justifiable reason for recourse to compulsory royalty rates since there need
be no absence of agreement as required by the Berne Convention Article 11 bis 2. Legal licences would
contravene normal modes of network exploitation. At p45.
113 As it is, purchasers of computers will be paying an uplift in price to meet the needs of rights holders.
Marks & Turnbull Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection ofTechnology, Taw and CommercialTicences [2000]
EIPR 198 who discuss the initiatives taken by right holders and equipment manufacturers in developing
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clear from the cases deciding that it is valid to use licence terms to control use of
information in the public domain. How far the exercise of the fair use limitations might
be so altered remains to be seen. Some might argue that contractual restrictions are
irrelevant. Once a work has been accessed, then those parts in the public domain can be
re-used by authors, no matter the terms of any contract governing use. In other words,
ignore the terms of the contract. But this would be to invite millions of users to flout the
terms of the bargain into which they have entered. Such a move sits uneasily with the
ideals of a 'just and attractive culture'.
It would be of great benefit to authors in the EU were the 'pre-emption' debate
foreclosed by including measures in national legislation to the effect that the limitations
and exceptions to be found in the Copyright Directive could not be limited by contract.
However, as can perhaps be appreciated from the discussion above, such a provision
would not avoid the debate as to what could then be included in a database, and thus be
subject to the database right. Neither would it solve the problems associated with the
possibility of a new term of copyright running from the point of digitisation. It would
also seem to run counter to the provisions of the Copyright Directive which appear to
envisage that such alteration by contract is permissible in at least some of the provisions.
The problems might be alleviated by introducing some over-arching legislation which
would make contract terms unenforceable if they were not considered to befair and
reasonable. EU and UK law have a history of introducing such measures, notably to
protect consumers in the market place faced with standard terms presented by a supplier,
and where there is no chance of the consumer negotiating the terms. Thus, in the UK,
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) and the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999114 (the 1999 Regulations) both impact on standard terms
used in consumer contracts where those terms are not considered to be fair and
reasonable in the case of the 1977 Act, or which is contrary to the requirement of good
faith in terms of the 1999 Regulations.
copy protection systems for hardware. It will ultimately be the consumer who pays for these
developments.
114 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations came into force on 1st July 1995. The 1999
Regulations came into force on 1st October 1999 implementing EU Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts and replace the 1995 Regulations.
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The 1977 Act has been the subject of litigation, although perhaps not quite as much as
might be expected in relation to standard forms to be found in consumer contracts.
Matters which have come before the courts include determination ofwhether a clause is
fair and reasonable by looking to the relative bargaining position of the parties115,
attempts at exclusion of implied terms as to quality and fitness for the purpose under
consumer legislation116, and exclusion of implied terms as to the quality of services
supplied117. The 1999 Regulations, being newer, have been subject to less judicial
scrutiny but were considered in Director General ofFair Trading v First National Hankplclw.
In order to show that a term is unfair under the regulations, three requirements must be
met. The first is to show the term is contrary to the requirement of good faith119; the
second is to show that the term causes a significant imbalance in the parties rights and
obligations arising under the contract; and the third is to show that it is to the detriment
of the consumer. Although the House of Lords reversed the judgement of the Court of
Appeal and found that the term in question was not unfair, the Court ofAppeal made
some interesting comments in relation to the test which were not expressly disproved of
by the higher court. Thus, in relation to the first part of the test, the Court ofAppeal
said: 'thegoodfaith element seeks to promotefair and open dealings and to prevent unfair surprise and
the absence ofreal choice....Terms must be reasonably transparent and should not operate to defeat the
reasonable expectations ofthe consumer.In relation to the second and third parts of the test
that court said: The element ofsignificant imbalance would appear to overlap substantially with that
ofthe absence ofgoodfaith. A term which gives a significant advantage to the seller or supplier without a
countervailing benefit to the consumer (such as aprice reduction) mightfail to satisfy thispart ofthe test
ofan unfair term'. As a more general principle, it was said that the notion of good faith
appears to reflect the notion of: 'playingfair, coming clear orputting one's cards upwards on the
table'120. It would appear from these tests that there is both a procedural and substantive
hurdle to overcome. This might suggest that the more procedurally fair a supplier has
been, the more likely it is that a term will be found to be substantively fair, and vice
versa. However, as discussed, these provisions relate to consumer contracts: the issue in
115 7-ealander v lading Homes Hid. (2000) 2 TCLR 724. The clause in question could have created a 'significant
imbalance' between the parties.
116 Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 14(3). See R&B Customs Brokers Co v United Dominions Trust [1988] 1 WLR
321.
117 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 ss7, 8, 9. Fry v First NationalLeasing Ltd. June 7 2000.
118 Director General ofFair Trading v First National Bank Tic [2001] UKHL 52 [2001] 3 W.L.R. 1297 [2002] 1
All E.R. 97 [2001] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1000 rev'g Court of Appeal [2000] 2 All ER 759 (a case on the 1994
Regulations).
119 1999 Regulations 5(1).
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this study is the would-be author. Whether the would-be author would fall within the
definition of a 'consumer' for the extra protective measures the legislation incorporates
must be open to doubt, as it is at least arguable that a would-be author who wishes to re¬
use a part of a work for the purposes of creation is not a consumer in relation to that
work121. One might nonetheless consider introducing protective legislation targeted
towards the would-be author by merely changing the word 'consumer' in the passage
quoted above, to 'would-be author', thus providing a similar tier of regulatory oversight
in relation to the standard form click-wrap contracts that will inevitably be used in
conjunction with digital dissemination of works protected by copyright. Would that then
give the would-be author the freedom needed to re-utilise those parts of the public
domain for authorship, even where a contract term limited such use? If terms limiting
use were buried in small print, or generally hard to find, in other words procedural
fairness was in question, then, as discussed, the terms may be considered unfair.
However, the reaction from the well-advised right holder would be to make the terms
limiting re-use absolutely transparent prior to permitting access to the work. In terms of
the above test, it is likely to be considered that such terms were substantively fair,
particularly where the right holder was doing no more than was permitted by the
Copyright Directive in any event.
Regulation of standard form contracts used in connection with the dissemination of
digital works will no doubt be important in many circumstances, even where it is a
would-be author, rather than a consumer, faced with non-negotiated terms122. Existing
measures to be found in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 also apply to standard
form contracts where the person dealing with the supplier is not a consumer. In these
circumstances the term must still be fair and reasonable123. So it might be that the right
120 Per Bingham LLJ in Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 348, 342 cited
with approval by the Court of Appeal in Director General ofFair Trading v FirstNational Bank ibid at 768-9.
121 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 12 provides that: A party to a contract "deals as consumer" in relation
to anotherparty if— (a) he neither makes the contract in the course ofa business nor holds himselfout as doing so; and
(b) the otherparty does make the contract in the course ofa business. Note that the section does not extend to
Scodand. See also The Chester Grosvenor Hotel Company Ltd vAlfredMcAlpine Management Ltd 56 Build LR 115
QBD. R eFB Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd /l988] 1 WLR 321
122 'Standard Form Contract' (Unfair Contract Terms Act s 17) has been considered in M'Crone v Boots Farm
Sales Limited 1981 SC 68. The term 'was wide enough to include any contract, whether wholly written orpartly oral,
which included a set offixed terms or conditions.'
123 Unfair Contract Terms Act s 17 provides: (1J Any term ofa contract which is a consumer contract or a standard
form contract shall have no effectfor thepurpose ofenabling a party to the contract - (a) who is in breach ofa contractual
obligation, to exclude or restrict any liability ofhis to the consumer or customer in respect ofthe breach; (b) in respect of
contractual obligation, to render no performance, or to render a performance substantially differentfrom that which the
consumer or customer reasonably expectedfrom the contract; ifit was notfair and reasonable to incorporate the term in the
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holder seeks to insert terms in the contract which alter the nature of the agreement
anticipated by the would-be author as customer. If this is so, then those terms must be
fair and reasonable. One might envisage a term which excluded liability for the quality of
the work disseminated, such that it could not be read or listened to, would be found not
to be fair and reasonable. By contrast, and in common with the points noted above, it
would be difficult to find a term limiting re-use of the work as being unfair and
unreasonable, especially where that is what appears to be permitted by the Copyright
Directive.
Historically copyright has not required any further tier of regulation in order to ensure re¬
use in line with fairness. Fairness, in the sense of balance, has been an integral part of
the law and there has been no need for further controls. It may well be argued that the
law as it will apply to digital reproduction retains that sense of balance which is true, at
least as far as it impacts on the right holder, the author and the consumer as user.
Where, however the impact is the greatest is on the would-be author as user. What is
really required is that the fairness, in the sense of balance that is required for the would-
be author to ply his trade, is reflected in the law itself. That is what copyright law has
always struggled to do, but that is the balance which has changed in the digital era, to the
detriment of authorship.
5.1 Intelligent digital fences
Content providers have always argued that digital fences cannot be configured to cope
with the public domain. Either access is given to a work, or it is not. However, the
pace of development in relation to the technical aspects of the Internet is quite startling,
and might be expected to continue in the foreseeable future. It is conceivable that
'intelligent' digital fences could be constructed to take account of uncertain boundaries
for example, of fair dealing. If so, then many of the difficulties that have characterised
the debate will be overcome. However, if such 'intelligent' digital fences are to develop,
then there need to be standards in place against which they can be measured. For
instance, no technology would be developed to allow access to a work for the purposes
of criticism and review, if such a rule were not in place, or if the rule could be limited by
contract. (2) In this section 'customer' means aparty to a standardform contract who deals on the basis ofwritten standard
terms ofbusiness ofthe otherparty to the contract who himselfdeals in the course ofa business.'
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contract. At present it would appear that any development of intelligent fences is
according to standards mandated by copyright owners:
'legislators should also look at copying opportunities that are inpractice being built into copy
protection structures under development. Technicalmeasures may be useful infacilitating certain
exceptions and limitations to the rights ofcontent owners. If this works out inpractice, then
there is little need toprovidefor exceptions to the general rule against circumvention ofsuch
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measures.
But this is perhaps unsurprising, given the highly equivocal stance that regulators have
taken towards the public domain. What is perhaps required is a greater commitment to a
free public domain on the Internet, and against that standard digital fences can be
developed. Thus the architecture that makes up the Internet can be developed against a
backdrop which both protects a work to ensure the financial incentive can be obtained
from use of that work, while at the same time ensuring that authors are able to make use
of the materials in the public domain125.
6. Summary
Access, and the price of access, to creative works and databases distributed over the
Internet, coupled with potential contractual restrictions on use, are the central, and most
difficult features relating to the dissemination of these works over the Internet. This is
particularly so if the Internet is to support a thriving public domain, and if authors are to
find and to be able to use the raw material necessary to create the next generation of
digital works. Digital fences can provide much needed protection for creative works,
allowing content providers to control distribution and reproduction. However, at
present digital fences appear only to be able to provide an all-or-nothing solution. They
can control access to and each use of a protected work. That means that access can be
denied or payments can be levied for each such step in a transaction. It appears that the
major control on whether and for what such charges will be levelled, and how much
those charges will be, is the free market. There are factors which can influence that
development, including both government-sponsored and self-regulatory moves to ensure
that access to some works is free. That in turn may help to keep the prices charged by
124 Marks and Turnbull ibid.
125 Lessig refers to this approach as building an architecture of cyberspace where the code (the law) is
reflected in the code (the software and other elements that make the Internet function) Lessig, Code and
other Caws ofCyberspace Basic Books (US) 1999.
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commercial operators low. Equally, the worst excesses of refusal to supply, or excessive
pricing, may be controlled by competition law. Questions also remain over the extent to
which the public domain can be altered by contract. This results at least in part from the
rather equivocal stance of legislators on this subject, spurred on by right holders keen to
ensure that their 'property rights' are not watered down. Measures could be taken at the
margins to ensure that in the interests ofwould-be authors such terms are reasonable.
However, the extent to which such measures might conflict with the approach taken in
the Copyright Directive which would appear to permit at least some elements of the
public domain, such as they remain, to be altered by contract is far from clear.
In this environment, authorship is going to become more difficult, or at least more
expensive. Charging for access and use, coupled with contractual restrictions, valid or





The intention behind this study has been to discover whether the development of the
law of copyright and its application in the digital era changes the balance between author,
intermediary and user to be found in the existing law of copyright. If it does, then the
second purpose was to assess the implications for the public domain, and in particular,
on the availability of raw materials for authorship.
The discussion in the last chapters has suggested that quite remarkable changes are
underway, both in the balance between the respective parties, and for the public domain.
It is the author who will be most affected. Not the existing author, but the future author
who depends on elements of the public domain for the raw materials necessary to create
new works. Those elements, which include the fair dealing limitations, the term of
protection of copyright, the ideas expression doctrine, and the exhaustion rule, each of
which has historically contributed to these raw materials, may no longer be freely
available, or exist, in relation to works disseminated over the Internet.
The preceding chapters have analysed how this will happen: from the creation and legal
protection of digital fences, through the imposition of contractual limitations on the
public domain, and through changes to the public domain itself, whether dejure or de
facto. Each move represents a small shift in favour of the current copyright owner.
Taken together, they represent a profound transfer away from a framework in which the
law of copyright supports a thriving public domain, to a situation where the intermediary
may be able to control, monitor, and charge for every access to, and use of, existing
creative works. That includes those parts in the public domain, to the extent that the
public domain remains.
Not all commentators view these changes with alarm: a number of arguments underlie
the ease with which the changes are accepted. Firstly, many point to the still unrivalled
potential of the Internet as a means of global communication and information
dissemination. For these benefits, some drawbacks have to be accepted. Among those
drawbacks is that the public domain can no longer be free, nor freely available. This
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view might, in part, be based on the assumption that there will always be at least some
'street corners' on the Internet over which right holders do not seek to exert control. In
addition, market forces will act to keep down prices for access and use, while terms and
conditions on which works can be accessed and used will be reasonable, and the public
interest will require works to be made available through such institutions as public
libraries. Those who take this view may also agree with the right holders (most notably
those from the Anglo-American traditions) who argue that intellectual products are
property, no more and no less. In other words, it accepts the theory that copyright is
historically, and currently, capable of explanation in terms of market failure.
In reply to this view, it has been suggested that both private and public controls on
pricing and terms may not be as effective as one might hope, and that market forces
might just conspire to privatise most spaces in part due to the economic difficulties
facing Internet participants seeking to obtain a financial return from Internet content.
But perhaps more importandy, market failure is not a sufficient explanation for the
historical development of copyright, where various forces have, over the years,
determined the shape of the law. To concentrate on market failure as a justification for
increased control over the dissemination of creative works over the Internet is to ignore
the public policy and social aspects that have historically characterised the development
of this branch of the law: that copyright owners should bear some limitation on
economic incentives they derive from property rights in order to further other policy
goals within society. In particular, these limitations are necessary to ensure that future
generations of authors are able to create new works. This policy factor has been lost
sight of during the legislative process, where an observer obtains the impression that any
concessions for authors arise rather as a result of barter than principled development. If
the implications of these changes could be confined solely to the consumer market, then
a market failure approach might be justifiable. A financial return has to be obtained
from the dissemination ofworks, or they will not be created. But the changes affect far
more than the consumer market. This study has been about the public domain providing
the raw materials necessary for authorship: in this, authors and consumers are two
different bodies with different needs.
There is no doubt that policy in relation to any area of law shifts over time to reflect
changing values within society. It has not been the intention to state, nor has the
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argument been made in this study that the balance is immutable. One policy factor over
the years may take precedence over another, or one development favour one interest
group over another1. However, that is not an argument for losing sight of the fact that
copyright has always represented a balance, more or less, between the diverse groups.
To make the argument, as some do, that: '[rjathermore insight may arisefrom the observation
that it isgenerally considered socially desirableforpeople to be permitted to protect by their own means
what they create2\ completely ignores every argument for the subsistence of copyright from
the view that creative works, being an amalgam of what has come before, cannot be
owned in full, to the argument that has been the subject of this study, that free parts, or
at least a public domain, is essential for future creation.
The second view, related to that about market failure, is that copyright has in any event
had its day. Contract can now govern the relationships between the producers and users,
and what is required is some means to ensure that contract can cope with some of the
abuses that could be thrown at it by copyright owners. New or extended mechanisms
may need to be found to ensure contracts in standard form3 entered into between
suppliers and consumers are fair as between the parties4. But above that, it would be for
the parties to reach agreement on the terms of their bargain, including agreement over
payment for access to, and use of those parts ofworks in the public domain. The slot
left by copyright would be filled by contract, where the focus is on consumer protection,
rather than, as historically been the case, fulfilling the needs of the copyright owner in
preventing dissemination ofworks without consent. But this view seems to rest on the
assumption that it is the consumer market, and that market alone, that is affected by the
dissemination of works on the Internet. It gives little comfort to the future author
seeking to use the public domain in creating new works. There are others who recognise
that the future author merits attention, and to that end have suggested that as contract
and digital fences come to replace copyright on the Internet, then legislators would do
1 Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development ofan Access Right in US Copyright Law
Columbia Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No 8. For example,
when the photocopier was invented, this could be seen as favouring the user (infringer) over the right
holder.
2 Brennan, Eocksmiths and Safecrackers in Cyberspace 2000, Digital Technology Law Journal Vol 2 No .
http://wwwlaw.murdoch.edu.au/dtlj/index.html.
3 The majority of contracts entered into between the supplier and the consumer on the Internet will not
individually negotiated between the supplier and the consumer, but rather in standard form. The supplier
will offer the terms, and the consumer click on an 'I agree' icon, or arguably exhibit agreement merely by
proceeding into the site.
4 For a discussion on the controls on standard form contracts in the consumer market see chapter 9 of this
study.
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well to take care: 'to apply to these two substitutes the historical norms ofcopyright£. So, for
example, copyright has always recognised that there must be limitations on property
rights to ensure that there is sufficient in the commons for the creation of new works.
Thus, new rules of contract could be developed to reflect that norm: a new rule might
provide that it was not possible make those elements of creative works which are not
property rights the subject of contract, such as those parts of creative works which may
be used for the purposes of fair dealing. But such an approach would be bound to suffer
from the difficulties already encountered in deciding if, and when, the property limits on
copyright can be narrowed (or expanded) by contract whether as a result of the
Copyright Directive, or as a rule of domestic law. It seems also to reinvent copyright
under a different name: contract.
A further objection to copyright becoming contract is that an author who wants to use
elements in the public domain may be forced to ignore contractual restraints that have
been placed on this use. Even ifmany terms may be unenforceable by the copyright
owner once a web site is accessed, for instance that no part may be used for criticism and
review, or that no parts may be extracted and re-utilised, inviting authors to ignore a
bargain just because it cannot be enforced easily cannot be good policy. It has been
suggested that regulatory control could be introduced to provide a measure of oversight
ofwhat could, and what could not be included within the standard form contracts that
will be used in conjunction with the dissemination ofworks over the Internet, specifically
in relation to the effect of these clauses on would-be authors6. The inevitable
shortcoming of these proposals has also been highlighted. In so far as the oversight
concerned procedural matters, then there may be much to be gained. However, in so far
as substantive issues were concerned, it would appear that any such moves would run
counter to the majority of the provisions to be found in the Copyright Directive. The
result is that if clauses curtailing use are included, and fairly included in contracts, and
these are routinely ignored, the effect of the law is to encourage widespread flouting.
A further argument used by those who are sanguine about the disappearance of the
public domain is that, no matter the terms of the laws written to assist right holders in
their quest for perfect control, in particular those laws designed to protect digital fences,
there will always be ways in which the controls can be circumvented. But laws outlawing
3 Goldstein, Copyright and its Substitutes 1997 Wisconsin Law Review 865 p 871.
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circumvention have been written at the most stringent standard in the US, and that same
standard has been adopted in Europe. Would-be circumventors fight, not just with one,
but with two hands tied behind their backs. Any successful attempt, particularly where
entertainment products are implicated, may result in both civil and criminal charges
being brought against those who would circumvent these controls. This whether or not
a copy of the works is made, and whether any financial benefit derives from the
circumvention. The remarkable efforts by the entertainment industry to bring to heel
those allegedly responsible for writing and disseminating the code which can overcome
the circumvention controls in DVD's provides a good illustration of the lengths to which
that industry will go in protecting the integrity of digital fences7.
At the moment, it would appear to be the copyright owners and the content creators, in
particular through the entertainment industry, who are dictating the shape of legislation.
These factions would appear to be inviting legislators, users and authors alike to trust
them to ensure that the public domain does not disappear under a welter of digital fences
and contract restrictions. They are, in other words, dictating the accessibility and use of
the public domain.
Regulators, legislators and policy-makers would do well to take heed of these moves.
The wheels of the legislator grind slowly. The development of technology bounds ahead.
By the time the legislators and the law catch up, it may be too late. The Internet may be
stuffed with content hidden behind devices that will only respond in the way
programmed by, and at the behest of, the content providers. These may or may not
reflect the laws of the territories in which they are distributed. Content providers may or
may not be willing to pursue wider democratic policy objectives justifying the expansion
of the Internet, and allow 'free' access to works distributed behind those fences to certain
groups within society8. There is a hint that a few of those who have been involved in the
negotiation of the Copyright Directive might be aware of some of the worst excesses
that could result from implementing a programme aimed at the interests of current
content providers. The expansion of the 'fair dealing' limitations9, together with the
6 For discussion of these points see chapter 9 of this study.
7 For a comment on these problems, see the discussion in chapter 4 of this study.
8 Some content providers voluntarily allow free access to the content contained within their web sites to
certain interest groups. For instance, Smith Bernal provides free access to Casetrak for academics. For
other commercial subscribers, a fee is payable.
9 For a full discussion see chapter 5 of this study.
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proposals for the 'digital property trust', combine to suggest that regulators are alert to
the danger of the disappearing public domain.
One nagging problem does however remain arising from this study. It has been argued
that the public domain is essential for the creation of new works. Theories of copyright,
whether those which have been formulated at the inception of legislation in this area, or
the newer theories, all justify a public domain. Each system of legislation under scrutiny
in this study - the UK, the US and France - supports this to a greater or lesser degree.
But there appears to be no solution to the problem as to how access can be mandated
for the public domain encompassed within works made available over the Internet,
without making the whole of the work available. And if the whole of the work becomes
available, the copyright owner may be deprived of a justified financial return. Having
accepted the problems faced by content providers if their works are released on the
Internet without authorisation, and without the protection of a digital fences10, there are
strong arguments for encouraging the development of just such fences11. But having
accepted this, the focus remains on how the would-be author can obtain access to those
parts of the work behind the digital fences which lie in the public domain. At best, it
has been suggested that a programme could be implemented which might encourage free
access to creative works. At worst, it would appear that such access will remain at the
discretion of the content provider, with the price of such access subject to the vagaries of
the free market.
Only time will tell how serious fencing in and metering the public domain will actually be
for the creation of new works. But careful attention must be paid to the potential
problems for authorship. Perhaps, in the future, the public domain, historically
considered as limitations on or exceptions to private property, will come to be viewed as
true user rights12, or public property. It would be easier for an author seeking to gain
access to a work to use a property right to argue for that access, rather than to employ an
exception to some one else's13. This in turn requires an understanding of the importance
10 For a discussion of the problems, see chapter 2 of this study.
11 For a full discussion of digital fences, see chapter 4 of this study.
12 This is the terminology used by a number of writers. See eg. MacQueen, Copyright and the Internet in Law
and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce Edwards and Waelde Eds. Hart 2000.
13 Public domain in thefields ofliterature, drama, music and art is the other side of the coin ofcopyright. It is best defined in
negative terms. It lacks the privateproperty elementgranted under copyright in that there is no legal right to exclude others
from enjoying it and is free as the air to common use '.Krasilovsky, Observations on the Public Domain 1967, 14 Bull.
Copyright Soc'y 205.
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of the public domain to the production of new cultural, educational and scientific works.
To date, that appreciation appears to have been sorely lacking, particularly for regulators
and current content providers. It is perhaps only if the production of new works stalls,
or becomes prohibitively expensive for those same content providers who shout so
loudly for enhanced rights today, that it will be appreciated that the results of what has
been achieved to date are in no-one's long-term interests.
To this end, it is notable that many of the changes that have been made to copyright over
the past years have been in response to the fears of the right holders in the music
industry. Some litigation that has taken place was discussed in chapter 2 of this study,
and it certainly is the case that others apart from those in the music industry have been
involved. However, there is also no doubt that it is the music industry which has been
the most active and vocal in seeking to protect rights. It is music that is so ideally suited
to digital dissemination, and it is music that appeals to millions of Internet users. Right
holders may, or may not have been right to worry about their content. It is unlikely that
even time will tell whether the music-sharing facilities on the Internet have actually
decreased the financial return music companies might otherwise have expected. Who
knows whether Napster fanatics would actually have purchased a legitimate hard copy of
downloaded music14? However, as the capacity of the Internet expands, without
controls these and other entertainment products, such as videos and DVD's may well
have been increasingly copied and disseminated around the Internet. The entertainment
industry felt it could not afford to wait and find out if their market would actually have
suffered. The result has been the raft ofmeasures discussed over previous chapters. In
many ways, as has been argued, these moves are justified to protect products in the
entertainment industry where those products are sold to consumers. The great difficulty
is that the measures are applied indiscriminately to all digital works, no matter their form
or substance or potential use. Certainly, during the course of dissemination, one digital
bit must look much like another. Would there be any way to distinguish a bit that is a
musical note, and one that is a word on a page? One suspects not. Thus it might have
proved futile to try and build a framework where there was a true distinction between
14 A story in the Los Angeles Times discussed the effect of Napster on record sales. The article argues that
if the use of Napster diminished record sales, then sales should be up with Napster usage having
decreased. Apparently, record sales at that time were down as well. Some suggest that this demonstrates
that Napster helps record sales by exposing customers to new music.
http://www.latimes.eom/business/20010620/t000051058.html. Others might point to the fact that many
countries are currently in, or facing a recession.
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consumer products and those used for authorship, particularly literary works15. Certainly
the attempt was made in the Copyright Directive, with the fair dealing measures and the
digital property trust. Sadly, the regulators lost courage at the final hurdle, and bowed to
the pressure from the (music) industry, so that even they are now watered down to the
extent that, for the would-be author, they may prove to be of no practical assistance.
The entire framework now impacts on the digital dissemination of all works. In chapter
3 regulators were taken to task for not having engaged in any 'what if scenarios prior to
going down the path of increasing the strength of copyright and attendant rights for the
benefit of right holders. It was accepted that such an exercise might have been difficult
at the time, as many of the developments that have occurred since could not have been
foreseen. However, it would have needed only a little imagination to realise that what
was beneficial for the entertainment industry in general and the music industry in
particular might not be so appropriate for other creative works. With the development
of the framework that now supports the digital dissemination of creative works, it would
not have taken much to appreciate that in the final analysis it would be for the publisher
to set the price, and to determine whether or not restrictive terms on use are employed in
connection with that dissemination. A small step from there, and the terms themselves
might have been predicted, such as those which were found in conjunction with the first
release of the Adobe Acrobat eBook reader. Adobe licensed a number of digital works
for use with the reader. One was Alice 's Adventures in Wonderland, a book which is in the
public domain because the author, Lewis Carroll, died in 1898. The 'Permissions' that
accompanied the digital download of this book included the following:
Under the 'Copy' heading, thepermissions said: 'No text selections can be copiedfrom this
book to the clipboard.' Under Trint,' it indicated: Noprinting ispermitted on this book.'
Under Uend,' users were told: This book cannot be lent orgiven to someone else.' Under
'Give': This book cannot be given to someone else. 'Andfinally, under HeadAloud,' the
permissionspage asserted: This book cannot be read aloud'16.
In the copyright framework that has been erected for the digital age, there is almost
nothing but market forces that would prevent these types of terms being used by right
holders in conjunction with dissemination of all types ofworks. Bearing that in mind,
and as promised in the introduction to this study, a challenge follows for all those who
15 Lynch, The Battle to Define the Future ofthe Book in the Digital World. 2001, FirstMonday Vol 6, No. 6
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/current_issue/lynch/index.html.
16 These permissions are taken from an article by ~Lessig, Adobe in Wonderland The. Industry Standard March
19th 2001. http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,22914,00.html?body_page=l
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remain relaxed about the developing controls over access to and use of the public
domain.
The Internet, and access to and use of content found on the Internet has become an
indispensable part of academic life in Universities today. That holds true across the
disciplines to be found in these establishments. To take but one example. The
University of Edinburgh Department ofArchitecture, in conjunction with the University
of Middlesex Department ofArt, Design and Performing Arts, run an MSC in Design
and Digital Media. The home page, which can be found at
http://www.caad.ed.ac.uk/postgradstudy/MSc/, contains links to many projects
undertaken by the students who have taken the course over a number of years. Having
talked extensively to the students, the degree to which use is made of existing works both
in hard copy and digital form found on the Internet and elsewhere, is evident. Copyright
is clearly an issue for the students as well as the educators. All would like to work within
the confines of the existing law. However, imagine then a model which requires
payment for access to works which currently exist on the Internet, coupled with further
restrictions on the use which can be made of those works in the new creations by the
students, perhaps incorporating those terms found in conjunction with Adobe's digitised
Alice in Wonderland Even the briefest of glances at the work, should amply
illustrate that the framework that has been built for the control of dissemination of
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